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THE HOUSEHOLD DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN EUROPE 
by 
Guglielmo Wolleb 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This research studies the trends in, and causes of, 
inequality in the household distribution of income in a 
number of European countries. 
This research follows two previous studies by the 
European Federation for Economic Research devoted to changes 
in the "rapport salariai" in Europe and to Europe's place in 
the world economy.1 This present study focuses on Europe and 
emphasises the similarities in its economic and social 
structures, which make Europe a meaningful entity. It 
nevertheless identifies the important national differences 
which still exist between the various countries. Like the 
earlier reports, it centres on the systems of social and 
economic regulation, and within that the role of the family. 
The report is the collective work of a working group in 
which national papers were extensively discussed at various 
stages of drafting. 
The report consists of five national papers and an 
introduction which explains the basic theoretical concepts 
and summarises the main results in a framework of comparative 
analysis. 
The national papers follow a similar plan so as to 
enable common features and national characteristics of the 
household distribution of income and in its determining 
variables to be identified at European level. The opening 
chapter is devoted to an assessment of the degree and 
structure of inequality, and its evolution throughout the 
seventies and early eighties. The following chapter deals 
with the roles played by the welfare system, market forces 
and the family itself in producing changes in inequalities of 
distribution. A description is given of demographic and 
labour market trends and of their impact on the size and 
!. See R. Boyer, "La flexibilité du travail en Europe", 
Editions La Découverte, Paris, 1986 and F. Cripps and 
T. Ward, "Europe in the World Economy", mimeo, 1987, to 
appear in the Oxford University Press. 
composition of households. This is followed by an analysis 
of the various sources of inequality and of their relative 
importance. Inequalities arising from the structure of the 
family, relations with the labour market, social class, and 
geographical position are considered in turn. Finally, an 
attempt is made to identify those groups in the population or 
those types of household where these factors of inequality 
are likely to accumulate, causing situations of relative or 
absolute deprivation. 
In view of the wide statistical differences in household 
income, limiting both the comparison of different countries' 
experiences and the temporal comparison within each country, 
national reports include a statistical appendix where the 
definitions of the main concepts used in the paper are given 
and where the limits of available statistics are specified. 
However, the definitions of family and of income used in the 
various countries' reports are roughly similar. The 
definition of family coincides with the concept of household, 
which comprises persons living alone or groups of people 
living at the same address. As far as possible, the 
definition of income used is that of disposable income, 
including labour and capital income and social transfers 
after deducting social contributions and taxes. France is 
the only major exception, because its data source refers to 
taxable household revenues, which differ considerably from 
the above definition of disposable income. 
This introduction follows the same format as the 
national reports and is based on their contents. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
The choice of the household as a unit of analysis in the 
income distribution process draws upon a wide and inter-
disciplinary area of research. Such work concentrates on the 
role of the family within the economy, highlighting its links 
with the production system, and its position at the centre of 
the system of social reproduction. 
The family has been found to play a relevant role in 
determining labour supply, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, by taking decisions autonomously on 
participation rates and on its members' share of market and 
non-market activities. The quantity of labour supplied may 
vary in accordance with the specific needs of the family 
throughout its life-cycle, or in response to external 
economic events, while its composition is mainly dependent on 
the historically determined division of labour within the 
family. What is relevant is that, in regulating the labour 
supply, the family acts as a relatively autonomous decision-
making unit capable of evolving strategies conducive to its 
objectives. 
The family, moreover, performs the crucial, legally and 
culturally established role, of satisfying the needs of its 
members by means of solidarity in the use of all individual 
resources accruing to it. ^ The standard of living of 
individual members is therefore determined within the family 
and not on the level of their personal income. The 
responsibility for the satisfaction of basic individual needs 
has gradually been taken over by the State, at least for 
those needs which are recognised as a citizen's right. 
However this process has transformed, rather than reduced, 
the role of the family in the sphere of social reproduction 
for three ' main reasons. Firstly, because the total 
substitution of the family in some fundamental fields of 
activity, such as education, health and social security has 
proven to be impossible, especially in those instances where 
personal care is required. Secondly, because the growth of 
welfare provisions and of real consumption in general, has 
increased in line with the rise in the socially acceptable 
standard of living, necessitating continuous family 
intervention to fulfill increasing requirements. Thirdly, 
because the growth of the service sector, and of the welfare 
institutions in particular, extended the tasks of the family 
to cover the management of relations with all kinds of public 
and private bodies. 
The family's function in the productive sphere and in 
the system of social reproduction are of primary importance 
to our analysis of income distribution, which focuses on the 
actual standard of living of families. This standard of 
living depends on the total amount of available resources, of 
which income represents an important part,3 and on the needs 
of the family which can be roughly estimated by its size and 
composition.'* The funding of resources is clearly linked to 
2. The emphasis on the family as a decision-making unit 
and as a solid unit of consumption must not be confused with 
an implicit judgement on the degree of harmony and justice 
prevailing within the family. Important decisions can and in 
fact, are taken, by individual members of the household which 
conflict with the opinion of other members. The division of 
resources within the family may well be unfair. Ultimately, 
the relationship between family members is regulated by a 
variable and historically determined mix of solidarity and 
balance of power. 
. Needless to say, disposable income is only one of 
the available resources which determine the households' 
standard of living. Consideration of the other resources, 
which are covered extensively in economic and sociological 
literature, would certainly help in the assessment of living 
standards but would also make a single piece of research 
unmanageable. 
. This standardized treatment of human needs is 
extremely poor even though it is the only one of practical 
use for statistical analysis. Students and policy makers 
should, however, bear in mind the following remarks by 
the family's relation with the labour market which represents 
the main source of income for the household. The satisfaction 
of needs highlights the central position of the family 
because it is the common use of the family's resources which 
breaks the direct link between individual earnings and the 
standard of living of family members. Resources and needs 
are therefore the two poles of our inquiry on income 
distribution. The comparison between the two offers a 
criterium on which to assess the equality of a given 
distribution. 
In performing its functions in the productive sphere and 
in the system of social reproduction, the family does not act 
in isolation but interacts with the market forces and with 
the state in ways which are characterized by different 
mixtures of conflict and complementarity and which, in any 
case, induce a process of reciprocal adaptation. The 
family's action is therefore constrained by, and constrains 
in its turn, the contemporary working of these two 
socio-economic regulators. 
This focus on the interdependence of socio-economic 
processes can highlight complex relationships. An 
interesting example is the interrelated dynamics between the 
evolution of the welfare state,the increase in women's labour 
supply and changes in the composition of labour demand. 
The development of the welfare system has relieved women 
of some tasks related to social reproduction but on the same 
time the consensus which has accompanied the welfare system 
has been eased by the crucial support of family intervention 
in all those areas in which the welfare services were unable 
to satisfy the essential needs. These changes in the 
division of labour between state and family in the 
R. H. Tawney where the author not only recognizes the wide 
variety of human needs but recommends individual care for 
their satisfaction: "it is true, again, that human beings 
have, except as regards certain elementary, though still 
sadly neglected, matters of health and development different 
requirements, and that these different requirements can be 
met satisfactorily only by varying forms of provision. But 
equality of provision is not identity of provision. It is to 
be achieved, not by treating different needs in the same way, 
but by devoting equal care to ensuring that they are met in 
the different ways most appropriate to them " "The more 
anxiously, indeed, a society endeavours to secure equality of 
consideration for all its members, the greater will be the 
differentiation of treatment which, when once their common 
human needs have been met, it accords to the special needs of 
different groups and individuals among them ". 
See R. H. Tawney, "The Religion of Inequality", in 
A. B. Atkinson (ed.), "Wealth, Income & Inequality", Oxford 
University Press, 1980, extracts from R. H. Tawney, 
"Equality", Unwin Books, 1965. 
reproductive sphere affected the productive sphere as well. 
The growth of the welfare state favoured the growth of female 
activity rates both directly by means of employment creation 
in the welfare institutions and indirectly by means of a 
modification of women's tasks within the family. 
Developments in the productive sphere connected to the 
growth of the private service sector, the characteristics of 
technological innovation and the uncertainty of the economic 
perspectives, all resulted in a demand for labour which was 
flexible and cheap. This led to the growth of female 
employment and favoured the ongoing process of a change in 
the women's role within the family. 
This dynamic sequence demonstrates how socio-economic 
processes are never the result of the action of a single 
force or social actor, but the outcome of complex 
interrelations between different protagonists and between 
different spheres of activity. Moreover, differences in the 
experiences of various countries can be more easily 
understood by studying not only the specific peculiarities of 
a single socio-economic regulator, but also the different 
structure of relations and their different boundaries of 
action. As far as our analysis is concerned, we have 
identified the State, the Market, and the Family as the main 
protagonists in the income distribution process, and have 
attempted to assess their relative roles in relation to 
changes of income distribution over the last decade. 
However, it is beyond the scope of this study to develop a 
full analysis of each country's wage and welfare systems, and 
of their role in the socio-economic systems of regulation. 
3. POPULATION, LABOUR FORCE AND HOUSEHOLDS 
Demographic trends and changes in the composition of the 
labour force affect household income in a variety of ways. 
The age structure of the population, and the average 
size and age composition of the household, is affected by the 
birth and death rates. Changes in size and composition, 
affect household income and its power to satisfy household 
needs, both by means of changes in the number and type of 
potential earners, and by means of changes in the total 
number of people in the family. 
Changes in the sex and age structure of the labour force 
alters the composition of household income, which consists of 
the contributions from the husband, the married woman and the 
children. Changes in the process of income formation are, in 
turn, associated with changes in total household income, as 
the number of workers in the family varies. 
The composition of unemployed people according to age 
and sex also influences household income. Unemployment is a 
painful experience for everybody and it also has a negative 
affect on the level of household income. However, the 
onsequences on household income vary depending on which 
member of the family is unemployed: the husband whose income 
is generally the main monetary resource of the household, the 
wife whose income is relevant but less important, and the 
children whose contribution is not significant for the 
family's standard of living. 
Thus, the current trends in population, labour force and 
unemployment affect the overall distribution of income, by 
means of changes in the structure of households by size and 
composition; (households of different size and composition 
have different average incomes) and by means of changes in 
the relationship of each household with the labour market; 
(the number of workers and the sources of income change). 
The next section will therefore be devoted to a brief 
description of these trends over the last decade. 
Demographic trends in Europe, throughout the sixties and 
seventies, have been characterized by a fall in the birth and 
death rates, generally resulting in a slowing down of 
population growth, and in an ageing of the population. The 
intensity and timing of these phenomena, however, varied in 
different countries. 
Germany has been experiencing a period of negative 
growth since the seventies, while in the U.K. the population 
growth has been around zero; in Italy too, growth declined 
continuously throughout the seventies, and gave rise to 
modest positive rates in the early eighties. In France, 
after a decrease in the first half of the seventies, 
population growth stabilised around a positive annual rate of 
0.5% over the last ten years. Spain is the only country in 
which population in the seventies grew at a rate higher than 
in the sixties; however, since 1981 its population growth 
has halved. 
In all countries these demographic trends have produced 
a fall in the population aged under 14 and a modest or zero 
rise in the over 65s. The reduction in the youngest part of 
the population was particularly high in Germany and reflected 
a period of prolonged negative growth, while in Spain it was 
very low, due to the high birth rate in the seventies. In 
the early eighties the share of the under fourteens was 15% 
in Germany, around 20% in France, Italy and the U.K. and 25% 
in Spain. In all countries the share of the over 65s was 
around 15%, except in Spain, where it was slightly lower. As 
a result, the population of working age increased in all 
countries except Spain, where it remained stable. 
Demographic trends also contributed to a change in the 
size and composition of households. All countries have 
experienced a fall in the share of large families, due to a 
reduction in the number of children, and a significant 
increase in the one person households, partly due to the 
ageing of the population and the different average life 
expectancy of men and women. Spain is the only exception, 
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recording a similar household composition in 1971 and in 
1981. The average size of households has therefore decreased 
in all countries but still differs widely, being 
particularly low in Germany (2.3) and particularly high in 
Spain (3.7). (See Table 1) 
The composition of the labour force and unemployment by 
sex and age affects the household's relationship with the 
labour market and hence the household income. (See Table 2) 
Differences in the rate of activity between countries do 
not arise from differences in the male rate of activity, with 
the major exception of the U.K.. This homogeneity reflects 
the common role played by the male in European households as 
the main income earner. However, great differences arise, in 
female rates of activity, which range from a bottom value of 
33% in Spain to a top value of 58% in the U.K.. These 
disparities in relation to the labour market reveal profound 
differences between countries in the woman's role in the 
household and in her contribution to household income. 
TABLE 1 
AVERAGE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLDS 
1968 
FRANCE 3 .1 
1971 
UNITED KINGDOM 2.9 
1972 
GERMANY 2 . 7 
1971 
ITALY 3.3 
1971 
SPAIN 3.8 3.7 
A temporal comparison within each country shows that all 
countries have experienced a fall in the male rate of 
activity mostly due to a lengthening of the education period 
of young people, and to the increase in early retirement of 
older workers. Conversely, the female rate of activity, has 
increased in the U.K., in France and Italy, while it has 
remained stable in Germany and Spain. However, the stability 
of the overall female activity rate in Germany and Spain is 
the result of a contemporary fall in activity among the 
younger and older parts of the population of working age and 
of an increase in participation by the middle age-group. 
2.7 
1984 
2.6 
1985 
2.3 
1981 
3.0 
1981 
Despite the widely different starting levels in each country, 
a common trend, towards an increase in married women's 
participation, and in their contribution to household income 
exists in Europe. 
Large differences between countries can be observed in 
the composition of unemployment by sex and age. 
TABLE 2 
COMPOSITION OF LABOUR FORCE 
RA MRA FRA RU MU/TU FU/TU YU/T 
FRANCE 
1973 
1985 
67.6 
65.7 
86.3 
76.5 
48.7 
55.0 
2.6 
10.1 
37.0 
47.3 
63.0 
52.7 
24.5 
38.8 
U.K. 
1973 
1985 
72.9 
74.3 
93.0 
88.3 
53.1 
60. 1 
3.3 
11.3 
85.5 
69.1 
14.5 
30.9 
24.9 
38. 1 
GERMANY 
1973 
1985 
68.8 
65.2 
89.1 
79.9 
49.6 
50.4 
0.8 
8.6 
54.9 
55.9 
45.1 
44.1 
23.3 
26.2 
ITALY 
1973 
1985 
58.9 
59.7 
84.9 
79.2 
33.9 
40.8 
6.2 
10.5 
46.3 
43.2 
53.7 
56.8 
60.2 
59.6 
SPAIN 
1973 
1985 
61.4 
56. 1 
91.5 
78.7 
32.4 
33.6 
2.5 
21.4 
74.0 
64.2 
26.0 
35.8 
50.8 
47.7 
Source: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris 1987. 
RA: Rate of activity; MRA: Male rate of activity; FRA: 
female rate of activity; RU: rate of unemployment; MU/TU: 
male unemployment over local unemployment; FU/TU: female 
unemployment over total unemployment; YU/TU youth 
unemployment over total unemployment. 
Italy is an extreme case, where unemployment hits mainly 
women and young people, while the adult male is unlikely to 
experience a job loss. The U.K. is completely different, 
there male unemployment is higher than female unemployment 
and youth unemployment is less important than in most other 
European countries. This difference implies that in Italy 
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the fundamental component of household income is seldom put 
at risk, and that women and young people suffering from a 
lack of income are protected by the safety-net provided by 
the family. In the U.K., on the other hand, unemployment has 
a much more devastating effect, cutting the main source of 
household income and pushing households with unemployed heads 
to the bottom level of income distribution, as is illustrated 
in the U.K. report. The link between unemployment and 
poverty in the U.K., and the lack of a clear relationship 
between the two in Italy, emerges from the poverty studies 
on Europe, and confirms the different impact unemployment has 
on household income in the two countries. Other countries 
fall between Italy and U.K. A more balanced situation is 
found in Germany, where the male and female rates of 
unemployment are similar, and where youth unemployment is the 
lowest of the countries considered. The position in France 
is a moderate version of the Italian situation, with a female 
unemployment rate twice as high as the male one, and a 
significant proportion of youth unemployment. Spain has very 
high rates of both male and female unemployment, and very 
high youth unemployment amounting to 50% of total 
unemployment. There is a significant number of households 
with unemployed heads, and their per capita income is half 
that of households with full time employed heads. 
Changes in the population of working age and in the 
activity and unemployment rates affect national income, and 
hence household and per capita income, by means of changes in 
the number of employed people over the total population. The 
values of this ratio for European countries in 1973 and 1985, 
are shown in Table 3, and expressed as the product of the 
share of the population of working age of the total 
population, the share of the labour force (employed and 
unemployed) of the population of working age and the share of 
the employed of the labour force. The Table also displays 
the values of two slightly different definitions of the 
"dependency ratio": total population over employed people 
and total population over labour force. The dependency ratio 
can be usefully interpreted as the average number of persons 
who must be maintained by the average level of income of one 
employed. 
The values of the "dependency ratio" differ widely 
between countries. One group of countries, with relatively 
low dependency ratios, is composed of the U.K., Germany and 
France. 
The lowest value is that of the U.K., due to a 
particularly high value of both the male and female rate. 
During the seventies the dependency ratio, measured over the 
labour force, decreased slightly, because of the rise in 
women's participation and in the share of the population of 
working age. The low level of the dependency ratio in 
Germany is also imputable to the high share of the population 
of working age, which was around 70% in 1983. During the 
seventies and early eighties the increase of this share 
E/TP 
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TABLE 3 
DEPENDENCY RATIOS 
PWA/TP LF/PWA E/LF TP/E TP/LF 
FRANCE 
1973 
1985 
41.1 
38.8 
62.4 
65.8 
67.6 
65.7 
97.4 
89.8 
2.43 
2.58 
2.37 
2.31 
U.K. 
1973 
1985 
44.6 
43.1 
62.5 
65.6 
72.9 
74.3 
97.8 
88.5 
2.24 
2.32 
2.19 
2.05 
GERMANY 
1973 
1985 
43.4 
41.9 
63.7 
70.0 
68.8 
65.2 
99.0 
91.7 
2.30 
2.39 
2.28 
2.19 
ITALY 
1973 
1985 
36.4 
37.4 
65.9 
69.5 
58.9 
59.7 
93.8 
90.1 
2.75 
2.67 
2.58 
2.41 
SPAIN 
1973 
1985 
37.4 
28.61 
62.5 
64.9 
61.4 
56.1 
97.5 
78.5 
2.75 
3.50 
2.60 
2.75 
Source: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris 1987. 
E: Employment; TP: Total population; 
PWA: Population of working age; LF: Labour Force, 
offset a fall of 4 points in the rate of activity, 
stabilising the dependency ratio. France represents an 
intermediate case, showing a value of the share of the 
population of working age similar to that of the U.K., and a 
value of the rate of activity near to that of Germany. The 
dependency ratio is only slightly higher than in the other 
two countries. Between 1973 and 1983, as in Germany, the 
rise in the share of the population of working age 
counterbalanced a fall in the rate of activity, and 
stabilised the dependency ratio. In all three countries the 
slight decrease in the dependency ratio, measured over the 
labour force, turns into a slight increase in the ratio if 
measured against employed people, due to the rise in 
unemployment during period. In 1973 Italy had a much higher 
dependency ratio than in the three countries considered 
above. However since 1973 the trend has been towards a 
decrease in the difference, due to a reduction in the gap 
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between the activity rate and the share of the population of 
working age. Spain is an extreme case of a high and 
increasing dependency ratio. The high value is the 
cumulative result of the lowest share of the population of 
working age, the lowest rate of activity and the highest rate 
of unemployment of all the countries considered. The 
increase of the ratio between 1973-1983 was produced by the 
rise in unemployment and the fall in the rate of activity. 
4. THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY IN EUROPE 
Trends in inequality in household income distribution 
throughout the seventies and early eighties have not been 
uniform in the European countries. In France and Germany 
there was a significant decrease in income inequality, in 
Spain and Italy substantial stability, and an increasing 
disparity in the U.K. 
Between 1970 and 1979 in France the Gini coefficient 
decreased from 0.444 to 0.404 and the two relative Lorenz 
curves did not intersect, denoting an unambiguous reduction 
of inequality. The concentration of income decreased for all 
types of household considered i.e. working households, 
wage-earner households and non-working households. The level 
of concentration remained much higher within non-working 
households than within working households and was 
particularly low within wage earners households. The 
structure of deciles changed in favour of the bottom 50%, 
and especially the third decile, and to the disadvantage of 
the two top deciles. 
From 1970 to the early eighties in Germany there was a 
significant shift towards greater equality, with a decrease 
of the Gini coefficient from 0.392 in 1970 to 0.334 in 1984. 
The bottom quintiles all increased their share of income at 
the expense of the fourth and more especially the top 
quintile. Concentration was reduced for households of every 
size and type considered, except for the one person and the 
one earner households. Inequality was relatively high for 
the small size and the one earner households. This trend 
towards equality was, however, reversed in 1985 when the Gini 
coefficient jumped from 0.334 to 0.352 and the top quintile 
recovered part of the income share lost in the previous 
fourteen years. Whether 1985 represents the start of a new 
trend or just a short term interruption of the previous trend 
is difficult to predict; however, the economic policy 
measures implemented by the conservative governments since 
1982 suggest that the former is the more plausible 
hypothesis. 
The decrease in inequality in Spain between 1973 and 
1981 was modest but unambiguous. The Gini coefficient sank 
from 0.393 to 0.373 and the relative Lorenz curves did not 
intersect; the structure of deciles changed only slightly 
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particularly in favour of the first decile and to the 
detriment of the top two deciles only. 
The dispersion of household expenditure remained 
remarkably stable in Italy from 1976 to 1984, and neither the 
Gini coefficient nor the structure of deciles have undergone 
modifications. The concentration of income decreased 
slightly between 1980 and 1985 with a reduction of the Gini 
coefficient from 0.317 to 0.306; however, the bottom 50% did 
not profit much from this reduction which cut the share of 
the top decile in favour of the sixth, seventh and eighth 
deciles. Inequality, as in other countries, is higher for 
the one and two person households than for larger families. 
The U.K. is the only country where a significant 
increase in inequalities occurred between 1973 and 1984. 
This period can, however, be divided into two different 
phases: from 1973 to 1979, and from 1979 to 1984. 
Throughout the seventies there was an increase in inequality 
in original income due to a rise in the share of income of 
the four top deciles, and the Gini coefficient increased from 
0.407 to 0.426. However, the inequality of household 
distribution in gross income remained unchanged throughout 
the period denoting an offsetting action by social 
transfers. After 1979 there was again a marked rise in the 
inequality of original income with an increasing of the Gini 
coefficient from 0.426 to 0.471 in 1984. The State 
redistributive action by means of taxes and social transfers 
was not strong enough to balance this tendency of original 
income, resulting in an increase of inequality in gross and 
in disposable income. From 1979 to 1984 the Gini coefficient 
rose from 0.342 to 0.376 for gross income and from 0.316 to 
0.337 for disposable income. The increase in inequality is 
unambiguous since the Lorenz curves for 1984 lie entirely 
above the Lorenz curves for 1973 and 1979. 
The wide disparities in the evolution of household 
distribution of income between European countries may seem 
surprising in view of several common features in their 
economic background during the period. All countries were 
hit equally by the international economic crisis and 
experienced a slowing down of growth, a rise in unemployment 
and in inflation, a fall in the share of profits and a 
decrease in the share of manufacturing value added and 
employment. Similarities between European countries can also 
be found in the economic policies pursued by governments to 
overcome economic and social problems of the seventies and 
eighties. At the outset of the crisis governments pursued 
policies to defend levels of employment and real wages and to 
restore economic growth in the belief that the previous 
trend of economic development would be restored. At the end 
of the seventies, with a timing specific to each country, the 
analysis of the crisis and the order of priority of economic 
objectives changed radically. The idea of a structural 
crisis requiring major changes at economic, social and 
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institutional level prevailed in most countries. Economic 
policies were aimed at abating inflation, restoring 
profitability in industry, introducing elements of 
flexibility in the labour market and at limiting the role of 
the State in the economy while economic growth, high 
employment and social progress no longer received the same 
general consensus as policy objectives. 
The dissimilarity in the evolution of income 
distribution between European countries, in spite of the many 
similarities in economic trends and economic policies, 
confirms the result of the previous research of EFER on the 
striking combination of common elements .and national 
differences in European economic development after the 
second world war.5 In the fifties and sixties all European 
countries experienced a prolonged period of economic growth 
following a broadly similar model of development (known as 
the "Fordist' model of development in the literature of the 
French "regulation' school,6) of which it is possible to 
identify the major features in each country. However, behind 
the common general characteristics, the concrete adaptation 
of the Fordist model of development was inevitably specific 
to each country, reflecting the persistence of deep 
differences in European societies. In the same way, the 
crisis of the Fordist model of development in the seventies 
was common to all countries producing similar phenomena all 
over Europe, and raising the same important questions on the 
kind of society we live in. But again the concrete forms 
assumed by these phenomena and the answers given to these 
questions were inevitably specific to each nation. 
The rise in unemployment was, for instance, a general 
phenomenon, but the social groups hit by the loss or the lack 
of jobs were not the same in the different countries; the 
ideological attack on the Welfare State was widespread all 
over Europe, but its intensity and effectiveness differed 
drastically from country to country; the claim for more 
flexibility in the labour market was almost universal but the 
forms in which these elements of flexibility have been 
introduced, reflect the specific characteristics of 
industrial relations and industrial structure in each 
country. It is not surprising therefore, that a common 
slowing down of growth in real household income had far from 
homogeneous consequences on the equality of distribution. 
Important differences between European countries can 
also be found in analysing the causes of changes in 
distribution. 
Boyer, "La flexibilité du travail en Europe", 
Editions La découverte, Paris, 1986. 
°. See R. Boyer-J. Mistral, "Accumulation, inflation, 
crises", Puf, Paris, 1983. 
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To analyse these changes it is useful to distinguish 
between the changes resulting from the working of market 
forces, changes deriving from State action, and changes 
caused by transformations in the structure and behaviour of 
the family unit.7 While the role of the market and the state 
in producing changes in distribution of income is widely 
recognized, the role of the family is often ignored. 
However, as we have already seen, household income 
distribution is affected by changes in the size and age 
composition of the family, as well as by changes in the 
labour market in relation to family members. A proper 
consideration of the family unit is, therefore, crucial for a 
better interpretation of changes in income distribution and, 
in particular, to explain the apparent lack of coherence 
arising at times between expected changes in household income 
ineguality, considering exclusively state and market forces 
action, and the actual changes in inequality which reflect 
structural modifications of the family as well.8 
In France the decrease in inequality is mainly the 
result of developments in the labour market, favourable to 
employees and low paid workers, and of a rise in social 
transfers favourable to low income families. The share of 
wages throughout the seventies rose from an average of 49% in 
1969-73 to an average of 55% between 1974-76, and remained 
relatively stable until the end of the decade. This shift in 
income shares was accompanied by a significant narrowing of 
earning differentials by socio-economic class and sex. On 
the expenditure side of the welfare system, the increase in 
the rate of pensions benefitted inactive households, and the 
rise in unemployment allowances accrued exclusively to 
7. Statistical data related to the wage system, the 
welfare system and household disposable income is not 
homogeneous. Therefore the impact of changes in the wage and 
welfare systems on household distribution can be assessed 
only qualitatively and with a certain degree of uncertainty. 
8. It may be useful for the interpretation of the 
evolution of inequality to keep in mind two characteristics 
of the Gini coefficient. Firstly, it measures inequality in 
household income distribution without allowing for different 
sizes. Secondly, it measures the overall concentration of 
income regardless of the presence of phenomena of internal 
mobility. The first characteristic, in particular, may 
produce some paradoxical results. Since large families 
generally have a higher household income than small families, 
an improvement in the relative position of small size 
families normally results in a decrease of the Gini 
coefficient, even if, in per capita terms, the large families 
are much poorer than small families. 
2) 
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working households. The extension of social cover for 
various transfer items benefitted mainly low income 
households, such as farmers. Finally, increases in family 
allowances, which in France play an important redistributive 
role, have been more selective since 1974 mainly going to 
manual and clerical worker households whose head is often an 
unmarried woman with children to care for. On the revenue 
side, various changes in tax legislation in the seventies and 
early eighties increased the share of taxes paid by high 
income earners, resulting in a reduction of inequality in 
disposable income. Two changes in the family unit may also 
have affected income distribution: the increase in the 
number of married couples with husband and wife both working 
and the decrease in the average family size. The first 
phenomenon probably reduced inequality in household income 
because the differentials within women's earnings are 
narrower than the differentials within men's earnings, and 
because in France working women are uniformly spread among 
all social classes. The second phenomenon probably caused 
increased inequality because of the high concentration of 
income in small size households where single adults and 
couples without children have very different levels of income 
from retired people living alone or in couples. 
In Germany between 1970 and 1978 developments in the 
primary distribution of income and in the welfare system were 
responsible for the reduction of inequality. The adjusted 
wage share rose from about 62% in 1970 to 66% in 1975, thus 
lessening the reasonable assumption that non wage earners 
were concentrated in the higher deciles. Expenditure on the 
four main items of social benefits - pensions, unemployment, 
sickness and accident insurance - increased rapidly because 
of a rise in the level of benefits and the number of 
beneficiaries. Because of their concentration in the lower 
deciles of income distribution, the high proportion of 
transfers going to pensioners and the unemployed contributed 
to a reduction of inequality. Changes in the family 
structure during the period, such as a reduction in the 
average size and the related increase in the share of single 
person households, had the opposite effect, but they were not 
strong enough to offset trends in the labour market and in 
the welfare state. After 1978 the wage share declined and 
pay differentials widened, while the growth of social 
transfers stopped. Reduction of inequality was produced by 
the impressive rise in the share of multi-earner households, 
a category which shows a low and decreasing income 
concentration. The rise in the share of this type of family 
reflects a socially widespread increase in the participation 
of married women with relatively low pay differentials. The 
Gini coefficient rise in 1985 can be attributed, 
hypothetically, to the conservative policies which produced 
changes in the welfare system which were unfavourable to low 
income families, such as a negative growth of social 
transfers, a rise in the share of transfers going to high 
income social groups and a rise in the share of taxes paid by 
low income classes. 
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In Italy several phenomena which occurred in the 
seventies, such as the rise in the wage share, the narrowing 
of wage differentials, the rapid increase in social transfers 
and in direct taxes pointed to a reduction of inequality. 
The only phenomenon which had the opposite effect was the 
reduction in the average size of the family and the related 
increase in the share of one person households. After the 
second oil shock some of these trends towards equality were 
reversed. The share of wages declined, pay differentials 
widened and unemployment increased rapidly. However, these 
two phases, which appeared so clearly to the economic 
observer, did not produce different trends and the 
inequality of household income distribution remained 
remarkably stable throughout the whole period. We must 
therefore conclude that the redistributive effects originated 
in the market place, and State action, have been weaker than 
is usually expected, and certainly weak enough to have been 
counter-balanced by tendencies in both the structure and 
behaviour of the family unit. This leads us to the further 
conclusion that in Italy, the shift in the balance of power 
between classes, social groups, and political parties which 
has taken place at political, cultural and social levels, did 
not result in any significant change in the equality of 
income distribution. 
The slight decrease in inequality in Spain is mainly due 
to the development of the Welfare system throughout the 
seventies. Fiscal pressure and public expenditure increased 
rapidly in that period, even if in 1981 their levels were 
still very low compared to the standards prevailing in 
Europe. On the revenue side of the system, two aspects of 
the increase in taxation are worth mentioning: firstly, the 
increase in the share taken by direct taxes; secondly, the 
high share of taxes levied on labour income (85%) , and the 
low share levied on capital income(15%). The former probably 
reduced income concentration within working households, while 
the latter widened the gap between the income of employees 
and independent workers. On the expenditure side, the rapid 
increase of social transfers and, within them, of pensions 
and unemployment benefits, had a more powerful 
redistributive effect in decreasing income inequality. 
Developments in labour relations had less clear-cut effects 
on income distribution. The adjusted share of wages remained 
relatively stable throughout the seventies, while in the mid-
seventies there was some narrowing of wage differentials. 
The rise in unemployment, and its economic consequences were 
serious, because it hit mainly low income groups, and because 
of the low level coverage of unemployment allowances. More 
devastating effects were probably avoided by the shock 
absorber role played by the larger Spanish families, to youth 
and female unemployment. 
Between 1973 and 1979 the Labour Government in power in 
the U.K. produced a reduction of earning differentials 
through widespread legislation in favour of workers, and 
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through the implementation of income policies. In spite of 
these government policies, ineguality in original income 
increased during the period because of the rise in 
unemployment, and because of changes in the structure of the 
household. The particularly high level of unemployment 
reached at the end of the seventies had particularly severe 
effects on household income, because a considerable part of 
it was composed of males in the middle age classes. The 
family structure changed by an increase in the number of 
pensioners and in the number of married women working. Both 
these trends contributed to an increase income inequality. 
The former is the result, common to other European countries, 
of the ageing of the population, and it increased inequality 
by swelling the number of people in the lower deciles of 
income. The latter increased inequality because of the 
relative concentration of women at work in high income 
deciles, unlike in other countries, where the phenomenon was 
observed to be uniformly widespread across society. The 
redistributive action of the welfare state, through large 
increases in all items of social transfers, was, however, 
very effective, following the commitment of the Labour 
Government to improve the relative position of low income 
groups and the allowances to beneficiaries. As a result, no 
changes occurred in the equality of gross income 
distribution. After 1979, with the Conservative Government 
in charge, labour market relations were left more to supply 
and demand. This resulted in a further rise in unemployment 
and in a widening of wage differentials. The commitment of 
the government to limit the role of the State in the economy 
was implemented, through, among other things, cuts in social 
expenditure and regressive changes in the system of 
taxation. The obvious result was an increase in inequality, 
not only in original income distribution but in gross income 
and disposable income distribution as well. 
5. THE PATTERN OF INEQUALITY 
Inequality in income distribution emerges from our 
analysis as a multidimensional phenomenon. Consequently, 
levels of household income cannot be determined by the use of 
a single indicator, many different factors have to be taken 
into account. 
This lack of a simple relationship between the level of 
income and any single socio-economic variable has reinforced 
the widespread conviction that the diversity of social groups 
in contemporary capitalist societies have become so complex 
as to be intractable for scientific analysis. In particular, 
the ending of the clear connection between the social class 
of the head of household and the income range into which the 
household falls, has strengthened the opinion that meaningful 
criteria for distinguishing and analysing social classes no 
longer exists. 
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Thus, the emphasis on 'complexity' is perfectly 
justified and our analysis of income distribution fully 
confirms this fundamental characteristic of modern European 
societies; however, social complexity should not be confused 
with social muddle nor allowed to obscure what actually 
happens. Our analysis, from the specific perspective of the 
process of income distribution, singles out various factors 
which lead to inequality, and shows that from the 
relationship between these factors and the whole economic 
system, a pattern of income inequality, however complex, can 
be observed. 
In all countries there are three sets of factors which 
have been found to play an important part in determining 
income inequality. We will analyse them in turn. 
Some income inequality arises from differences in the 
phase of the life-cycle in which households find themselves. 
Each single household is, in fact, likely to occupy different 
positions in the income hierarchy throughout its life, as 
income changes with changes in the age and composition of the 
family. Individual income is a function of age, and 
generally follows a well identified temporal pattern, rising 
to the age of retirement and falling afterwards. Household 
income, however, depends on the level of individual incomes 
and on the number of people working which, in turn, is 
affected by the composition of the family, i.e. the relative 
numbers of adults and children. Young couples, without 
children, may therefore receive a relatively high income, in 
spite of low individual earnings, if husband and wife are 
both working. The birth of children has a negative effect on 
household income, particularly in the pre-school phase of 
their life when the woman is likely to become economically 
inactive, or to reduce her working time. Household income 
recovers in the following phase when children have grown up 
and the woman finds it easier to work, thereby adding her 
income to that of the husband, which, in the meantime, has 
increased with his age. Family income reaches its peak when 
adult children, still living in the original family, add 
their personal income to that of parents still working or 
receiving a pension. Finally, household income falls 
abruptly as adult children leave the original family and the 
parents retire. 
The household's standard of living only partly follows 
the path of its income, being determined, in each phase of 
the family's life-cycle, by the adequacy of the household 
income to meet it's changing needs in respect of changes in 
size and composition. 
The life-cycle income disparity is, by definition, 
related to demographic factors; however, it would be wrong 
to consider it a "natural' and therefore 'unavoidable' and 
'unchangeable' cause of inequality. On the contrary, the 
link between this source of income inequality and specific 
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characteristics of the socio-economic system should be 
appreciated. There is nothing "natural', for instance, in 
young peoples' lower than average income; but even assuming 
that this must be so because of hard economic laws, how low 
this income actually is depends on the characteristics of the 
demand for labour, and on the type of employment policies 
pursued in each country. The presence of children, to take a 
second example, is a factor which inhibits work by women; 
however, women's propensity to work while their children are 
of pre-school age is influenced by the level and quality of 
childcare facilities, and by the extent of the demand for 
labour, requiring more flexibility in working time or in the 
duration of the job. The size of the family, to take a 
further example, has a negative affect on the standard of 
living, but its impact can be more or less offset by fiscal 
concessions or by family supplements. It is important to 
emphasize that even inequalities arising from life-cycle 
aspects of distribution are largely affected by the 
interaction between the wage and welfare systems and family 
behaviour; and also that differences between countries in 
the pattern of ineguality can only be picked out by 
reference to these aspects of the socio-economic structure. 
A second set of factors, which has been found to be a 
determining cause of inequality, relates to the household's 
relationship with the labour market. Essentially this 
comprises the employment status of the head and the number of 
workers in the family. 
Income of households with heads employed is much higher 
than income of households whose heads are unemployed, 
inactive or retired. This generally results in a lower 
standard of living in households headed by unemployed or 
inactive persons. Whether retired people have a lower than 
average standard of living is, however, open to doubt once 
the small size of this type of family is taken into account. 
Assessment of the relative position of retired households, in 
terms of welfare, depends on the choice of indicator used to 
compare income of families of different sizes. In terms of 
per capita income, pensioners seem to enjoy a standard of 
living close to the average, while in terms of equivalent 
income, a situation of relative deprivation is more likely to 
emerge. In this case too, the economic situation of 
unemployed and retired people is determined ultimately by the 
welfare system, by means of the level and coverage of 
benefits, and by the family, by means of the protection 
provided for members in difficulties. As far as unemployment 
is concerned, in countries where it has significantly hit 
household heads, the economic situation of unemployed 
households is very sensitive to changes in the level of 
benefits, as in the U.K.; whereas in countries like Spain 
and Italy, where a considerable part of unemployment is 
composed of young people, it is the family which makes up for 
the low or partial coverage of unemployment benefits. There 
are important differences between countries in the retired 
economic situation as well. There is some evidence that in 
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countries like Spain, the U.K. or Italy the retired 
households are more often found in the lower part of income 
distribution, although this does not seem to be the case in 
France. Peculiarities in the structure of national welfare 
systems may produce differences in treatment within a 
homogeneous group of population in each country. This is the 
case, for instance, in the U.K., where a wide income gap 
divides State pensioners and people dependent on private 
pensions, and in Italy, where many types of pension coexist 
with very different levels of benefits. 
The number of workers in the family, as mentioned above, 
is an important cause of income disparities. Apart from 
being affected by demographic factors, changes in the number 
of workers have, historically, resulted from the interaction 
between the growth of the welfare systems, the 
characteristics of the demand for labour and long run 
cultural transformations in family behaviour. This factor of 
inequality has become more important in all European 
countries due, mainly, to the impressive rise in women's 
participation over the last decade. The relevance of this 
factor of inequality in a comparison between countries 
depends on the relative levels of the female rate of 
activity, and on the characteristics of female employment. 
Differences in the former, already analysed, have shown wide 
disparities between the U.K., Germany and France on the one 
hand, and Spain on the other, with Italy lying in the middle. 
Differences in the latter depend mainly on the share of 
part-time work, leaving aside disparities in pay 
differentials by sex. The income contribution of working 
women is higher in France than in the U.K., due to the 
prevalence of full time work in France and of part time work 
in the U.K. 
The impact on the overall degree of inequality of rising 
female employment depends on both the social diffusion of the 
phenomenon, and the amplitude of wage differentials among 
working women. Important differences between countries arise 
in relation to the first aspect. In France and Germany the 
increase in women's participation occurred quite uniformly in 
all social classes, producing a reduction of inequalities, 
while in the U.K., there is evidence of a concentration in 
high income families causing an increase in household income 
inequality. On the whole, however, the judgment on this 
social phenomenon can only be positive, because it reduces 
individual inequalities by sex, and offers a concrete 
opportunity for low income families to improve their relative 
position in the income hierarchy. On the other hand, the 
lack of a second earner's contribution is very detrimental to 
the standard of living of several households, particularly 
those with large size families. It seems that ultimately, we 
are evolving towards a model of society in which the 
participation of various members in the make-up of household 
income is more a matter of necessity rather than a matter of 
choice. 
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The third set of factors which helps to determine the 
household income position relates to the social class of the 
head, and is comprised of the sector of activity, the 
socio-professional category, the skill and the level of 
education. 
The income of the head emerges from our analysis as the 
central component of household income in all countries, even 
in those where married women participate and their income 
contribution is relatively high. The increase in the number 
of workers in the family has, therefore, modified the sexual 
division of labour within the family, leaving, unaltered, the 
priority of the respective responsibilities. Differences in 
the head of household's earnings are therefore still crucial 
in determining the income and standard of living of each 
household. 
The evidence supplied in the national reports in 
relation to employed heads shows that social class variables 
still play a definite role in determining the level of 
income. Pay differentials are particularly high by 
socio-professional category and by skill, though they are 
less important by sector of activity, with the exception of 
workers in agriculture in some countries and areas. Also 
significant is the positive relationship between the level of 
education and income range, as it relates income and 
education by socio-professional category. Finally, a clear 
relationship emerges between the socio-professional category 
of the father and the level of education of the children 
denoting a transmission of inequalities from generation to 
generation. Quite clearly the link between individual 
income, socio-professional category and education is far from 
being perfect or invariable. In various countries pay 
differentials have undergone important modifications, with 
gradual and significant changes in the relative position of 
different social groups; new professional categories have 
emerged while others have declined, following the changing 
structure of employment. A weakening of the relationship 
between education and income has occurred, as shown by the 
presence of high income categories with low levels of 
education, particularly within the self-employed. However, 
on the whole, our results, though based on rough and 
unsatisfactory criteria of disaggregation, show how the 
largely held opinion, that we live in a sort of social chaos 
where any class distinction has become meaningless, is 
unfounded, at least as far as income distribution analysis is 
concerned. 
If we concentrate on household rather than individual 
income, these findings can be partially modified. On the one 
hand, the income hierarchy by socio-professional category of 
the head is fully confirmed; on the other hand, the 
dispersion along the ladder of income is more pronounced. 
Manual households, for instance, are still concentrated in 
the low and middle deciles of distribution, but they can be 
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found in significant numbers in the upper deciles as well; 
professional, technical, administrative and managerial 
households can mostly be found in the upper deciles, but a 
not irrelevant share lies in the central deciles as well. 
This relative dispersion of income brings us back to the 
first finding of our analysis, that is, the multidimensional 
aspect of distribution, and the impossibility of positioning 
unequivocally a household in an income bracket by the use of 
a single criterium. The social class of the head is still a 
key element of division in income distribution but its 
effects can be corrected or accentuated by the working of 
other factors of inequality, and by the contribution to the 
household income of other sources of income.^ 
Using these three sets of factors a general pattern of 
income inequality for European countries can be described, 
and the household position in the income distribution pattern 
is determined by specific combinations of these factors. To 
conclude these introductory notes, three final qualifications 
to such a pattern are worth mentioning. 
Firstly, phenomena of upward and downward social 
mobility, or even situations of poverty are produced by 
particularly favourable or unfavourable combinations of these 
factors, and national reports offer a wide range of household 
types according to the various possible combinations.. For 
instance, households with more than one worker are unlikely 
to be found at the lower level of distribution, even if the 
head belongs to a low income socio-professional category, 
while one earner households of middle to high income heads, 
with high dependency ratios, may experience a significant 
deterioration of their standard of living; manual or 
agricultural households experiencing unemployment, or with 
one earner only, are concentrated at the bottom of the 
distribution level together with retired people living alone 
on modest pensions, and with single parent families headed by 
inactive women. The study of these combinations of factors 
is clearly crucial to the identification dynamic sequences 
leading to relative deprivation, and population groups which 
are likely to be disadvantaged. 
Secondly, the relative importance of each of these three 
factors varies from country to country revealing interesting 
differences in the social classes' structure and in the 
labour market conditions. For instance, in their report on 
the U.K., Sara Horrell and Jill Rubery maintain that the 
9. This does not apply to the top level of 
distribution - the few giants of Pen's parade - the position 
of which remains untouched. See J. Pen 'A parade of dwarfs 
(and a few giants)1 in 'Wealth, Income & Inequality' A. B. 
Atkinson (ed.), Oxford University Press, 1980 extract from 
'Income distribution', Penguin books, 1971. 
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labour market relationship öf the household has become a more 
reliable indicator of the household position in the 
distribution of income than the social class of the head. 
Whereas, Veronigue Sandoval finds that in France other 
factors, however important, seldom reverse the relative 
income position obtained by belonging to a social class. 
These and other differences show that the common pattern of 
inequality we have described, must be adapted to the 
specific situation of each country. 
Thirdly, the pattern of income inequalities described 
does not include all possible factors working at national 
level. For instance, the Italian situation cannot be 
explained without giving a central position to the 
geographical dimension of inequality; regional disparities 
have also been found to play an important role in the Spanish 
experience, and is a guestion emerging in the North and 
perhaps, in the U.K. as well. In Germany, the U.K. and 
France indirect information suggests that racial factors play 
a part in determining the bottom level of income 
distribution. All this implies that the common pattern of 
income inequality must be integrated to fit national 
experience. 
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN FRANCE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After the years of growth that France had experienced 
during the early sixties, 1968 marked the beginning of a 
crisis. 
First there was a social crisis. Besides the students' 
revolt, nine million employees were on strike. The growth in 
national income did not prevent the growth of income 
inequalities, and the first demand on the government was to 
make a significant increase in the minimum wage. 
It was also a political crisis, after 10 years, of 
government with General De Gaulle at the head. Although of 
the government. Though 1968 gave the right the greatest 
majority it had known since the war, De Gaulle left the 
government in 1969. At the same time, France began to 
restructure its industry as part of its greater integration 
into the European Common Market. Moreover, the political 
agreement which took place in 1972 between the Socialist 
Party and the Communist Party lead to increased support for 
the Socialist Party and to its accession to the Presidency of 
the Republic and to government in 1981. 
The restructuring of French industry which subsequently 
took place occurred within a serious economic crisis with 
numerous firms going bankrupt, with thousands of jobs ebing 
lost, and with a break in the upward growth of national 
income. 
The consequences of this crisis for income distribution 
in France is the subject of this chapter. 
2. STRUCTURAL CHANGES AFFECTING POPULATION 
AND INCOME SINCE 1970. 
The evolution of a population's standard of living 
depends on its growth in size in relation to that of the 
National Income. This in turn is conditional upon the number 
of people working in relation to the rest of the population. 
Finally, income distribution between households depends on 
both the non-employed and the employed in these households, 
as it depends on the share of social transfers in the 
National Revenue. 
2.1 Changes affecting the population of France 
Per capita income growth depends on the relative 
percentage of working people and on their productivity. From 
this point of view, four background movements concerning the 
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French population are influential: the ageing population, 
the increase in the female rate of activity, unemployment 
growth, and the improved qualifications of employees. 
2.1.1 Changes in the age structure of population 
Between 1968 and 1982, we observed a decrease in the 
number of children and young people under 19 years old in 
relation to the size of the working population (France 
getting in line with other European countries). This trend, 
together with a static retired population, has been 
influenced by the growth of per capita income. 
In the future, however, we can expect a decrease in the 
number of people between 20 and 59 years of age, and an 
increase in people over 60 years old. 
TABLE 2.1 
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION 
1968 1975 1982 
Under 19 years old 
From 20 to 59 years old 
Over 60 years old 
(Source: Census) 
32.2 30.7 28.7 
49.0 50.3 52.8 
18.8 19.0 18.5 
2.1.2 Increase in Women's labour force participation 
Between 1968 and 1982 the working population grew faster 
than the whole population because of an increase in the 
labour market participation of women between 20 and 60 years 
of age (see table 2(c)). 
The rate of female participation in the labour force in 
France was 34.8% in 1984, very close to that of Germany 
(35.3%) and much higher than that of Italy (27.9%). The 
increasing participation of women in the labour market is 
seen among single women, widows or divorced women, but it is 
among married women that we find the most important change. 
27 
TABLE 2.2 
WORKING POPULATION 
1968 
49.655 
1975 
52.587 
1982 
54.296 Total population 
(in thousands) 
Working population 
- in thousands 19.935 21.771 23.525 
- as % of total 
population 40.1 41.4 43.3 
There has been an increase of more than 20 points in their 
rate of activity in the last 20 years for those between 20 
and 50 years old. It cannot be related to a great expansion 
of part-time work,10 because such an expansion did not occur 
in France, and in 1986 only 15% of women employees (and 2% of 
men) were part-timers. 
2.1.3 A dramatic increase in unemployment since 1974. 
Unemployment affected only 2.2% of the working 
population in 1968, 3.8% in 1975 but 8.8% in 1982 and 9.3% in 
1986. 
At the beginning of the seventies (1971) the rate of 
unemployment was 2.9% for women and 1.5% for men. Fifteen 
years later the figures were 11.2% and 7.9% respectively. 
The proportion of young people, under 25 years old has 
decreased slightly (from 37.3% to 34.5%), not because they 
find a job more easily, but because they remain at school 
until they are 18 or over. 
Furthermore, the increasing proportion of unemployed who 
are between 25 and 49 years old (from 38.6% to 51.8%), in 
relation to those who are 50 years old or more cannot be put 
down entirely to the expansion of early retirement, and must 
in part be due to the numerous redundancies in the 
manufacturing industry. 
2.1.4 Changes in the structure of the labour force 
The number of employees as a percentage of the working 
population was 79.5% in 1970, higher than that observed in 
Italy (68.2%) but less than that of Germany (83.3%) and of 
10. Employees working less than 30 hours a week. 
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the United Kingdom (92.4%) 
84.1% in 1982. 
It has increased since, and was 
On the other hand, the number of farmers in 198 2 
represented only 60% of their number in 1968. In fact the 
integration of France into the Common Market, where the 
competition was greater, led to the disappearance of 
thousands of little farms. 
Changes have also occurred among employees. They work 
more and more often in the service industry. The employees 
who worked in the manufacturing industry represented 72% of 
the employees in 1968, 66% in 1973 and only 54% in 1984. 
Most of them (70%) were manual workers against only 18% in 
the service industry. In 1984, manual workers still 
represented 65% of the employees working in the manufacturing 
industry but their percentage of total population of 
employees decreased. The women who swelled the labour force 
between 1973 and 1983 belong to the clerical and salaried 
staff levels. The men belong to the salaried staff and 
executive levels. 
TABLE 2.3 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60-64 
65 
years 
years 
years 
years 
years 
years 
years 
years 
years 
years 
years 
All Ages 
Source: 
WOMEN·S 
old 
old 
old 
old 
old 
old 
old 
old 
old 
old 
old 
PARTICIPATION IN THE LABOUR 
ACCORDING TO THEIR STATUS 
Single 
Women 
1962 
35.3 
74.3 
79.8 
78.5 
77.6 
76.5 
75.0 
73.8 
68.5 
57.2 
22.3 
53.6 
1982 
16.2 
66.7 
83.9 
86.1 
84.3 
82.3 
79.7 
78.0 
70.8 
42.3 
5.5 
46.2 
recensenents 
Married 
1962 
41.9 
45.2 
36.2 
32.0 
33.4 
35.0 
38.2 
38.4 
34.6 
26.7 
10.4 
32.4 
1982 
30.6 
67.1 
64.9 
62.4 
61.2 
58.0 
54.1 
49.0 
39.8 
18.6 
2.2 
47.5 
Widows 
1962 
57.5 
60.2 
55.3 
56.8 
62.3 
67.0 
66.6 
61.7 
53.8 
39.1 
8.8 
22.4 
1982 
13.6 
55.3 
69.0 
71.0 
77.1 
75.1 
72.7 
64.6 
49.7 
23.2 
1.4 
12.6 
FORCI 
Divorced 
1962 
60.0 
80.3 
73.4 
75.7 
76.4 
76.7 
78.0 
73.4 
69.7 
55.4 
18.8 
63.0 
1982 
58.1 
82.6 
84.5 
86.2 
87.1 
87.1 
83.9 
81.3 
71.0 
38.9 
4.5 
67.6 
All Women 
1962 198 
35.5 
61.5 
45.3 
38.7 
39.5 
41.2 
45.0 
45.3 
42.2 
33.9 
11.0 
36.2 
16.7 
66.S 
65.5 
67.0 
65.1 
62.0 
58.3 
54.1 
45.0 
22.3 
2.2 
43.0 
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CHANGES 
Executives 
- men 
- women 
Salaried Staff 
- men 
- women 
Clerical Staff 
- men 
- women 
Manual Workers 
- men 
- women 
IN 
OF 
THE 
TABLE 2. 
STRUCTURE 
EMPLOYEES 
1968-1973 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
62 
14 
248 
143 
107 
367 
475 
264 
(IN 
4 
OF THE POPULATION 
THOUSANDS) 
1973-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
-
-1980 
283 
63 
236 
322 
30 
225 
323 
114 
1980-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
+ 
-
-
-1983 
73 
17 
58 
41 
54 
105 
238 
106 
(Source: Declarations annuelles de salaires) 
2.1.5 Summary 
Manual workers are affected most by job losses in the 
manufacturing industry, and their rate of unemployment which 
was 2% against 1.3% for the whole employed population in 1968, 
reached 11.7% (against 8.8%) and more than 17% for women manual 
workers in 1984. The population of employees is concentrated 
more and more in the less stable occupations in the service 
industry, and are often held by women. 
Despite a decrease in the number of young people (under 19 
years old) , in relation to the number of those of working age, 
and despite an increased number of women in the labour market, 
the dependency ratio (or the non-employed population as a 
percentage of total population) remained stable throughout the 
entire period, because of an [unknown expansion] of 
unemployment since 197 3. 
1968 1975 1982 
Dependency ratio 60.7 60.2 60.5 
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It appears that while the manufacturing industry was 
throwing out men manual workers women, as well as swelling the 
labour market in the service industry, have played determining 
roles in regulating the labour force, in accordance with the 
needs of the market, and in the equilibrium of household 
resources. 
2.2 Changes affecting the structure of income 
The expansion of the work force obviously increased the 
importance of wages, but it also affected wage differentials. 
If the growth of transfer payments has not slowed down as much 
as original income since 1973, the social transfers structure 
has changed and the recipients are no longer the same. 
2.2.1 The increasing importance of wages and changes 
in wage differentials 
In 1973 wages represented 54.6% of original income, but 
66.1% in 1983. In other respects the trend towards a narrowing 
of wage differentials, which began in 1968, has continued. The 
gap between the average male and female wage, which was 33% of 
the male wage in 1968, was only 26% in 1983, and even less if 
calculated with a constant structure of employees. The massive 
entry of young women and men into the salaried staff and 
executive groups partially explains the narrowing of wage 
differentials. 
TABLE 2.5 
INDEX OF WAGES ACCORDING TO 
Executives 
Salaried staff 
Clerical staff 
Manual workers 
All employees 
1968 
350 
166 
88 
79 
100 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
1973 
325 
156 
87 
81 
100 
CLASS OF EMPLOYEES 
1980 
260 
134 
84 
82 
100 
1983 
253 
131 
82 
80 
100 
(Source: Declarations annuelles de salaires) 
The narrowing of wage differentials may also be due to a 
political policy expressed in government recommendations. Yet 
wage differentials according to the age of employees do not 
seem to decrease. They are not the same for manual and 
clerical workers as for the salaried staff. Manual and 
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clerical workers of 41 to 50 years of age are the ones who earn 
more, but on average only about 12 per cent more than the mean. 
On the other hand, among salaried staff, those who earn more 
are the oldest. They are 60 to 65 years old, (even older than 
65 among the executives). 
Though .we do not have much statistical data on these wage 
differentials, it appears that there is a trend towards a 
slight increase (Table 2.6). 
TABLE 2.6 
INDEX 
Under 18 years 
From 18 to 2 0 
From 22 to 2 5 
From 26 to 3 0 
From 31 to 4 0 
From 41 to 50 
From 51 to 60 
From 61 to 65 
Over 65 years 
All employees 
OF WAGES ACCORDING 
SOCIO-
old 
old 
TO AGE, FOR DIFFERENT 
-ECONOMIC CLASSES OF EMPLOYEES 
Execut 
1975 
_ 
-
39 
62 
91 
109 
112 
128 
126 
100 
ives 
1979 
-
40 
62 
91 
108 
115 
129 
134 
100 
Salaried 
staff 
1975 
__ 
39 
64 
87 
108 
114 
115 
113 
96 
100 
1979 
„ 
49 
67 
85 
104 
114 
115 
117 
102 
100 
Clerical 
workers 
1975 
41 
69 
87 
104 
114 
115 
112 
105 
98 
100 
1979 
37 
68 
85 
101 
112 
113 
112 
108 
98 
100 
Manual 
workers 
1975 
42 
69 
88 
103 
112 
112 
108 
97 
86 
100 
1979 
36 
67 
86 
100 
110 
112 
109 
98 
85 
100 
(Source: Declarations annuelles de salaires) 
2.2.2 The growth of transfer payments and taxes 
Social transfers made up 23.3% of gross income in 1970. 
In 1984 they made up 33.2%. 
The government financial contribution to these payments 
was reduced from 22.5% in 1970 to 21% in 1980, but it has 
increased sharply since then because of government expenditure 
in favour of the unemployed. Income tax has been higher since 
the end of the seventies. 
Various changes in tax legislation were introduced. Some 
of them concerned every household which paid income taxes. 
This was the case with the introduction in 1982 and 1983 of a 
social contribution of 1% of total income, dedicated to 
unemployment allowances. Other changes were to the advantage 
of households with many children. For instance, since 1980 an 
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additional "half--point" in the "familiar ratio" (wriicn divide 
the total income of the household to calculate the income taxes 
to be paid) has been given to the tax-payers with at least 3 
children to feed.11 
TABLE 2.7 
BURDEN 
Original income 
Social transfers 
Gross income 
Direct taxes 
OF SOCIAL 
1970 
76.78 
23.3 
100 
6.2 
TRANSFERS 
1975 
73.1 
26.9 
100 
6.3 
AND TAXES 
1979 
70.8 
29.2 
100 
7.3 
1984 
66.7 
33.2 
100 
8.9 
(Source: C.E.R.C.) 
Others have had a direct redistributive effect. This was 
the case with the change in the tax-table at the end of 1973 
which benefitted poor tax-payers, and also the exceptional 
increase of 10% in income tax which the salaried staff 
households, with two people working, had to pay. And also the 
progressive additional tax created in 1984, and the 
introduction of an additional step on the tax-table at a higher 
rate. 
On the other hand, the national insurance contributions 
paid by employees have increased in relation to those paid by 
employers. 
2.2.3 The Welfare State 
Despite a steady decrease in the rate of growth of social 
transfers since 1975 they have, nevertheless, helped to deaden 
the shock of the dramatic slowing down of wages on the 
disposable income of households, especially for households with 
one wage-earner. 
11. A one person household has a familiar ratio of 1. A 
married couple with no childred 
still living with them has a familiar ratio of 2. This ratio 
is increased by 0.5 for each child less than 18 years old. But 
since 1980 a married couple with 3 children to care for, 
instead of having a familiar ratio of 3.5, has one of 4. 
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TABLE 2.8 
FINANCING STRUCTURE OF 
National insurance 
contributions of 
- employers 
- employees 
- self-employed 
Government 
contribution 
Other returns 
Total returns 
1970 
57.4 
13.4 
5.0 
22.5 
1.7 
100.0 
1975 
56.4 
14.5 
4.1 
23.4 
1.6 
100.0 
WELFARE 
1980 
54.1 
18.5 
4.7 
21.0 
1.7 
100.0 
1983 
51.4 
18.0 
5.0 
23.9 
1.7 
100.0 
TABLE 2.9 
RESPECTIVE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH OF ORIGINAL INCOME, 
SOCIAL TRANSFERS AND DISPOSABLE INCOME 
(measured as increases in purchasing power) 
Original income 
(income from labour 
property) 
Social transfers 
Disposable income 
1970-1975 
2.3% 
6.3% 
3.3% 
1975-1979 
0.4% 
3.4% 
1.1% 
1979-1984 
- 1.4% 
2.4% 
- 0.6% 
Within the total amount of social transfers, the 
contribution from family benefits and allowances decreased, 
despite a revival of family policy since 1974. 
Between 1960 and 1974, the growth rate of family benefits 
was below that of average wages. Since 1974 this has no longer 
been the case. The family policy has become more selective, 
and is addressed almost exclusively to families with modest 
incomes. 
Since 1972 the benefit paid to one-wage households, 
(Allocation de salaire unique) is only paid to those households 
where income does not exceed the amount considered to be a 
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ceiling. This only benefits the poorest, particularly single 
parent families. The family income supplement (complement 
familial), which was introduced in 1978 in place of several 
family benefits, is also reserved for families whose total 
income is below a fixed ceiling. 
Health spending has also seen its share reduced despite a 
real growth in the number of recipients. This growth was due 
to the extension of social cover to non-wage earners, and to 
the action of a long-term trend, resulting from both progress 
in medical techniques and increased expectations of medical 
care. 
The reduction of the share of health spending in the total 
amount of social transfers is, therefore, only a mathematical 
effect of the very high growth of unemployment allowances since 
1975. 
TABLE 2.10 
RELATIVE SHARE OF VARIOUS ALLOWANCES 
1970 1979 1984 
17 
38 
39 
2 
4 
100 
14 
32 
42 
7 
5 
100 
13 
31 
40 
11 
5 
100 
Family allowances 
Medical care 
Pensions 
Unemployment allowances 
Other allowances 
All 
(Source: Comptes de la Nation - C.E.R.C) 
Facing an unknown increase in the number of redundancies 
and job losses, the policy followed (through the main 
amendments of July 1979, November 1982, and April 1984) 
gradually abolished the particularly favourable conditions 
reserved for economic redundancies in favour of a greater 
homogeneity in the rates of compensation, and of an extension 
of the allowances to the unemployed who, before this, had 
received nothing. It was also used to create a pre-retirement 
allowance for the older employees who leave work before they 
are 60 years old. 
Finally, the purchasing power of the pensions and rents 
paid by the Social Security Administration did not grow at the 
same rate as that of hourly wages (except in 1980-81 and 1984). 
But, according to the C.E.R.C, the difference in the annual 
rate of growth between the average pension and the average wage 
was 0.3% in favour of pensions from 1975 to 1983, against 1.8% 
in favour of the average wage between 1967 and 1974. 
Furthermore, more older farmers and self-employed people became 
eligible to receive this kind of social transfer. 
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For old people the minimum income paid to the poorest 
inactive households, was often revalued during the period. 
TABLE 2.11 -
MEAN ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH OF HOURLY WAGE, PENSIONS 
PAID BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, AND 
OLD PEOPLE'S MINIMUM INCOME 
average 
1971-76 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 198' 
Hourly 
wage ' 14.5% 12.7% 12.6% 12.9% 15.3% 15.0% 15.4% 11.2% 7.( 
Pensions 13.9% 11.8% 10.3% 11.0% 15.2% 15.8% 12.6% 7.2% 7.' 
Old people 
minimum 20.3% 15.8% 20.0% 16.7% 12.6% 23.8% 32.4% 9.2% 4.S 
inc. 
(Source: Comptes de la Nation) 
2.2.4 Summary 
Not all households received the same benefit from the 
growth of social transfers and from the corresponding 
increase in the burden of taxes paid. 
The changes in fiscal policy, as we have already seen, 
have mostly profited the poorest, to the detriment of the 
richest. But social transfers do not deal with the 
redistribution of income, but with the meeting of people's 
needs. They also deal with compensation for expenses 
connected with a particular situation (illness, unemployment, 
retirement ·..) which may be that of the head of the 
household, or that of another member of the household, and 
which is not directly linked to the amount of total income 
the household receives each year. 
That is how, for example, a member of Mr. Dupont ' s 
household (an executive), may receive a pension despite the 
fact that the increase in the amount of pensions mainly 
benefitted inactive households. On the other hand, the 
growth of unemployment allowances since 1975, and 1979, 
concerned working households almost exclusively, and more 
precisely wage earners. 
Two sections of the population are sick more often than 
others: old people and young children. The population of 
old people, is not the same as that of non-working 
households. Also young children are found in all other 
groups of households. However, the farmers were the main 
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beneficiaries of the extension of social cover to non-wage 
earners at the beginning of the period. 
Finally, family allowances were more profitable to 
manual workers with a modest income and, more often than the 
other groups, a large family, and to clerical workers whose 
head of household is often an unmarried or divorced woman (or 
a widow), with one or two children to care for. 
TABLE 2.12 
DIFFERENCES IN THE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH OF SOCIAL 
TRANSFERS ACCORDING TO THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP OF 
THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD 
Non-working households 
Working households of which 
Farmers 
Self-employed 
Executive 
Salaried staff 
Clerical workers 
Manual workers 
1970-75 
6.4% 
5.9% 
6.4% 
5.2% 
4.3% 
4.7% 
5.5% 
6.0% 
1975-79 
5.5% 
1.1% 
4.9% 
1.6% 
- 6.1% 
- 0.2% 
- 0.5% 
3.2% 
1979-84 
2.0% 
2.7% 
1.4% 
1.6% 
2.8% 
2.9% 
3.8% 
2.8% 
2.3. Changes affecting the size and structure of 
households 
The decreasing size of average households, and the 
changes in the distribution of married couples among those 
where husband and wife are both working, and who have no 
children, and those where the husband is the only one to work 
and who have three children or more, also affect the 
distribution of per capita income. 
2.3.1 Increasing number of households composed of 
one adult 
The number of households composed of only one adult 
increased at the annual rate of 1.7% during the sixties and 
at an annual rate of growth of 3% since 1968. 
Several factors explain this: the mortality rate has 
fallen such that average life-time has increased, 
particularly for women, and the number of old people living 
alone has increased due to different generations no longer 
being members of the same household. Also young people are 
remaining single longer and divorce is more frequent, thus 
creating more single households in the young age groups. 
This factor seems the most influential, as the increase in 
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the number of single households is higher for men (3.5%) 
than for women (2.6%) and the percentage of single households 
composed of men or women of 2 5 to 54 years old increased 
throughout the period. 
TABLE 2.13 
HOUSEHOLDS COMPOSED OF ONLY ONE ADULT 
Men (thousands) 
including (in %) 
15-24 years old 
25-54 years old 
55 and over 
1968 
1,022 
9.8 
40.1 
50.1 
1975 
1,312 
10.4 
45.8 
43.8 
1982 
1,666 
11.1 
48.2 
40.7 
Women (thousands) 
including (in %) 
15-24 years old 
25-54 years old 
55 and over 
All 
including (in %) 
Non-working 
2 , 1 7 6 2 , 6 2 3 3 , 1 5 1 
3.4 
15.2 
81.4 
3,198 
58.5 
5.3 
18.5 
76.2 
3,935 
59.1 
6.5 
20.4 
73.1 
4,817 
58.9 
2.3.2 Increasing number of married couples with 
husband and wife both working 
The number of these couples increased 33.4% between 1968 
and 1975, and 19.8% between 1975 and 1981, against a decrease 
of 8.5% and 12.7% respectively, for married couples where the 
husband was the only one to work. 
In 1968 couples where both husband and wife were working 
were mainly 40 years old and over, the younger couples being 
less numerous. Now they are more often under 40 years old, 
although this is not the case for married couples where the 
husband is the only one working. 
Also couples with two or more children, where both 
parents work, are more numerous than in 1968. This is not 
the case with married couples where the husband is the only 
one working. 
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2.3.3 Decrease in the size of the family 
Between 1968 and 1982 we observed a sharp decrease in 
the number of large families, partly due to the increase in 
married women's participation in the labour force. But, as 
we see below, married women no longer stop working when they 
have their second or even third child, while, non-working 
married women with three or more children, are increasingly 
in a minority. 
TABLE 2.14 
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILIES 
(MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES) 
ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN THEY HAVE 
1968 1982 
No children 
One child 
Two children 
Three children or more 
(of which 4 or more) 
4 8 . 2 % 
2 1 . 8 % 
1 5 . 7 % 
1 4 . 3 % 
( 6 . 4 % ) 
5 0 . 5 % 
2 2 . 7 % 
1 7 . 7 % 
9 . 1 % 
( 2 . 6 % ) 
2.3.4 Summary 
As the percentage of single parent families did not 
increase much during the period, divorced women having 
changed place with widows, what evolved can be expected to 
have brought about an homogenisation of the quotient 
(calculated within each household) between the number of 
people earning an income or receiving a transfer, ■ and the 
total number of persons in the household. Therefore they 
only contributed to a reduction of the differences in 
standard of living between households. 
This is more precisely the case within the population of 
married couples in which only fifteen years ago, the gap in 
the standard of living could be very important between those 
with no children and husband and wife both working, and 
those, nearly as numerous, where the wife did not bring a 
wage home, and who had 3 children or more. 
Today, in every socio-economic group, married couples 
with husband and wife both working are more numerous than 
those where the wife does not work, and they have almost the 
same number of children. Today, the percentage of couples 
with 3 or more children is below 10% of all couples. 
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TABLE 2.15 
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE HOUSEHOLD 
POPULATION ACCORDING TO THE DIFFERENT STANDARDS 
1968 1982 
Married couples 
with wife working 23.9% 32.8% 
with wife not working 46.2% 34.2% 
Single parent families 4.2% 4.3% 
Single persons 20.3% 24.6% 
Others 5.4% 4.1% 
Average number of persons 
per household 3.1 2.7 
CAUSES OF THE CHANGES OBSERVED IN THE INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION SINCE 1970. 
Since 1970 the dispersion of household income decreased. 
However, this does not mean we are now living in a more 
egalitarian society. Everything depends on the definition of 
equality we have. But we can expect the structural changes 
observed above to have had an influence on the distribution 
of income, and so can ask what happened to the main sources 
of inequality? 
3.1 Changes in income distribution 
To observe such changes we can only refer to the income 
survey which uses income declared to the Tax Administration. 
As shown in the appendix this declared income partly overlaps 
the definition of original income for wage earner households. 
But it also includes pensions to non-working persons and is 
prone to understatement of self employment income and 
investment income. Furthermore, the last survey we have 
access to covers the year 1979. 
3.1.1 The distribution of income 
The data on the distribution of household income by 
deciles is shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.2. 
It demonstrates that there was a decrease in the 
dispersion of income throughout the entire period, as the 
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Lorenz curves do not intersect. But the reduction of the top 
quintile's share of total income from 48.3% to 45.4%, does 
not really benefit the bottom quintile: instead the main 
beneficiary is the third decile. 
TABLE 3.1 
CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF DECLARED INCOME SINCE 1970 
Deciles arranged by 
declared income 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
Percentage of income going to 
each decile 
1970 
0 . 9 
2 . 7 
3 . 6 
5 . 7 
6 . 9 
8 . 5 
1 0 . 8 
1 2 . 7 
1 6 . 6 
3 2 . 0 
1 9 7 5 
1 . 2 
3 . 1 
4 . 6 
5 . 9 
7 . 1 
8 . 6 
1 0 . 4 
1 2 . 7 
1 6 . 2 
3 0 . 2 
1979 
1 . 4 
3 . 4 
4 . 8 
6 . 1 
7 . 2 
8 . 7 
1 0 . 4 
1 2 . 6 
1 5 . 9 
2 9 . 5 
(Source: INSEE, Income Survey) 
TABLE 3.2 
PERCENTAGE OF INCOME GOING TO THE BOTTOM 25. 50 AND 
75% OF HOUSEHOLDS 
1970 1975 1979 
to the bottom 25% 
to the bottom 50% 
to the bottom 75% 
5.6% 
20.3% 
45.0% 
6.4% 
21.9% 
46.9% 
7.1% 
22.9% 
48.0% 
(Source: INSEE, Income Survey) 
It we take a look at the Gini coefficients which have 
been calculated for different populations, we see that the 
highest dispersion is observed among non-working households. 
Furthermore, dispersion of income is lower among employee 
households than among the households of the whole working 
population, which covers self employed households as well as 
wage earners. 
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TABLE 3.3 
GINI COEFFICIENTS 
For the whole population 
For working households 
For non-working households 
For employees (wage-earner) 
households 
1970 
0.346 
1975 
0.340 
1979 
0 
0 
0 
.444 
402 
479 
0 
0 
0 
418 
380 
449 
0 
0 
0 
404 
373 
428 
0.327 
(Source: INSEE, Income Survey) 
LORENZ CURVES 
1970 
1975 
1979 
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We will look at thè influence of the head of 
household's age. The sex of the head of household will not 
be considered as female headed households are still 
relatively rare and most of these are covered under the one 
person and single parent households. 
With regard to inequality through the links of the 
household with the labour market, we will first study the 
influence of the number of workers within the household, then 
that of the socio-economic group to which the head of the 
household belongs, and then the influence of the area and its 
rate of urbanisation. 
3.2.1 The size of the household 
One of the main factors of inequality in the household 
standard of living lies in the number of persons who make up 
the household. When looking at a household's total income it 
seems that households of four persons are much richer than 
households composed of only one person, but this is no longer 
the case when considering income per capita. On the 
contrary, on average, household standard of living decreases 
as the household's size increases. Had we taken an 
equivalent income indicator this decrease would not appear 
until the four person household, but large families would be 
the poorest. 
If some of the socio-demographic changes we described 
earlier lead towards a decrease in the dispersion of income 
per capita within the total household population, such as the 
increased participation in the labour force of married women 
and the progressive disappearance of families with 4 children 
or more, other factors have interposed which increased the 
disparities in income per capita between households according 
to the size of the household. 
Therefore the changes in income according to the size of 
the household between 1970 and 1979, were quite surprising. 
With regard to the income declared at the tax office 
(income from labour, property, and pensions), we would have 
expected an increase in the disparities of households' total 
income and a decrease in the disparities of income per capita 
between households composed of one person and those composed 
of two persons, because of the greater likelihood of married 
women to be working. But it is not the case. On the 
contrary they have increased, as has the disparity between 
two person households and three person households. 
Households of two persons whose average income per 
capita income was only 3% less than the income per capita of 
households of one person in 1970, had, on average, a gap of 
10% in their standard of living in 1979. 
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TABLE 3.4 
CHANGES IN DISPARITIES OF DECLARED INCOME 
(BEFORE TRANSFERS AND TAXES) ACCORDING TO SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD 
(income of household of 1 person = 100) 
Total income 
1970 1975 1979 
Income per capita 
1970 1975 1979 
Households of 
1 person 
2 persons 
3 persons 
4 persons 
5 persons 
100 
195 
264 
272 
268 
100 
191 
241 
261 
257 
100 
180 
217 
228 
224 
100 
97 
88 
68 
53 
100 
96 
80 
65 
51 
100 
90 
72.5 
57 
45 
Two reasons can be given to explain this surprising 
data: first the reducing percentage of older retired people, 
and the growing percentage of young men of working age 
amongst households composed of only one person, as shown 
above, and the second, the greater proportion of old retired 
couples amongst the two person households. 
The only social transfers which can correct the 
inequalities in standard of living, due to the size of 
household, are family benefits. 
In fact, if health spending is more important to large 
families than to households without any children this 
disparity is compensated for by higher health expenditure. 
If we include family benefits (calculated according to a 
table) in household income, we can see that the only 
households whose per capita income improves are those with 2 
or 3 children. The gap in their standard of living compared 
with the one person household is reduced by 3 (from 32% to 
29%) and 6 (from 47% to 41%) percentage points respectively, 
in 1970, and by 2 (from 43% to 41%) and 5 (from 55% to 50%) 
percentage points respectively in 1979. 
To conclude, the effect of family benefits in reducing 
inequality appears to be small, and decreases between 1970 
and 1979. 
If we take into account tax policy with the action of 
the "familiar ratio", which also helps reduce inequality 
according to the size of household, we must calculate the 
inequality in per capita income after transfers and taxes, 
i.e. inequality in disposable per capita income. This has 
been done for 1979, and Table 3.5 compares inequalities in 
income per capita according to the size of household, and for 
1) declared income 2) income after transfers but before 
taxes, and 3) disposable income (after transfers and taxes). 
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It appears that the "familiar ratio" has no longer a 
great influence on the reduction of equality in the standard 
of living between households according to their size. 
TABLE 3.5 
DISPARITIES BETWEEN HOUSEHOLDS OF DIFFERENT SIZES 
ACCORDING TO THE KIND OF INCOME PER CAPITA TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT 
(income per capita of households of 1 person = 100) 
Size of 
Households 
Declared income Income 
(from labour, prop. before 
and pensions) taxes 
Disposable 
income 
1 person 
2 persons 
3 persons 
4 persons 
5 persons 
6 persons 
3.2.2 
100 
90 
72.5 
57 
45 
28 
The age of the head of 
100 
90 
73 
59 
50 
35 
household 
100 
89 
73 
60 
51.5 
37 
The age of the head of the household is also a major 
factor in causing disparities in households' standard of 
living. Those who.are under 25 are often unmarried living 
alone, or young married couples, whose income is often only 
based on a beginner wage, or on profits from a practice still 
composed of a few people, or from a farm where the burden of 
borrowing is great. 
Households whose head is between 26 and 35 years old are 
usually married couples with their first baby, and the 
presence of another wage or a profit from a non-wage activity 
is more frequent. Those who are between 36 and 45 years old 
are those with the highest disposable income, but also those 
who have the largest household size. After 55, the average 
number of persons in the household is no longer 3 but 2, the 
children having left. Within this generation of households, 
working women are less frequent, which explains the decrease 
in the average disposable income per household. Then, after 
65, the husband has often died, and the household is often 
composed of an old woman receiving only a single pension. 
Considering the disparities in disposable income per 
household, the biggest disparity is that between the young 
married couple aged under 25 years old and the household 
whose head is between 36 and 45 years old: the gap is 44%. 
The disparities in disposable per capita income are less 
important and the ordering no longer the same as for 
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disposable income per household. In fact, the household 
whose head is between 3 6 and 45 years old becomes the 
poorest. Then, as the head gets older the children leave 
home gradually and the disposable income of the household 
keeps increasing. Eventually the standard of living of older 
households appears higher than the one of couples with 
dependent children. 
TABLE 3.6 
DIFFERENCES IN THE AVERAGE DISPOSABLE INCOME PER CAPITA. 
ACCORDING TO THE AGE OF THE HEAD OF THE HOUSEHOLD 
(all households = 100) 
Age of Disposable Income Average number 
head of of persons 
household per household per capita in household 
Aged under 25 70 93 2.09 
Aged 26 to 35 107 91 3.25 
Aged 36 to 45 125 88 3.91 
Aged 46 to 55 117 102 3.15 
Aged 56 to 65 96.5 117 2.28 
Aged 66 or over 73 119 1.68 
All households 100 100 
This surprising result depends partly on the indicator 
of inequality. If instead of taking the disposable per 
capita income we had taken the equivalent disposable income, 
the ratios would not have been the same. The youngest 
households would have appeared poorer than those whose head 
is between 36 and 45 years old which have two children, and 
the oldest households would not appear so much richer. 
3.2.3 The number of workers within the household 
In 1970, households whose only source of income was 
social transfers or income from property, declared on average 
an amount of income which was half the average income 
declared by households who had one of their members 
(generally their head) working. The difference between 
households with only one person working and households with 
two active members, was less important; the second worker 
contributed only about 45% extra income. Finally households 
with 3 workers or more earned only about 13% more than those 
with 2 workers. In 1979 differences in the income declared 
to the Tax Office according to the number of workers in the 
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household had decreased, at least between households with no 
workers or just one or two. We can explain the decrease in 
the gap between the income of inactive households with no 
worker and the income of households with only one worker, by 
a greater annual rate of growth in pensions than wages. In 
contrast we expected that the reduction of disparities 
between wages of men and women during these years, would lead 
to an increase in the income of households with two workers, 
which would be faster than the increase in the income of one 
worker households, so that the gap between the two average 
incomes would also increase. But, on the contrary, the gap 
was not 43% but 37% in 1979. Again structural effects 
combined with age factor interposed: on average two worker 
households are younger than the one worker household. 
TABLE 3.7 
AVERAGE DECLARED INCOME PER HOUSEHOLD ACCORDING TO THE 
NUMBER OF WORKERS WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 
(income declared by no-worker household = 100) 
1970 1979 
No worker households 
One worker households 
Two worker households 
Three or more worker households 
All households 
However, the average income declared by households with 
three or more workers grew more rapidly than that of two 
worker households, and in 1979 the gap between the two was 
17% rather than the 13% it was in 1970, on average. 
Disparities between per capita disposable income are not 
so important, as the average number of persons per household 
increases as the number of workers does, as we see in 
Table 3.8. 
We should take into account the influence of 
unemployment on household income. However, unfortunately we 
do not have any indication of the income of households where 
one or two workers are unemployed. 
We only know through the Employment Survey, which is 
published each year, which group of households has the 
greatest probability of having one or two workers unemployed. 
100 
200 
287 
325 
208 
100 
158 
219 
253 
163 
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TABLE 3.8 
DISPOSABLE INCOME PER HOUSEHOLD AND PER CAPITA 
ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF WORKERS WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD 
DISPOSABLE INCOME 
per household per capita 
No worker households 53 
One worker households 98 
Two worker households 13 2 
Three worker households 156 
105 
92 
109 
92 
Average number 
of persons 
by household 
1.6 
2.9 
3.3 
4.65 
All households 100 100 
For instance in 1963 we know that the rate of 
unemployment was 9.3% among manual workers and 8.2% among 
clerical staff and shop assistants, but only 3.3% among 
salaried staff and 1.9% among executives. Clerical staff and 
shop assistants are generally women who are married to 
salaried staff as well as to manual workers, but the other 
socio-economic groups are mostly men at the head of the 
corresponding households. Thus we can say that the 
probability of unemployment is greater among manual 
households than among executives or salaried staff which 
increases inequalities. 
We also know that in 1986 the greatest probability of 
having one or two persons unemployed was found among married 
couples with three children or more; especially among 40 
year olds or over, whose children are grown-up. More than 
20% of them had at least one person unemployed and 5% two 
persons unemployed. 
3.2.4 The socio-economic group of the head of household 
In a household the main source of income is generally 
from the labour market activity of its members. In a married 
couple where husband and wife both work, the greatest income 
from activity is very often the husband's who is, moreover, 
considered to be the head of the household. 
In France, income from work, particularly for wage 
earners, is tightly linked to the socio-economic group to 
which one belongs, and not so much to ability and 
professional experience. 
That is why the socio-economic group to which the head 
of the household belongs is a strong determining factor in 
the household's income, and is as important as the number of 
workers within the household. 
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If we consider the income declared to the Tax Office in 
1979 it appears, despite a real decrease in the disparities 
since 1970, that the average income of a salaried executive 
was three times greater than that of a non-working household. 
If we take into account the family benefits received and 
the taxes paid, as well as the number of persons within the 
household, the differences are not so important. The non-
working households have only 2.9 persons on average, against 
2.75, which is the mean for the whole population of 
households. This explains why their per capita disposable 
income is slightly higher than the average. In contrast, in 
manual worker households the average number of persons is 
3.4, higher than that of the salaried executive's (3.12). 
Nevertheless, the action of the tax policies explains that 
differences in per capita disposable income between these two 
socio-professional groups are less important than the 
differences in the income declared to the Tax Office. 
TABLE 3.9 
DIRECT TAXES ON INCOME BEFORE TAXES RATIO 
1970 1979 1984 
Farmers 
Self-employed 
Executives 
Salaried staff, professional and 
technical 
Clerical and shop assistants 
Manual workers 
5.9 
9.9 
10.4 
5.8 
4.6 
3.1 
7.2 
11.3 
11.6 
7.3 
6.0 
4.2 
9.1 
13.6 
14.2 
9.3 
7.1 
4.9 
All working households 6.4 7.7 9.3 
As far as non-wage earner households are concerned 
(farmers and self-employed), the income they declare to the 
Tax Office cannot be considered reliable because of fiscal 
fraud. If we take the disposable income definition from the 
national accounts which corrects the sub-declared incomes and 
recovers all kinds of social transfers, Table 3.11 confirms 
the conclusions found in Table 3.10 concerning the decrease 
in disparities since 1970, except for farmers whose income is 
low in relation to the average. Nevertheless, in 1979 
farmers appear to have had the same per capita disposable 
income as clerical workers. Incidentally, the self-employed 
households, had the highest per capita disposable income from 
the beginning of the crisis (1975). 
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TABLE 3.10 
DISPARITIES IN INCOME DECLARED ACCORDING TO THE 
SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL GROUP OF THE HOUSEHOLD, AND 
DISPARITIES IN PER CAPITA DISPOSABLE INCOME 
average 
Income declared per capita number of 
disposable persons in 
1970 1979 income household 
Farmers 
Self employed 
Executives 
Salaried staff 
Professional and 
technical workers 
Clerical and shop 
assistants 
Manual workers 
Inactive households 
All households 
51 
172 
260 
149 
102 
87 
60 
100 
69 
171 
214 
129 
94 
84 
71 
100 
55 
131 
176 
118 
100 
75 
105 
100 
3.7 
3.2 
3.1 
3.0 
2.7 
3.4 
1.5 
2.8 
Since 1979 the disparities have kept decreasing between 
the different salaried socio-professional groups. In 
contrast, the gap in disposable income between inactive and 
active households keeps growing. 
Finally farmers are 
affected by the crisis. 
the socio-economic group most 
Another factor in income disparity is the educational 
attainment of employees and professional workers. The Income 
Survey does not include data on the educational level of 
households. However, through the Employment Survey we have 
data on the median income of the heads of households 
according to their educational attainment. This data shows 
that in 1986 households' heads who graduated from University, 
and especially those who graduated from Colleges of 
University level, specialising in professional training (2.6% 
of the population) , have a median income three times greater 
than that of households' heads who did not get a degree after 
leaving school (16.7% of the population). This is not 
surprising as the former are executives and the latter manual 
workers. 
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TABLE 3.11 
CHANGES IN DISPARITIES IN DISPOSABLE INCOME PER CAPITA* 
ACCORDING TO THE SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL GROUP OF THE HOUSEHOLD 
Farmers 
Self-employed 
Executives 
Salaried staff 
professional 
and technical 
Clerical and 
shop assistants 
Manual workers 
Inactive 
households 
All households 
1970 
98 
185 
168 
1975 
89 
174 
166 
1979 
89 
174 
152 
1984 
83 
165 
140 
Distribution 
of households 
in 1982 
4.2% 
6.9% 
6.4% 
109 107 100 95 9.8! 
92 
68 
93 
00 
93 
69 
103 
100 
89 
69 
109 
100 
90 
70 
117 
100 
11.4% 
28.4% 
32.8% 
100% 
* All social transfers included, and after correction 
of fraud, as it is calculated by the national accounts. 
TABLE 3.12 
MEDIAN INCOME ACCORDING TO THE EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
OF THE HOUSEHOLD'S HEAD 
Primary school 
High School 
College 
University 
Unknown or no degree 4,890 
CE.Ρ 5,541 
Β.E.P.C (Β.E) 6,173 
CA.Ρ + Β.E 5,586 
Baccalaureate 7,069 
Bac.+ technical degree 7,444 
D.U.Τ or DEUG 7,848 
Diploma 2nd or 3rd 
cycle universitarie 9,595 
Diploma d'une grande 
ecole 14,758 
francs 
francs 
francs 
francs 
francs 
francs 
francs 
francs 
francs 
each 
each 
each 
each 
each 
each 
each 
each 
each 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
month 
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However, despite the fact that Education in France is a 
public utility to which everyone has access, whatever standard 
of living he has, Table 3.13 shows that 47% of working men whose 
father is, or was, an executive or a professional are executives 
or salaried staff because 51% have the baccalaureate degree or a 
higher degree. In contrast 45.5% of working men whose father 
is, or was, a manual worker have left school without any degree 
and only 5.3% have got the baccalaureate. Because of this there 
appears to be an inter-generational reproduction of social 
inequality. 
TABLE 3.13 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT ACCORDING TO THE 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP OF THE FATHER 
Percentage of working men 
Socio-economic group of Father 
Farmers 
Self-employed 
Executive or Professional 
Salaried staff 
Clerical or shop assistant 
Manual worker 
without 
any degree 
54.9 
30.0 
9.3 
19.0 
31.3 
45.5 
hav ing the 
baccalauréat 
6.3 
18.2 
51.2 
25.0 
13.5 
5.3 
3.2.5 The area and rate of urbanisation 
The disparities in income per household between the 21 
administrative areas of the French territory seem important. 
For instance, the average income in Limousin or in Languedoc-
Roussillon is lower by 25 to 30% than the average income of 
households living in Alsace or in the Rhone-Alpes area. 
Nevertheless, area is not in itself, a factor in income 
disparity. For instance, if the lowest average income for 
executives is found in Basse-Normandie and in Picardie, for 
the salaried staff it is found in Poitou-Charente and in 
Languedoc-Roussillon. And finally, for clerical workers, it 
is found in Bretagne and in Limousin. 
There is only one characteristic area from this point of 
view; it is the Region Parisienne, often called Ile de 
France, where you can find the highest average income for 
every socio-professional category. 
There are two reasons which explain this: firstly it is 
where the highest rate of women's work is found, and 
secondly, though the two factors are linked, it has the 
highest rate of urbanisation. 
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Table 3.14 shows the difference in the average income of 
households between the Ile de France area and the others, in 
1979. The difference grows with the age of the household's 
head, and decreases with the number of workers within the 
household. Farmers are with the inactive households (who are 
older than the others) the only socio-professional group for 
which the gap exceeds 40%. 
These disparities have decreased considerably in the 
past few years. In 1970 the ratio between the average income 
per household in the Ile de France and the average income of 
the whole population of households was 1.40 as opposed to 
only 1.25 in 1979. 
This can be explained by a decrease in the disparities 
in household income according to the size of the municipality 
they live in. 
Nevertheless, the disparities between the income of 
households living in Paris and the income of households 
living in the country, are still significant, as is shown in 
Table 3.15. 
TABLE 3.14 
RATIO BETWEEN THE INCOME PER CAPITA OF HOUSEHOLDS 
LIVING IN ILE DE FRANCE, AND THE AVERAGE INCOME OF 
HOUSEHOLDS, ACCORDING TO VARIOUS CRITERIONS IN 1979 
All households 1.38 
Households whose head is a farmer 
Households whose head is self-employed 
Households whose head is an executive 
Households whose head is salaried staff 
Households whose head is a clerical worker 
Households whose head is a manual worker 
Households whose head is inactive 
One person households 
Two person households 
Three person households 
Four person households 
Five or more person households 
No worker households 
One worker households 
Two worker households 
Three or more worker households 
Households whose head is 25 years old or less 
Households whose head is 26 to 35 years 
Households whose head is 36 to 45 years 
Households whose head is 46 to 55 years 
Households whose head is 56 to 65 years 
Households whose head is 66 or older 
2 . 3 6 
1 .36 
1 . 1 3 
1 .22 
1 . 2 1 
1 . 2 1 
1 .47 
1 .32 
1 .34 
1 .27 
1 .28 
1 .36 
1 .47 
1 .42 
1 .30 
1 . 3 0 
1 . 1 6 
1 .29 
1 . 4 1 
1 .44 
1 . 5 1 
1 . 4 1 
** 
* * 
** 
** 
** 
100 
148 
165 
217 
100 
114 
118 
150 
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TABLE 3.15 
CHANGES IN DISPARITIES IN AVERAGE INCOME PER HOUSEHOLD 
ACCORDING TO THE SIZE OF THE MUNICIPALITY THEY LIVE IN 
1970 1979 
Country municipality 
Towns of less than 100,000 inhabitants 
Towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants 
Paris and Greater Paris 
4. THE POPULATION AFFECTED BY POVERTY 
We have seen the influence of different factors on the 
inequality of household income. Nevertheless all of them 
cannot be credited with the same importance. 
For example, even if having a large family is a factor 
of inequality between households, the average per capita 
income of an executive married couple with three children is 
greater than the average income of a manual household 
composed of one person only. 
In the same way, we saw that in 1979, the average income 
of households living in Paris was 40% greater than the 
average income of households living somewhere else in the 
country, but the average income of a manual household living 
in Paris was lower than the average income of a salaried 
executive household living in a small town. 
In fact, for the great majority of the households, 
earnings from work are the main source of income. The socio-
professional group to which the household belongs appears, 
therefore, to be the main factor of inequality. 
In Tables 4.1 to 4.3 for any population of households 
declaring one, two, three or more different sources of 
income, and within each of these populations for any family 
structure you find the same order; the average declared 
income of executives is greater than that of salaried staff, 
which is itself greater than the average income of clerical 
households, these all having a higher average income than 
that of manual households. 
However, not every manual household or inactive 
household has the same standard of living. The standard of 
living of the former depends on the number of incomes he 
receives from the activity of its members, from a pension, or 
from property. In 1979, 55% of manual households declared 
only one income (the wage of the head of the household), and 
only 8% of them declared three incomes or more. In contrast 
30% of executive households declared only one income and 26%, 
three incomes or more. 
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TABLES 4.1 TO 4.3 
AVERAGE INCOME ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
GROUPS AND DIFFERENT STANDARDS OF HOUSEHOLDS 
4.1: FOR HOUSEHOLDS DECLARING ONLY ONE SINGLE 
SOURCE OF INCOME 
Single parent One person Married couples 
families households where husband is 
the only worker 
Farmers n.s 
Self-employed 60,870 
Executives n.s 
Salaried staff 55,860 
Clerical workers 36,340 
Manual workers 28,800 
Inactive households 14,100 
13,940 
46,980 
69,980 
48,740 
37,000 
31,060 
21,970 
25,070 
77,680 
106,720 
69,620 
50,340 
40,670 
n.s 
4.2: FOR HOUSEHOLDS DECLARING TWO SOURCES OF INCOME 
Single 
parent 
families 
One 
person 
household 
Married Couples 
Where 
husband is 
the only 
worker 
With 
husband and 
wife both 
working 
Farmers 57,170 43,470 46,880 43,680 
Self-employed 98,920 102,520 123,860 97,670 
Executives n.s 108,510 167,200 131,200 
Salaried staff 61,910 68,260 93,560 92,780 
Clerical workers 47,160 48,340 66,590 79,680 
Manual workers 40,780 37,290 59,760 68,640 
4.3 FOR HOUSEHOLDS DECLARING THREE SOURCES OF INCOME 
Married Couples 
Farmers 
Self-employed 
Executives 
Salaried staff 
Clerical workers 
Manual workers 
where husband is 
the only worker 
67,350 
145,430 
182,910 
107, 140 
88,210 
76,680 
with husband and 
wife both working 
67,100 
132,840 
170,220 
116,580 
90,990 
81,170 
incomes 
36% 
38% 
44% 
42% 
34% 
37% 
35% 
3 incomes 
or more 
12% 
26% 
26% 
15% 
12% 
8% 
15% 
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TABLE 4.4 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER 
OF INCOMES THEY DECLARE AND TO THEIR SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL 
GROUP IN 1979 
1 income only 
Farmers 52% 
Independents 36% 
Executives 3 0% 
Salaried staff 43% 
Clerical workers 54% 
Manual workers 55% 
Inactives 50% 
The average income of manual households declaring only 
one income is only 69% of the average income of manual 
households. In contrast executive households who declare two 
incomes (which is more frequently the case) have an average 
income which is greater (by 2%) than the average income for 
all executives. The inequality is, therefore, greater than 
it would appear from the averages calculated for each socio-
professional group. 
Finally, within manual households who declare only one 
income, 70% are married couples with an inactive wife, 25% 
are composed of one-person households, and 5% of single-
parent families. 
The average income of married couples is slightly 
higher. But 60% of them have at least two dependent 
children. So their average per capita income is 40% below 
the average per capita income of manual workers, and 
represents only 42% of the average per capita income of the 
whole population. 
In other respects the per capita income also depends on 
the nature of the various incomes the household receives. 
Comparing Table 4.1 with Table 4.2, we see that, when the 
second source of income is the wife's wage the income of the 
married couple is increased: 
by 23% for executive households (131,200F/106,720F) 
by 33% for salaried staff 
by 58% for clerical workers, and 
by 68% for manual workers. 
As a matter of fact, as we have already seen, most 
working women are clerical workers or salaried staff. The 
ones who are clerical workers earn wages which are close to 
those earned by manual and clerical men. In contrast, women 
who are salaried staff, receive wages which are 33% below the 
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average wage of men salaried staff, and 6.5% below that of 
executive men. Therefore, working women reduce the 
disparities in income of households according to the socio-
economic groups to which they belong. 
If we compare the last two columns in Table 4.2 we see 
that amongst married couples whose second source of income is 
not derived from the wife's activity, the disparities in 
income according to the socio-economic group to which the 
household belongs are increased, compared to those observed 
for households declaring only one single source of income. 
This comes from differences in the nature of the second 
source of income. This second source is usually an 
investment income in executive or self-employed households, 
and a pension in manual and clerical households. On average 
this pension, received by one of the members of the 
household, is low, especially compared with the wage the wife 
would earn working full-time. Executive married couples, 
where the wife does not work, earn a higher wage (because the 
head is older, or because the family may move more easily 
from one town to another, or even to another country) and, 
like self-employed households, usually have a second source 
öf income - high investment earnings. 
Factors of poverty can also be seen if we rank 
households according to their per capita income and look at 
the distribution of persons among the different quartiles or 
deciles, according to certain characteristics of their 
households, or according to their individual characteristics. 
4.1 Large families 
Large families are concentrated more in the first two 
quartiles demonstrating the greater proportion of persons per 
household. 
4.2 Farmers' and manual workers' households 
If we take the average distribution of persons as a 
reference, we can also see in Table 4.5 that persons living 
in farmer households have the greatest probability (73%) , of 
belonging to a household whose per capita income is low 
(below the first quartile). This result can be explained 
partly by the understatement of farmers' income, and partly 
by a greater number of persons per household. But it is also 
evident that the dispersion of income is very large among 
farmers and that a great proportion of them do receive a low 
income while others are quite rich. 
The probability of belonging to the poorest households 
is also high for manual workers (53%). It decreases as we go 
up the socio-economic scale and is only 5.4% for persons 
living in an executive household. 
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In contrast people living in a professional self-
employed household like that of a lawyer or a doctor, have 
more than a 40% chance of belonging to a household whose per 
capita income is among the highest. 
TABLE 4.5 
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS ACCORDING TO THE 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP OF THEIR HOUSEHOLD 
Income per capita of the household 
belonging to 
The first The second The third The upper 
quartile quartile quartile decile 
Type of Household 
persons belong to 
Farmer 
Self-employed 
Professional 
Executive 
Salaried staff 
Clerical 
Qualified manual 
Non qual. manual 
All persons 
All households 
4.3 Single--pa: 
wife does 
73.0 
29.4 
9.7 
5.4 
18.7 
30.5 
48.8 
55.6 
35.5 
25.0 
rent fa 
not wo 
mil 
rk 
14.7 
22.6 
13.0 
12.0 
25.1 
26.2 
25.0 
23.4 
24. 1 
25.0 
ies and 
7.2 
20.4 
20.4 
27.3 
30.8 
24.7 
18.9 
15.3 
22.1 
25.0 
married couples 
1.7 
14.4 
41.0 
27.7 
8.6 
4.6 
1.2 
0.8 
7.0 
10.0 
where 
Another type of household for which the probability of 
having one of the lowest per capita incomes is high is the 
single-parent family whose head is a woman. For a person 
living in such a household the probability of a low income is 
61.4%. It is lower than 31% for persons belonging to a 
married couple household where husband and wife both work. 
But the probability of belonging to the 25% poorest 
households reaches nearly 50% for couples where the wife is 
not working. 
4.4 The other factors which are much less important 
or linked with the above 
The influence of age, or the life cycle effect, does not 
appear as important when compared with the two factors we 
have already observed. However, the probability of belonging 
to the poorest, from the standard of living point of view, 
reaches 46.7% for the persons living in a household whose 
head is between 36 and 45 years old and decreases as the age 
increases. 
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TABLE 4.6 
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS ACCORDING TO THE 
STANDARD OF HOUSEHOLD THEY BELONG TO 
Income per capita of the household 
belonging to 
The first The second The third The upper 
quartile quartile quartile decile 
Persons belonging 
to a household 
whose head is 
a wife 
with children 
a man 
whose wife is 
. salaried staff 
. clerical 
. manual 
. non-working 
an inactive 
person 
25, 
61. 
36, 
7, 
13. 
30. 
49. 
25. 
.1 
.4 
.8 
,1 
,6 
.8 
,8 
,6 
28.0 
23.6 
23.6 
13.9 
29.6 
35 
21. 
All persons 35.5 
29.6 
24.1 
23.1 
11.3 
22.0 
36.6 
34.8 
24.2 
15.9 
26.0 
22.1 
10. 
1. 
6. 
15. 
5. 
1. 
5. 
7.1 
7.0 
TABLE 4.7 
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS ACCORDING TO THE AGE OF 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 
Income per capita of the household 
belonging to 
The first The second The third The upper 
quartile quartile quartile decile 
Persons belonging 
to a household 
whose head is 
aged under 25 
aged 2 6 to 35 
aged 3 6 to 4 5 
aged 4 6 to 55 
aged 56 to 65 
aged 65 and over 
All persons 
33.0 
39.9 
46.7 
36.1 
26.9 
17.5 
35.5 
23.3 
25.1 
21.4 
21.4 
21.7 
33.1 
24.1 
28.3 
21.5 
18.4 
20.6 
24.7 
27.4 
22.1 
1.5 
4.0 
4.6 
9.3 
12.4 
9.1 
7.0 
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When a woman works the probability of her belonging to 
one of the poorest households is low (less than 30%) . But 
when she is between 20 and 59 years old and not working, the 
probability is high (46.2%). 
In contrast a working man often still has a wife who 
does not work and dependent children. If he is a manual 
worker the probability of him belonging to one of the poorest 
households is 38.2%. 
TABLE 4.8 
DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS ACCORDING TO THEIR SEX 
AND THEIR ACTIVITY 
Income per capita of the household 
belonging to 
The first The second The third The upper 
quartile guartile guartile decile 
Inactive persons 
over 60 years old 17.7 
Inactive persons 
aged 20-59 46.2 
32.8 
21.4 
28.0 
17.0 
8.5 
7.1 
All women working 
Executive female 
Salaried female 
Clerical female 
Manual female 
All men working 
Executive male 
Salaried male 
Clerical male 
Manual male 
1 6 . 7 
4 . 7 
6 . 9 
1 2 . 4 
2 7 . 8 
2 8 . 5 
4 . 5 
1 3 . 2 
2 1 . 3 
3 8 . 3 
2 3 . 3 
4 . 7 
1 3 . 1 
2 5 . 1 
3 1 . 7 
2 3 . 0 
9 . 4 
2 1 . 4 
2 4 . 3 
2 7 . 1 
2 9 . 6 
1 9 . 5 
3 0 . 1 
3 3 . 3 
2 6 . 6 
2 4 . 4 
2 3 . 3 
3 1 . 9 
2 9 . 4 
2 3 . 2 
1 1 . 1 
4 4 . 0 
2 0 . 1 
8 . 7 
2 . 7 
8 . 7 
3 5 . 4 
1 2 . 3 
5 . 8 
1 . 8 
All persons 35.5 24.1 22.1 7.0 
Finally, if we take per capita income as the standard of 
living indicator, neither inactive households nor retired old 
people appear as the poorest. People living in an inactive 
household have only 25.6% probability of belonging to a 
household whose standard of living is among the lowest. (see 
Table 4.6) 
Of the retired and inactive persons over 60 years old, 
only 17.7% of them belong to a household whose per capita 
income is among the lowest. (Table 4.8) 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The increase in the participation of women in the labour 
market, important amongst married women from 20 to 50 years 
old, cannot only be imputed to a reduction of the earnings of 
the household due to the great extension of unemployment 
since 1973. 
As a matter of fact, the increase in the female rate of 
activity is as important amongst the richest households as it 
is amongst the poorest. However, as we have seen above, this 
increase, together with the relative decrease in the number 
of young people, has prevented an increase in the dependency 
ratio since 1973, and partly contributed to the reduction in 
the dispersion of income amongst households. 
The earnings received from the head of the household's 
work are a determining factor in disparities in households, 
even if the wife's wages contribute to a reduction of them. 
Concerning disparities in the per capita income of 
households, the main source of dispersion remains the number 
of persons the household is composed of. The effect of 
family benefits in reducing inequality appears to be small, 
but it decreased between 1970 and 1979 giving these 
disparities the opportunity to increase. 
However, the number of large families has decreased since the 
sixties, even amongst married couples where the wife does not 
work; which partly contributes to reducing the dispersion of 
per capita income. 
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APPENDIX 
In this chapter the income considered is the income of 
the household. A household is composed of every person 
living together in the same house, or the same apartment, and 
their different earnings, whether they are related or not, 
are considered together. 
The main source of data concerning household incomes in 
France is the Income Survey, a survey of a representative 
sample of 40,000 tax declarations from those that each head 
of household, whether he is taxable or not (even if he did 
not earn during the whole year) , must send each year to the 
Tax Authorities (Direction Generale des Impots). These 
declarations concern the cash incomes subject to the income 
tax that each member of the household received (earnings from 
employment, self-employment, investment income and some 
transfer payments). 
Its periodicity fluctuates and the sampling, analysing 
and publishing delays are important. The last survey 
published concerns the incomes received in 1979; the 
previous surveys concern the incomes received in 1975, 1970, 
and 1965. 
In the 1979 survey one can find every "taxable" revenue 
declared by the household. Each one of the labour revenues 
is taxable. But this is not the case for capital or 
investment revenue. Some of them are not taxable at all, as 
for example, the revenues issuing from State loans, from 
housing-savings and from savings banks. Other capital 
revenues are subjected to a contract tax which is deducted as 
it arises and, due to this, are not on the household's tax 
declaration. Finally, only some of the social transfers are 
taxable and must be on the household's tax declaration. This 
is the case for pensions (but not for the minimum old-age 
allowance), and benefits paid to the unemployed by ASSEDIC, 
and, since 1979, for daily transfer payments for illness. 
However, knowing the composition of the household and the 
incomes declared, it is possible to calculate the family 
benefits received (or the minimum old age allowance) and the 
taxes paid so that we can know the disposable per capita 
income. 
If one compares the data issued from the Income Survey 
and those concerning the "Gross Disposable Income of 
Households" published in the National Accounts, the former 
present an amount which is below that of the latter by more 
than a third. 
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This deviation can be partly explained (one third of it) 
by the understatement of some of the incomes received by the 
tax-payers (especially self-employment revenues and 
investment incomes). However, the remaining two-thirds of it 
lie in differences in the definition of income. 
As a matter of fact, the income definition by the 
National Accounts is larger, due to some fictitious earnings 
as the imputed income for owner-occupation included in the 
calculation of the household's income. Also included is the 
production of the family garden (broadly estimated by the 
national accountants) and all social transfers concerning 
health, transfer payments, as well as incomes in kind, like 
free medical aid, and all hospital care ... Due to this old 
people, as well as large families with young children to care 
for appear richer. 
In other respects the "gross" disposable income includes 
capital consumption which should not be taken into account to 
compare self-employed household's income with employee headed 
households. Finally, no sharing out between the different 
households is done with this kind of revenue so that we can 
only have average incomes for each socio-professional group 
of households. 
Other data on household income exists in France, but 
does not have the characteristics we need to study income 
distribution among households. 
Tax data has a double advantage, it is exhaustive and is 
published each year. Therefore, the data is recent and 
reliable. However, the concepts they use as "income groups" 
and "tax units" are well adjusted for the study of taxes 
perceived by the State according to each kind of revenue, but 
not for the study of total income distribution and 
inequalities among households. 
The Family Benefits Offices collect data on the incomes 
of their recipient population. But this population is the 
only one for whom data is collected. 
Finally, calculations are made on various family 
standards, according to the composition of the family and the 
socio-professional group to which its members belong. The 
average wage of the group and the transfer payments they 
should receive according to the transfer tables, and then 
subtracting from this sum the tax they should pay according 
to the tax-table. These calculations remain theoretical and 
their only concern is these peculiar family standards. 
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THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN GERMANY 
Alois Guger 
Institute of Economic Research Vienna 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade, there has been renewed interest 
in the subject of the distribution of income. After a period 
of high and continuous expansion, growth faltered, 
unemployment increased rapidly, and real net incomes 
stagnated all over the world. Many industrialized countries 
experienced stagflation and turned into "Zero-Sum Societies' 
(Thurow) for nearly a decade. Despite a considerable 
extension of social security schemes, the economic situation 
of the unemployed and problems of poverty have become topics 
of growing concern again. 
The subject-matter of this paper is the household 
distribution of income in Germany since the early seventies. 
The main objectives of this research are: 
show how income distribution has behaved in the course 
of the economic and social developments of the last 
decade; 
to identify the major factors associated with income 
inequality and its change; 
to assess the redistributive impact of the public 
sector. 
This paper starts with a short description of the 
available data. After surveying the long-run development of 
the factor and household distribution of income and the main 
macro-economic, social and demographic factors, a more 
detailed account of the household distribution of income in 
the years 1973, 1978 and 1985 will be given. We then try to 
identify the main characteristics of income inequality in 
Germany, and study the relationship between income 
distribution and the economic and social developments of the 
last decade. 
2. SOURCES OF DATA, INCOME UNIT, AND INCOME CONCEPT 
There are two kinds of data sources on income 
distribution - official records, i.e. tax statistics, 
employment data or the records of the social security system 
etc. and survey results, i.e. the income-expenditure survey 
and the mikrozensus. As a rule, data from different sources 
is of limited compatibility, because data is rarely collected 
specifically for the purpose of measuring the size-
distribution of income. 
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Both data sources have their inherent shortcomings as a 
basis for measuring income inequality (SAWYER 1976). 
Unadjusted official records normally cover only part of the 
population and include only some sources of income, e.g. 
income tax statistics omit those below the tax thresholds and 
tax-free transfer payments; survey-based information is, 
besides the usual sampling errors, subject to varied response 
rates and misreporting of income which introduces an element 
of bias: it underestimates the degree of inequality because 
there are indications that income going primarily to higher 
income classes (e.g. property and entrepreneurial) is more 
under-reported than income from other sources; and the 
definitions of the income units of two sources are rarely in 
line with each other. (Information on the available data on 
income distribution in Germany is given in the Appendix.) 
There are many reasons for incomparability in the 
sources of income distribution. Therefore, a number of 
adjustments have to be made to make the various available 
information consistent and suitable for study. The German 
Institute of Economic Research (DIW) made the necessary 
adjustments for Germany and constructed a Social Accounting 
Matrix which combines the information on distribution from 
various sources with the corresponding data of the National 
Accounts (GOSEKE & BEDAU 1974). 
The data prepared by the DIW together with the National 
Accounts, the Income Expenditure Survey, the Mikrozensus, and 
the Earnings Statistics are the main sources on income 
distribution used in this paper (cp. Appendix). 
This study focuses on the welfare position of the 
individual household. It looks mainly at the distribution of 
disposable income, but we are also interested in the sources 
of income and the redistributive activities of the welfare 
system. The income concepts employed are, therefore: 
original or primary income, i.e. gross market income of 
employees (wages and salaries) , and entrepreneurial or 
property income (profits, rents, dividends and interest 
payments); 
total income, i.e. gross market income plus transfer 
payments (pensions, social security payments, other 
transfer expenditures); 
disposable income, i.e. total income less direct taxes 
and social security contributions. 
The corresponding income receiving unit is the private 
household which is either a one-person or a multi-person 
household. Persons living in institutions like hospitals, 
monasteries or homes fore the aged are excluded. 
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3. INCOME INEQUALITY TRENDS 
This section presents some data on the overall long-run 
development of inequality on the German economy, and on the 
main structural and macro-economic changes affecting the 
distribution of income. 
3.1 Long-run changes in the size distribution of 
household income 
The starting point in this analysis is shown in Chart 1 
which plots the quintile shares of household distribution of 
disposable income and the development of the Gini coefficient 
over the period 1950 to 1985. 
The overall distribution of household income suggests 
some movement towards equality in that the bottom quintiles 
have tended to gain some share of total disposable income, 
whilst the top quintile tended to lose, until the early '80s. 
Since then the top quintile has improved its position, whilst 
the first and second quintiles have remained in the same 
positions. 
The general picture which emerges is that in the '50s 
and early '60s the dispersion of income narrowed somewhat 
but, widened again in the second half of the '60s. From 
1970, when the dispersion in income was nearly as high as in 
1950, to the early '80s, the development of quintile shares 
and Gini coefficients indicates a greater shift towards 
equality. 
Any assessment of these changes in the overall 
distribution of income has to consider macro-economic and 
structural factors, such as demographic changes, changes in 
the household size (Table A.l; Appendix), and changes in the 
socio-economic or sexual structure of the labour force. In 
the next section we look at the functional distribution and 
some macro-economic figures, before going into structural 
considerations in the following chapter. 
3.2 Macro-economic development and changes 
in factor shares 
Changes in factor shares have, for a long time, been 
seen as an important factor in altering the size distribution 
among persons and households (NOLAN 1987). The idea being 
that a large proportion of profits and sei f-employment income 
goes to the top deciles, thus cyclical fluctuations in 
profits would show up in pro-cyclical changes in the top 
deciles. 
The long-run trend in the distribution of factor income 
is mainly determined by the structure of employment; i.e. 
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TABLE 3.1 
Wording population, employment, and unemployment in the long run 
Participation Rates Unemployment Rate 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
Total 
Population Employ-
ment 
46,894 
55,425 
60,652 
61,566 
19,997 
26,247 
26,668 
26,302 
Self 
Employ-
ed 
6,323 
5,990 
4,422 
3,316 
Em-
ployees 
13,674 
20,257 
22,246 
22,986 
Unem-
ployed 
1,580 
271 
149 
889 
Total 
Labour 
Force 
46.0 
47.8 
44.2 
44.2 
Unemployment rate 
Work- Employees Unemployed in % 
ing in % of of 
Popu- Total Non Self 
lation Employ- employed 
ment Labor Total 
Force 
42.6 
47.4 
44.0 
42.7 
68.4 
77.2 
83.4 
87.4 
10.4 
1.2 
0.7 
3.7 
7.3 
1.0 
0.6 
3.3 
O 
1973 
1978 
1985 
61,976 
61,326 
61,025 
26,922 
25,699 
25,534 
4 , 3 5 8 
3 , 4 3 5 
3 , 2 7 1 
22,564 
22,264 
22,515 
273 
993 
2,304 
43.9 
43.5 
45.6 
43.4 
41.9 
41.8 
83.8 
86.6 
88.2 
1.2 
4.3 
9.3 
1.0 
3.7 
8.3 
Source : Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden, Lützel : Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen 1950-1984, 
1984, 1986 ; Wirtschaft und Statistik 3/1987, 6/1985. 
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TABLE 3.2 
THE LONG-RUN DEVELOPMENT OF 
Year 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1973 
1978 
1980 
1984 
1985 
1950/60 
1960/70 
1970/80 
1973/78 
1978/85 
National 
income 
1 
1, 
1, 
1, 
78,5 
240,1 
530,4 
720,9 
,009,3 
,149,4 
,351,6 
,423,3 
Compen-
sation of 
employees 
FACTOR SHARES IN NATIONAL INCOME 
Property 
and entre-
preneurial 
income 
in bill. DM 
45,7 
144,4 
360,6 
509,5 
720,9 
842,1 
953,4 
989,4 
averaqe rate of 
11.2 
8.2 
8.0 
7.0 
5.9 
11.5 
9.6 
8.8 
7.2 
4.6 
32,8 
95,7 
169,7 
211,4 
288,4 
307,3 
398,2 
433,9 
qrowth per 
10.8 
5.9 
6.1 
6.4 
6.0 
Wage Sha 
(Wage-income 
actual 
58.2 
60.1 
68.0 
70.7 
71.4 
73.3 
70.5 
69.5 
vear in % 
0.3 
1.2 
0.7 
0.2 
-0.4 
re 
ratio) 
adjusted by 
employer-
employee 
ratio 
in % 
65.7 
60.1 
62.9 
64.1 
63.6 
64.8 
62.5 
61.5 
-0.9 
0.5 
0.5 
-0.2 
-0.5 
Source: Lutzel, H.: Entwicklung des Sozialproduktes 1950 
bis 1984, Wirtschaft und Statistik 6/1985, 3/1987. 
Bundesamt Wiesbaden: Statistiches Jahrbuch. 
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TABLE 3.3 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY: 
GDP. NATIONAL INCOME AND DISPOSABLE INCOME 
IN THE LONG RUN 
At Constant Prices (1976) 
GDP National income Disposable income 
per per per 
in bill. person in bill. person in bill. inhabit-
employed employed ant 
DM DM DM 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1973 
1978 
1985 
1950/60 
1960/70 
1970/80 
1980/85 
1973/78 
1978/85 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
263,1 
611,5 
956,6 
,262,0 
,083,6 
,189,5 
,342,0 
13,446 
23,463 
36,017 
48,074 
40,567 
46,386 
52,682 
average rate 
8.8 
4.6 
2.8 
1.2 
1.9 
1.7 
5.7 
4.4 
2.9 
1.8 
2.7 
1.8 
176,0 
445,5 
749,2 
981,5 
854,1 
947,7 
1,011,6 
of arowth 
9.7 
5.3 
2.7 
0.6 
2.1 
0.9 
8,801 
16,973 
28,094 
37,317 
31,725 
36,877 
39,618 
per year 
6.8 
5.2 
2.9 
1.2 
3.1 
1.0 
146,4 
348,8 
604,5 
817,3 
667,4 
774,5 
835,9 
in % 
9.1 
5.7 
3.1 
0.5 
3.0 
1.1 
3, 
6, 
9, 
13, 
,052 
,291 
,966 
,274 
10,930 
12,629 
13,698 
7.5 
4.7 
2.9 
0.6 
2.9 
1.2 
Source: S t a t i s t i s c h e s B u n d e s a m t W i e s b a d e n , L u t z e l : 
Vo lkswi r t s cha f t l i che Gesamtrechnungen 1950-1984, 1984, 
1986; Wir t schaf t und S t a t i s t i k 3/1987, 6/1985. 
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TABLE 3.4 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF GROSS AND NET INCOMES PER PERSON 
IN THE LONG RUN 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
N a t i o n a l 
income 
p e r 
employed 
p e r s o n 
compen- Gross 
s a t i o n Wage 
D i s p o s a b l e Consumer 
Net income p e r P r i c e s 
Wage i n h a b i t a n t 1976=100 
p e r employee 
i n DM p e r y e a r 
3,926 
9,148 
19,889 
43,700 
3,342 
7,128 
16,210 
36,633 
— 
6,144 
13,836 
29,928 
— 
5,172 
10,728 
21,168 
1,392 
3,396 
7,056 
15,540 
44,6 
53,9 
70.8 
117,1 
1973 
1978 
1985 
26 ,778 22 ,579 18 ,780 13 ,800 9 ,360 84 ,4 
39 ,274 32 ,379 26 ,580 18 ,948 13 ,452 106 ,5 
5 5 , 7 4 3 44 ,433 35 ,808 24 ,024 19 ,272 140,7 
a v e r a g e r a t e of growth p e r y e a r i n % 
1950/60 
1960/70 
1970/80 
1980/85 
1973/78 
1978/85 
8.8 
. 8.1 
8.2 
5.0 
8.0 
5.1 
7.9 
8.6 
8.5 
3.9 
7.5 
4.6 
-
8.5 
8.0 
3.7 
7.2 
4.3 
-
7.6 
7.0 
2.6 
6.5 
3.4 
9.3 
7.6 
8.2 
4.4 
7.5 
5.3 
1.9 
2.8 
5.2 
3.7 
4.8 
4.1 
S o u r c e : S t a t i s t i s c h e s B u n d e s a m t W i e s b a d e n , L u t z e l : 
V o l k s w i r t s c h a f t l i c h e Gesamtrechnungen 1950-1984 , 1984, 
1986; W i r t s c h a f t und s t a t i s t i k 3 / 1 9 8 7 , 6 / 1 9 8 5 . 
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3.1) causes the long-run rise of the wage share in national 
income (Table 3.2). Taking into account the changing 
employment structure by the adjusted wage share12 in Chart 2 
the distribution of factor income shows just cyclical 
fluctuations but no long-run trend. 
Turning to macro-economic trends, Tables 3.1-3.4 and 
Charts 2 and 3 present some basic indicators of the long-run 
economic and demographic development. 
The twenty-five years after the war were a period of 
high growth. Real disposable income per person increased at 
a rate of 7.5% per year in the '50s and 4.7% in the '60s, and 
total employment by a yearly rate of 3.1% in the first period 
and 0.2% in the second. (Table 3.3, growth of employment 
implicit in columns 2 and 2.) But, while income and 
employment grew at a remarkably high rate, the distribution 
of income remained fairly stable: the actual share of wages 
in national income increased from about 60% in the early '50s 
to 68% in 1970, but neither the adjusted wage share13 (Table 
3.2 and Chart 2) nor the household distribution of income 
(Chart 1) showed a long-run change in these years. 
In the '70s and early '80s when growth faltered and 
unemployment rose fast, both the adjusted wage share 
increased and the dispersion of household income narrowed; 
i.e. the size of the Gini coefficient decreased from 0.392 in 
1970 to 0.334 in 1984. In the '70s employee's compensation 
grew, not only faster (8.8% per annum) than property and 
entrepreneurial incomes (6.1% per annum, cp. Table 3.2) but 
there was also a considerable increase in the share of 
property incomes accruing to non-self-employed households; in 
1970 40% of all property incomes accrued to self-employed 
households, in 1980 about a third (BEDAU 1984). 
Since 1981 unemployment has exploded and the actual and 
adjusted share of wages in national income has been falling, 
but the ineguality in the household distribution of income 
narrowed further until 1984. Although one might have 
expected that the increase in unemployment would have reduced 
the lower incomes even more, the lower quintiles show a more 
or less steady increase in their income share until 1984, 
while the top guintile lost ground in the increasing share of 
profits in national income during this period. But since 
1985 the size distribution of household incomes appears to 
have widened: the bottom quintile lost some share in income, 
with the top quintile beinq the main gainer in this process. 
12. The adjusted wage share takes into account the 
increasing share of employees in total employment; 
i.e. the actual wage share divided by an index of 
the share of wage earners in total employment 
(1960 = 100). 
13. see footnote 12 
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4. THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
SINCE THE EARLY 1970s 
In this section we shall concentrate on the period since 
the early '70s, and study demographic and structural factors 
which may have led to the changes in the general distribution 
of income. 
4.1 Demographic changes and the size distribution 
of income 
One of the most important demographic changes in the 
post-war period has been the gradual ageing of the population 
(cp Table 4.1). Since the old leaving the work force tend to 
have a lower than average income, an increasing proportion of 
elderly people tends to increase ineguality by swelling the 
numbers in the lower income groups. But, since the early 
1980s this trend has clearly reversed. 
TABLE 4.1 
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION (% SHARE) 
Less than 15 years old 
From 15 to 65 years old 
Over than 65 years old 
1961 
21.7 
67.2 
11.1 
1971 
22.5 
63.1 
14.4 
1981 
17.6 
66.8 
15.6 
1984 
15.4 
69.9 
14.7 
Source: Bundesminister 
Hauptergebnisse 
1984. 
fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung: 
der Arbeits- und Sozialordnung 
The effect of this ageing population has, on the one 
hand, been reinforced somewhat, by a substantial decline in 
the participation rates of males over the age of 55, and of 
females over 60. On the other hand, the on-going increase in 
female participation, has increased total labour force 
participation which is likely to have lowered the inequality 
in household income, as the Gini coefficients in Table 4.5 
indicate. The income of multiple-earner households is 
considerably more equally distributed than that of one-earner 
households which are over-represented in lower, as well as 
higher income groups. 
The growing demand for higher education which is 
indicated by falling participation rates of young people 
certainly reduces inequality in individual incomes, but its 
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distributive effect on household income seems to be narrowing 
since the influx to higher education is higher in high-income 
groups. (Table 4.2 provides data on labour force 
participation rates by age and sex, Table 3.1 presents data 
on total participation.) 
Another general trend which tends to increase inequality 
in addition to the ageing of the population, and which is 
partially related to it, is the decline in the size of 
households. The average household's size was 2.7 in 1972 and 
2.3 in 1985 (Table 4.4). The share of one-person households 
increased in this period from 26% to 31.6% (cp Table 4.3). 
Using average figures for eight OECD countries M. Sawyer 
(1976:20) showed that nearly 70% of the households in the 
bottom decile were one-person households. 
A contrary, but more than compensating effect, which 
tends to lower the inequality of household income, may have 
arisen from an increasing proportion of two and more earner 
households. The share of one-earner households decreased 
from 66.4% in 1973 to 60.8% in 1985, as the figures in Table 
4.3 shows. This was guite a substantial shift, bearing in 
mind that, at the same time, the number of one-person 
households rose quickly. A glance at Table A.l reveals that 
there had only been a slight shift in the mid '70s, but since 
1978 household size fell, and the number of earners per 
household increased substantially. 
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TABLE 4.2 
LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES BY AGE AND SEX 
Age 
15-20 
20-25 
25-30 
30-35 
35-40 
40-45 
45-50 
50-55 
55-60 
60-65 
65< 
1972 
Male 
62.1 
83.6 
93.0 
98.1 
98.7 
98.4 
96.7 
93.9 
86.2 
68.5 
15.0 
Female 
60.4 
67.0 
53.4 
48.1 
48.5 
50.0 
50.7 
46.5 
36.0 
17.7 
5.7 
Total 77.5 39.1 
1979 
Male Female 
52.0 46.2 
81.1 69.2 
90.2 60.8 
97.3 55.0 
98.3 53.6 
98.1 54.4 
96.6 51.3 
92.9 46.7 
82.3 38.4 
39.5 11.4 
7.7 3.1 
72.8 39.2 
1985 
Male Female 
47.9 41.9 
80.1 73.8 
87.9 67.0 
96.4 61.6 
97.7 61.9 
97.6 61.6 
96.6 57.1 
93.2 50.2 
79.1 37.8 
33.0 10.9 
5.7* 2.5* 
60.3 35.9 
* 1984 
Source: Mikrozensus S t a t i s t i s c h e s J a h r b u c k fur d i e 
Bundes repub l ik Deutschland. S t a t . Bundesamt 
Wiesbaden. 
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TABLE 4.3 
PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS 
Household by 
Social Group 
Self-employed 
Farming 
Non-farming 
Employees (incl. 
unemployed) 
Civil servants 
Non-manual 
Manual 
Retired 
Old-age pensions 
(private) 
Public pensions 
(Government) 
Total 
BY SOCIAL GROUP AND SIZE AND NUMBER 
Share of 
respective 
group 
in total 
1973 
in 
9.7 
2.6 
7.1 
56.4 
6.2 
20.3 
29.9 
33.8 
29.4 
4.4 
100.0 
1985 
% 
7.6 
1.6 
6.0 
52.5 
6.3 
22.4 
23.8 
39.9 
35.9 
4.0 
100.0 
Average 
size 
1985 
Share of 
respective 
one-person 
household 
1973 
persons 
per 100 
households 
314 
415 
289 
268 
282 
249 
283 
164 
164 
161 
231 
9.0 
3.4 
11.3 
16.1 
18.0 
18.4 
14.2 
47.2 
47.2 
47.0 
26.0 
OF EARNERS 
Group in 
total one-
earner 
household 
1985 1973 1985 
in % 
12.1 
4.3 
14.2 
19.9 
16.0 
25.6 
15.6 
50.7 
50.6 
51.9 
31.6 
in % 
70.1 
79.5 
66.8 
60.0 
65.4 
65.8 
55.0 
76.0 
76.1 
74.8 
66.4 
42.3 
32.6 
45.0 
54.7 
58.1 
61.1 
47.8 
72.4 
72.4 
72.2 
60.8 
Private households 22.735 25.175 
in 1,000 
5.900 7.955 15.095 15.3 
Source: DIW, Schriften zum Bericht der Transfer-Enquete-Kommission, 
Bd. 1(2) 1985; Bedau, K-D.* DIW-Wochenbericht 51-52/1986. 
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TABLE 4.4 
Share of respective Disposable income 
group in total Average size per household per person 
1972 1982 
in % 
1985 1972 1982 1985 1972 1982 1982 1972 1982 1 
persons per average 1972 average 
100 households = 100 = 100 = 100 
Farming 
Non-farming 
2.5 
6.7 
Civil servant 6.2 
Non-manual 
Manual 
Unemployed 
Retired 
Others 
19.4 
30.6 
0.5 
30.5 
3.8 
1.7 
5.9 
6.3 
21.7 
22.7 
2.6 
34.3 
4.9 
1. 
6. 
6, 
20, 
22. 
3. 
33. 
6. 
.5 
.0 
.2 
.9 
, 1 
,2 
,6 
,5 
463 
326 
318 
282 
319 
287 
172 
190 
436 
311 
303 
267 
308 
250 
167 
190 
415 
289 
282 
249 
283 
225 
164 
200 
132 
276 
120 
114 
87 
58 
64 
64 
121 
271 
126 
116 
92 
53 
69 
61 
160 
171 
184 
178 
185 
159 
188 
167 
76 
225 
100 
108 
73 
54 
98 
90 
68 
214 
102 
107 
74 
52 
101 
79 
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 
in 1000 
All private 
households 22,647 24,724 25,615 
266 245 231 100 100 174 100 100 
in DM in DM 
22,548 39,335 8,487 16, 
Source: Stat. Bundesamt Wiesbaden: Schuier, K. 
Einkommensverteilung nach Haushaltsgruppen, 
Wirtschaft und Statistik 7/1984 
Using Gini coefficients as a measure, Table 4.5 compares 
the inequality of disposable household income according to the 
size of household and the number of earners. Income 
distribution within multiple-earner households is substantially 
more equal than within one-earner households. 
While the income inequality of one-person and one-earner 
households did not change in the '70s, the Gini measures 
indicate a narrowing of the dispersion of incomes of multiple-
person households and particularly of multiple-earner 
households. 
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TABLE 4.5 
COMPARISON OF THE INCOME INEQUALITY 
BASED ON HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
Household size 
One earner 
Two and more earners 
One person 
Two person 
Three persons 
Four persons 
Five and more persons 
All households 
Gini coefficient 
1973 1975 1978 
. 3 8 5 
. 2 7 4 
. 3 1 5 
. 3 3 6 
. 2 9 8 
. 2 9 9 
. 2 9 0 
. 3 8 6 
. 2 5 8 
. 3 0 5 
. 3 2 9 
. 2 8 6 
. 2 7 8 
. 2 8 0 
. 3 8 5 
. 2 5 1 
. 3 1 6 
. 3 2 4 
. 2 8 1 
. 2 7 2 
. 2 8 0 
370 366 364 
Source: DIW: Bericht der Transfer-Enquete-Kommission, 
Bd 1(2) 1982. 
The evidence on the distributive effects of the socio-
demographic changes since the early '70s does not, at first 
glance, seem to be clearly conclusive. While the gradual 
ageing of the population, the decreasing participation rates of 
the elderly and the falling size of households, are likely to 
have widened the dispersion of household income, rising womens' 
participation and, partially related, the increase in multiple-
earner households seems to have lowered inequality. A glance 
at the development of the general distribution of household 
income suggests that factors leading to greater inequality were 
dominant. 
4.2 Socio-economic changes and the size distribution 
of income 
The distribution of income is necessarily linked to the 
socio-economic structure of the economy. As the conditions of 
production and remuneration vary with sectors; occupations, 
employment status, age and sex; population shifts react 
automatically on the general distribution of income. 
The principle factors determining the overall distribution 
of income are: 
income differentials between various sectors and social 
groups ; 
the relative size of the respective sectors and groups as 
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measured by the proportion of the population which they 
employ; and 
the extent of dispersion of incomes within each sector or 
group. 
4.2.1 Differentials in gross earnings of individuals 
and households 
There are many different sources of inequality in 
individual pay. There are inequalities which result from 
industry or geographical location, or the size of the firm in 
which a person is employed. Other sources of inequality are 
associated with the personal characteristics of the individual 
like sex, age, and education. Still other dimensions of 
inequality derive from differences in working hours, or from 
the place of the worker in the occupational hierarchy. We are 
now going to look at the same data illustrating the most 
important dimensions of inequality. 
Pay differentials between sectors and industries 
Saunders and Marsden (1981) found that "West Germany had 
the most equal pattern of pay" (p. 344) of the EC-member 
countries for the 1970s. This data, however, is only available 
up to 1978. According to the latest available data on labour 
costs in the EC, inter-industrial wage differentials seem to 
have widened considerably in German industry since 1978. An 
international comparison of inter-industrial hourly labour cost 
differentials for manual workers shows that earnings 
differentials in Germany and Austria are by far the largest in 
industrialized Europe, though they are still significantly 
lower than in the USA and Japan. (Guger 1987)14 
Information on inter-sectoral differentials in earnings 
per year is shown in Table 4.6. In energy and insurance 
activities people earn between 30% and 40% more than the 
average wage, in tourist services incomes are about 40% and in 
farming 20% below the average income. There has not been a 
significant change in the inter-sectoral wage differentials 
since 1975 and as the data in Table 4.6 indicates, the 
coefficient of variation decreased just slightly between 1975 
and 1985. 
Occupational pay differentials 
The simplest form of occupational differential is between 
manual and non-manual workers. (Tables 4.7 and 4.8.) Earnings 
differentials between manual and non-manual workers are guite 
14. The coefficient of variation of labour costs varies 
between 8.5 and 19.7 in Europe; Germany being on the 
upper end and Sweden and Denmark on the bottom. 
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substantial, and have slightly widened in the last decade. 
According to the data in Table 4.8 the earnings of male manual 
workers were, on the average, 2 5% below the income of non-
manual workers in 1973 and about 30% in 1982 and 1985 (Table 
4.7). Evidence which accords to the hypothesis that the 
incomes of blue-collar workers varies more significantly with 
labour market conditions than the salaries of white-collar 
workers. As the figures illustrate, this increase in the 
disparity between blue and white-collar incomes is entirely 
confined to the final goods production and building; there 
were no changes in the occupational earnings differentials in 
basic industry, mining, and energy production. 
Skill differentials in earnings 
Pay inegualities within each occupational group, manual or 
non-manual workers, are to some extent the result of skill 
differentials. Manual workers of the lowest skill earn about 
20% less than their highest skilled colleagues. This 
relationship has remained fairly stable for blue-collar workers 
since the early '70s, but widened for white-collar workers. 
The skill differentials in salaried income are much wider than 
in manual earnings. In 1973 the average salaries of the 
lowest-skilled group was 50% of those in the highest-skilled 
group, and in 1982 45% (Table 4.8). But, as the data of 
Saunders and Marsden (1981 Chapter 4.8) suggests, this increase 
in salary differentials was confined to the late '70s and early 
'80s. 
Pay differentials according to sex, age and education 
In every country the distribution of income among 
economically active persons is subject to the influence of 
differences in remuneration according to sex. age, and 
education. 
The differentials in remuneration between men and women 
are partly due to differences in activities, education, and 
working time, and partly to discriminatory practices. Table 
4.9 presents some evidence for full-time employees in Germany. 
In 1981, the remuneration of full-time employed women was two-
thirds that of men's earnings for both manual and non-manual 
workers. Sexual wage differentials are smaller in energy 
production, banking and insurance than on average (Table 4.7). 
As Saunders and Marsden (1981) showed, during the 1970s the 
tendency was for women's pay differentials to narrow. But, in 
the 1980s, sexual wage differentials narrowed for manual 
workers only, as the data in Tables 4.7 and 4.9 reveal. 
There are inter-relationships between age, sex, education, 
and experience which cause inequalities in pay. On the whole, 
remuneration increases with age and education; people under 30 
with or without professional training earn considerably less 
than the average. Academics and people with higher 
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professional training earn 40% more (Table 4.9). 
Since women generally stop working at an earlier age than 
men the women's labour force is younger than that of men. For 
most women high activity rates in youth are followed by years 
of domestic activity and restricted earning possibilities in 
the case of a subsequent return to paid work. This factor may 
be of more importance to salary earners because of the frequent 
use of incremental wage scales for non-manual workers. For 
women manual workers, on the other hand, their concentration 
within low-wage industries and shorter hours are more important 
factors. (cp. Saunders and Marsden 1981, chapter 5 for further 
information). 
The statistical basis is too weak to identify sexual pay 
discrimination; thus, the question of whether the principle of 
"equal pay for equal work' is fully applied remains unanswered. 
To give precise weight to all the various factors involved 
in individual earning differentials and their mutual 
interactions is not possible because information is too 
incomplete. However, a broad assessment of the changes in 
earning differentials in Germany suggests that pay dispersion 
narrowed gradually until the late '70s, and then widened, due 
to increasing differentials within white-collar workers, in the 
late '70s and early '80s. But, taking into account differences 
in working time, by looking at the yearly earnings per 
employee, the overall distribution has been fairly stable since 
the mid '70s (Table 4.6). 
At the household level, the data presented in Table 5.1 
and 5.2 shows that total income (i.e. gross income including 
transfer payments) tended to become more unequal between social 
groups from 1973 to 1978 and less so between 1978 and 1985. 
The coefficient of variation of total household income between 
social groups increased from 56 in 1973 to 60 in 1978, and 62 
in 1985. 
4.2.2 Changes in the socio-economic structure 
Since average incomes between social groups and sectors 
vary, population shifts in the course of economic development 
automatically react on the general distribution of income. 
The long-run shifts in the occupational and skill 
structure of the working population are likely to lower 
earnings differentials. The falling numbers of self-employed 
and manual workers (Table 4.10) as well as the well-documented 
general trend towards a higher-gualified work force (Zangl 
1977, Wolfmeyer and Warnken 1981) suggest a narrowing in the 
dispersion of income. 
The increase in women's participation - as illustrated in 
Table 4.2, and by the sexual composition of the labour force in 
Table 4.10 - is, on the one hand, more likely to widen 
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individual wage dispersion but, on the other hand, leads to 
greater equality in household incomes by adding comparatively 
more to family incomes in the lower income groups than those in 
higher ones." 
The impact of the changing structural distribution of 
employees between activities is more difficult to predict. A 
simple comparison of the employment and earnings structures in 
Table 4.10 and 4.6 seems to suggest that some movement towards 
greater inequality arose from structural change, i.e. the 
decline in manufacture's employment share has not been 
compensated for by a similar increase in some other high-wage 
activities. 
The question arises as to whether wages play the role 
which is attributed to them in theory, or not; i.e. does paid 
employment increase in high-wage industries and diminish in 
low-paid activities? The recent structural changes in the 
economy have, in fact, been shifts to low-wage services and 
away from high-wage industries. If wages fulfill their 
orienting function, there should be a positive correlation 
between the wage and employment structure of an economy. 
Looking at this particular relationship Janke (1981) could not 
find any significant correlation between the wage and 
employment structure in manufacturing in Germany between 1960 
and 1978; i.e. no orienting function of wages, as neo-
classical economics postulates, could be verified. Hence, 
though shifts in employment structures are quite remarkable, 
the results of Janke's research suggests that the effects of 
this structural change in income distribution would not 
necessarily tend to greater equality. 
15. This may change in the near future, in the US for 
instance, labour force participation rates are 
rising most rapidly for women who are married to men 
with high incomes (Thurow 1980). 
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TABLE 4.6 
EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BY ACTIVITY 1975 AND 1985 
Yearly Earnings per Employee 
Index: Average yearly 
Total = 100 rate of growth 
1975 1985 1975-85 
Activity 
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 
Industrial production 
Energy 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Building 
Trading 
Transport and communication 
Services 
Banking and finance 
Insurance 
Hotel and restaurants 
Education, science and 
culture 
Private enterprises 
Public services 
Administration 
Social security 
Total 
Coefficient of variation 
74.6 79.9 
1 0 0 . 7 
1 3 1 . 6 
1 2 3 . 6 
1 0 0 . 0 
9 6 . 1 
8 2 . 4 
1 0 8 . 3 
8 7 . 1 
1 2 1 . 7 
1 3 0 . 6 
5 6 . 4 
1 0 3 . 1 
9 6 . 3 
1 1 9 . 6 
1 1 9 . 7 
1 1 8 . 4 
1 0 0 . 0 
2 1 . 8 0 
i n 
2 2 . 0 8 7 
1 0 7 . 3 
1 3 2 . 0 
1 2 4 . 8 
1 1 0 . 0 
8 8 . 2 
8 7 . 3 
1 0 1 . 8 
8 6 . 8 
1 2 0 . 4 
1 3 8 . 7 
5 8 . 7 
9 9 . 1 
9 9 . 7 
1 0 5 . 0 
1 0 5 . 0 
1 0 4 . 6 
1 0 0 . 0 
2 1 . 3 8 
DM 
3 5 . 8 1 6 
5.7 
5.6 
5.0 
5.1 
6.0 
4.1 
5.6 
4.3 
4.9 
4.8 
5.6 
5.4 
4.5 
5.3 
3.6 
3.6 
3.7 
5.0 
Source: Schoer, K.: Bruttolohne und -gehalter 1975 bis 1985, 
Wirtschaft und Statistik 11/1986. 
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TABLE 4.7 
EARNINGS DIFFERENTIAL BY INDUSTRY. 
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS AND SEX 
1985 
Industrial production 
Energy 
Mining 
Manufacturing 
Building 
Distribution 
Wholesale 
Retail 
Banking 
Insurance 
Total 
Earnings per year 
Manual workers 
Non manual -
68.7 
83.7 
67.9 
68.8 
65.0 
= 100 
Women 
Men 
manual 
69.0 
71.9 
-
67.9 
-
= 100 
non-manual 
65.3 
70.6 
66.6 
65.2 
62.0 
68.4 
66.7 
75.7 
76.6 
63.1 
Source: Hake, L.: BruttoJahresverdienste in Industrie und 
Handel 1985, Wirtschaft und Statistik 12/1986. 
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TABLE 4.8 
CHANGES IN EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS OF MALE EMPLOYEES 
FOR OCCUPATIONAL STATUS AND SKILL 
Manual 
Non-manual 
1973 1982 
Weekly/monthly earnings 
of the lowest skill 
group in % of the highest 
Manual 
1973 1984 
Non-manual 
1973 1984 
Activity 
Energy 
Mining 
Basic & semi-
finished products 
Investment goods 
Consumer goods 
Food production 
Building 
Services (distri-
bution, banking, 
insurance) 
Total (82) 
75 
60 
71 
69 
71 
73 
64 
74 
74 
60 
71 
62 
66 
70 
61 
79 
69 
84 
79 
77 
81 
79 
69 (81) 79 
78 
70 
83 
80 
79 
81 
80 
53 
57 
50 
47 
49 
52 
43 
53 
80 Í46) 50 
48 
58 
49 
47 
48 
51 
39 
48 
45 
( ) 1962 
Source: Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung: 
Arbeits und Sozialstatistik, Hauptergebnisse 1984, 
1973/74, 1963. 
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TABLE 4.9 
EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS BY AGE AND EDUCATION 
OF FULL­TIME EMPLOYEES 
1981 
Yearly Gross Wage Index 
per employee 
Age 
15­20 
20­30 
30­40 
40­50 
50­60 
60< 
Education 
Compulsory school ing 
17,705 
29,397 
36,316 
36,407 
35,366 
33,837 
52.1 
86.6 
106.9 
107.2 
104.1 
99.6 
No professional ti 
Plus professional 
■ainmg 
training 
High School (Α­level, Abitur) 
No professional training 
Plus professional 
Higher professiona 
University degree 
Sex and occupational 
Manual worker 
Male 
Female 
Non­manual worker 
Male 
Female 
Total 
training 
il education 
. status 
29,327 
34,690 
38.554 
40,945 
48,048 
49,410 
31,892 
34,403 
22,272 
36,396 
43,004 
28,557 
33,962 
86.4 
102.1 
113.5 
120.6 
141.5 
145.5 
93.9 
101.3 
65.5 
107.2 
126.6 
84.1 
100.0 
Source: Bundesamt Wiesbaden: Mayer, H­L., Becker, 
B.: Sozialversicherungspflichtige Beschäftigte nach 
Beschaftigungsdauer, Bruttoarbeitsentgelt und Art der 
Beschäftigung, Wirtschaft und Statistik 12/1984. 
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TABLE 4.10 
EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE BY SEX, OCCUPATIONAL STATUS AND ACTIVITY 
1972 1978 1984 
percentage share 
Sex 
Men 63.5 62.7 61.8 
Women 36.5 37.3 38.2 
Occupational status 
Self-employed 
Employers 
Civil Servant 
Non-manual worker 
Manual worker 
Activity 
Agriculture, forestry 
15.0 
85.0 
7.7 
32.0 
45.3 
12.8 
87.2 
8.7 
36.1 
42.3 
11.8* 
88.2* 
8.9* 
39.5* 
39.8* 
and fishing 
Industrial production 
Energy and mining 
Manufacturing 
Building 
Trading 
Transport and communication 
Services 
Banking and insurance 
Other services 
Non-profit organisations 
Administration and social 
security system 
Total employment 
7.2 
47.4 
2.0 
37.6 
7.7 
12.1 
5.7 
26.9 
2.8 
13.6 
1.5 
9.0 
100.0 
5.8 
44.6 
2.0 
35.8 
6.8 
11.9 
5.8 
31.1 
3.1 
16.0 
1.8 
10.1 
100.0 
5.2 
41.8 
2.0 
32.2 
7.7 
12.4 
5.8 
34.8 
3.5 
19.6 
1.7 
10.0 
100.0 
* 1985 (Mikrozensus, Wirtschaft u. Statistik 4/1987, p. 295). 
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch fur die BRD, Stat. Bundesamt 
Wiesbaden. 
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Although it is doubtful whether the distribution of 
employees' between various activities has affected income 
distribution, the shift in the social structure of households 
since the early '70s (cp. Table 4.4) has led to inequality. 
Though there has been some decrease in the share of self-
employed households, whose income is well above the average, 
the increasing share of the low-income groups has had more 
impact on distribution; the share of non-active households 
(retired, unemployed, and others, i.e. students etc.) increased 
from 34.8% in 1973 to 43.3% in 1985. In 1982 the disposable 
household income of these groups was between 47% and 39% below 
the average. While the number of unemployed households 
increased between 1972 and 1982 at a rate of 19% per annum, 
their relative disposable income fell back from 58% to 53% of 
average income. (Table 4.4) 
Therefore we can say that the effect of structural changes 
in the labour force point in opposite directions: 
(1) the shifts in sexual, occupational, and qualitative 
composition led to greater equality in the size distribution of 
household income; 
(2) the structural changes between activities are less 
conclusive, but are more likely to have widened dispersion; 
and 
(3) the rising share of non-active households have increased 
inequality. 
This effect is underlined by the large decline in the Gini 
measure for each social group, with the exception of the self-
employed, than for all households together (cp Tables 5.3-5.5). 
5. THE REDISTRIBUTIVE IMPACT OF THE WELFARE STATE 
In this final chapter, after looking at the influence of 
taxes and transfer payments on the size distribution of 
household incomes, we are going to study the inequality of 
disposable household incomes within social groups and the 
changes in it since 1973. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present data16 on original (i.e. market 
or primary) household income, on transfer payments, on taxes, 
and social security contributions. This data on transfer 
payments includes social and private transfer payments, i.e. 
payments between households, and from firms to households, such 
as private pensions and insurance payments; and the data on 
taxes and social security contributions also include private 
insurance premiums. 
16. Households of unemployed are not separated in this 
date; they are part of their professional group. 
But compare Table 4.4. 
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The activities of the welfare state increased continuously 
in the period under consideration: In 1973 original income 
amounted to 84% of total income, in 1985 to 80%. While 
original income increased by 5.2% per annum, transfer payments 
grew at a rate of 8.0%. 
The bulk of this shift from market to transfer income 
happened in the mid '70s; between 1973 and 1978 transfer 
payments expanded at a yearly rate of 11% (cp. Table 5.1), 
while taxes and social security contributions increased by 7.4% 
per annum.17 Thus, the disposable to total income ratio 
remained constant at 70%. In the later period, between 1978 
and 1985, the increase in transfer payments was no greater than 
that of taxation, that is 6.0%. Hence, the disposable to total 
income ratio fell to 66% in 1985. 
The flow of transfer payments and taxes between social 
groups (in Tables 5.1 and 5.2) shows a quite remarkable 
pattern.18 The rate of growth of transfer payments to non-
farm self-employed, whose income is about three times higher 
than the average income, is by far the highest one, while the 
increase in their tax payments is one of the lowest. Hence, 
their income after redistribution is still more than three 
times higher than the average income. 
While, from 1973 to 1978 inequality between social groups 
had declined slightly - the coefficient of variation of 
disposable household income fell from 52 to 51 - there has been 
a remarkable increase since then, the coefficient of variation 
was 63 in 1985. The most important factors causing this 
development since the late '70s were the explosion of transfer 
payments to the self-employed, especially to non-farming 
households, and the increase in social security contributions 
(i.e. health insurance) of the retired. While, on the one 
hand, transfer payments to the average household increased at a 
rate of 6.0% per annum farmers got 18.1% and other self-
employed 25.3% more per annum. On the other hand, taxes and 
social security contributions of the retired increased at a 
yearly rate of more than 16% while the average increase was 
6.0%. Since 1978, and even more so since 1983, this high 
increase in the social security contributions of pensioner 
households has been part of a number of policy measures to 
reduce public-budget deficits, which has also included measures 
to slow down the increase in total pensions, unemployment 
allowance, and assistance payments. 
In the late '70s and '80s farmer and manual worker 
households dropped below their 1973 income position. i.e. in 
1975 farmers earned about the average of all incomes, while 
17. We should mention here, however, that there is 
serious doubt about the comparability of the data 
on transfer payments over time. 
18 See footnote 17 
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TABLE 5.1 
AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY SOCIAL GROUPS 
IN GERMANY 1973, 1978, 1985 
DM per month 
(Index: Average income of all households = 100) 
Self-employed Non Civil Manual Old Public All 
1973 
V = 77 
Original income 
Transfer payments 
Total income 
V = 56 
Income taxes and 
contributions to 
social security 
Disposable income 
V = 52 
1978 
Farm-
ing 
3390 
114 
3504 
(121) 
527 
2977 
(149) 
Non 
Manual 
workers 
Farming 
7569 
93 
7662 
(265) 
2313 
5349 
(267) 
3285 
182 
3467 
(120) 
1360 
2107 
(105) 
ser-
vants 
2980 
130 
3110 
(108) 
707 
2403 
(120) 
work-
ers 
2808 
220 
3028 
(105) 
1165 
1863 
(93) 
age 
pen-
sions 
324 
910 
1234 
(43) 
85 
1149 
(57) 
pen-
sions 
388 
1460 
1848 
(64) 
280 
1568 
(78) 
hous 
holds 
2433 
453 
2886 
(100 
885 
2001 
(100 
V = 78 
Original income 
Transfer payments 
Total income 
V = 60 
Income taxes and 
contributions to 
social security 
Disposable income 
V = 51 
4566 10522 
295 216 
4861 .10738 
(120) (266) 
764 
4097 
(147) 
3291 
7447 
(268) 
4694 
340 
5034 
(125) 
2043 
2991 
(108) 
4200 
229 
4429 
(110) 
1001 
3428 
(123) 
3895 
423 
4318 
(107) 
1746 
2572 
(93) 
450 
1389 
1839 
(46) 
131 
1708 
(61) 
525 
2061 
2586 
(64) 
410 
2176 
(78) 
3278 
762 
4040 
(100 
1262 
2778 
(100 
1985 
V = 81 
Original income 
Transfer payments 
Total income 
V = 62 
Income taxes and 
contributions to 
social security 
Disposable income 
V = 63 
4408 15570 6812 5916 5109 812 1048 4458 
946 1047 449 541 491 1904 3332 1146 
5354 16617 7261 5457 5600 2716 4380 5604 
(96) (279) (130) (97) (100) (48) (78) (100 
1570 4814 3124 1976 2419 380 1171 1899 
3744 11804 4136 4482 3180 2338 3201 3706 
(101) (319) (112) (121) (86) (63) (86) (100 
V coefficient of variation 
Source: DIW: Schriften zum Bericht der Transfer-Enquete-Kommission 
bd 1(2) 1982, Bedau, K-D.: Wochenbericht 51-52/1986. 
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TABLE 5.2 
INCREASE IN GROSS AND NET HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME IN GERMANY 1973-1985 
(average percentage change per year) 
Self-employed 
1973/1978 
Original income 
Transfer payments 
Total income 
Income taxes and 
contributions to 
social security 
Disposable income 
1978/1985 
Original income 
Transfer payments 
Total income 
Income taxes and 
contributions to 
social security 
Disposable income 
1973/1985 
Original income 
Transfer payments 
Total income 
Income taxes and 
contributions to 
social security 
Disposable income 
Farm- Non 
ing Farming 
Non Civil 
Manual ser-
workers vants 
Manual Old Public All 
work- age pen- hous 
ers pen- sions hold 
sions 
6 . 1 
2 0 . 1 
6 . 8 
7 . 7 
6 . 6 
6 . 8 
1 8 . 4 
7 . 0 
7 . 3 
6 . 8 
7 . 4 
1 4 . 5 
7 . 7 
8 . 5 
7 . 3 
7 . 1 
1 2 . 0 
7 . 3 
7 . 2 
7 . 4 
6 . 8 
1 4 . 0 
7 . 4 
8 . 4 
6 . 7 
6 . 8 
8 . 8 
8 . 3 
9 . 0 
8 . 3 
6 . 2 
7 . 1 
7 . 0 
7 . 9 
6 . 8 
6 
1 1 
7 
7 
6 
- 0 . 5 
1 8 . 1 
1 . 4 
1 0 . 8 
- 1 . 3 
5 . 8 
2 5 . 3 
6 . 4 
5 . 6 
6 . 8 
5 . 5 
4 . 1 
5 . 4 
6 . 3 
4 . 7 
5 . 0 
1 3 . 1 
3 . 0 
1 0 . 2 
3 . 9 
4 . 0 
2 . 2 
3 . 8 
4 . 8 
3 . 1 
8 . 8 
4 . 6 
5 . 7 
1 6 . 4 
4 . 6 
1 0 . 4 
7 . 1 
7 . 8 
1 6 . 2 
5 . 7 
4 
6 
4 
6 
4 
2 . 2 
1 9 . 3 
3 . 6 
9 . 5 
1 . 9 
6 . 2 
2 2 . 4 
6 . 7 
6 . 3 
6 . 8 
6 . 3 
7 . 8 
6 . 4 
7 . 2 
5 . 8 
5 . 9 
1 2 . 6 
4 . 8 
8 . 9 
5 . 3 
5 . 1 
6 . 9 
5 . 3 
6 . 3 
4 . 6 
8 . 0 
6 . 3 
6 . 8 
1 3 . 3 
6 . 1 
8 . 6 
7 . 1 
7 . 5 
1 2 . 7 
6 . 1 
5 . ; 
8 . 1 
5 . ' 
6 . 1 
5 . : 
Source: DIW: Transfer-Enquete-Kommission Bd 1(2) 1982, DlW-Wochen-
bericht 51-52/1986. 
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TABLE 5.3 
REDISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOMES BY PUBLIC TRANSFERS 
AND TAXES IN GERMANY 
All households 1985 
Deciles Original 
income 
0.6 
0.6 
1.5 
4.5 
6.8 
8.8 
11.2 
13.8 
17.9 
34.3 
0.519 
Transfer 
Payments 
Decile 
15.6 
15.6 
16.9 
16.3 
9.4 
5.4 
4.6 
4.7 
4.8 
6.7 
-0.258 
Total 
income 
share 
3.7 
3.7 
4.6 
6.9 
7.3 
8.1 
9.9 
11.9 
15.2 
28.7 
0.360 
Disposable 
income 
3.6 
4.2 
5.6 
6.8 
6.8 
9.2 
9.3 
11.6 
14.6 
28.3 
0.344 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Gini 
Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung 
(DIW): Wochenbericht 51-52/1986. 
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REDISTRIBUTION BY TRANSFERS AND TAXES 
LORENZ CURVES 
CHART 4 
INCOME 
t.O 
0.9 
0. 8 
0.7 
0. 6 
0. S 
0. 4 
0. 3 
0.2 
0. t 
0. 0 
— O R I G I N A L INCOME 
--TOTAL INCOME 
- OISPOSIBLE INCOME 
1985 
ORIGINAL INCOME 
TOTAL INCOME 
I 0 ■ OISPOSIBLE INCOME 
1973 
i A 
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in 1973 their disposable income had been 20% above average. 
The income position of worker households worsened from 7.0% 
below average in 1973 to 14.0% below in 1985. While civil 
servants held their position at 20% above average, non-manual 
workers improved their position from 5.0% to 12.0% above this 
level, and old-age pensioners, as well as state pensioners, 
fell below average, from 43.0% to 37.0% and 22.0% to 14.0% 
respectively. Non-farming self employed, however, jumped from 
165% to 220% above the average level. 
Thus, there has been a considerable change in social and 
economic policy; while the inequality of income between social 
groups declined slightly until 1978, it widened significantly 
from the late 1970s owing to more than proportionally rising 
transfer payments to the highest income group, and the more 
than proportional increase in taxes and social security 
contributions of the lowest income groups, like pensioners. 
Table 5.3 presents an overall view of the redistributive 
effects of the welfare state for all households in 1985, 
including data on the decile distribution of the various 
components of disposable income: the data shows the important 
impact of transfer payments on distribution; about three 
guarters of all transfer payments go to the five lower deciles. 
The Gini coefficient is reduced from .519 to .3 60 by transfer 
payments, but the influence of the tax system is comparatively 
small. The Gini measure of disposable income in 1985 amounted 
to .344 compared to .360 for total income. 
Another important factor, mentioned above, is the 
dispersion of income within social groups. Tables 5.4-5.6 
present data on the distribution of disposable incomes within 
the social groups under consideration in 1973, 1978 and 1985. 
As the distribution of decile shares and the Gini 
coefficient show, the household incomes of the private 
economy's old-age pensioners are distributed more unequally 
than the other groups, though the Gini measure fell from .341 
to .294 between 1973 and 1985. This comparatively wide 
dispersion seems to be due to the large number of one-earner 
households in this group. 
With the exception of self-employed households, inequality 
decreased in all social groups and generally over all 
households during this period. In 1985, farmers' (Gini .206), 
manual workers' and state pensioners' household incomes (Gini 
.222 for both) were the most equally distributed. 
Though inequality by social groups increased considerably 
between 1978 and 1985 according to the Gini coefficient, the 
overall distribution of income narrowed even more during this 
period. The Gini coefficient of disposable income for all 
households fell from .370 in 1973 to .364 in 1978 to .352 in 
1985. 
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6. SUMMARY 
The long-run development of the distribution of household 
disposable income in Germany showed a trend towards greater 
equality in the 1950s and early 1960s, and again in the 1970s, 
up to the early 1980s. The bottom quintiles gradually gained 
income shares at the cost of the top guintile during these 
periods. 
The factors which reacted upon distribution were numerous 
and of diverse influence and importance at different periods. 
The most important impact, which led to greater equality, 
probably goes back to socio-demographic changes. Although the 
gradual ageing of the population, and the fall in the size of 
households, and in the participation rates of the elderly, have 
tended to increase inequality in household incomes, the 
narrowing influence of the increase in multiple-earner 
households, and rising women's participation seems to have 
dominated the development and led to greater eguality. 
In the 1970s the impact of these socio-demographic factors 
was less pronounced, their influence was reinforced by a 
narrowing of pay differentials and shifts in the occupational 
and skill structure of the labour force, and by rising transfer 
payments by the state which contributed to the tendency to 
greater equality. 
Since the late 1970s, however, although individual pay 
differentials widened, the dispersion of household incomes 
between social groups increased, and the redistributive 
activities of the state were reduced substantially (cp. 
Chart 4) . The increase in multiple-earner households has had 
such a dominating impact, as a consequence of rising women's 
participation, that equality within in each social group, and 
in the general distribution of disposable household income has 
increased. 
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TABLE 5.4 
DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSABLE HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
Deciles 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Median: 
50% 
earn 
Median 
income 
Average 
income 
Gini 
Self-employed 
Farming Non 
Farminç 
5.7 
6.8 
7.6 
8.2 
8.8 
9.6 
10.4 
11.5 
13.3 
18.1 
37.1 
2735 
2985 
.187 
4.4 
5.6 
6.4 
7.1 
7.9 
8.8 
9.9 
11.4 
13.8 
24.8 
31.4 
4475 
5348 
.278 
Non 
manual 
workers 
í 
4.0 
5.2 
6.2 
7.2 
8.2 
9.4 
10.8 
12.6 
15.2 
21.4 
30.8 
1850 
2106 
.275 
IN GERMANY 1973 
Civil 
Serv-
ants 
Decile 
4.2 
5.5 
6.6 
7.5 
8.5 
9.6 
10.8 
12.4 
14.8 
20.1 
32.3 
2160 
2405 
.252 
Manual Old 
workers Age 
Pensions 
share 
4.1 
5.2 
6.3 
7.3 
8.3 
9.4 
10.8 
12.5 
15.0 
21.1 
31.2 
1649 
1862 
.268 
3.1 
4.1 
5.2 
6.3 
7.3 
8.4 
10.2 
12.9 
16.7 
25.8 
26.0 
195 
1149 
.341 
Public 
pensions 
3.9 
4.7 
5.4 
6.1 
7.0 
8.3 
10.0 
12.3 
15.7 
26.6 
27.1 
1189 
1561 
.334 
All househol 
Average 
income 
per mon 
DM 
2.6 
3.8 
4.9 
6.1 
7.3 
8.7 
10.4 
12.6 
16.0 
27.5 
24.7 
1602 
2000 
.370 
52 
75 
98 
121 
146 
174 
208 
252 
319 
550 
Source: Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung (ed.): Schriften 
zum Bericht der Transfer-Enquete-Kommission "Das Transfersystem 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" Bd 1(2), Kohlhammer, 
Stuttgart 1982. 
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TABLE 5.5 
DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSABLE HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
IN GERMANY 1978 
Self-employed Non Civil Manual Old Public All househo 
manual serv- workers age pensions 
Farming Non- workers ants Pensions Avérai 
Farming inco: 
per mo 
Deciles 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Median 
50% 
earn 
Median 
income 
Average 
income 
Gini 
5.9 
6.9 
7.5 
8.2 
8.8 
9.5 
10.5 
11.6 
13.3 
17.7 
37.3 
3776 
4092 
.311 
4.0 
5.2 
5.9 
6.6 
7.3 
8.0 
9.0 
10.4 
12.6 
31.0 
29.0 
5694 
7447 
.311 
4.1 
5.4 
6.5 
7.5 
8.5 
9.5 
10.8 
12.3 
14.8 
20.7 
30.0 
2692 
2992 
.260 
Decile 
4.1 
5.6 
6.7 
7.7 
8.7 
9.8 
11.0 
12.5 
14.6 
19.4 
32.8 
3163 
3429 
.244 
share 
4.1 
5.5 
6.6 
7.7 
8.6 
9.7 
10.9 
12.4 
14.6 
19.8 
32.5 
2356 
2570 
.248 
3.4 
4.2 
5.0 
5.8 
6.8 
8.3 
10.3 
13.0 
16.9 
26.3 
25.2 
1274 
1707 
.355 
4.0 
4.8 
5.7 
6.5 
7.4 
8.8 
10.5 
12.9 
16.0 
23.4 
28.4 
1755 
2176 
.308 
2.6 
3.8 
5.0 
6.3 
7.6 
8.9 
10.5 
12.5 
15.6 
27.1 
25.3 
2293 
2778 
.364 
7 
10 
13' 
17. 
21i 
24i 
29: 
341 
43: 
75! 
Source: Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung (ed.): Schrift« 
zum Bericht der Transfer-Enguete-Kommission "Das Transfersyster 
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" Bd 1(2), Kohlhammer, 
Stuttgart 1982. 
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TABLE 5.6 
DISTRIBUTION OF DISPOSABLE HOUSEHOLD 
Self-emploved Non 
Manual 
Farming Non-
Farming 
Deciles 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Median 
50% 
earn 
Median 
income 
Average 
income 
Gini 
4.5 
6.3 
7.4 
8.3 
9.1 
10.0 
10.9 
12.0 
13.6 
17.9 
35.7 
3567 
3734 
.206 
3.8 
5.5 
6.5 
7.4 
8.3 
9.3 
10.4 
11.9 
14.3 
22.4 
31.6 
10386 
11806 
.272 
4.1 
5.8 
6.8 
7.7 
8.6 
9.5 
10.6 
11.9 
14.1 
21.0 
32.9 
3730 
4137 
.251 
IN GERMANY 198 5 
Civil 
Serv­
ants 
Decile 
4.2 
6.0 
7.0 
7.9 
8.8 
9.7 
10.7 
12.0 
13.9 
19.7 
34.0 
4146 
4482 
.233 
Manual 
workers 
Ρ 
share 
4.2 
6.1 
7.2 
8.2 
9.0 
9.9 
10.9 
12.1 
13.8 
18.6 
34.6 
3013 
3179 
.222 
Old 
Age ] 
ensions 
2.9 
4.9 
6.2 
7.3 
8.5 
9.6 
11.0 
12.6 
15.0 
22.1 
29.7 
2111 
2338 
.294 
INCOME 
Public 
pensions 
4.4 
6.2 
7.2 
8.1 
8.9 
9.8 
10.8 
12.0 
13.7 
19.0 
34.7 
2992 
3203 
.222 
All househol 
Average 
income 
per mont 
DM 
3.0 
4.5 
5.5 
6.4 
7.4 
8.5 
9.8 
11.7 
14.9 
28.3 
26.8 
2925 
3706 
.352 
1110 
1668 
2036 
2377 
2733 
3138 
3641 
4337 
5518 
10500 
Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW): 
Wachenbericht 51/52/1986. 
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APPENDIX 
A.l Table A.l: The size composition of private households 
by social groups 1973, 1978, and 1985. 
A.2 The reliability of the available data basis, 
1. The Income and Expenditure Survey: 
The IES is a five year representative sample survey which 
has been in operation since 1962/63. The survey looks at the 
income and expenditure of private households, and their socio-
economic characteristics, excluding foreign and very high-
income households. The survey is based on a voluntary sample 
of 50,000 households, i.e. 0.2% of all private households. The 
households co-operating are asked to write down carefully all 
their income for one year, and each expenditure item for one 
month, and to declare the rough structure of the expenditure 
over the whole year. People who are not living in families 
(hospital etc.), households of foreigners and of very high 
income are excluded. As in all comparable surveys there is 
evidence that inequality is underestimated by the IES. (Euler 
1983, 1983a). 
2. The Mikrozensus 
The Mikrozensus is a 1% representative yearly survey on 
personal and socio-economic characteristics of the population. 
There had been regular surveys from 1957 to 1982, but they were 
postponed in 1983 and 1984 and this survey programme started 
again in 1985. Hence, only a small amount of data from the 
1985 survey was available, and the Bundesamt has to rely on the 
EUROSTAT labour force statistics data for these years. 
3. Tax Statistics 
The income tax statistics cover individuals who are taxed 
on assessment. Spouses are normally assessed jointly 
(splitting method). Individuals only receiving wage incomes 
under a certain income level pay no wage taxes and are not 
assessed (1977 two-thirds of all wage-tax payers), and 
therefore not included in the tax statistics. 
National Accounts 
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Wage and Earnings Statistics 
There are yearly wage and earnings statistics covering 
wage rates and earnings on a national and regional basis by 
industries, and qualifications provided by the Statistisches 
Bundesamt Wiesbaden and in three-year periods by the EUROSTAT 
labour cost surveys. 
6. DIW Data 
The distribution accounting of the Deutsches Institut fuer 
Wirtschaftsforschung in Berlin based on data of various sources 
(Mikrozensus, Income and Expenditure surveys, and National 
Accounts) of the Statistisches Bundesamt Wiesbaden (cp. Goseke 
and Bedau 1974). 
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House-
hold 
size 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 + 
one earner 
household 
TABLE A.l 
THE SIZE COMPOSITION OF PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS 
Self-emploved 
Farming 
3.4 
13.7 
19.7 
22.2 
41.0 
79.5 
Non-
Farming 
11.1 
24.9 
22.2 
20.0 
21.8 
66.8 
BY SOCIAL GROUPS 
Non-
Manual 
Civil 
Servants 
workers 
18.4 
24.5 
26.1 
18.9 
12.1 
65.8 
1973 
18.0 
25.1 
25.8 
18.7 
12.4 
65.4 
Manual 
workers 
14.2 
22.6 
26.6 
20.6 
16.0 
55.0 
Old Age 
Pensions 
47.2 
36.3 
10.9 
3.4 
2.2 
76.1 
Public 
pensions 
47.0 
35.6 
11.4 
3.5 
2.5 
74.8 
Al 
hou 
hol 
26. 
27. 
20. 
14. 
11. 
66. 
1978 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 + 
one earner 
household 
3.1 
13.5 
19.8 
22.9 
40.6 
80.2 
12.0 
25.3 
21.8 
19.3 
21.5 
66.8 
19.3 
24.9 
25.9 
18.3 
11.6 
64.9 
19.1 
25.2 
26.2 
18.1 
11.4 
64.8 
14.9 
23.2 
26.4 
20.1 
15.3 
54.9 
48.3 
35.8 
10.5 
3.2 
2.2 
48.3 
36.0 
10.8 
3.0 
2.0 
27. 
28. 
20. 
13. 
10. 
74.7 74.9 66. 
1985 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 + 
one earner 
household 
4.3 
12.3 
18.8 
22.0 
42.5 
32.6 
14.2 
25.5 
23.9 
23.6 
12.8 
45.0 
25.6 
26.0 
22.4 
19.1 
6.9 
61.1 
15.9 
23.8 
23.9 
25.3 
11.1 
58.1 
15.6 
24.8 
25.6 
21.0 
12.8 
47.8 
50.6 
37.8 
7.7 
2.5 
1.4 
72.4 
51.8 
37.0 
7.4 
2.6 
1.2 
72.2 
31.1 
30.1 
17.-
13.1 
7.: 
60.! 
Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Wochenbericht 
51-52/86, Schriften zum Bericht der Transfer-Enquete-Kommissioi 
"Das Transfer-system in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", Band 
Teilband 2. 
104 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BEDAU, K. D. 
BEDAU, K. D. 
EULER, M. 
EULER, M. 
EULER, M. 
Vermogenseinkommen der privaten Haushalte in d 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1970 bis 1983 
Wochenbericht des DIW Jg. 51(31) 1984. 
Aspekte der Einkommensverteilung, Wirtschaftsdien 
VII/1985. 
Die Einkommensverteilung und entwicklung in d 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1962-1978 nach Ergebniss 
der Einkommens und Verbrauchsstichproben 
Konjunkturpolitik Jg. 29(4) 1983. 
Genauigkeit von Einkommensangaben in Abhngigkeit v 
der Art der statistischen Erfassung, Wirtschaft u 
Statistik 10/1983. 
Erfassung and Darstellung der Einkommen privat 
Haushalte in der amtlichen Statistik, Wirtschaft u 
Statistik 1/1985. 
GOSEKE, G. & 
BEDAU, K-D. 
GUGER, A. 
JANKE, A. 
NOLAN, B. 
SAWYER, M. 
Verteilung und Schichtung der Einkommen der privat 
Haushalte in der Bunderepublik Deutschland 1950-197 
Berlin. 
Arbeitskosten und Produktivität als Dererminanten d 
kostenbestimmten We 11 ewerbsfahigkeit de 
österreichischen Industrie, AIGINGER, K. (Hrsg): D 
internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Osterreich 
Osterreichische Strukturberichterstattung 1986, Bd I 
WIFO-Gutachten, WIFO, Wien 1987. 
Lohnnive 11ierung, Lohndifferenzierung un 
Produktivität Mitteilungen des Rheinisch-Westfälisch 
Instituts fur Wirtschaftsforschung, Jg. 32(1-2), 198 
Cylical Fluctuations in Factor Shares and the Si 
Distribution of Income, Review of Income and Wealt 
vol. 33(2), June 1987. 
Income Distribution in OECD Countries, OECD Econom 
Outlook - Occasional Studies, July 1980. 
105 
SAUNDERS, Ch . & 
MARSDEN, D. 
THUROW, L. C. 
P a y I n e q u a l i t i e s i n t h e E u r o p e a n 
B u t t e r w o r t h E u r o p e a n S t u d i e s London 1 9 8 1 . 
Communil 
The Zero­Sum Society, Basic Books, New York 1980. 
WOLFMEYER, P. & 
WARNKEN J. 
ΖANGL, P . 
Zum Wandel d e r b e r u f l i c h e n Q u a l i f i k a t i o n s s t r u k t u r 
d e r B u n d e s r e p u b l i k D e u t s c h l a n d s e i t A n f a n g d e r 61 
J a h r e , M i t t e i l u n g e n d e s R h e i n i s c h - W e s t f a l i s e i 
I n s t i t u t s f u r W i r t s c h a f t s f o r s c h u n g , J g . 3 2 ( 4 ) , 1 9 8 1 
D i e b e r u f l i c h e Q u a 1 i f i k a t i o n s s t r u k t u r c 
E r w e r b s t a t i g e n b e d a r f s v o n 1970 b i s 1 9 8 0 , M i t t e i l u n ç 
d e s R h e i n i s c h - W e s t f ä l i s c h e n I n s t i t u t s f 
W i r t s c h a f t s f o r s c h u n g , J g . 3 2 , 1 9 8 1 . 
106 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FAMILY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
THE ITALIAN CASE 
Antonio Nizzoli Guglielmo Wolleb 
(University of Pavia) (University of Parma, Ismeri Europa) 
We wish to thank Gilberto Seravalli for detailed and 
fruitful comments on a previous draft of the paper and Michele 
Salvati for useful suggestions on the approach to the problem 
of distribution. The paper remains the responsibility of the 
authors. 
107 
INTRODUCTION - THE PLAN OF THE WORK 
The aim of this research is both to analyse changes in the 
distribution of household income from 1975 to 1985 and to 
assess the relative importance of various factors of inequality 
in 1985, the last year for which there is data available. 
The first aim, pursued in Chapter 1, is entirely devoted 
to a temporal comparison of the degree of inequality in 
distribution throughout the seventies and early eighties. 
Changes in ineguality are discussed in relation to the action 
of market forces, to the state redistribution through public 
expenditure and revenues and to structural and behavioural 
changes in the household unit. 
The second aim is pursued in Chapters 2 to 5. In the 
second chapter the main data concerning population, households 
and labour force has been supplied. This includes growth and 
composition of the Italian population, changes in size and 
composition of households, rates of activity, of employment and 
unemployment by sex, age and geographical area. 
The third chapter concerns the life-cycle role and labour 
market relationships in the determination of income 
inequalities. The analysis is based on households of equal 
size. The importance of the employment status and the age of 
the head, of the number of worker-earners, and the composition 
of households (relative number of children and adults) in 
producing different levels of income, is discussed. 
The fourth chapter deals with income differences related 
to the sector of work, to the socio-economic category and the 
level of education of the head of the household. The 
possibility of households being in specific parts of the income 
distribution, according to the socio-economic class and 
education of the head, is also studied. 
The final chapter focuses on income inequalities arising 
from the geographical location of the household. The 
underlying causes of the lower average income in the Southern 
area is also analysed, with special attention being paid to the 
economic determinants of the high dependency ratios prevailing 
in the families of the South. 
The paper is concluded by a statistical appendix reporting 
the main definitions used in the text and commenting on the 
characteristics and reliability of statistical data. 
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THE TEMPORAL COMPARISON OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
1. STABILITY IN DISTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL REGULATION 
1.1 The evolution of income inequality 
In this research the inequality of family income has been 
calculated using the Gini coefficient for the five years 
between 1980 and 1985. Throughout this period the values of 
the coefficient show substantial stability in concentration 
(see Table 1.1 and Graph 1.1). Although we have no data on 
family income before 1980, we do possess data on family 
consumption. The Gini coefficients which have been estimated 
on the basis of this data show that throughout the period 1975 
to 1984 family consumption remained stable (see Table 1.2 and 
Graph 1.2). This impression of stability is confirmed by the 
income distribution per decile between 1980 and 1985 and by the 
consumption distribution per quintile between 1975 and 198519 
(see Tables 1.1, 1.2 and Graph 1.3). If we assume that there 
has been no significant change in saving distribution and 
consider consumption to be a reliable indicator of income, we 
may conclude that the distribution of family income in Italy 
has remained stable over a period of eleven years. 
Before we analyse the causes of this stability in detail, 
it may be expedient to gualify the results of our analysis with 
two preliminary remarks. 
Firstly, we have compared family incomes regardless of the 
size of the household itself. This is due to the fact that the 
Gini coefficients capture the inequalities in distribution of 
income which derive from differences in size between various 
households. Although the Gini coefficients for households of 
the same size would show lower values, these would still 
indicate that there is a very unequal distribution of income 
amongst Italian families. 
Our second qualification concerns the interpretation we 
should give to this stability. Stability in the Gini 
coefficient does not imply that there is no mobility in 
distribution. It is compatible with upward and downward 
movements in the incomes of households of various types. The 
internal distribution may thus change several times without 
affecting the coefficient of concentration which is the 
aggregate degree of inequality. 
These qualifications notwithstanding, the results of our 
analysis are rather unexpected. It is surprising that the 
level of equality in distribution has remained unaffected by a 
lengthy period of workers' unrest, the drive towards equality, 
and the growth of the welfare state. Nor has it been affected 
19. For a discussion on the significance of this result 
see Garonna (1984). 
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by the ensuing reaction from the employers, the de-
industrialization process, or the growth of the informal 
economy. 
There are several factors which affect the level of 
eguality in distribution. However, from our results we seem to 
have to assumed that, contrary to common opinion, these factors 
have had no particular effect; or, alternatively, that due to 
an extraordinary conjunction of circumstances, the net result 
of these factors has been nil. 
We have no ready made explanation for this anomaly. It is 
possible that what we have encountered is a mere statistical 
"trick' produced by the fact that the results of the sample 
survey are unrepresentative. Those who share this view should 
turn to the following section. Nevertheless, we may suggest an 
hypothesis, a direction for enquiry, which could be fruitful. 
The crucial point to focus upon is that the factors which 
act upon income distribution cannot be considered to be 
independent of one another. Firstly, shifts towards inequality 
which originate in one section of the socio-economic system 
elicit counter-tendencies, either in parts of the same section 
or in other areas altogether. Secondly, the actual 
participants in the conflict over income distribution attempt 
to react, rather than tacitly accept changes detrimental to 
themselves. Lastly, there are various shock-absorbers 
contained within the socio-economic system via legal and 
institutional procedures which are activated automatically 
whenever drastic changes in distribution occur. 
There are many examples of this interaction between events 
and behaviours. 
One such instance is the way in which the tendency towards 
the levelling of wages, regarded with suspicion by both the 
employers and certain groups of employees, has been opposed 
through the wage drift, which has resulted in the widening of 
wage differentials. Here we have a confrontation between 
protagonists within the same area of the socio-economic system 
(the market). 
On the other hand, the likely effect on income 
distribution of mass redundancy in the industrial sector has 
been mitigated by either the creation or reinforcement of 
institutions which protect the income of the unemployed. This 
is an instance where tendencies towards inequality which 
operate in a section of the system (the market) activate 
counter-tendencies in another section (the state). 
The drop in the level of income of the head of a 
particular type of household might induce other members of the 
household to look for jobs to integrate and stabilize the 
family income. Here, stability is the result of opposite 
tendencies in different sections of the system, with the family 
itself as the main social actor. 
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TABLE 1.1 
PERCENTAGE OF INCOME OF EACH DECILE 
decile 
Year 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Gin 
1980 2.87 4.84 5.71 6.96 8.00 9.28 10.63 12.33 14.99 24.39 0. 
1981 2.64 4.73 6.07 6.98 8.18 9.43 10.79 12.64 15.23 23.31 0.3 
1982 2.70 4.92 5.92 7.05 8.15 9.35 10.82 12.56 15.03 23.50 0.3 
1983 2.97 5.13 6.30 7.26 8.36 9.71 11.10 13.03 15.17 20.95 0.3 
1984 2.85 4.88 5.92 6.96 8.10 9.31 11.01 12.48 15.01 23.48 0.3 
1985 2.90 4.74 5.89 6.98 8.06 9.54 10.84 12.65 14.93 23.49 0.3 
Source: ISTAT 
TABLE 1.2 
PERCENTAGE OF EXPENDITURE OF EACH QUINTILE 
guintile 
Quintile 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 198 
1st 6.3 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.0 6.6 6.3 6.4 6.1 6. 
(income) (7.7) (7.4) (7.6) (8.1) (7. 
2nd 12.0 11.7 11.7 11.8 11.5 11.8 11.6 11.6 11.5 11. 
(income) (12.7) (13.1) (13.0) (13.6) (12. 
3rd 17.2 16.9 16.9 16.8 16.6 16.4 16.5 16.5 16.5 16. 
(income) (17.3) (17.6) (17.5) (18.1) (17. 
4th 23.8 23.3 23.4 22.9 23.2 22.7 22.8 22.8 23.0 23. 
(income) (23.0) (23.4) (23.4) (24.1) (23. 
5th 40.7 42.1 41.9 42.3 42.7 42.5 42.8 42.7 42.9 42. 
(income) (39.4) (38.5) (38.5) (36.1) (38. 
Gini 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0. 
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These instances, and we could cite many other examples, 
show that stability is the product of a regulatory system in 
which the market, the state, and the family all play 
fundamental roles.20 Thus stability is not a random 
occurrence, but an indication of a long-term equilibrium in the 
balance of power of the various protagonists in the social 
scene. 
To support our hypothesis, it would be interesting to 
follow the income progress from the primary phase of 
distribution through the State redistributive action to the 
eventual household's disposable income. Unfortunately, there 
are no statistical links between the various phases of the 
distributive processes since the bodies of data related to the 
wage system, the welfare state and household income are not 
homogeneous. Furthermore, in Italy the available data on 
family incomes makes no distinction between original income, 
gross income and disposable income. Without such data we 
cannot verify whether the stability of distribution we have 
encountered is the result of a "general" stability within the 
market, the state and household spheres of activity or whether 
it is the result of opposing tendencies in each of these areas. 
In the following pages we will try to single out the 
factors which in the last fifteen years have affected the 
distribution of family income, distinguishing between the 
respective roles of the market, the state, and the family 
itself. However, the significance of these factors is not 
exactly quantifiable and therefore such conclusions may be open 
to doubt. Furthermore, the high level of interaction between 
the state, the market and the family makes it difficult to 
distinguish precisely between the respective influences. Thus 
the separate treatment of their roles should be considered as a 
mere rhetorical device of our exposition. 
1.2 The Market 
In Italy at the end of the sixties, the period of worker 
and union unrest initiated two main redistributive processes. 
On the one hand, the share of wages and salaries increased 
as a percentage of both the gross domestic product and the 
industrial value-added. On the other hand, pay differentials 
amongst employees decreased. The levelling of pay was the 
result of both the egalitarian nature of the economic claims, 
and the peculiar mechanism of indexation based on a uniform 
treatment of all earnings (the 'punto unico di contingenza') 
and on the privileged safeguard of the lowest wages. These 
phenomena operated in an egalitarian direction throughout the 
seventies until their function was exhausted. 
2 0. See Lange-Regini (1987) on the dynamics of a system 
of regulation. 
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From the end of the seventies the situation changed 
radically. The share of the gross operating surplus in the 
national product increased, whilst there was an even greater 
increase in profits from manufacturing. At the peak of the 
cycle, in 1980, the share of profits in manufacturing was 3 
points higher than at the equivalent point of the previous 
cycle in 1973; and the average for the eighties has remained 
constantly at a higher level than it was in the seventies. 
Besides the increase in profits in the industrial sector, 
there was a shift of resources towards the financial capital, 
as a result of restrictive monetary policies based on real 
rates of interest, which were amongst the highest in the 
industrialized countries. 
The move towards the levelling of pay ceased, partly due 
to the freezing of indexation and to the drop in inflation, and 
partly because the working class movement was crushed, and the 
progress of egalitarian values was put in check. Furthermore, 
whilst previous mechanisms of indexation guaranteed an 
automatic, generalised and uniform increase in nominal wages, 
thereby reducing the role of sectorial and local bargaining, 
nowadays, the level of wages is linked to the bargaining power 
of particular sectors of the working class, and therefore 
reflects the balance of power between the various social 
groups. 
Since 1980, employment in the industrial sector, 
particularly in large companies, has fallen sharply, in line 
with what was already happening in other industrialized 
countries. At the same time, there has been an expansion of a 
secondary labour market, characterised by lower salaries, 
precarious conditions of employment, and lack of legal 
safeguards and trade union protection. This expansion results 
partly from the characteristics of a new labour force in which 
women and young people have a greatly increased presence; and 
it is also the result of the employers' interest in more 
flexible labour relations and in a more decentralized structure 
for the labour market. 
It is difficult to say what kind of impact these 
transformations will have on the distribution of income. One 
has the impression that we live in a more segmented and 
corporative society, where more is left to the balance of power 
within both the market and the state: a less egalitarian 
society altogether.21 
1.3 The State 
It would be interesting to assess how effective the 
redistributive function of the state is, and, more particularly 
2:1-. On the danger of an evolution towards a more unequal 
society see Salvati (1984) and Boyer (1986). 
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to see whether the general movement away from egalitarianism 
towards social segmentation has also affected the action of the 
state. Unfortunately, at present we do not have sufficient 
statistical information to draw a conclusive picture of the 
situation. The most recent study on the redistributive role of 
the state at the family level is by Sobbrio in 1974.22 In his 
work Sobbrio maintained that, on the whole, the state performed 
an important redistributive function, since the Gini 
coefficient for the disposable income, 0.325, was significantly 
lower than that for the original income, 0.432. Expenditure in 
education and social transfers played the largest part in this 
redistributive process. Tax revenue had instead a limited 
role, for the egalitarian tendency of direct taxation was 
counterbalanced by the anti-egalitarian bias of indirect 
taxation. Income redistribution through social contributions 
had a moderately regressive effect. 
The lack of recent studies and accurate quantitative 
estimates limit our analysis to the identification of those 
changes in the welfare system which might have affected income 
distribution, distinguishing the expenditure and the revenue 
sides. 
Undoubtedly, public expenditure in Italy increased between 
1971 and 1983, rising from 37% to 57.5% of the GDP. Within 
public expenditure itself, interest payments have increased 
more than proportionally. However, this cannot account for the 
entire increase in expenditure, which has affected all areas of 
welfare. 
Education expenditure has increased in line with the GDP 
and has stabilised at 6%. Health expenditure jumped from 4% to 
6% of GDP in the first half of the seventies and has remained 
at the same level. The income maintenance expenditure has had 
the highest increase, rising from 11% in 1970 to 16.6% in 1983. 
Pensions in particular account for the increase of expenditure 
in the latter group, since there has been a rise in both the 
monetary level of benefits and in the number of beneficiaries. 
Expenditure on pensions represents more than 80% of the total 
income maintenance expenditure, while it is more than 13% of 
the GDP. A more modest, but rapidly growing, share is 
represented by unemployment benefits, which have risen from 
1.7% to 5% in the last fifteen years. Social assistance 
benefits and family income supplements, each of which 
represents 5% of income maintenance expenditure, have 
registered a modest increase in real terms, although their 
share of the total expenditure has decreased. 
Both the size and direction of the distributive effects of 
these trends are difficult to assess, for the beneficiaries of 
public expenditure are numerous.23 
22. See Sobbrio(1979). 
23. See Ferrera (1984), pp. 130-136. 
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TABLE 1.3 
OUTLAYS OF GOVERNMENT 1973-1983 
(Absolute value and % of GNP) 
Years direct indirect contri- other total 
taxes taxes butions 
1973 5398 (6.0) 8784 (9.8) 11341 (12.6) 2318 (2.6) 27841 (31. 
1978 22264 (10.0) 22368 (10.1) 31081 (14.0) 5465 (2.5) 81178 (36.5 
1983 83694 (15.5) 60242 (11.2) 87975 (16.4) 13324 (2.5) 245235 (45.8 
RECEIPTS OF GOVERNMENT 1973-1983 
(Absolute value and % of Gdp) 
Years consumption investment interest transfers total 
(household) 
1973 13907 (15.5) 2562 (2.9) 2269 (2.5) 13281 (14.8) 34116 (38. 
1978 35257 (15.9) 6901 (3.1) 13038 (5.9) 39560 (17.8) 102832 (46. 
1983 104372 (19.5) 22944 (4.3) 48898 (9.1) 109929 (20.5) 308713 (57. 
Source: G. GHESSI, "La finanza pubblica in Italia in cifre 1965-1983 
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TABLE 1.4 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD 1985 
size of the 
household 
% of 
households 
(quintile) 
first 
quintile 
(A) 
fourth 
quintile 
(Β) 
1985 
Β/A 
(1980) 
Β/Α Gini 
1 component 
2 components 
3 components 
4 components 
5 components 
>5 components 
17.9 
23.2 
22.2 
21.7 
9.6 
5.5 
484 
895 
1279 
1353 
1370 
1501 
1321 
2103 
2592 
2918 
3068 
3211 
2.72 
2.34 
2.03 
2.16 
2.23 
2.13 
2.40 
2.35 
2.20 
2.08 
2.17 
2.12 
0.328 
> 2 com 
ponents 
0.277 
Source: ISTAT 
It is not easy to identify the particular beneficiaries of 
expenditure on public goods and this is an issue we cannot 
address here. 
Even though we chose to limit our analysis to monetary 
transfers to households, there is no easy answer to the 
problem. There are transfer payments which are not intended to 
produce a "vertical' redistribution of income, and which 
consequently reach a composite group of beneficiaries. Other 
transfer payments have vertical redistributive effects which 
overlap with the redistributive effects between social 
categories, economic sectors, or geographical areas. Other 
items of transfer payments, due to special conditions of 
eligibility, result in a discriminatory treatment of households 
in similar economic conditions. Finally, similar kinds of 
transfer payments may result in highly discriminatory monetary 
treatments which do not correspond to effective differences in 
needs. 
In order to reach conclusions, we shall consider those 
items of expenditure which have increased most during the last 
fifteen years. 
had 
Very likely, the large increase in pension expenditure has 
a redistributive effect which is a move in an egalitarian 
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direction.24 The redistributive power of the pension system 
lies in the existence of a ceiling which pensions cannot 
supersede, in methods of calculation which are partially 
independent of the past contributions of the beneficiary, and 
above all in the charitable nature of certain pensions. These 
include both social pensions, which are given to those who paid 
no contribution during their working life, the integration to 
the minimum level of contribution for those who did not reach 
it, and disability pensions which, almost invariably, have the 
function of subsidising and integrating the income of those in 
poor conditions. Expenditure on disability pensions in 
particular has greatly increased and now represents 33% of the 
total expenditure on pensions, and equals the amount spent on 
old age pensions. However, these pensions, which are very low, 
cannot guarantee the autonomy of the individual, who is 
constrained to rely on family support. The beneficiaries are 
mostly poor people, in the southern part of Italy, and the 
criteria for entitlement has little to do with either the age 
or the health of the beneficiaries themselves. 
The increase in expenditure on the unemployed has also had 
a redistributive effect, which has partly compensated for the 
anti-egalitarian tendencies of the market. As in the previous 
instance, there are various kinds of subsidies, which differ in 
amount and criteria of entitlement, but which satisfy similar 
kinds of need. On the one hand, there is an ordinary rather 
meagre allowance to which workers mainly in agriculture and in 
the Mezzogiorno are entitled. On the other hand, there is the 
special treatment which the institution of the 'Cassa 
integrazione guadagni' (Cig) reserves for the skilled manual 
and non-manual workers, mainly concentrated in the industrial 
sectors, who receive a sum linked to their last salary. In the 
last fifteen years, the increase in unemployment expenditure is 
almost entirely due to the Cig. The Cig covers two-thirds of 
the salary of those workers who have been made partly or 
temporarily redundant, either due to a crisis which may have 
struck a single company or a whole sector, or as a consequence 
of a process of restructuring and reorganisation. (Those who 
claim the Cig officially maintain their jobs and consequently 
are not classified as unemployed). In the seventies and in the 
early eighties, this institution underwent several 
modifications in order both to improve its efficiency, extend 
its area of intervention into non-industrial sectors, and to 
increase its individual periods of duration.2^ its function is 
to make the consequences of industrial reconversion, which has 
caused a fall in employment in the sector of about 600 thousand 
units in the first part of the eighties, more acceptable. 
To conclude this discussion on expenditure we would like 
to consider one further aspect of pensions and unemployment 
24. On the characteristics of the Italian pension system 
see Regonini (1984). 
25. See Saraceno (1985). 
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benefits.26 Both systems comprise types of transfer payments 
which guarantee a real income, and payments which have a purely 
integrative function. The former are mostly diffused in the 
Centre and North of Italy, and the latter in the Mezzogiorno. 
This partly explains the-phenomena which, as we shall discuss 
later, contributes to territorial inequalities in the 
distribution of family income. Firstly, the 'impoverished' 
beneficiaries of the South must necessarily remain within the 
family; a fact which contributes to make families larger. 
Secondly, their contribution to family income is lower than the 
contribution of earners of analogous transfers in the North of 
Italy. 
To move to revenues, from 1973 to 1983 the evolution of 
revenues was characterised by high growth and a change in 
composition (see Table 1.3). The fiscal reform of 1973 
produced a rise in taxation, largely due to the increase in 
personal income tax (Irpef: imposta personale progressiva). 
Direct taxation increased from 6% to 15.5% of the GDP and from 
19% to 34% of total revenues. This fundamental change in the 
Italian fiscal system has certainly had an egalitarian effect 
on the employees, both because the aliquots increased 
progressively and because the high inflation rates of the 
seventies and the ineffectiveness of the methods of correction 
used caused a fiscal drag effect. 
However, the redistributive power of personal income tax 
is perceptibly reduced by both the high rate of fiscal fraud 
and the erosion of taxable income.27 Tax fraud widens the gap 
between the self-employed, who may have frequent recourse to 
it, and the employees, for whom there is no opportunity for 
fraud. The erosion of taxable income is the way in which 
certain kinds of income, more likely to be found amongst 
wealthy families - share income, capital gains, land and 
property revenues - are either excluded from taxation, or are 
only partly assessed. Tax fraud and erosion provide a natural 
limit to the egalitarian action of personal income tax, the 
main redistributive power of which is exercised amongst 
employees. 
We may note that the above considerations regard the 
redistributive effect of the tax system solely in relation to 
individual earners. Its redistributive effect on households 
certainly has a more distinctively egalitarian character, for 
there is a positive relationship between family income and the 
number of employed/earners in a household, and a similar 
positive relationship between the number of employed/earners 
and the level of taxation of a single household. 
26. See Garonna (1984) pp. 209-218. 
27. See Longobardi (1984) on the redistributive effects 
of the fiscal system. 
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In conclusion, although the statistical information in our 
possession is rather scanty, we may say that throughout the 
seventies and eighties there was no breach of the general 
tendency of state intervention, and that the state maintained, 
and perhaps increased, its redistributive function. 
One might ask whether there is any visible sign that the 
function of the state as a social regulator is about to change. 
In a recent study on the Italian situation the authors 
concluded that in several welfare sectors there had been an 
inversion OF the general tendency: the role of the state has 
been curtailed and its place progressively taken either by 
market forces or by self-help organisations.28 These changes, 
which do not necessarily tend towards inequality, do not come 
from ambitious reforms; nor is it likely that they will be 
rationally programmed in the near future. They are rather the 
result of a piecemeal and 'incremental' process. R. Boyer has 
reached a similar conclusion in an Efer research on the 
transformations in wage structure in Europe. Indeed, he 
maintains that, in spite of violent ideological assaults, the 
European welfare states have been subject to marginal 
modifications rather than radical changes.29 
1.4 The Family 
If the family structure had not undergone a change over 
the last ten years, trends towards equality or inequality would 
derive exclusively from the direct action of the state and of 
the market forces. However, this is not the case, because the 
family has changed in size, composition and in its members' 
behaviour. In the last ten years two particular changes have 
influenced the degree of equality in distribution. 
Firstly, we may consider the decrease in the average size 
of the household, partly due to the increase in the number of 
people who live alone. For reasons which will be better 
explained below, this strengthens the anti-egalitarian 
tendency, both because there is a high degree of concentration 
of income within this type of family and because the one person 
families are concentrated in the lower decili. 
The Gini coefficient for one person families was 0.328 in 
1985, a value which is higher than that calculated for larger 
families: 0.277 (see Table 1.4). In a study conducted in 1981 
on expenditure distribution, Garonna produced similar results: 
the Gini coefficient for one person families was 0.344, for two 
person families: 0.327, and for other types of families 0.285: 
analyses of other countries have yielded similar results. 
Moreover, the bulk of the one person families consists of 
28 See Lange-Regini (1984), p. 45 
29. See Boyer (1986). 
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retired people who lie in the bottom half of distribution. A 
rise in their share of total households is likely to result in 
an increase in inequality. 
Secondly, we should consider the increase in the number of 
people per household who are income earners. Although it is 
certain that this increase affects the position of single 
households on the income ladder, it is not clear whether it has 
an unequivocal effect on income distribution. To answer this 
question one would need accurate information on those families, 
classified according to their level of income, where the 
increase has been more relevant. For instance, it would 
certainly be interesting to establish whether the increase in 
married women who work - the new most important factor in the 
formation of the family income - has been more diffused amongst 
families in the upper or lower decili of income. The most 
likely hypothesis is that women's participation has mostly 
taken place in the households of different size. In the lower 
decili there are many small size households, which comprise 
retired people and singles, where the level of women's 
participation is minimal. In the upper decili, on the 
contrary, there are large size households, where women's 
participation is more likely to occur. A comparison between 
households of the same size would probably produce an opposite 
result both because there is higher women's participation in 
households belonging to low income social groups, and because 
pay differentials between women are narrower than those between 
men. 
1.5 Conclusions 
Until the end of the seventies both at the level of 
primary distribution and state redistribution, the prevalent 
tendency was towards equality. However, two phenomenons of 
which we are not in a position to judge the real influence, 
seem to have worked against this tendency: the change in 
family size and the increased presence of married women in the 
labour market. 
If we do not consider the possibility that the data in our 
possession is utterly inadequate, there are two main hypothesis 
which explain the stability in distribution of family 
consumption shown by the Gini coefficient. 
The first is that, in effect, the distribution of income 
has evolved along more egalitarian lines but that this tendency 
has altered the saving rather than the consumption 
distribution. The second is that there has actually been a 
substantial stability in income distribution. In the latter 
case we must conclude that changes in relation to the power 
between classes and social groups which have taken place at 
political, cultural and social levels have not resulted in any 
change in the distribution of income. The redistributive 
effects originated in the market place, and for the state 
action have therefore been less momentous than it is usually 
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thought, and certainly small enough that they have been 
successfully opposed by counter tendencies in both the 
structure and in the acquired behaviour of the family unit. 
The beginnings of the eighties have, instead, been 
characterised by the substantial weakening of the working class 
position, a reduction in the contractual power of the manual 
workers and the diminished political and cultural influence of 
both the unions and the parties of the left. Nonetheless, 
these changes have made very little difference in income 
distribution unlike the changes in the seventies. 
The picture of the society which emerges from our 
considerations is one where there is a high degree of stability 
in the midst of deep processes of structural and cultural 
transformations; a society in which changes in relation to 
power between the classes are limited and, above all, have a 
limited effect on income distribution; a society whose formal 
and informal mechanisms of regulation have guaranteed the 
stability in distribution for a period as long as ten years. 
CAUSES OF INEQUALITY IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
2. POPULATION, FAMILIES AND LABOUR MARKET 
2.1 Demographic trends 
The object of this chapter is to set out the main data on 
the evolution and composition of the Italian population and 
households and on the changes in the labour market during the 
past ten years. This data is fundamental to the analysis of 
the causes of inequality which will be developed in the 
following three chapters. 
In 1973 the Italian population was 54,650,000. In 1987 it 
was over 57 million. During the last twenty years in Italy the 
demographic trend has been characterised by a steady fall in 
the birth rate (see Table 2.1). While in the fifties and the 
sixties the average birth rate was 18 per 1,000, in 1984 it was 
10.3. The birth rate is now only fractionally higher than the 
death rate and in 1984 the difference between the two resulted 
in a natural population growth of about 50 thousand units - a 
number which is not significantly affected by the net migratory 
flows (see Table 2.2). 
The falling trend of the birth rate is evident throughout 
the national territory. However, the respective starting 
points of the Centre/Northern and Southern parts of Italy were 
different, and while the birth rate is still higher than the 
death rate in the Mezzogiorno, it is lower in the Centre and 
the North. In the latter regions, therefore, the present 
situation is characterised by a population loss of 60 thousand 
a year; while in the Mezzogiorno, the population increases at 
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an average of more than 110 thousand a year. During the first 
two decades after the war, the internal and external migratory 
flows represented a safety-valve for the Mezzogiorno. During 
the sixties these flows drastically declined, and today they 
have a very limited effect on the growth of the southern 
population.30 
TABLE 2.1 
NATURAL GROWTH OF POPULATION 
(1952-1984) 
Years 
1952-61 
1962-74 
1975-84 
1983 
1984 
Mezzogiorno 
births 
23.6 
21.6 
16.4 
14.2 
13.8 
deaths 
9.0 
8.7 
8.8 
8.6 
8.1 
diff. 
14.6 
12.9 
7.8 
5.6 
5.8 
Centre/North 
births 
14.7 
16.0 
10.5 
8.7 
8.4 
deaths 
9.9 
10.4 
10.5 
10.8 
10.1 
diff. 
4.8 
5.6 
0.0 
-1.9 
-1.7 
b 
Italy 
irths 
18.0 
18.0 
12.6 
10.6 
10.3 
deaths 
9.5 
9.8 
9.8 
9.9 
9.4 
diff. 
8. 
8. 
2. 
0. 
1. 
(absolute values) 
1952-61 4,308 1,647 2,661 4,609 3,118 1,491 8,917 4,766 4,15 
1962-74 5,132 2,128 3,004 7,007 4,617 2,390 12,139 6,745 5,39 
1975-84 3,085 1,659 1,426 3,716 3,787 -71 6,801 5,446 1,35 
1983 281 170 111 319 391 -72 600 561 3 
1984 278 162 116 308 370 -62 586 532 5 
Source: SVIMEZ, Rapporto sull'economia del Mezzogiorno. 
30. See Siracusano-Tresoldi-Zen (1986) 
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These demographic trends have influenced both the growth 
of population and its age distribution (see Table 2.3). In 
Italy, as in other countries, the increase in the number of 
people over 65 and the steady decrease in the population under 
14 has resulted in what is normally called the 'ageing' of 
population. The difference between the Centre/Northern part of 
Italy and the South is also reflected in the age structure of 
their respective populations. In the Centre/North the 
percentage of the population above 65 is higher than in the 
South: 13.9% against 10.8%; and, more significantly, the 
population under 14 is a considerably lower percentage: 17.2% 
against 23.8%. All considered, the proportion of the 
population of working age is lower in the South than in the 
Centre/North: 65.4% against 68.9% when we include the 14-18 
age group, and 56.1% against 61.2% when we exclude it. 
2.2 The structure of the households 
The most reliable data on the number of households is from 
the 1981 census (see Table 2.4). According to the census, in 
Italy there were 18,632,619 families and a population of 
56,076,496. In comparison with 1971, the rate of increase in 
households has been higher than that of the population, with a 
consequent decline in the average size from 3.3 to 3.0 members 
per household. This fall is mainly due to the increase in the 
number of one person families, which were 12.9% of the total 
and are now 17.8%; and a parallel decrease in the number of 
large families, which dropped from 21.5% of the total to only 
14.9%. Families with two, three, or four members have 
maintained a constant position throughout the last ten years 
(see Graph 2.1). 
The territorial difference between the Centre/North and 
the Mezzogiorno is reflected in the size of the households. 
Large households are more frequent in the South, and there are 
fewer small size households. In the Mezzogiorno, the average 
size is 3.32 members against 2.89 in the Centre/North. 
2.3 Trends in the labour market 
The increase in the rate of economically active women is 
the single most important change in the Italian labour market 
in the last fifteen years. Although the percentage of the 
working population has fallen, the activity rate for the period 
1970 to 1985 increased from 36.5% to 41%. This increase is the 
result of both the de facto stability of the male activity 
rate, and the steady increase in the female activity rate, 
which rose from 19.2% in 1970 to 28.1% in 1985 (see Graphs 2.2 
and 2.3). The Graphs show that the activity rate of the 
central age groups, from 20 to 50, has increased the most. The 
rate peaks in the group between 20 and 24, is stable until 30, 
and subsequently shows a steady decline with the increase in 
age. The curve for the male rate of activity has a reverse U 
shape, and reaches its peak in the 30 to 50 age group, where 
the rate almost reaches 100%. 
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TABLE 2.2 
Periods 
1952-61 
1962-74 
1975-84 
1983 
1984 
NET MIGRATION FLOWS BY 
Mezzogiorno 
internal 
migra-
tions 
-915 
-1,644 
-307 
7 
4 
migra-
tions 
abroad 
-1,099 
-587 
92 
2 
-
total 
-2,014 
-2,231 
-215 
9 
4 
GEOGRAPHICAL AREA 
Centre-North 
internal 
migra-
tions 
915 
1,644 
307 
-7 
-4 
migra-
tions 
abroad 
-490 
-51 1 
28 
1 
-
1952-
total 
425 
,593 
335 
-6 
-4 
-1985 
Italy 
migra-
tions 
abroad 
-1,589 
-638 
120 
3 
-
tota 
1,58 
-63 
12 
Source: Malfatti (1977); Rapporto sull'economia del Mezzogiorno 
TABLE 2.3 
Census 
1951 
1961 
1971 
1981 
(1985) 
0-4 
9.1 
8.3 
8.2 
5.9 
5.3 
AGE 
0-14 
17.0 
16.2 
16.3 
15.7 
14.2 
DISTRIBUTION 
15-44 
45.9 
43.5 
41.8 
42.4 
43.3 
45-54 
11.4 
12.8 
11.5 
12.7 
12.7 
OF POPULATION 
55-64 
8.4 
9.6 
10.9 
10.3 
11.7 
65-74 
5.7 
6.3 
7.4 
8.5 
7.5 
>74 
2.5 
3.3 
3.9 
4.7 
5.9 
Average 
32.0 
33.7 
34.8 
36.3 
n.a. 
Source: Census, ISTAT estimate for 1985. 
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TABLE 2.4 
HOUSEHOLDS BY SIZE 
(Census 1971 and 1981-Estinate ISTAT 1985) 
1 comp. 2 comp. 3 comp. 4 comp. 5 comp. >5 comp. Tots 
1971 
% 12.9 22.0 22.4 21.2 11.8 9.7 IOC 
House­
holds 2,061,977 3,509,530 3,582,072 3,390,154 1,892,890 1,544,549 15,981 
(Β) 
Compo­
nents 2,061,977 7,019,060 10,746,216 13,560,616 9,464,450 10,637,300 53,489 
(A 
Α/Β =3.3 
1981 
% 17.8 23.6 22.2 21.5 9.5 5.4 100 
House­
holds 3,323,456 4,402,980 4,117,217 4,008,008 1,773,621 1,007,055 18,632 
(Β) 
Compo­
nents 3,323,456 8,805,960 12,351,651 16,032,032 8,868,105 6,695,292 56,076 
(A) 
A/B = 3 . 0 
1985 
% 17.9 23.2 22.2 21.7 9.6 5.5 100 
House­
holds 3,392,716 4,397,264 4,207,726 4,112,958 1,819,557 1,042,454 18,953 
(B) 
Compo­
nents 3,392,716 8,794,528 12,623,180 16,451,833 9,097,788 6,842,300 57,202 
(A) 
A/B = 3 . 0 
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GRAPH 2 . 1 
Household size 
1985 
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5.0% 
c o m p 
10.0% 
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Graph 2.2 
ACTIVITY RATES BY SEX AND GEOGRAFICAL AREA 
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TABLE 2.5 
POPULATION AND LABOUR FORCE COMPOSITION BY SEX 
(.000) 
LABOUR FORCE 
(PEOPLE SEARCHING OCCUPATION) 
Total 
Unem- First Other Total Total non- popula-
Year Employed ployed job active tion 
1970 
1980 
1985 
13,888 
14,038 
13,986 
211 
112 
277 
196 
417 
597 
MEN 
— 
179 
180 
407 
708 
1,054 
14,295 
14,746 
15,040 
11,845 
12,339 
12,454 
26,140 
27,085 
27,493 
WOMEN 
1970 
1980 
1985 
5,068 
6,449 
6,756 
68 
99 
204 
147 
465 
653 
-
412 
560 
208 
976 
1,418 
5,276 22,070 
7,425 21,147 
8,173 20,832 
27,346 
28,572 
29,005 
MEN and WOMEN 
1970 
1980 
1985 
Year 
1970 
1980 
1985 
18, 
20, 
20, 
,956 
,487 
,742 
279 
211 
482 1, 
343 
882 591 
250 740 
Labour force Employed 
Population 
.546 
.544 
.547 
Populatior 
MEN 
.531 
.518 
.508 
615 19,571 
1,684 22,171 
2,471 23,213 
Searching occ, 
ι Labour force 
.028 
.048 
.070 
33,915 53,468 
33,486 55,657 
33,285 56,498 
. Non-active 
Population 
-
.454 
.456 
.453 
WOMEN 
1970 
1980 
1985 
192 
259 
281 
185 
225 
232 
039 
131 
173 
808 
741 
719 
MEN and WOMEN 
1970 
1980 
1985 
365 
398 
410 
354 
368 
367 
031 
076 
106 
635 
602 
590 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 2.6 
LABOUR FORCE COMPOSITION BY AGE AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA-1985 
(.000) 
Men and Women 
Labour force 
People searching occupation Searching 
occupation 
Age Employed Unemployed first job Total TOTAL Labour 
and other Force 
Mezzogiorno 
14-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-59 
> 60 
Total 
Centre-
North 
14-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-59 
> 60 
Total 
232 
527 
790 
4,519 
382 
6,450 
556 
1,460 
1,716 
9,823 
737 
14,292 
11 
40 
39 
92 
1 
183 
35 
93 
49 
119 
2 
298 
Italy 
253 
351 
172 
152 
3 
931 
350 
344 
127 
231 
7 
059 
264 
391 
211 
244 
4 
1,114 
385 
437 
176 
350 
9 
357 
496 
918 
1,001 
4,763 
386 
7,564 
941 
1,897 
1,892 
10,173 
746 
15,649 
53 
42, 
21, 
5. 
1, 
14. 
40, 
23, 
9. 
3. 
1. 
8. 
14-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-59 
> 60 
Total 
788 
1,987 
2,506 
14,342 
1,119 
20,742 
46 
133 
88 
211 
3 
481 
603 
695 
299 
383 
10 
1,990 
649 
828 
387 
594 
13 
2,471 
1,437 
2,815 
2,893 
14,936 
1,132 
23,213 
45.2 
29.4 
13.4 
4.0 
1.1 
10.6 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 2.7 
LABOUR FORCE COMPOSITION BY AGE AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA-1985 
f.000) 
MEN 
Labour Force 
People searching occupation searching 
occupation 
Age Employed Unemployed First job total TOTAL 
and other Labour 
Force 
Mezzogiorno 
14-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-59 
> 60 
Total 
Centre-
North 
14-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-59 
> 60 
Total 
3 
4 
6, 
9, 
166 
357 
560 
,280 
300 
,663 
307 
808 
999 
r652 
557 
,323 
8 
26 
24 
62 
1 
121 
17 
40 
24 
72 
2 
155 
117 
166' 
68 
44 
3 
398 
144 
142 
41 
49 
4 
380 
125 
192 
92 
106 
4 
519 
161 
182 
65 
121 
6 
535 
291 
549 
652 
3,386 
304 
5,182 
468 
990 
1,064 
6,773 
563 
9,858 
43.0 
35.0 
14.1 
3.1 
1.3 
10.0 
34.4 
18.4 
6.1 
1.8 
1.2 
5.4 
Italy 
14-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-59 
> 60 
Total 
473 
1,165 
1,559 
9,932 
857 
13,986 
25 
66 
48 
134 
3 
276 
261 
308 
109 
93 
7 
778 
286 
374 
157 
227 
10 
1,054 
759 
1,539 
1,716 
10,159 
867 
15,040 
37.7 
24.3 
9.1 
2.2 
1.2 
7.0 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 2.8 
LABOUR FORCE COMPOSITION BY AGE AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA-1985 
(.000) 
WOMEN 
Labour Force 
People searching occupation Searching 
occupation 
Age Employed Unemployed First job Total TOTAL Labour 
and other Force 
Mezzogiorno 
14-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-59 
> 60 
Total 
Centre-
North 
14-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-59 
> 60 
Total 
66 
170 
230 
1,239 
82 
1,787 
249 
652 
717 
3,171 
180 
4,969 
3 
14 
15 
30 
-
62 
18 
53 
25 
47 
-
143 
136 
185 
104 
108 
-
533 
206 
202 
86 
182 
3 
679 
139 
199 
119 
138 
-
595 
224 
255 
111 
229 
3 
822 
205 
369 
349 
1,377 
82 
2,382 
473 
907 
828 
3,400 
183 
5,791 
67.8 
53.9 
34.1 
10.0 
-
25.0 
47.4 
28.1 
13.4 
6.7 
1.6 
14.2 
Italy 
14-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-59 
> 60 
Total 
315 
822 
947 
4,410 
262 
6.756 
21 
67 
40 
77 
-
205 
342 
387 
190 
290 
3 
1,212 
363 
454 
230 
367 
3 
1,417 
678 
1,276 
1,177 
4,777 
265 
8,173 
53.5 
35.6 
19.5 
7.7 
1.1 
17.3 
Source: ISTAT 
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In Italy from 1970 to 1985 employment increased by 
1,785,000 units, which is almost eguivalent to the registered 
increase in the level of female employment: 1,688,000 (see 
Table 2.5). At the same time, the rate of female unemployment 
increased from 3.9% to 17.3%, remaining at a much higher level 
than male unemployment, which increased from 2.8% to 7% over 
the same period. Amongst both men and women, the age group 
which has been worst hit by unemployment is that between 14 and 
24, with a rate of 33%. Unemployment has only marginally 
affected the male adult individual with a full-time job, and 
whose income is fundamental to the family economy. It has hit 
mainly women and young people who may be looking for their 
first job, or for temporary and part-time jobs, and whose 
income may form a vital contribution to the family budget. 
These trends in the labour market are reflected across the 
whole country; but there are great gaps in the female rate of 
activity and unemployment between the Centre/North and the 
Mezzogiorno (see Tables 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8). In the 
Centre/North the female rate of activity has reached 31%, while 
in the Mezzogiorno it is only 23%. Furthermore, during the 
last few years the gap has tended to increase. Differences 
between the respective male activity rates are less marked: 
the rate is 55% for the Centre/North and 51% in the South. 
The main difference between the two areas is the presence 
of women in the labour market, and consequently the 
contribution of women to family income. While in the 
Central/Northern part of Italy the most common family model is 
one where women are wage earners, in the South the prevalent 
model is that where women's sole occupation is housework. 
Probably there are both cultural and socio-economic reasons at 
the root of this situation. However, we tend to believe that 
the main reason lies in the low level of demand for labour. 
The lack of job opportunities and the unfavourable 
conditions, which are often attached to a job, reduces the 
activity rate and/or produces higher unemployment amongst women 
and the young. The poor conditions of work, both in a 
quantitative and qualitative sense, are also reflected in lower 
pensions and, consequently, in the lack of autonomy amongst old 
people. This increases the probability that the elderly, the 
young, and women remain with the same family for a longer 
period, a fact which also increases the average size of the 
households, and the house workload necessary to satisfy the 
needs of each single member. The lack of adequate social 
services worsens the female condition; they are accorded sole 
charge of the domestic responsibilities. This further 
"discourages' women from entering the labour market; and since 
the lack of jobs outside home eliminates one possible 
disincentive against procreation, it also results in a lot more 
children. 
As further proof of this circularity of cause and effect, 
we may observe that while in the Mezzogiorno the activity rate 
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is lower, the rate of unemployment is higher than in the 
Centre/North. The unemployment rates in the Centre/North are 
5.4%, 14.2% and 8.7%, for men, women and the overall level 
respectively. In the Mezzogiorno they are: 10%, 25%, and 
14.7%. The larger gaps between the two sets of rates are those 
relating to women and the young, while the gap is narrower for 
men in the central age groups. Both in the Centre/North and 
the South the income of the head of household is guaranteed 
whatever the differences in the level of income and the quality 
of job; but the contribution of other members to the family 
income is considerably lower in the South. 
Finally, we can link the observations advanced on the 
Mezzogiorno, in relation to both the demographic trends and the 
labour market. A lower share of the population of working age, 
a lower activity rate, and a higher rate of unemployment 
contribute to a higher dependency ratio. At macro-economic 
level the dependency ratio is taken to be the ratio between the 
total population and people in work, which, if considered from 
the point of view of income, shows the average number of people 
supported on the income received by a single employed person. 
Lastly, the composition of the population not of working age 
varies from the Centre/North, to the South. While in the 
northern part of the country there is a relatively high 
proportion of old people, who receive an income, in the 
southern part there is a relatively high proportion of 
children, who have no income at all. Income distribution at 
geographical level is therefore affected by differences in both 
the dependency ratio and the age structure of the population. 
3. LIFE-CYCLE AND LABOUR MARKET 
3.1 The choice of the unit of analysis 
The last ten years have been characterised by important 
changes in the relationship between several social protagonists 
and the labour market. The number of those who, for reasons of 
age, have given up working and live on transfer payments has 
increased in both absolute and relative terms. Similarly, from 
either a cultural choice or an economic need, more women within 
the working age group prefer the labour market to solely 
housework. Finally, there has been an increase in the number 
of young and not so young people who, although actively looking 
for work, spend prolonged periods out of work. 
These tendencies have affected the family through the 
increase in the number of members who contribute to the family 
income and in the diversification of the sources of income. 
The object of this chapter is to evaluate how important the 
changes in family structure are for the distribution of income. 
We will examine six different types of household, from the one 
person household to those with more than 5 members - with 
reference to sex, age and profession of the household head - to 
regional areas, number of workers and number of income earners 
per household. For each of these classifications we give the 
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percentage share in relation to the total number of households 
of the same type and the monthly disposable income for the 
years 1980 and 1985 (see Tables 3.1 to 3.6). 
The choice of households of similar size to the unit used 
in our analysis, prevents spurious comparisons between incomes 
of households of different sizes, whose respective needs are 
manifestly different. At the same time, the compensatory 
function of the family notwithstanding, we can pinpoint 
conditions of objective disadvantage which derive from a 
specific status. We can thus avoid the thorny problem of which 
is the best indicator of equality of distribution: household 
income, per capita income, or equivalent income. (See Table 
3.7 for a comparison of households and per capita income 
amongst households of different size.)3-1-
In theory it would be preferable to take households of 
similar size and composition as the unit of our analysis. 
Unfortunately, the statistical information in our possession is 
inadequate, and we must therefore start from the disputable 
premise that households of similar size have comparable levels 
of need. Another limitation of the data in our possession is 
that it mostly refers to the head of the household; a fact 
which reflects an ideal type of family where the head is the 
sole generator of income, and where the inequality in 
distribution depends entirely on the head of the household's 
level of income. The lack of information on the other members 
of the household and on their individual level of income 
certainly limits our analysis. 
3.2 On being old and living alone 
According to the 1971 census there were approximately two 
million one person families, which represented 12.9% of the 
total number of households. The 1981 census shows an increase 
of 1,200,000 families and a new percentage level of 17.8% of 
the total of all families. 
Two factors have contributed to the increase in this type 
of family: on the one hand, a change in social habits has 
resulted in the rapid increase in those who live alone: young 
people who want to live independently from their families and 
"single' adults. On the other hand, one person families are 
the product of the ageing population, together with the longer 
life-span of women, who are usually younger than their 
husbands. Within the group of one person families it is 
possible to distinguish two very different kinds. The first, 
and more numerous, consists of the elderly, generally a woman, 
living on her own pension. The second consists of people aged 
31. On this problem see the Introduction to this Report. 
For a criticism on the use of equivalence scales see Garonna 
(1984) . 
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between about 30 and 55, generally men, whose income derives 
from employment. 
The gap between these two kinds of one person families is 
considerable. The constituents of the former group (elderly 
female pensioner) have an income which is only half that of the 
members of the latter group (relatively young, male, 
economically active). Thus, within the one person families 
there are three elements of advantage/disadvantage reinforcing 
each other: to be male rather than female, young rather than 
old, economically active rather than in retirement. Table 3.1 
shows that the differences which result from each of these 
polarities are very considerable. 
3.3 The couple: retired, employed and bi-employed 
The importance of age, and of the position in the labour 
market in income distribution, is confirmed by the analysis of 
the household with two members. The percentage of this type of 
household over the total number of households has not increased 
much between the last two censuses: in 1971 it was 22% of the 
total, 3.5 million in absolute numbers; by 1981 it had reached 
4.4 million or 23.6%. 
We may concentrate our analysis on three very different 
kinds of households which comprise the vast majority of 
households of this size. The first consists of an elderly 
couple, where the household head is a pensioner. This type 
accounts for more than half of the total number of households 
of this size. The second is a couple of working age, where the 
head of the household is the only wage earner. This kind 
represents 33% of the total. The third kind consists of two 
adults who are both wage earners. This represents 16% of the 
total. 
These three kinds of household have been listed in 
ascending order in relation to their disposable income. 
Household's whose head is in employment have an income 25% 
higher than households where the head is a pensioner; in turn, 
households comprising two employed people have an income 40% 
higher than families where only one person is in employment. 
This confirms that elderly pensioners are at the bottom of the 
income pyramid. But is also confirms the quantitative 
importance of female employment, in relation to the increase in 
family income. 
In the case of a one person family, it is irrelevant 
whether or not the head of this type of household is young. 
This may appear strange when one considers what has already 
been said about the precariousness of employment amongst the 
young, and on the large proportion of unemployment amongst 
people under the age of 30. The explanation is to be found in 
the simple fact that the great majority of the young who are in 
this position remain in the family. When the young are either 
without a job or with a precarious one, he/she postpones the 
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creation of his/her own family unit and uses the protection' 
of the family of origin.32 
It has been argued that the fact that there is no link 
between unemployment and poverty is to be explained in the 
observation that unemployment does not affect the household 
head, on whom the family income depends, but the young person 
who can count on the support of the family.33 This 
consideration, which tends to undermine the gravity of 
unemployment is, however, to be qualified by more careful 
thought; if it is true that unemployment does not directly 
affect the household head, the reverse is also true; in fact, 
young people who are potential household heads are prevented 
from becoming actual head of households by unemployment. 
The absence of a clear gap between the income of the young 
and not so young heads, in the case of one person families may, 
therefore, be simply explained by the consideration that only 
those young people who have a job which guarantees full 
financial autonomy leave the original household. 
In the households with two members the absence of such a 
gap can be explained both by the delay in the formation of the 
new unit, and by the high percentage of women in employment. 
The level of female employment is particularly high until 30 
and it is not affected by marriage. Moreover, a high 
percentage of young women have full time jobs. It is only 
after children are born that women either start working part-
time or abandon the labour market altogether.34 Amongst 
younger couples it is therefore likely that the family income 
is made up of a relatively low wage of the household head and a 
quite significant contribution on the part of the wife. 
3.4 On the 'protected' elderly 
According to the census of 1981, there were about 4.1 
million households of three people; 600,000 more than in 1971. 
Their percentage over the total of all households has remained 
stable at about 22%. The average of the household head is 
obviously decreasing; 14.9% under 30; 43.5% between 31 and 
50; 31.9% between 51 and 65; and 9.8% over 65. 
32. The role of the family also remains crucial in those 
instances when the young separates from the original household. 
For a research study on this subject see Bugarini (2983). 
33. On the structure of Italian unemployment see 
Accornero-Carmignani (2986) and Accornero (2987) . 
34. See Irer (1983) and OECD (1984). 
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TABLE 3.1 
ONE-PERSON HOUSEHOLD 1980-1985 
INCOME BY DIFFERENT CRITERIA 
(% and per-capita income .000 Lira) 
Head of Areas 
Household Age 
Total Male Female <30 31-50 51-65 >65 >51 Cen/North Mezz 
1980 
1985 
13.9 
17.9 
33.0 
33.0 
67.0 
67.0 
5.8 
8.9 
14.6 28.4 51.2 79.6 71.2 28.8 
16.1 27.0 48.0 75.0 70.3 29.7 
1989 
Y 
1985 
464 
984 
575 
1181 
409 
888 
702 
1321 
667 
1394 
492 
1036 
363 
755 
— 
— 
498 
1047 
380 
835 
Employees per family Earners per family 
Job Pension Other 0 1 2 >2 1 2 >2 
1980 26.5 68.4 5.2 73.3 26.7 - - 98.7 
% 
1985 27.9 64.6 7.4 72.0 28.0 - - 97.2 
1980 687 366 613 383 686 - - 459 
Y 
1985 1434 783 1044 807 1441 - - 985 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 3.2 
TWO-PERSON HOUSEHOLD 1980-1985 
INCOME BY DIFFERENT CRITERIA 
(% and per-capita income .000 Lira) 
Head of 
Household Age Areas 
Total Male Female <30 31-50 51-65 >65 >51 Cen/North Mezz 
1980 
g. 
1985 
23.3 
23.2 
82.4 
82.7 
17.6 
17.3 
9.6 
9.5 
18.3 33.8 38.3 72.1 71.2 28.8 
19.2 35.3 37.2 72.5 72.2 27.8 
1980 
Y 
1985 
390 
794 
391 
793 
385 
802 
463 
931 
480 
962 
407 
806 
315 
666 
—— 
— 
417 
854 
323 
640 
1980 
3--s 
1985 
43.8 
39.5 
52.4 
55.8 
3.8 
4.7 
Employees per family Earners per family 
Job Pension Other 0 1 2 >2 1 2 >2 
46.5 37.3 16.2 - 42.2 57.5 -
51.6 32.6 15.8 - 39.7 59.7 -
1980 475 316 425 306 418 568 - 371 404 
Y 
1985 964 673 815 651 837 1175 - 723 844 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 3.3 
THREE-PERSON HOUSEHOLD 1980-1985 
INCOME BY DIFFERENT CRITERIA 
(% and per-capita income .000 Lira) 
Head of 
household Age Areas 
Total Male Female <30 31-50 51-65 >65 >51 Cen/North Mezz 
1980 22.6 92.8 7.2 16.4 42.2 29.9 11.6 41.5 73.6 26.4 
% 
1985 22.2 92.2 7.8 14.9 43.5 31.9 9.8 41.7 71.8 28.2 
1980 
Y 
1985 
347 
684 
348 
687 
333 
650 
338 
599 
350 
735 
353 
685 
329 
647 
— 
— 
368 
737 
287 
549 
1980 76.9 20.6 2.6 7.7 54.7 34.7 2.9 42.6 41.9 15.0 
% 
1985 74.9 22.2 2.9 10.7 51.3 35.1 2.0 41.4 44.4 13.6 
1980 
Y 
1985 
354 
706 
323 
625 
295 
557 
260 
495 
318 
620 
402 
815 
444 
927 
301 
580 
383 
758 
376 
770 
Source: ISTAT 
143 
TABLE 3.4 
FOUR-PERSON HOUSEHOLD 1980-1985 
INCOME BY DIFFERENT CRITERIA 
(% and per-capita income .000 Lira) 
1980 
% 
1985 
Total 
21.6 
21.7 
Head of 
household 
Male Female 
96.7 3.3 
97.1 2.9 
Age Area 
<30 31-50 51-65 >65 >51 Cen/North Mezz 
6.5 65.5 23.2 4.8 28.0 67.5 32.5 
5.5 66.5 24.7 3.3 28.0 65.0 35.0 
1980 
Y 
1985 
278 
564 
278 
564 
274 
551 
236 
420 
275 
541 
298 295 
621 616 
301 
616 
230 
468 
Employees per family 
Job Pension Other 0 1 2 >2 
Earners per family 
1 1 >2 
1980 89.4 9.2 
% 
1985 87.8 10.2 
1.4 2.4 56.3 33.8 7.5 50.6 
2.0 3.9 51.6 37.4 7.0 46.4 
33.9 15.3 
38.0 15.5 
1980 277 283 
Y 
1985 561 597 
324 235 248 309 376 243 302 342 
512 412 491 645 757 473 619 703 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 3.5 
FIVE-PERSON HOUSEHOLD 1980-1985 
INCOME BY DIFFERENT CRITERIA 
(% and per-capita income .000 lira) 
Head of 
household Age Areas 
Total Male Female <30 31-50 52-65 >65 >51 Cen/North Mezz 
1980 
3-
1985 
11.1 
9.6 
96.3 
96.9 
3.7 
3.1 
3.7 
2.4 
64.5 
63.2 
1980 
Y 
1985 
231 
472 
231 
471 
229 
500 
196 
310 
216 
441 
256 
520 
268 
570 
25.7 6.1 31.8 57.4 42.6 
29.9 4.5 34.4 54.3 45.7 
255 198 
536 397 
Employees per family Earners per family 
Job Pensions Other 0 1 2 >2 1 2 >2 
1980 87.2 11.4 1.3 2.2 52.4 30.9 14.5 42.6 30.4 26.7 
% 
1985 87.0 11.2 1.8 2.9 49.9 33.2 14.0 42.3 32.1 25.2 
1980 
Y 
1985 
230 
468 
238 
517 
259 
407 
183 
341 
202 
399 
252 
537 
296 
609 
193 
384 
243 
509 
278 
575 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 3.6 
MORE THAN FIVE-PERSON HOUSEHOLD 1980-1985 
INCOME BY DIFFERENT CRITERIA 
(% and per-capita income .000 lira) 
Head of 
household Age Areas 
Total Male Female <30 31-50 51-65 >65 >51 Cen/North Mezz 
1980 7.4 97.3 2.7 1.3 
% 
1985 5.5 97.5 2.5 1.7 
59.4 30.1 
70.3 32.6 
9.2 39.3 46.6 53.4 
5.4 38.0 44.3 55.7 
1980 
Y 
1985 
186 
385 
187 
386 
156 
335 
145 
341 
175 
343 
192 
410 
205 
489 
227 
460 
152 
326 
Employees per family Earners per family 
Job Pension Other 0 1 2 >2 1 2 >2 
1980 83.0 14.9 2.1 
% 
1985 83.5 13.7 2.7 
2.0 38.5 32.0 27.4 26.6 26.8 46.5 
3.8 42.9 28.5 24.8 30.4 25.5 43.9 
1980 
Y 
1985 
187 
384 
183 
397 
168 131 158 184 228 152 169 214 
344 282 331 405 465 322 365 438 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 3.7 
HOUSEHOLD AND PER-CAPITA INCOME (Y) 1985 
Size of the 
household 
(.000 Lira) (index) 
Household Y Per-capita Y Household Y Per-Capita Y 
1 component 
2 components 
3 components 
4 components 
5 components 
>5 components 
984 
1589 
2051 
2256 
2361 
2541 
984 
794 
684 
564 
472 
385 
1 0 0 . 0 
1 6 1 . 5 
2 0 8 . 4 
2 2 9 . 3 
2 3 9 . 9 
2 5 8 . 2 
1 0 0 . 0 
8 0 . 6 
6 9 . 6 
5 7 . 3 
4 7 . 9 
3 9 . 1 
Source: ISTAT 
Research into the income of this type of household usually 
distinguishes between a group of households with three adult 
members (56%) , and a group with two adults and a child (44%) . 
The diffusion of these two groups is directly linked to the 
household head's age, as he grows older the household with 
three adults takes the place of the couple with a child. 
When we compare this type of household with the previous 
two, we notice that the negative effect which being old and 
retired had on the relative income position of the household 
has partly disappeared. The income gap is 14% when we compare 
the over 65 age group with that between 31 and 50. The income 
difference between pensioners and people in employment is only 
4%. The explanation for such a small gap is that in many 
households where the head is a pensioner, there is another 
member who is economically active. When we consider that the 
households with pensioners as head are 22% of the total number 
of households with three members, while the households with no 
employed person are only 10.7%, we may draw the conclusion that 
the difference in percentage (11.5%) represents those 
households with an economically active member. Within this 
group, the standard of living of the elderly pensioner is 
'protected' by part of the family income coming from the 
employment of one of the family members, possibly an adult son 
or daughter. On the other hand, the households with no 
economically active member experience a difficult financial 
situation. They usually comprise elderly people with one or 
even two pensions, though usually small, and a young person 
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without a job. The gap between their average income and the 
average income of the whole group of households with three 
members is about 4 0%. 
Three considerations emerge from this data. Firstly, that 
to be retired and elderly is an objective condition of economic 
disadvantage. In considering small families, it is evident 
that the elderly person, the elderly couple, and the elderly 
couple with an unemployed daughter/son can be found in the 
lower half of the income scale. It may be true, as Gorrieri 
has maintained in his report on poverty, that "the equation 
between being elderly - single or in a couple - and being poor 
lacks foundation;35 yet, even though the equation is not 
straightforward, the passage to the elderly status represents a 
worsening of his income condition. This brings into question 
the legitimacy of the values of a society which penalises 
people who are in objectively weak conditions. 
The second consideration concerns the kind of protection 
guaranteed by the family. As we have already seen with young 
people who are either unemployed or in precarious jobs, the low 
income of the elderly person within the family tends to be 
"hidden' by the cumulative effect of the more than one income 
receivers. The group of households with a pensioner as the 
head is not necessarily penalised if it has more than three 
members. Society appears to delegate to the family the 
function of looking after the elderly, although one should add 
that the autonomy and dignity of elderly people may be put 
under threat within the family institution itself. 
Thirdly, within the three member households, the young age 
of the household head is a disadvantage, because the birth of 
the first child forces the woman either to abandon the labour 
market or to reduce the amount of her working hours. When not 
sustained by the woman's contribution, the low level of wages 
of the young head results in an income gap of about 23%, 
between the group of households where the head is under 30 
years old and the group where he is between 31 and 50. 
3.5 On being many with few in work 
The larger the household, the greater the opportunity to 
increase the family income through the cumulative effect of 
more than one income. In larger families, the number of 
earners is a major factor of inequality in the distribution of 
income. 
In 1971, the number of households with four members was 
3,390,000; while in 1981, it was 4,008,000. In ten years the 
proportion of the total number of households has changed 
little; from 21.2% to 21.5%. In comparison with the previous 
types, households with four members are more diffused in the 
35. See Gorrieri (1985), pp. 44-46, 
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South. Furthermore, there is a predominance of household heads 
in the 31 to 50 age bracket. The demographic reasons for this 
difference between large and small families is self-evident: 
it is unlikely that a man under thirty has more than one child, 
and very probably by the age of 65 his siblings have already 
formed their own family units. 
The type of household under examination comprises 41% of 
households with two adults and two children, 39% with four 
adults, and 20% in one of the two intermediate situations: 
either three adults and one child, or one adult and three 
children. The composition of this kind of household is a sort 
of snapshot taken at a particular point in the natural progress 
of one single household: from the couple with two children, to 
a mature couple with two adult sons and/or daughters who have 
not yet formed a family of their own. 
Differences in the number of employed people per household 
depend on the "composition' of the household (linked to the 
life-cycle of the family on which the relative numbers of 
adults and children depend) and on the working position of both 
the married woman and the sons and daughters in households of 
similar composition. 
We can confine the differences in income to those stated 
above. There is an income gap of 3 0% between households with 
only one person employed and those with two people employed. 
The latter group is, in turn, 17% worse off than the group 
where more than two people work. The gaps arising from a 
different number of earners are in line with those produced by 
differences in the number of people in work. 
The income gaps, according to the age group of the 
household head, reflect the level of probability of a second or 
third income to bolster the head's income. Young couples with 
two children are at a disadvantage, for it is unlikely that the 
wife will substantially supplement the husband's income. The 
older the household head, the more advantageous the conditions 
of the household, because the cumulative effect of more than 
one income is more frequently due to the presence of an adult 
son/daughter in work. 
3.6 On large families in the South 
The study of households with five or more members 
strengthens the importance of the dependency ratio as a factor 
of inequality. (The dependency ratio at a micro-economic level 
is defined as the ratio between the number of household earners 
and the number of those who are in employment. In a few cases 
it may be useful to consider the ratio between members and 
income earners). 
In this type of household there is a higher probability 
that other incomes will supplement the head's income; but the 
eventual lack of additional support from other members may 
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prove to be detrimental to the fulfillment of the family's 
needs. 
During the last fifteen years, households with five or 
more people have declined, both in number and in proportion to 
the total number of families. Yet they still represent 28% of 
the total population. In comparison with previous types of 
households we find that there is a concentration of this type 
of household in the Mezzogiorno. In 1985, Southern households 
were 33% of the total, but amongst the households with five and 
more than five members, they represented respectively 45.7% and 
55.7%. It is likely that such a concentration of large 
households in the South will increase as a result of the 
present demographic trends. The question of the dependency 
ratio has, therefore, a particular value in geographical terms. 
In households with five members the income gap between 
those with one person in employment, and those with two is 35%; 
while the gap between those with two or more persons in 
employment is 13%. In households with more than five members 
the gaps are 22% and 15% respectively. 
As the household head gets older - up to the age of 
retirement - his income increases per se and the family income 
is likely to be boosted by other incomes from employed members 
of the household, or from transfer earners. 
3.7 The income contribution of working women 
To conclude this section, it may be useful to summarise 
our findings on the relationship between income and the 
presence of the various members of the household in the labour 
market. 
The increase in female participation in the labour market 
has been an important and positive factor, which has changed 
the traditional division of roles within the family and often 
modified the hierarchical nature of the couple relationship. 
This is particularly true in Italy, where the starting point 
was low and the catholic ideology of the woman/mother/wife is 
deeply rooted. 
We must now evaluate the exact degree to which this 
increased participation has been transformed into financial 
support, thereby altering the traditional equation between the 
head of the household's income and the family income overall. 
Our evaluation is only tentative, for it is based on 'fragile' 
and incomplete data. Table 3.8 summarises the data on the 
household with one, and more than two people in employment. 
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TABLE 3.8 
% INCREASE IN HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYED 
Number of Employed Household Size 
1 2 >2 
Years % increase in income 
36 
40 
26 
31 
25 
31 
25 
35 
16 
22 
--
— 
10 
14 
22 
17 
17 
13 
24 
15 
1980 
1985 
1980 
1985 
1980 
1985 
1980 
1985 
1980 
1985 
The relative gap between households with one or two 
persons employed is about 30%. In theory, the size of this gap 
is due to either a low second income or to the concentration of 
secondary employment amongst those households where the first 
income is rather low. Both hypotheses seem to have some 
foundation. The first can easily be taken for granted, since 
we know that many women work part-time, and that they are 
usually confined to the bottom half of the job scale which is 
unskilled and badly paid. The other hypothesis is supported by 
the uniformly descending curve of the female rate of activity 
by age. This data shows that.as the household head's income 
rises with age women's presence in the labour market decreases. 
It is also plausible to assume that female employment is 
relatively higher amongst the lower social groups, where a 
second income is required to satisfy primary needs. 
If an inverse relationship between head's income and 
women's work is well founded, we may conclude that women's 
contribution to the family income is higher - though how much 
higher we cannot say - than the 30% which divides households 
with one person in employment from those with two. The wife's 
income continues to take second place to the husband's, but has 
now assumed greater importance as a contribution to the family 
income. Although the division of roles within the family has 
not been overcome, a too strict division of areas of skill 
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between the sexes is in the process of disappearing. Women's 
position at the centre of the system of social reproduction is 
not in question, but their life is made up of less "family' and 
more "market'. 
The income gap between households with two and those with 
more than two people in employment is about 15%, where the 
third income usually comes from young people in employment. It 
would be useful to distinguish between working class 
households, where young people often have permanent jobs, and 
households of non-manual workers and professional people, where 
the young have temporary jobs and their contribution to the 
family income is irrelevant. This, and other similar pieces of 
information, could shed light on the groups of households in 
which the contribution of the members is important. 
From the aggregate data in our possession, we can only 
conclude that young people's contribution to the family income 
is fairly modest even if it may become more important in those 
instances where the head has a particularly low income and the 
household income is made up of various small inputs from 
different sources.36 
4. INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL CLASSES 
As we have already seen, although the head of the 
household is not the only earner, he still maintains a central 
role in the household. Since his position within the socio-
economic system is essential for the determination of his 
income, we will refer to economic sectors and socio-
professional categories as partial indicators of his income 
position. We possess data on family income, but not on the 
household head's income alone. This means that the head's 
income cannot be analysed as a single factor of inequality in 
distribution. The income gap which we will analyse will 
therefore include the contributions of the other members of the 
household. 
Table 4.1 suggests a first distinction between employees 
and self-employed. The gaps between these two categories of 
income is not very wide: 15% when we compare family income, 
13% when we compare per capita income. Amongst employees, the 
higher incomes are in the service sector (both public and 
private), while the lower incomes are in agriculture. The gaps 
between the service and the industrial sector are small. But 
the gaps between the industrial sector and agriculture are very 
3 . A similar conclusion has been reached by NEgri-
Santagata (1984) as a result of research on an urban area. 
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substantial: 30% per household and 45% per capita. The 
backward conditions of large agricultural areas in the 
Mezzogiorno, where the standards of life depend on both public 
allowances and the domestic economy, is probably the main 
single cause for such a gap. 
Amongst the self-employed the higher incomes are those in 
the industrial sector, followed by services and agriculture. 
Here the gaps between services and industry are small, and 
between the former and agriculture, though smaller than the ones 
in the previous group, they are still significant, especially in 
relation to per capita income. 
As the values of the Gini coefficients for the two groups 
show, internal ineguality is more evident amongst the self-
employed than amongst employees. 
However, the income gaps within single sectors are more 
significant than those between one sector and another. If we 
compare the average family income of the higher 50% and the 
lower 50% of each single sector, we find gaps that span from 
100% (in industry) to 130% (in agriculture). A similar 
comparison of per capita income on the basis of data compiled by 
the Banca d'Italia indicates that the gaps are even wider. ^  
These internal gaps show that within sectors skills and length 
of service are important factors in determining the range of 
wages, but they also signal the inadequacy of the division in 
sectors traditionally used by the ISTAT in its computations. 
The socio-professional group of the household head is 
certainly more relevant than the sector of occupation in any 
assessment of the changes in the level of income (see Table 
4.2) . 
In 1985 the incomes of working class families were 22% 
lower than those of non-manual workers and the self-employed, 
and 71% lower than employers and professional people. Since the 
average size of household per socio-professional group varies, 
the gap in per capita income between working class households and 
the self-employed is slightly lower at 19%; while there is an 
1. These results are drawn from Targetti-Lenti (1984), 
pp.180-189. 
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increase in the gaps between working class households and non-
manual workers (34%) and employers and professional people (75%), 
The size of the gaps between the various socio-
professional groups is confirmed by the sample survey of the 
Banca d'Italia, which provides a more sophisticated breakdown 
of the data (see Table 4.3).2 Managers, employers and 
professional people are at the top of the income scale, while 
at the bottom, in reverse order, we find the employees in 
agriculture, self-employed in agriculture and manual workers of 
other sectors. The division according to the socio-
professional qualification of the head of the household is not 
entirely satisfactory here, because the gaps within each single 
group are often wider than those between one group and another. 
See Targetti-Lenti (1984), pp. 189-202. 
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TABLE 4.1 
HOUSEHOLD AND PER-CAPITA INCOME 
BY STATUS OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE HEAD 
(1985, .000 Lira) 
white blue 
average country industry other collar collar Gini 
Employees 
% 
Household Y 
Per-capita Y 
Other 
% 
Household Y 
Per-capita Y 
71.2 
2028 
584 
28.8 
2420 
658 
5.5 
1563 
403 
20.6 
2081 
540 
39.7 
2010 
558 
18.0 
2601 
679 
54.8 
2089 
627 
61.4 
2480 
694 
43.5 
2261 
688 
Employers 
16.1 
3168 
903 
56.5 0.249 
1850 
515 
Self 
Employed 
83.9 0.281 
2276 
614 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 4.2 
PER CAPITA INCOME BY SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL 
CATEGORY OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1985 
(.000 Lira) 
Blue White Self-
Employees Collar Collar Other Employer Employed Gini 
% 7 1 . 2 
Y 585(A) 
N o r t h 
% 4 2 . 5 
Y 6 9 1 ( a ) 
Mezzogiorno 
% 4 5 . 6 
Y 4 5 1 ( b ) 
3 0 . 9 
513 
] 
40.3 28.8 4.6 24.2 
688 658(B) 903 614 
B/A = .889 
16.8 
773(a) 
b/a = .652 b/a = .671 
19.1 
519(b) 
0.261 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 4.3 
AVERAGE LEVEL OF INDIVIDUAL AND HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC CATEGORY AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
(Indices and % - Total employed 1982) 
EMPLOYERS 
Managers 
White collars 
Workers in agriculture 
Workers in other sectors 
OTHERS 
Agriculture 
Other sectors 
Employers professional 
TOTAL 
Individual 
92 
240 
103 
44 
79 
133 
92 
130 
173 
100 
% 
(80.4) 
(1.9) 
(36.9) 
(3.7) 
(37.9) 
(19.6) 
(3.8) 
(11.1) 
(4.7) 
100 
Household 
94 
184 
104 
59 
80 
116 
88 
114 
148 
100 
% 
(56) 
(2.4) 
(24.5) 
(2.3) 
(26.8) 
(19.4) 
(4.3) 
(10.6) 
(4.5) 
100 
A Average income of an employed (.000 Lira) = 11,329. 
Β Average yearly individual income of an unoccupied 
(.000 Lira) = 5,246. 
A/B = 216. 
A Average yearly household income head employed 
(.000 Lira) = 19,367. 
Β Average yearly household income of an unoccupied head 
(.000 Lira) = 12,258. 
A/B = 158. 
Source: Bank of Italy (Targetti Lenti, 1982) 
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From this data we can make a hierarchical classification 
of incomes which is reflected in the particular position which 
each social group has in the income scale (see Table 4.4). 
Managers, employers and professional people are almost 
exclusively in the upper fifth of the income scale. Self-
employed and non-manual workers are in the middle and upper-
middle part of the scale, even though the self-employed are 
often in the bottom decili, since several sub-groups have 
precarious jobs. And lastly, manual workers, who are 
definitely in the middle of the scale, though they 
occasionally, and significantly, appear both in the upper and 
lower fifth of the scale. 
So far the picture is a rather complex one. It shows that 
there are substantial differences in income between social 
classes, but it also shows that individuals from different 
social classes can be found scattered across the entire 
spectrum of the income scale. This picture concurs with what 
we have said about the transformation of the family function in 
the process of income production. Vertical divisions, 
determined by the class to which the head of the household 
belongs, are traversed by horizontal divisions produced by the 
participation of other members in the formation of the family 
income. Important groups of population, which are 
characterised by a head with an average sized income may be 
pushed into the bottom or higher levels of the income scale, 
either by favourable or unfavourable conditions, such as the 
relative number of employed per household and the size of the 
household itself. Those groups characterised by the high 
income level of their head remain in the upper fifth, even 
though they may have an unfavourable dependency ratio. 
In order to substantiate this hypothesis we would need to 
have comparative statistical information on family income, the 
number of employed and the socio-professional category. 
Lacking such data, we are obliged to use data compiled by 
Garonna for the year 1981. 
One part of this statistical information considers the 
relative distribution of households per number of employed 
people.3 Working class households are those with a higher 
proportion of households with three or more people in 
employment. This is not surprising, for it is obvious that 
households in modest economic circumstances need as many 
contributors as possible to the family income. 
A second piece of statistical information, which is not as 
self-evident as the previous one, shows that, although there is 
a difference in the number of those in employment between large 
working class families, and similarly sized middle class 
families, this does not apply to small households. This would 
suggest that it is economic need, made more pressing by the 
See Garonna (1984). p. 85 Table 6.4 
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size of the household, which forces the members of working 
class families to generate other incomes, either through the 
work of the wife or through that of the young son/daughter, 
who, in middle class households, rarely contributes to the 
family income. When there is no accumulation of income, large 
working class families are forced towards the poverty line, and 
their level of income drops near to that of pensioners and the 
unemployed. In fact, the proportion of working class 
households which are in the low income bracket becomes 
significant in the group of large size households.4 
Similar observations could be advanced on the relationship 
between income distribution and qualification of the head of 
the household, a factor which is obviously connected to his 
social position. Naturally, the gaps in per capita income 
which are shown in Table 4.5 are wide, but they are not as wide 
as might be expected. In particular, the gaps between the 
lower three qualification levels are minimal, both in the North 
and the Mezzogiorno, while the earnings of the household heads 
with academic or high school qualifications are definitely 
higher. 
This relative levelling of incomes reflects the lack of 
co-ordination between the characteristics of the labour demand 
and the educational curricula, and the function the educational 
system has played in disguising youth unemployment. However, 
it is possible that the absence of clear differences in income 
is also the result of the weakening of the linear relationship 
between social position and qualification of the household 
head, level of his income, and the family income. Yet, this 
hypothesis cannot be fully verified for lack of adequate 
statistical information. 
See Garonna (1984), p. 90 Table 6.6 
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TABLE 4.4 
PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS IN EACH QUINTILE 
BY SOCIO-PROFESSIONAL CATEGORY OF THE 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1985 
(Quintile) 
% Total 1st 2nd 3rd 4 th 5 th 
EMPLOYED 
OTHER 
Employers 
Self-employed 
EMPLOYEES 
White Collar 
Blue Collar 
62.5 
18.0 
2.9 
15.1 
44.5 
19.3 
25.1 
21.7 
5.2 
.2 
5.0 
16.5 
3.4 
13.1 
60.1 
13.7 
1.2 
12.4 
46.4 
15.3 
31.1 
71.1 
17.7 
1.8 
15.9 
53.4 
21.0 
32.4 
79.3 
22.7 
3.6 
19.1 
56.6 
28.2 
28.4 
80.7 
31.1 
7.7 
23.4 
49.5 
29.0 
20.6 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 4.5 
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION AND PER-CAPITA INCOME 
BY EDUCATION LEVEL OF THE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1980-1985 
No 
Instruction Primary Secondary High University 
1980 % 
North 
Mezzogiorno 
1985 % 
North 
Mezzogiorno 
1980 % 
North 
Mezzogiorno 
1985 % 
North 
Mezzogiorno 
12.3 
8.6 
18.3 
14.1 
9.8 
21.1 
237 
295 
198 
499 
607 
417 
48.5 
51.0 
47.0 
42.4 
45.9 
39.7 
273 
321 
207 
563 
659 
427 
21.4 13.5 
22.8 13.8 
18.5 12.0 
23.8 14.8 
25.3 14.8 
21.1 13.4 
302 363 
4.2 
3.8 
4.3 
4.8 
4.1 
4.8 
437 
352 
233 
615 
716 
478 
411 
306 
754 
858 
611 
485 
390 
909 
1037 
733 
Source: ISTAT 
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5. THE NORTH SOUTH GAP: TOWARDS A NEW DUALISM 
The 'questione meridionale' (Southern question) is 
certainly not new. It started with the national unification 
process, and after more than a century does not seem to have 
been resolved, though its forms and manifestations have 
radically changed. Even now the Mezzogiorno is the main 
element of structural weakness in the Italian economy, and the 
gap in economic, social, and civil terms between the 
Centre/North of Italy and the South remains wide. 
The under-developed condition of the South has some 
bearing on our analysis, for it accentuates the gaps between 
family income, income per capita and living standards of the 
respective populations in the Centre/North and the South. 
If we take the northern regions as a point of reference, 
the gap in the average income per household is 22%, while the 
gap in income per capita is 36% (see Table 5.1). These gaps 
refer to the disposable income, without considering the 
redistributive process fostered by the state, which in a number 
of regions reduces the inequalities in the GDP by up to 50%.5 
One of the most important factors on inequality is the 
high dependency ratio which characterises the Mezzogiorno (see 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 for a strong inverse relationship between 
dependency ratios and disposable income per capita at regional 
level). Its relevance, which we have already discussed at a 
macro-economic level, can obviously be ascertained in the case 
of the household unit. 
In the North, households with only one recipient of income 
represent 45.5%, while in the Mezzogiorno they increase 
noticeably to 61.2%. Those with two recipients of income are 
respectively 40.6% and 29.7%. Finally, those with more than 
two recipients are 13.4% against only 8%. The average size of 
households for each of the three groups are 2.24, 2.99, and 
4.33 in the North; and 3.06, 3.44, and 5.07 in the South (see 
Table 5.4). In conclusion, households in the Mezzogiorno have 
fewer recipients of income, and in general support more 
members. 
We may reach similar conclusions if we use the same 
criteria when we analyse the data relating to those in 
employment per household. While households without employed 
members are proportionally similar in the two geographical 
areas, this is not true for households with one employed 
For an interesting and complete, though dated, 
assessment of the State redistribution at regional level, see 
Forte-Bevolo-Clerico-Rosso (1978). See also on the same 
problem Wolleb-Wolleb (1984). 
162 
TABLE 5.1 
HOUSEHOLD AND PER-CAPITA INCOME 
BY GEOGRAPHICAL AREA 198 5 
(.000 Lira) 
1980 1985 
Household Per-capita Household Per-capita 
Areas Income Income Income Income A/B 
NORTH 1029 
CENTRE 948 
MEZZOGIORNO 810 
345 
295 
230 
Indexes 
100 
.86 
.67 
2023(A) 
1887(A) 
1591(A) 
100 
.93 
.78 
718(B) 2.81 
632(B) 2.98 
479(B) 3.32 
NORTH 
CENTRE 
MEZZOGIORNO 
100 
.92 
.79 
100 
.89 
.66 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 5.2 
LABOUR MARKET INDICATORS BY REGION 1985 
Labour force 
Population 
Employees 
Population 
Unemployed 
Labour force 
men women total men women total men women total 
Italv 
North 
Lombardia 
Valle d'Aosta 
Piemonte 
Liguria 
Veneto 
Friuli Venezia 
Giulia 
Trentino Alto 
Adige 
Emilia Romagna 
Centre 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Mezzogiorno 
Abruzzi 
Molise 
Campania 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
Source: ISTAT 
54.7 
57.1 
55.3 
56.5 
54.3 
56.0 
53.9 
56.9 
57.1 
55.3 
54.2 
56.6 
56.0 
52.1 
51.5 
52.9 
51.7 
53.0 
49.1 
52.0 
51.0 
28.1 
31.7 
29.8 
33.5 
26.2 
28.7 
29.0 
31.0 
36.3 
31.0 
29.6 
35.9 
26.7 
29.3 
27.9 
24.6 
23.2 
29.4 
23.2 
17.8 
23.4 
41.0 
44.0 
43.7 
44.6 
39.6 
42.0 
41.0 
43.6 
46.4 
43.0 
41.7 
46.0 
41.0 
40.5 
39.5 
38.5 
37.1 
41.0 
35.9 
34.5 
37.0 
50.9 
54.7 
55.4 
53.1 
51.3 
52.8 
50.7 
54.1 
54.5 
52.6 
50.3 
54.3 
52.1 
48.5 
48.4 
47.7 
47.1 
48.7 
43.0 
47.1 
43.3 
23.3 
27.6 
29.8 
28.5 
22.7 
24.7 
25.1 
27.2 
31.4 
26.8 
23.3 
31.8 
22.3 
24.3 
22.6 
18.8 
18.4 
22.0 
16.8 
12.6 
15.2 
36.7 
40.6 
42.5 
40.4 
36.3 
38.4 
37.4 
40.4 
42.6 
39.3 
36.5 
42.7 
36.8 
36.1 
35.3 
33.0 
32.4 
35.1 
29.6 
29.5 
29.1 
7.0 
4.5 
3.2 
6.1 
5.7 
5.9 
6.1 
4.6 
4.7 
4.9 
7.9 
4.1 
7.1 
7.0 
4.8 
9.9 
9.0 
8.2 
12.4 
9.4 
15.2 
17.4 
13.2 
5.9 
15.0 
13.6 
14.0 
14.1 
11.8 
13.4 
15.2 
21.3 
11.2 
16.5 
17.8 
17.0 
23.7 
20.7 
25.3 
27.8 
29.6 
35.1 
10.6 
7.7 
4.2 
9.5 
8.5 
8.7 
8.9 
7.4 
8.1 
8.8 
12.4 
6.9 
10.2 
11.0 
10.0 
14.4 
12.8 
14.4 
17.5 
14.8 
21.5 
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TABLE 5.3 
PER CAPITA INCOME BY REGION 1980-1985 
1980 1985 1980 1985 
Regions 
North 
Italy = 100 
117.3 116.9 
Lombardia = 100 
Lombardia 
Valle d'Aosta 
Piemonte 
Liguria 
Veneto 
Trentino Alto Adige 
Friuli Venezia Giulia 
Emilia Romagna 
Centre 
Toscana 
Umbria 
Marche 
Lazio 
Mezzogiorno 
Abruzzi 
Molise 
Campania 
Puglia 
Basilicata 
Calabria 
Sicilia 
Sardegna 
124.1 
114.3 
121.4 
112.6 
104.1 
113.9 
117.0 
115.3 
100.3 
111.2 
93.5 
105.4 
92.2 
78.2 
89.8 
88.1 
75.9 
78.2 
73.1 
72.1 
83.3 
68.7 
124.9 
114.0 
113.5 
117.3 
109.3 
105.9 
110.9 
115.5 
102.9 
103.7 
91.0 
107.0 
102.9 
78.0 
94.1 
82.9 
80.1 
74.3 
80.3 
85.7 
70.4 
80.8 
100.0 
97.8 
92.1 
90.7 
83.8 
91.7 
94.2 
92.9 
89.6 
75.3 
84.9 
74.2 
72.3 
70.9 
61.1 
63.0 
58.9 
58.1 
67.1 
55.3 
100.0 
90.4 
91.2 
93.9 
87.5 
84.7 
88.7 
92.4 
82.3 
72.8 
85.6 
82.3 
75.3 
66.3 
64.1 
59.4 
64.2 
68.6 
56.3 
64.6 
Source: ISTAT 
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member, where the respective percentages for North and South 
are 37.4% and 49.9%. Nor is it true for households with two 
people in work, here the figures are 27.3% for the North and 
18.3% for the South. Nor is it true for those with more than 
two employed members, where the figures are 5.6% and 4% 
respectively. The average size of the household for these 
other groups is 1.63, 3.01, 3.49, and 4.59 in the North, 
against 1.95, 3.64, 4.09, and 5.81 in the Mezzogiorno. 
Therefore, there are fewer employed in the South who have to 
support larger households. 
As we have already noted, there are many indications that 
the high dependency ratio in the South derives mainly from 
socio-economic reasons. Firstly, the comparison between 
households of the same size shows that the gap between North 
and South increases as the households increase in size (see 
Table 5.5). This suggests that the lower number of employed 
people per household in the South is not just the result of the 
higher rate of concentration of larger households, where there 
is the higher dependency ratio; but it is also the result of a 
lower rate of employment in households of similar size and 
composition, a situation where demographic differences have no 
relevant role. 
Secondly, the monetary contributionto the family income 
from the other employed members of the family is decisively 
lower in the South than in the North. In the North, households 
with two employed people have an income 30% higher than those 
with one member in work, and those with more than two employed 
members an income 25% higher than those with two. In the 
South, the respective percentages are 20% and 10% (see Table 
5.4) . 
From this data we can conclude that changes in the family, 
in relation to the formation of income, are slower in the South 
than in the North. Since the opportunities for finding a job 
are fewer and the level of wages lower, other members of the 
household are discouraged from being economically active, and 
their eventual contribution is negligible. In the South, 
therefore, family income does not differ much from that of the 
head of the household, whereas in the North the difference is 
more marked. 
The situation of under-development has a negative effect 
on the income of the head of the household as well. 
The gaps between North and South in productivity, and 
consequently in income per employed person, are very wide (in 
this case, as in others, we have no data which only refers to 
the head of the household). Such gaps are particularly wide in 
agriculture, where they are as high as 50%, if we compare the 
national average with the average of small regions, such as 
Basilicata and Molise; and they vary between 20% and 40%. 
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Area 
TABLE 5.4 
HOUSEHOLD AND PER-CAPITA INCOME 
BY NUMBER OF EARNERS AND EMPLOYED 1985 
1 2 > 2 0 1 2 > 2 
Earner Earners Earners Employ. Employ. Employ. Employ. 
NORTH 
% 
Household 
Y (A) 
Per-capita 
Υ (Β) 
A/B 
45.5 40.6 
1561 2261 
13.4 29.7 37.4 27.3 
2903 1193 2036 2645 
5.6 
3307 
696 757 671 730 677 758 721 
2.24 2.99 4.33 1.63 3.01 3.49 4.59 
MEZZOGIORNO 
% 
Household 
Y (A) 
Per-capita 
Υ (Β) 
A/B 
61.2 29.7 
1375 1871 
450 544 
3.06 3.44 
8.0 28.8 49.9 18.3 
2296 
4.0 
990 1906 2296 2517 
453 508 524 562 433 
5.07 1.95 3.64 4.09 5.81 
Source: ISTAT 
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TABLE 5.5 
HOUSEHOLD AND PER CAPITA INCOME 
BY SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD AND GEOGRAPHICAL AREA 1985 
(.000 Lira) 
1 Comp. 2 Comp. 3 Comp. 4 Comp. 5 Comp. > 5 Comp. 
NORTH 
% 
Household Y 
Per-capita Y 
(Β) 
MEZZOGIORNO 
% 
Household Y 
Per-capita Y 
(A) 
A/B 
19.8 
1032 
1032 
16.0 
835 
835 
.80 
25.2 
1758 
879 
19.5 
1281 
640 
.72 
24.0 
2273 
758 
18.9 
1648 
549 
.72 
20.2 
2564 
641 
22.9 
1872 
468 
.73 
7.3 
2818 
564 
13.3 
1983 
397 
.70 
3.4 
3077 
472 
9.2 
2182 
326 
.69 
Source : ISTAT 
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If we take larger regions such as Campania, Abruzzi, Puglie, 
and Calabria. The gaps are very significant in the industrial 
sector too, where the levels of income per employed person are 
20% lower than the national average in that particular sector, 
while they are negligible in the private service sector, and 
they disappear in the Public Administration sector.6 
A further element which has a negative effect on the 
South, in comparison with the North, is that of capital 
incomes. In the current situation, when real rates of 
interest are high, the great disparity in the distribution of 
wealth is producing conspicuous flows of capital income, 
directed mainly towards the North. The importance of this 
single factor as a cause of inequality is particularly 
significant, despite its relatively modest position within the 
income total.7 This, as well as the great capital gains of 
the last few years, have enriched groups of people living 
mainly in the North, and who were already in the high income 
brackets. 
Leaving aside expenditure on public goods, the 
distribution of transfer income has also resulted in the 
worsening of the situation between the South and the North in 
relation to disposable income per household. This 'perverse' 
effect can be attributed to the large proportion of transfer 
payments in pensions which go to the North, where there are 
more elderly people, and where the average level of pension is 
higher. The size of this direct flow to the North more than 
compensates for the many charitable allowances distributed by 
the State in the South. 
In the last fifteen years the only, but crucial, element 
of the State redistributive function that has worked in favour 
of the South is the fiscal action. This has operated through 
the higher fiscal charge per capita in the North, where incomes 
per employee are higher and the ratio between those in 
employment and population is also higher.8 
The relative stagnation in the Mezzogiorno which has 
lasted for the last fifteen years, together with the near 
completion of the process of homogenisation of the rest of the 
country (Centre/Eastern regions and North/Western regions) both 
in terms of productivity and per capita income, have changed 
the distribution of income per household at a regional level. 
Beyond the deep differences in the productive structure, which 
are still evident between one region and another in the 
6. See Wolleb-Wolleb (1984). 
7. For the quantitative assessment of the importance of 
capital income as a factor of inequality at regional level see 
Wolleb-Wolleb (1984). 
8. The redistributive role of social contributions and 
taxes at regional level is estimated in Wolleb-Wolleb (1984). 
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country, we are in the midst of a new dualistic situation in 
which the levels of economic, social and civil welfare are 
decisively different in the Mezzogiorno then in the rest of the 
country. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The most important factors of inequality in income 
distribution amongst Italian families are: the income of the 
head of the household; the presence in the labour market of 
the other members of the household; and the geographical area 
to which the household belongs. 
The level of income of the head depends on his position in 
the labour market. The employed, adult head receives an income 
far higher than the one received by an aged retired head. 
Amongst the employed household heads the differences in 
income depends on the socio-professional category and their 
level of qualification. Naturally, things are not perfectly 
rigid; there is a significant latitude in the way in which 
these preconditions work in practice. In fact within each 
social group there are gaps as big as those between one group 
and another: a fact which shows both the high degree of 
segmentation of the social body and the inadequacy of the 
statistical disaggregation by socio-economic category. 
The lack of a direct correspondence between qualification 
and level of income shows that the educational curricula are 
not entirely adequate for the presumed professional outlet. It 
also shows that professional qualification is increasingly 
taking place on the job, while chances of having a high level 
of income through self-employment, where the level of 
qualification is not necessarily important, have increased. 
In spite of these limitations, our analysis has shown a 
definite income hierarchy between social groups and levels of 
qualification, with differences in pay which are still very 
high. 
The income of the head of the household is the fundamental 
core of the family income, but it is no longer its only 
component. The income of the other members of the family are 
an essential contribution to the family income and to the 
standard of living of the family itself. The gaps in income 
are therefore greatly affected by the number of members who are 
either employed or earners. Thus, simple information on the 
income, social provenance and level of qualification of the 
head, is not sufficient to judge the position of the family on 
the income ladder. The eventual contribution of other members 
of the family alters the income hierarchy established by the 
socio-economic category of the head. The number of employed in 
the family is, therefore, a factor of social mobility in 
relation to income. 
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The most important contribution to the income of the 
household head is that of married women. Their presence in the 
labour market is conditioned by three related factors. First 
is the life-cycle of the family, where the greatest obstacle to 
women working is the number and age of children, and by the 
inadequacy of childcare facilities provided by the State. The 
second factor is the possibility of finding a job with the 
required conditions, and the high rate of female unemployment 
shows the difficulty in finding such a job; and third, is 
personal choices which are dictated by cultural traditions. 
At an aggregate level the contribution of the third 
employed/earner, presumably a child, is low, a fact which does 
not exclude the fact that in specific classes of population 
their contribution to the family income may assume greater 
significance. 
The contribution of receivers of transfer payments is 
significant in those households where there are two generations 
of adults living together. In such instances the income of the 
pensioner is amalgamated with incomes from the employment of 
the following generations, increasing the family income 
noticeably. 
In Italy, the territorial position of the family is an 
important factor of inequality in income distribution. In the 
Mezzogiorno all factors of inequality play an unfavourable role 
in determining the relative levels of income. The incomes of 
the heads of household are lower because of the difference in 
the sectorial composition of the two economies, with 
agriculture having more importance in the Mezzogiorno, and, 
above all, because of the wide productivity gaps within the 
same sectors. The contribution of the other members of the 
household is lower, both because there are fewer second and 
third income earners and because the monetary level of their 
contribution is lower. This is mainly the result of 
insufficient labour demand which is reflected in high rates of 
unemployment and low rates of activity. 
In the Mezzogiorno the level of transfers is also lower, 
because retirement pensions reflect the gaps between labour 
income, and because there is a concentration of low level 
transfer payments which are given as an addition to the family 
income for charitable purposes. The lower levels of individual 
income and of employment also increase the average size of the 
household, highlighting the protective function of the family. 
The comparison with the standard of living in the North 
is, therefore, even more unfavourable because, in the South, 
family incomes are lower and they must satisfy the needs of 
more people. 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
Data on household income in Italy can be drawn from two 
different sources: the Bank of Italy Survey on Households and 
the ISTAT Survey on Household Budgets.9 
The first of these surveys is available from 1966 and 
contains data on both individual and household income and on 
wealth. However, the results drawn from this survey are not 
generally considered very reliable because the size of the 
sample, slightly above 2,000 households, was very small. This 
results in the volatility of the results as shown by the wide 
changes, year by year, of the values of the Gini coefficients, 
estimated on household income distribution.1° 
The statistical source used in this study is the ISTAT 
Survey on Income Distribution carried out from 1980 onwards and 
which is, in reality, a simple extension of the Survey on 
Expenditure carried out by the ISTAT from 1968. 
The ISTAT Survey makes use of a very wide sample (36,000 
households) and provides information with a certain degree of 
disaggregation. The sampling of the data is carried out by 
giving each family a notebook in which they record in detail 
their monthly expenditure. Families are chosen according to a 
'stratified' sample, in order to take into account the size of 
the residence commune, the prevailing economic activity and the 
altimetry (plains, hills, mountains). ISTAT charges a communal 
employee with the collection of the notebooks and with the 
control of the consistency of the answers. In particular if 
the identity INCOME = EXPENDITURE + SAVING is not satisfied, 
either a correcting procedure is carried out or the 
questionnaire is invalidated. 
9. See Banca d'Italia "I bilanci delle famiglie 
italiane', supplemento al Bollettino della Banca d'Italia, 
Roma, various years. ISTAT "La distribuzione quantitativa del 
redditoin Italia nelle indagini sui bilanci di famiglia', in 
Supplemento al bollettino mensile di Statistica, Roma, various 
years, and ISTAT "I consumi delle famiglie' in Supplemento al 
bollettino mensile di Statistica', Roma, various years. 
10. For detailed analysis and criticism of the various 
sources of data on household income see Banca d'Italia 'Le 
indagini campionarie sui bilanci delle famiglie italiane', 
Roma, 1986. For a specific criticism of the ISTAT survey on 
income see C. D'Apice "I redditi delle famiglie nelle indagini 
Istat', in Politica ed Economia, No. 5, 1984. 
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The results of the Survey make possible an analysis of:-
the topology of expenditure 
the pattern of expenditure by the professional 
status, the age and the degree of instruction of the 
head of the household 
- the territorial area 
- the number of earners and employed 
- the size of the family. 
The main limitation of the Survey, as an instrument in the 
analysis of income distribution, derives from its original 
nature as a Survey on Expenditure, so that specific questions 
on income and on saving are limited. 
The following limits are particularly prejudicial for an 
analysis of household income distribution. 
Firstly, there is no information on household income by 
individual components. 
Secondly, there is no differentiation of household income 
by types of source. 
Thirdly, there is no separate information on original, 
gross and disposable income. Information refers only to 
disposable income. 
The main definitions used in the ISTAT surveys are:-
HOUSEHOLD: a household comprises one person living alone 
or a group of people living at the same address having meals 
prepared together and with common housekeeping. The members of 
the household are not necessarily related by blood or marriage 
but they include all residents. 
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD: the head of household is the person 
who declared himself (herself) head of household in the 
interview. 
EMPLOYED: persons aged 14 or over who, at the time of the 
interview were gainfully employed, either full or part-time and 
either attending work or absent on holiday only. 
UNEMPLOYED: persons aged 14 or more who have lost their 
job and are still without a job at the time of the interview, 
but have declared they intend to seek work or are seeking work. 
PEOPLE SEARCHING FIRST OCCUPATION: persons aged 14 or 
over who have never worked and are seeking their first job. 
RETIRED: persons not working who have reached the age for 
receipt of National Insurance Retirement Pension, i.e. 65 and 
over for men and 55 and over for women. 
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UNOCCUPIED: persons who are neither working nor looking 
for a job who have not reached the age for receipt of a 
retirement pension. 
DISPOSABLE INCOME: all monetary inputs (wages and 
salaries, income from seif-employment, capital, income, social 
transfers, imputed rent of owned dwellings) less taxes and 
social contributions. 
TERRITORIAL AREAS: North, Centre, Mezzogiorno (South). 
North: Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, Lombardia, Liguria, 
Veneto, Trentino Alto Adige, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Emilia 
Romagna. 
Centre: Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio. 
Mezzogiorno (South): Abruzzi, Molise, Campania, Puglia, 
Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the household 
distribution of income, for the period 1973-1981. We cover 
both market generated income and the redistributional effect of 
government policies. The object is to identify the main causes 
or sources of inequality and to locate the types of households 
which face particular economic disadvantage. In short, the 
analysis is concerned with income distribution with an emphasis 
on welfare. 
The Spanish data that is available is not only "old" (the 
most recent surveys refer only to 1973 and 1981) , it is also 
inadequate for conducting a strict comparison between families 
of equal size and for conducting a comparison of equivalent 
incomes and constructing welfare indices. 
Another caveat must be noted at the outset: we feel that 
making comparisons for 1973 and 1981 imposed strong 
limitations, not just because of the statistical restrictions 
commented on before, but also because the period starting in 
1982 is the one in which, for the first time in Spanish 
history, there was a socialist government in power (the 
previous one being the government connected to the political 
transition to democracy). Our impression is that, during the 
time of the socialist government, the functional distribution 
of income has worsened as a result of government policies 
designed to stimulate profits. According to official sources, 
huge investments were expected; this could also have altered 
the household distribution of income. 
(1) The paper covers the period 1973-81, our selected 
years are coincidental with the years for which there exists 
Family Expenditure Surveys. Spanish FES corresponding to 1973 
and 1981 are not homogeneous (see appendix) and this feature 
creates a lot of difficulties; for instance; (a) the 
extension of the Survey limits the range of potential 
comparisons and; (b) the institutional change registered in 
Spain between the two years poses difficulties, even with the 
identification of categories in, for example, the regional 
comparison of income distribution, and in other categories (see 
below); the political process of transferring power to regions 
from a rigid centralised state, since democracy came to Spain 
is well known (about 1978 after a transition period beginning 
in 1975). See too Ahijado-Clapes (1987). 
(2) We shall talk of families, households and "economias 
domesticas" (domestic economies) without loss of generality. 
In Spanish literature it is usual to describe these "by 
families or familiar distribution" but the European Report will 
use the term "household". 
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The choice of the "household" as the final unit of 
analysis is motivated by the observation that the standard of 
living of an individual is strongly determined by the type of 
family or household in which he/she lives and to which accrue 
different classes of income or monetary inputs. It is evident 
that two equal incomes can hide different levels of welfare if, 
for instance, they correspond to two families in which the 
number of members and/or earners behind it are different. 
On the other hand, the main concept of income, as used in 
the Spanish Family Expenditure Surveys, is that of disposable 
income, defined as the sum of wages and salaries, capital 
incomes, less social contributions, less taxes plus social 
transfers. This concept is not very useful, in a study of 
market versus State distribution because it does not permit the 
redistributional effects of public policies to be distinguished 
or for any reasonable degree of disaggregation to be 
undertaken. This aspect will be considered by using other 
sources of information. 
We wish to pose and answer the following questions with 
regard to the distribution of income: 
(1) What is the size and the structure of inequality in income 
distribution? 
(2) Has there been a tendency for this inequality to increase 
or decrease? 
(3) What has been/what is the role of the State and its 
redistributional policy and how effective has this been? 
(4) What were the main changes, from an economic point of 
view, in the composition of the population and work force? 
(5) What have been the main sources of inequality? 
(6) What factors are instrumental in causing inequality and 
how do they affect specific groups, often in a cumulative 
way, thus producing particular disadvantages and even 
poverty? 
To deal with these questions the paper is divided into two 
main parts. In Section 2, after briefly discussing the 
framework of the Spanish economy and the economic policies 
which affected the distribution of income, we present a 
temporal comparison of some variables which permit us to 
measure the inequality in the form of indicators of the 
distribution such as the Gini coefficient; some trends such as 
the age structure of the population and the dependency ratio, 
etc. In Section 3, the main causes or factors of inequality 
(i.e. geographical, structure of family and the labour market 
causes, etc.) are considered and cross-classified and, if 
inequality exists, the areas in the distribution which a 
181 
particular factor, or set of factors, is likely to affect can 
be shown. The Appendix is devoted to definitions and concepts 
as well as methodology. 
2. DISPERSION OF THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION: 1973-1981. 
We use here the well known Gini coefficient to measure 
income distribution disparities in aggregate. Obviously these 
measures must be used cautiously taking into account the 
possible offsetting effects caused by the mobility between 
FES's groups. 
For the total set of households the Gini coefficients 
were: 
1973 0.3935 
1981 0.3730 
The inequality shown by the index decreased, but only by a 
very small amount, a mere 0.0205, percentage points, so we can 
conclude that there is striking stability in the temporal 
evolution of the income distribution (see Lorenz curves below). 
So taking the Gini coefficients as the index of inequality 
or dispersion in the distribution of income, one can say that 
the distribution, after taxes, was surprisingly stable although 
there was a slight move towards a more egalitarian distribution 
of income. 
From the analysis by decile of total disposable income for 
all households, we see that the index shows not only stability 
over time, but also a relatively high concentration, in the 
share of income going to the higher deciles. 
TABLE 2.1 
HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE INCOME BY DECILE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1973 2.05 3.89 5.25 6.51 7.76 9.06 10.56 12.51 15.64 26.75 
1981 2.47 4.07 5.42 6.68 7.94 9.23 10.68 12.56 15.52 25.37 
This stability is shown again when we see that the bottom 
50% of families get only 25% of total income. Though slight, 
the only reductions in the share of income are located in the 
two top deciles. 
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The degree of dispersion can be seen by looking at the 
ratio of the share of income going to the top and bottom 
deciles. For all households: 
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With this indicator the same result is obtained; the 
inequality has decreased a little for all households. 
We will first look at government policies and then at 
demographic changes in order to find explanations for the 
general stability and the small reduction in inequality in the 
distribution. 
2.1 The Framework of the Economy and the Economic 
Policies During the Period 
The distribution of income in the period being studied was 
obviously determined by the incomes obtained in the market and 
also by the changes and economic policies implemented by 
governments, particularly the ones referring to transfers by 
the State. In this paragraph we shall discuss the general 
economic framework behind the observed distribution and the 
main direction of policies. 
The period can be characterised, to a large extent, by a 
big institutional change which determined the possibilities for 
action and the room for manoeuvre. It was the transition to 
democracy which overlapped the early effects of the economic 
crisis, which began in 1973 after the first substantial 
increase in oil prices, and lasted until now, with another 
point of inflexion in 1979.H The early democratic governments 
carried out a deep and extensive institutional and political 
change - a very time and resource consuming task - and had to 
face economic crisis at the same time. 
The first transition period was one of high social claims, 
which translated into large wage increases. The resulting 
double figure inflation and unemployment following 
the oil crisis, appeared as the two main economic problems. 
The subsequent central governments (and even the socialist 
government after 1981) favoured the idea that the main problem 
was inflation. The cause, they said, was typical of cost-push 
theories; "excessive" wage increases, in both nominal and real 
terms. 
The theoretical argument was much too simple and naive (as 
the facts later showed); they pretended to raise investment 
(and then employment) through increases in the entrepreneurial 
surplus, without previously developing a formal negotiating 
process on the question of investment. The last link in the 
chain did not function properly, probably due to other factors, 
usually referred to as "animal spirits" and political, economic 
and institutional uncertainty. 
1 . For the analysis and consequences see EFER's Report 
on Europe and the World Economy (Cripps et al 1985). 
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The growth rate of the economy, as represented by GDP, 
decreased from 7.9% (a "Japanese" rate of growth) in 1973, to a 
mere 1.1% two years later, was an average of 2.1% per annum 
till 1981 and then steadily decreased until a floor of -0.86% 
was reached in 1981. 
During the period the economy suffered a very strong 
structural change, shifting from an industrial economy to a 
services economy, as measured by both the value added and 
employment. Nevertheless, the industrial sector managed to 
attain a very good growth in productivity (35% to 25% for the 
economy as a whole between 1975 and 1982) (Toharia 1986). 
The persistence of the 1973 economic crisis (and its 
deepening, as an almost direct consequence of the second wave 
of increases in the price of crude oil in 1979), together with 
the economic policies which favoured the control of inflation, 
gave rise to spectacular increases in the rate of unemployment. 
In 1973 there was almost full employment, unemployment being 
2.5% but, by the end of the period being studied, this rose to 
15.0% (the trend then continued so that unemployment rose to 
22.0%, one of the highest in Europe). This fact forced the 
unions to concede to an incomes policy which was negotiated at 
three levels (Government, Trade Union and "Patronal").12 
With it the link was broken between the increase in 
productivity and increases in wages and salaries. The share of 
wages in the value added decreased from 1978 onwards. 
These facts affected the level of income and its 
distribution at least from the point of view of the numbers 
receiving income from employment, because of the mass 
unemployment. 
2.2 The Fiscal System: Gross and Net Incomes 
In general the Spanish data corresponds to disposable 
income, after tax and social contributions. Looking at public 
revenues and social contributions will allow us to 
differentiate between gross and disposable aggregate income and 
to grasp, however roughly and qualitatively, through a 
complicated system of taxes and public expenditures, the role 
of redistribution policies on people's welfare and in 
offsetting the market forces at work. 
The redistributional policy operates in two stages: 
(1) from the public revenue side where the decision is made to 
tax a group to achieve a given level of the Public Sector 
Budget, which implies a redistribution policy, which raises the 
question of the regressiveness or progressiveness of the tax 
12. Together with a political desire for collaboration to 
strengthen the young democracy in the period of institutional 
change. 
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system. (2) From the expenditure and benefits side, there is 
another, maybe more explicit, redistribution policy, and 
account can be taken of the redistributive effects of each and 
every type of expenditure (i.e. with extremes in education and 
transport). 
It is well known that from the revenue side the system is 
slightly redistributive, whereas it is much more redistributive 
from the expenditure side. 
All this is obvious, but perhaps not trivial for a country 
like Spain which, in the period studied, registered profound 
changes in very important and very well rooted institutions, 
such as a modern fiscal system. 
To measure the first effect (the revenue side) it is 
necessary to look at the general fiscal system. 
TABLE 2.2 
Years 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
DIRECT, 
% 
4.09 
4.36 
4.51 
5.24 
5.40 
5.99 
6.17 
6.35 
, INDIRECT 
DT 
var 
_ 
0.27 
0.15 
0.73 
0.16 
0.59 
0.18 
0.18 
AND TOTAL 
% 
5.43 
5.38 
5.14 
4.99 
4.83 
5.09 
5.62 
5.50 
IT 
TAXES. 
var 
_ 
-0.05 
-0.24 
-0.15 
-0.16 
0.26 
0.53 
-0.12 
PER CENT. 
TT 
% 
9.53 
9.74 
9.66 
10.23 
10.23 
11.08 
11.79 
11.85 
var 
0.21 
-0.08 
0.57 
0.00 
0.85 
0.71 
0.06 
The figures correspond to the general fiscal pressure, as 
the ratio of taxes to GDP increased fairly consistently from 
1977, the year of the Fiscal Reform or, more obviously, from 
the year (1978) in which policies contained in the Fiscal 
reform were applied. Nevertheless the ratio is still low in 
relation to other European or Western countries.13 
The pressure on direct taxes increased evenly from 1978 in 
accordance with the more irregular increases in indirect taxes. 
One would have expected a decrease in the latter, but according 
to Treasury officials the "conjunctural" effect of the economic 
13. The 13% figures for Spain in 1981 corresponds to 
29.0% for the EEC as a whole in the same years, an average of 
27.7% for OECD countries and 19% for Japan. 
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crisis favoured the tendency to maintain the levels reached 
before the Reform. 
Another fiscal indicator of the "redistribution" policy 
which is maybe more meaningful than the one already considered, 
is provided by the ratio between direct and indirect taxes. In 
the case of Spain this is a reasonable indicator for the period 
studied. 
TABLE 2.3 
DIRECT/INDIRECT TAXES 
7 4 . 5 
8 0 . 9 
8 7 . 7 
1 0 4 . 3 
1 1 0 . 9 
1 1 7 . 7 
1 0 9 . 8 
1 1 5 . 5 
-
1 0 . 4 
6 . 8 
1 6 . 6 
6 . 6 
6 . 8 
- 8 . 0 
5 . 7 
Years DT/IT Change 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Both measures show how the fiscal system contributed to a 
greater equality in the distribution of income thus offsetting 
the market failures. 
The relationship is an increasing one, 1978 again being 
the year in which the index was above 100 and when the rate of 
change was the largest in the series, 16.6%. As has already 
been mentioned this was the year of the Reform. In this Reform 
the main tax for the first time in Spanish fiscal history was 
income tax - or at least the one with the most potential 
revenue generating power. But this time the reason for 
maintaining the indirect pressure, again according to official 
sources, was the crisis plus the need to substitute the old ITE 
(a tax on the firm's "traffic") by a value added tax proper, 
which resulted in an increase in the amount of indirect 
taxation (i.e. a fall in the index of -8.0 points by 1981). 
The share of the income tax over total revenues increased by 
50% during the period, from 21.9% in 1975 to 30.0% in 1982. 
There are various reasons for having different treatment 
for wages and capital incomes in the fiscal policies: 
a) The tax on property (Patrimonio) represents only 0.7% of 
the total revenues. This tax was first conceived as a 
complementary tax to the general income tax. 
b) The share of wage retention went up from 62.5% to 83.8% 
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between 1975 and 1982, whereas the corresponding ones for 
capital went down, with 13.2% and 11.3% as initial and 
final points. 
c) Last, but not least, it is interesting to comment on the 
tax on firms' income. This tax shifted from representing 
10.5% of "apparent" State revenues in 1975 to 7.6% in 
1982. It was created by the already quoted Act, which did 
not state the expected results. The cause of the fall 
being, again according to Treasury officials, the usual 
explanation, the economic crisis which badly affected the 
firms' profits and consequently eroded the revenue from 
this tax base.14 
The level and composition of tax evasion is another very 
important point in characterising the role of the fiscal system 
in the income distribution process. The degree of payment of 
tax by wage and salary earners was 23.93% in 1979, more than 
from the other sources of fiscal revenues; the corresponding 
percentage for 1983 was 27.84% (Lagares et al 1985). Tax 
payments are made through a controlled system for 95% of wage 
earners. Only about 50% of capital incomes are declared for 
tax. 
We can conclude that the Spanish fiscal system has 
improved, and approached the European system during the period. 
The progressiveness has been improving too, but it started from 
very low levels. However, some clouds remain, especially the 
ones coming from the weight of indirect taxes, and the very 
high tax evasion from capital income sources. In general we 
can conclude that the fiscal system has only made a small 
contribution to the reduction of inequalities in income 
distribution, but this has had a tendency to move towards 
greater equality. We can, therefore, draw the tentative 
conclusion that, over the period, as expected, the system 
contributed only slightly to the revenue side of the general 
redistribution policy. 
2.3 Were there changes in the conception of the Welfare 
State? 
To complete the picture it is necessary to look at social 
benefits - the expenditure side of redistribution policies. 
Firstly, a very general comment on the evolution of the social 
security system during the period is necessary. 
It is evident that the system of transfers and public 
social benefits affected both gross, and disposable incomes and 
the income available for the expenditure of a household. 
14. Very recent studies reveal that the net capacity of 
the corporation tax to finance spending is nil, due to the fact 
that a similar amount is devoted to subsidies to firms. 
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During the period under study the political complexion of 
the government was centre, (or centre right, socialist after 
1982); right wing in the transition and centre afterwards. 
The fact is that in Spain, during the reference years these 
governments with moderate tendencies carried out, in general, 
really progressive policies. 
The deepening of the economic crisis and its effects were 
not felt until the last part of the period being studied (i.e. 
the world's restructuring of the composition of output) and it 
is since then that the political commitment to reduce social 
security expenditure arose and was later maintained by the 
socialist government.1-* 
The question is, therefore, more complicated in regard to 
Spain for two reasons: (1) the previous system of financing 
(in a scruffy political setting) was not a true capitalisation 
of a revenue system, but was based on the naive belief (as was 
later demonstrated) of maintaining economic growth, growth of 
output and employment; and (2) an "inefficient" managing of 
the system. 
In general, it is true that one can expect conservative 
governments to try to emphasise the protagonism of the market 
and consequently the market system as the vehicle of income 
generation (resource allocation) and determination; and it is 
equally true, in general, that leftist governments are expected 
to reduce observed inequality through redistributional 
policies. 
But, as a matter of fact, the social security system (i.e. 
the number of benefits and to some extent the "size" of them) 
imposes a restriction on the operation of any meaningful 
reduction of public spending on this by any government. 
15. In passing, it could be said that this commitment was 
adopted without a proper debate on its merits and disadvantages 
and the role which the welfare state should play. 
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SOCIAL SECURITY 
Years 
1973 
1981 
1983 
TABLE 2.4 
- RESOURCES, CONTRIBUTIONS AND SUBSIDIES 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
R/GDP 
8.71 
11.96 
12.51 
in % 
C/GDP 
7.94 
10.28 
10.07 
GDP. 
S/GDP 
0.47 
1.33 
2.14 
R: resources 
C: contributions 
S: subsidies 
The absolute number of benefits16 is important. It has 
increased and means that more than 13% of the total population 
(on average), actually receives a benefit.17 
The resources, as a percentage of GDP, increased during 
the period; largely between 1973 and 1981, by 37.31%, being 
12% of the total. The tendency is still towards increase, but 
at a slower rate, (i.e. a cumulative rate of 6.31% between 1981 
and 1983). The contributions, a slightly regressive feature 
from an income distribution point of view, account for 86% of 
total resources, the rest being subsidies, but this decreased 
between 1981 and 1983. 
Of benefits the most important ones were retirement 
pensions (53-46%) which have decreased over the period; the 
orphan, family and other benefits only amount to a stable 4%, 
and the ones for sickness and widowhood together amount to 43-
49% of total benefit claimants. 
In value terms the structure was similar, but the 
retirement pensions retain a larger share, although this 
decreased from 56% to 51% over the period. 
16. Unemployment benefits are considered separately 
because they are managed by a different Ministry. 
17. As a rule in the socialist period (i.e. 1982 onwards) 
there is a one to one relationship between pensioners and 
pensions. 
190 
The same can be said of orphan-family benefit (3% stable), 
but the amount payable for sickness benefit has been 
increasing.18 
The number of benefit claimants increased in the period 
(1973-1981) by an average rate of 5.19%; from 3,799,908 in 
1977 to 4,626,612 in 1981. Of these the retirement pensioners 
are the most important with a share of 53.14% of the total in 
1977 and - after a small reduction - 48.89% in 1981. The 
sickness and widowhood benefit claimants are the next largest 
with basically stable shares of around 20% in each category. 
In terms of expenditure the increase in benefit claimants 
produced annual increases in expenditure of 3 6% on average, the 
extremes being 56.27% in 1977 and 26.49% in 1983. Evidently 
the rate of growth was decreasing; it is also worth mentioning 
that the starting levels were, on average, very low on average, 
which explains the high rates of growth. 
These benefits were financed from social contributions and 
subsidies, but, whereas the share of social contributions was 
decreasing (it amounted to 93.8% in 1973 and 85.7% in 1981, the 
same tendency being followed later with 77.8% in 1985); the 
share corresponding to subsidies was increasing; from 5.5% in 
1973 to 11.1% in 1981, the same tendency giving rise to a 21.8% 
share in 1985. In those same years the ratio of contributions 
to total resources was 91.11% and 85.97% and the ratio of 
subsidies to resources was 5.39% and 11.08% respectively (1973 
and 1981). The ratio of total resources to GDP changed from 
8.71% to 11.96% (12.75% in 1985); the ratio of contributions 
to GDP jumped from 7.94% to 10.07% (9.72% in 1985), and the 
subsidies as a percentage of GDP increased to 1.33% from 0.25% 
(2.72% in 1985) . 
Of total expenditure by the State, 12.19% of GDP in 1973, 
social benefits were 2.78% (of the 12.19%); and they grew to 
6.43% in 1981. Benefits were multiplied by a factor of 2.3 
(from 2.78% to 6.43%). Health benefits were a very relevant 
factor in this (2.57% in 1973 and 3.72% in 1981, so it was 
multiplied by a factor of 1.5). 
Thus it can be seen that, during the period, there was an 
enormous rise in the size of the social security system, as a 
proxy for the welfare system, although the large rise is partly 
accounted for by the very low levels at which the benefits 
started. 
18. There are reasons for thinking that there could be 
spurious increases here due to an inefficient conception and 
management of the system. 
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PERCENTAGE 
TABLE 
COMPOSITION 
2. 
OF 
5 
NUMBER OF 
BY CATEGORY - SOCIAL SECURITY 
Sickness 
Retirement 
Widowhood 
Orphan 
Family 
Others 
1973 
21.09 
53.14 
22.30 
3.03 
0.42 
0.02 
100.0 
1981 
23.91 
48.89 
23.63 
3.14 
0.43 
0.01 
100.0 
BENEFITS 
1983 
26.33 
46.70 
23.54 
3.00 
0.43 
0.00 
100.0 
TABLE 2.6 
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF EXPENDITURE BY CATEGORY 
SOCIAL SECURITY 
% 1973 1981 1983 
Sickness 
Retirement 
Widowhood 
Orphan 
Family 
24.16 
56.17 
17.07 
2.27 
0.33 
26.98 
53.58 
16.86 
2.19 
0.39 
30.11 
51.34 
16.15 
2.04 
0.36 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
The share of cash benefits was 77.30% in 1974 and 83.92% 
in 1981. Of these the central government gave 13.74% in 1974 
falling to 9.84% for 1981 (the figure was 9.12% for 1984). The 
social security share declined too, from 83.32% in 1974 in 
money terms to 66.30% in 1981 and 69.46% in 1984. 
The losses were in favour of "other social security 
systems" which had the biggest percentage gains; from being 
1.41% in 1974 they rose to 19.26% in 1984 (and 21.80% in 1981) 
and also in favour of "other public administrations" which 
increased from 1.5% to 2.05% between 1974 and 1981 (2.15% in 
1984) . 
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This to some extent reflects internal redistribution due 
to the state of creation of "autonomias". Thus the system saw 
both volume and structural changes as a consequence of the 
double effects of crisis and institutional change. 
Of these sources the benefits which came from the general 
social security system were the most important, not only 
because of the percentage it contributed, but it was also very 
important in absolute terms; 58.44% of the total benefit 
expenditure, 60.37% and 64.80% for 1974, 1981 and 1984 
respectively. 
Taking indices equal to 100 for 1974 at current prices; 
although this is not very important for studying the structure; 
the cash benefits of the social security system were multiplied 
by factors of 4.6 and 7.36 for 1981 and 1984. The ones coming 
from the central State were second in importance, and increased 
by factors of 4.14 and 5.85 (the total combined effect being 
5.8 and 8.8). 
Unemployment benefits increased, using an index of 1974 = 
100, to a considerable 4680 and 5630 during the reference 
period (1973-1981), thus they were multiplied by factors of 46 
and 56 respectively, as a consequence of the mass unemployment 
mentioned before. Our economy changed from an almost full 
employment rate in 197 3 to 2,000,000 (3,000,000 at the moment 
of writing) unemployed from a total population of 38 million. 
But, even worse, the extent of cover for unemployment benefit 
is less than for our European neighbours (only 30% in Spain) . 
On the other hand, the share of unemployment benefits of total 
benefits was decreasing for those years, 1974, 1981 and 1984: 
33.61%, 21.8% and 16.36%. 
We can conclude that social expenditure contributed 
strongly to maintaining household income, thus offsetting the 
effect of unemployment, and transferring incomes from the 
higher to the lower income groups, due to improvements in the 
fiscal system of revenue collection, and particularly due to 
the increased importance attached to the role of public 
spending.19 
Before going on to the disaggregate "micro-economic" data 
of part 3, we will look at the importance of various sources of 
income. 
2.3 Sources of Income 
The sources of Spanish incomes, as classified by the 
Family Expenditure Surveys, were the ones shown in Table 2.7, 
with minor modifications. 
19. In other cases the disparity in income distribution 
would tend to increase. 
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TABLE 2.7 
TOTAL INCOMES IN % 
5 9 . 2 9 
2 2 . 5 9 
8 . 6 2 
9 . 0 5 
5 7 . 1 9 
1 5 . 6 0 
1 2 . 1 8 
1 5 . 0 1 
1973 1981 
Ordinary incomes 99.28 98.98 
1.1 Employees 
1.2 Self-employed 
1.3 Capital and ownership incomes 
1.4 Transfers 
Extraordinary incomes 0.71 1.01 
Ordinary incomes represent the 99% of total income, 
having been stable over the reference period. 
The most important changes in the source of income 
correspond to the self-employed income which lost 3 0.94 
percentage points as a result of small firms collapsing during 
the economic crisis. The "transfer" incomes (and other incomes 
described in the 1981 FES, The Role of State) gained 65.85 
percentage points as a direct result of the crisis, and 
unemployment etc. and, as a consequence of the increase in the 
social security welfare system, as already studied (see above). 
Obviously, the increase in transfers arises from the increases 
in unemployment benefits and pensions, particularly the 
anticipated ones which resulted from the crisis. 
Wages and salary incomes (employees) lost on the whole 3.5 
percentage points. The capital and ownership incomes had a 
41.29 percentage point increase, (it must be remembered that 
the incomes considered here are disposable incomes, after taxes 
and social contributions plus benefits and transfers). 
The evolution of aggregate incomes is shown in Table 2.8. 
We can see that the evolution of gross and disposable 
incomes were strikingly similar (5.12 and 5.28 times in 1979 
relative to 1970). This occurred despite huge increases in 
income tax, plus property tax.20 The explanation for this is 
that despite the huge increases in the rates of tax, the 
absolute values were small around the fiscal reform years. 
20. As we have already seen the contribution of property 
tax is almost nil; so the huge increases correspond mainly to 
income tax. 
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TABLE 2.8 
GROSS AND DISPOSABLE INCOMES 
(Million Points) 
1. Wages and salaries (gross) 
2. Social contributions 
3. Wages and salaries (net) [1-2] 
4. Social benefits 
5. Capital and property incomes 
5.1 (resources) 
5.2 (uses) 
6. Transfers, current net 
6.1 (resources) 
6.2 (uses) 
7. Net income before taxes [3 + 
8. Taxes on income and property 
9. Net income of families 
4 + 5 + 6] 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
5.1 
5.2 
6. 
6.1 
6.2 
7. 
8. 
9. 
1970 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
index 1970 
1974 
212.0 
289.19 
209.56 
225.13 
106.99 
191.19 
273.51 
124.82 
168.52 
218.66 
201.38 
285.26 
200.4 
= 100 
1977 
405.17 
527.7 
397.8 
487.79 
312.23 
330.3 
685.40 
164.09 
317.15 
492.81 
362.40 
777.41 
356.09 
1979 
580.17 
778.64 
538.26 
882.71 
429.69 
-
-
528.55 
1592.70 
512.36 
In 1970 the proportion of income tax on gross income was 
1.49%, in 1977 3.21% and by 1979, after the Tax Reform, 4.51%. 
Using an index of 100 for 1970, taxes have the largest 
rates of growth (multiplying by 7.7 and 15 for 1977 and 1979) 
due to the fiscal reform. Contributions were only multiplied 
by factors of 4.5 and 5.8 for both periods and social benefits 
by 4.8 and 8.8; the second most important for this period. 
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2.4 The Population and its Age Structure: 
Demographic Factors and the Labour Market 
Demographic factors are another cause of changes in income 
distribution through the shift in the structure of households 
and number of earners in each household. 
The Spanish population grew between 1970 and 1981 by 11.16 
percentage points, reaching 37.8 million people. The 
distribution of men and women is approximately fifty-fifty 
(49.10 and 50.90 in 1981). 
Year 
1970 
1981 
Total 
33,956,376 
37,746,260 
TABLE 2.9 
POPULATION 
Women 
17,381,213 
19,216,496 
Men 
16,575,163 
18,529,764 
The share for women and men is almost stable both in the 
total and by age groups. 
TABLE 2.10 
POPULATION BY SEX AND AGE 
Aged 0-14, 15-64 and 65 and over 
Total male and female - % 
1970 
1981 
0-14 
27.32 
25.66 
15-64 
62.69 
62.94 
65 + 
9.69 
11.22 
It is easy to appreciate a fall of 1.66 (six percentage 
points) in the group of people aged 0-14; this corresponds to 
the fall in the fertility rate; and an increase in the numbers 
in the 65 and over group, of 1.52% but representing 22 
percentage points; thus the decreasing number of young and 
increasing number of old people do not offset one another which 
produces interesting results (see below). This could explain, 
at least in part, the increases in both the number of pensions 
and benefits and their share of total expenditure, as noted 
above. 
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The most significant change was possibly the number in 
the 65 and over group, the retired, who not only registered 
growth but the biggest growth, with 15.78 percentage points. 
The reduction in the number of children (aged 0-14) is, 
perhaps, more meaningful as a long run tendency than in 
absolute terms; it registered a 6 percentage point cumulative 
rate of decrease. As such this structure and those tendencies 
could be worrying, more so if the "pensioners" (people 
receiving benefits) are located in a systematic way in some 
groups (i.e., deciles, etc.). 
TABLE 2.11 
RATE OF ACTIVITY AND RATE OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
1964-1974 
1974-1977 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Rate of 
activity 
total 
52.1 
52.9 
50.3 
49.8 
49.3 
48.7 
48.1 
48.1 
50.0 
47.7 
47.4 
47.7 
TOTAL 
Rate of 
(ALL 
unemployment 
total 
2.03 
4.86 
5.3 
7.1 
8.7 
11.5 
14.4 
16.2 
17.7 
20.6 
21.9 
21.5 
AGES) 
RA 
Mal 
, 
-
75.2 
74.1 
73.2 
72.2 
71.4 
70.9 
70.0 
69.4 
68.7 
68.5 
RU 
e 
_ 
-
5.1 
6.6 
8.2 
11.0 
13.6 
15.1 
16.4 
19.4 
20.5 
19.7 
RA RU 
Female 
_ 
-
27.5 
27.5 
27.4 
27.1 
26.6 
27.1 
27.6 
27.6 
27.6 
28.2 
_ 
-
5.6 
8.1 
9.8 
12.9 
16.2 
18.9 
20.8 
23.4 
25.4 
25.6 
RA = rate of activity 
RU = rate of unemployment 
Still more signifi 
looking at the household 
the following Table, 
dependency ratios: (a) 
defined as the ratio o 
population and; (b) 
defined as the ratio of 
number of unemployed 
approximation we calcula 
employed.) 
cant are the dependency ratios when 
distribution of income, as we show in 
(In fact, there are two possible 
a "macro-economic" dependency ratio, 
f total population over the employed 
a "micro-economic" dependency ratio 
total people in the household over the 
in the household; here as an 
te first the ratio of unemployed over 
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An increase in the share of population aged over 65, if it 
is not completely offset by a decrease in the share under 14, 
produces an increase in the dependency ratio (defined as the 
ratio between non-employed and employed) ; this is a 
demographic factor. An increase in unemployment or a decrease 
in the rate of activity (or both) also produces an increase in 
the dependency ratio which, however, is due to changes in the 
labour market situation. 
The dependency ratio worsened steadily, increasing 3.8 
times between 1977 and 1983 (5.4 times between 1977 and 1986). 
This worsening was provoked more by the increase in the 
unemployment rate and the decrease in the activity rate than by 
the increase in the dependant population as observed above. 
The rate of employment and the rate of unemployment follow 
opposite tendencies, increasing the dependency ratio 
(corresponding to the unemployed as a ratio of actives) which 
increased by 2.71 times between 1977 and 1981, as a result of 
the crisis. 
The percentage of employees by sex, male, female of total 
employees, was absolutely stable between 1977 and 1981 (71.55% 
and 28.44 in 1977 and 71.86% and 28.13 in 1981). 
The same can be said of the percentage employees by sex as 
a percentage of active population, the ratio of both of them 
being 0.38 in 1977 and 1981. 
There is in almost all European countries a long-run trend 
towards an increase in the rates of activity, employment and 
unemployment for women. It seems that this is not totally true 
for Spain where there were increases in the rates of activity 
(slight) and unemployment (heavy); 5.6 in 2977 to 20.8 in 1983 
and 25.6 in 1986) but the rate of employment decreased slightly 
too. 
If the structure of incomes were stable and the 
demographic structures and the labour market changing, the 
stability in the observed disparity indices could be attributed 
to various mechanisms, as indeed was the case, for instance: 
(a) basically, to the redistributive role of the State and, but 
less importantly, to; (2) the shock absorber role of Spanish 
families, being traditionally very close (the shocks to be 
absorbed at this time were mainly the ones provoked by the 
economic crisis). 
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Year 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
(1986 
Rate of 
LABOUR 
actrv 
16-19 
Τ M F 
% 
TABLE 2.12 
MARKET RATIOS AND DEPENDENCY 
employees 
/actives 
94.71 
92.94 
91.30 
88.47 
85.63 
83.76 
82.25 
78.51 
'itv and rate 
Rate of 
20-24 
Τ M 
Of 
% unemployed 
/actives 
5.28 
7.05 
8.71 
11.52 
14.36 
16.24 
17.74 
21.48 
unemployment 
activity (*) 
25-54 
F Τ M 
RATIOS 
dependency 
ratio 
bv 
F 
0.05 
0.07 
0.09 
0.13 
0.16 
0.19 
0.21 
0.27) 
sex and 
55 , 
Τ 
age 
and over 
M F 
1977 15.3 14.5 16.3 10.2 10.5 9.8 3.5 3.8 2.5 2.4 3.0 0.6 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Year 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
51.3 
49.0 
46.7 
44.7 
43.1 
41.2 
40.2 
37.5 
57.1 
54.4 
52.4 
50.5 
49.2 
46.7 
45.9 
42.7 
16-19 
Τ 
15.3 
21.6 
26.3 
34.9 
43.0 
47.6 
51.1 
55.6 
55.9 
M 
14.5 
19.9 
25.3 
32.9 
41.5 
46.5 
49.7 
54.4 
54.1 
45.3 
43.3 
40.5 
38.5 
37.0 
35.5 
34.1 
32.0 
F 
16.3 
23.9 
27.7 
37.6 
45.2 
49.2 
53.0 
57.1 
58.6 
59.2 
59.5 
59.5 
59.9 
60.7 
61.0 
61.1 
60.9 
62.8 55.1 
62.9 55.6 
63.1 55.2 
63.9 55.2 
65.2 55.7 
65.6 55.9 
66.0 55.7 
66.9 54.4 
61.8 
62.0 
62.0 
61.7 
62.5 
63.2 
63.5 
64.0 
95.5 
95.4 
94.9 
94.6 
94.5 
94.4 
94.1 
94.0 
Rate of Unemployment 
Τ 
10.2 
14.4 
18.0 
24.1 
29.6 
33.5 
37.1 
42.1 
44.6 
20-24 
M F 
10.5 9.8 
15.0 13.7 
18.3 17.7 
24.4 23.7 
29.2 30.0 
33.3 33.8 
35.7 38.9 
40.5 44.1 
42.2 47.8 
Τ 
3.5 
4.4 
5.5 
7.3 
9.1 
10.4 
11.8 
14.2 
15.8 
29.3 
30.0 
30.4 
30.2 
31.6 
33.1 
33.8 
34.7 
25-54 
M 
3.8 
F 
2.5 
i 4.7 3.7 
5.8 
7.8 
9.6 
10.6 
11.8 
14.3 
15.6 
4.6 
6.0 
7.5 
10.2 
11.8 
13.9 
16.3 
27.4 
26.5 
25.6 
24.8 
23.9 
23.4 
22.6 
21.7 
46.3 
45.3 
44.0 
43.1 
41.5 
40.0 
38.8 
37.0 
12.8 
12.0 
11.4 
10.7 
10.3 
10.5 
10.0 
9.7 
55 and over 
Τ 
2.4 
2.9 
3.5 
4.5 
5.7 
6.4 
9.7 
M 
3.0 
3.7 
4.4 
5.5 
6.8 
7.7 
8.2 
9.2 10.9 
9.8 11.5 
F 
0.6 
0.8 
1.0 
1.5 
2.0 
2.4 
2.6 
3.8 
4.8 
* Rate of activity = % of population over 16 years 
previously declared active (the 65 and over are retired 
and thus not considered in the figure). 
** Annual averages. 
*** Rate of unemployment = % unemployed over active 
population. 
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TABLE 2 . 1 3 
RATES OF ACTIVITY BY AGE AND SEX - ANNUAL AVERAGE 
1 6 - 1 9 2 0 - 2 4 2 5 - 5 4 55 a n d o v e r 
Y e a r s T M F T M F T M F T M F 
1977 53.5 60.0 46.8 58.5 62.1 54.4 61.8 95.8 29.0 28.1 47.9 13.1 
1981 44.7 50.5 38.5 59.9 63.9 55.2 61.7 94.6 30.2 24.8 43.1 10.7 
1985 37.5 42.7 32.0 60.9 66.9 54.4 64.0 94.0 34.7 21.7 37.0 9.7 
Source: Encuesta de Población Activa. 
1977 
1981 
1985 
DISTRIBUTION OF 
1 
6.8 
3.4 
2.5 
1 2 
2 
24.4 
14.9 
10.5 
Male % 
3 4 
TABLE 2 .14 
THE UNEMPLOYED BY 
ANNUAL AVERAGES 
Total 
3 
23.6 
17.1 
12.1 
5 6 
% 
1 
4 
24.5 
24.5 
18.2 
2 
TIME OF SEARCH 
5 
15.1 
24.5 
22.4 
Female % 
3 4 
6 
5.6 
15.6 
34.4 
5 6 
1977 7.7 25.5 23.7 23.6 14.5 5.0 5.0 21.9 23.4 26.5 16.3 6.9 
1981 4.1 16.7 18.0 24.2 23.4 13.6 2.1 11.1 15.3 25.2 26.8 19.5 
1985 2.7 11.5 12.9 19.0 22.1 31.8 2.1 8.7 10.6 16.6 22.9 39.1 
1. Less than one month. 
2. From 1 to 3 months. 
3. From 3 to 6 months. 
4. From 6 months to 1 year. 
5. From 1 to 2 years. 
6. Two years and over. 
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Since 1973 all Spanish governments have favoured an 
economic policy of inflation control to combat the economic 
crisis, rather than reducing unemployment. Because of this 
there was an increase in the dependency ratio on employed 
people, see Table 2.12. The final result of the 
increase/decrease of inequality will depend on: (a) the volume 
of income of employed people, the non-dependents and; (b) the 
positive-negative role of the fiscal and social security 
systems. 
Youth unemployment increased considerably between 1977 and 
1981, both for men (17%) and women (16%) being 18% of the 
total. The two intermediate groups (20 to 24 years and 25 to 
54) registered an almost stable rate of activity. The rate 
corresponding to the group aged 55 and over fell to (14% total, 
8% for males and more worrying, 30% for females). 
The time spent searching for a job increased dramatically 
for all the unemployed, and particularly those in the 1 to 2 
years, and 2 years and over categories, for both men and women. 
The rate was 1.5 times higher for women. 
The unique global explanation for the behaviour of the 
indices of disparity, after the "macro-economic" analysis 
conducted in the three last paragraphs, is that the family 
acted as a shock absorber against the effects of the 
demographic shifts, the market failures and some macro-economic 
policies. 
We turn now to a more "micro-economic" and disaggregated 
explanation of the observed income distribution. 
3. CAUSES AND SOURCES OF INEQUALITY 
In this section we will consider the main factors which 
determine the distribution of income. In particular, the 
household characteristics which are likely to determine the 
position of the household in relation to income distribution. 
For this purpose, and those outlined in the Introduction, we 
will look at the numerical composition, the age structure, the 
location and geographical position of the household as well as 
some socio-economic criteria, such as the educational 
attainment of the head. The distribution of households 
according to these factors will help to establish the income 
distribution range in which the families are likely to lie. 
In section 4 we shall look for any cumulative effects of 
these factors have on the position of the household within the 
distribution. 
It is essential that a study of this type shouldknow the 
household's structure and any changes in its structure over 
time. This factor will be considered when discussing each of 
the aforementioned sections. 
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3.1 The Size and Composition of Households 
and Families 
For the period under consideration (Table 3.1) the 
relative structure of household size seems relatively stable. 
However, this may disguise some quite considerable changes in 
the preceding period. Nevertheless, the data here shows some 
tendencies which are similar to those found in other European 
countries; there is a decrease in the number of households of 
six or more persons and an increase - the most significant 
increase - in the number of two person households. 
Paradoxically, households with three members now comprise a 
slightly smaller percentage of all households, but those with 
four members have increased slightly (2.97%). 
Incomes increased in a systematic way with the number of 
persons in each household and decreased per capita for 1973 and 
1981, but the decrease was systematic for 1981 compared to 
1973; the disparities grew per capita although the structure 
of disparities were roughly stable. The most meaningful 
decline was the one relating to households with two persons 
between 1973 and 1981 (from 23 to 13.7%). 
As would be expected, the dispersion between homes of one 
and two persons declined during the period (from being 80.92% 
it went to 83.07%), because of the social changes and, in 
particular due to the increased participation of married women 
in the labour market. These changes paved the way for a "size 
and age effect" in income distribution.21 
For 1981 the number of households was 10,024,733 which, 
when divided by population, (figures according to FES) gives an 
average of 3.69 persons in each household; the number of 
earners was 15,838,473 which gives an average of 1.57 per 
household. 
The age of the head of family (see Table 3.2) is also a 
very important element in explaning the household's income. A 
priori we might expect the age of the main earner to have an 
important effect on income if this income is obtained unevenly 
throughout the earner's life time. 
Although it is not possible to infer the ageing of the 
population from these figures, (it has been shown in figures 
presented in Section 2) we only have data for 1981, it is 
possible to find the absolute value; the category represents 
20.35% of the total, a considerable figure. 
21. Equivalent income for 1973 and 1981 is not considered 
here because the 1973 Survey included a category for 7 or more 
persons which resulted in non-homogeneity as previously 
mentioned in the text. 
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TABLE 3.1 
AVERAGE EARNINGS BY HOUSEHOLD. PER CAPITA AND 
OF MAIN EARNER, ACCORDING TO THE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD 
1 PERSON = 100 
6 or more 
persons 
Per household 
1973 100 
1981 100 
Per capita 
1973 100 
1981 100 
Per earner 
1973 100 
1981 100 
161.87 
166.14 
80.92 
83.07 
120.83 
119.83 
231.76 
230.59 
77.23 
76.86 
149.40 
143.80 
Distribution of hou 
264.36 
250.42 
66.06 
62.60 
165.76 
155.83 
284.75 
260.87 
56.94 
52.17 
158.68 
149.98 
seholds Per Cent 
323, 
238. 
46. 
41. 
150. 
131. 
.13 
.05 
.98 
,66 
,02 
,07 
Households 
Persons 
1 2 3 4 5 6 and over 
1973 
1981 
7.74 20.18 19.37 22.19 14.83 15.71 
8.11 21.46 18.39 22.85 14.86 14.30 
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TABLE 3.2 
INCOME BY AGE OF HEAD OF FAMILY 
All figures for 1981 
By household, per capita and per earner 
Under 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54 55 to 64 over 65 
= 100 
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
1 0 0 
1 2 0 . 
1 0 5 , 
1 5 4 , 
, 3 8 
, 8 9 
. 3 4 
119, 
8 4 , 
152, 
. 7 9 
. 0 1 
. 9 0 
122 . 
8 8 , 
1 2 3 , 
. 2 2 
. 6 0 
. 0 8 
1 0 8 . 
1 0 7 , 
112 , 
. 0 1 
. 9 2 
. 6 7 
6 8 , 
9 7 , 
8 2 , 
. 5 8 
. 8 4 
. 6 1 
% of Households 
2 . 3 1 1 4 . 6 2 1 9 . 9 1 2 3 . 6 1 1 9 . 1 6 2 0 . 3 5 
Average size of household 
3.3 3.7 4.6 4.5 3.3 2.3 
The first impression is that the increase of household 
income as age increases is very low. This may simply be due to 
modest wage differentials occurring with age. However, it is 
possible that wages and salaries do rise with age but that, as 
the age of the head rises with his wage or salary, there is a 
decrease in the number of people working in the household. Up 
to the age of 25 both men and woman work on low wages; 
afterwards the wage or salary of the man usually rises and the 
woman joins the inactive part of the population whilst involved 
in child rearing. This is in accord with the big fall in 
women's rate of activity after the age of 24. It is difficult 
to know what relative importance to attribute to the two 
explanations. The fall after 55 is, of course, due mainly to 
the increasing number of pensioners who are head of households. 
The fall in household income after the age of 65 is 
particularly striking. 
With per capita income the dominant factor is obviously 
the size of the family. As size rises the per capita income 
falls (up to 54) ; as it falls the per capita income rises. 
Generally, the size of the family dominates the positive effect 
of age in average earnings. It should also be noted that 
people over 65 have per capita incomes which are just higher 
than the average. It is very difficult to decide here whether 
the significant factor, in terms of welfare, is the household 
size or the per capita income. 
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The fall in income per earner after the age of 44, despite 
an increase in household and per capita income, may be due to 
the presence of a third earner (i.e. a young son) with a very 
low income, as there are not usually pensioners between the age 
of 44 and 54, apart from the usual benefits for sickness etc. 
After 54 there is an increasing number of pensioners and this 
explains the fall in income per earner here. 
The Spanish data seems to fit quite well into what could 
be called a "household's life cycle theory": disposable 
incomes grow until the head of family is 45 to 55 years old and 
evenly decline thereafter until the 65 and over age group (i.e. 
retired, etc.). The largest disparity in relation to the mean 
is the one between the 45-54 and 55-64 age groups which exhibit 
a 12% change. 
The lowest incomes usually correspond to the 65 and over 
group, and they exhibit a 32% differential in relation to the 
25 year old group (taken here as the mean, i.e. equal to 100). 
As would be expected, household size is largest in the 
middle age groups which affects the per capita indices, where 
maybe not only the number of children, but the age implies 
greater spending. These household sizes were 4.6 and 4.5, with 
two to three children for the 35 to 44 and 45 to 54 age groups, 
and here the smallest and the second smallest per capita 
incomes were found (even smaller than the one corresponding to 
the retirement group). The indices of these incomes expressed 
as indices were 84.88 and 97 respectively, where the mean is 
100. 
Thus retirement implies only a 3% "loss" of income with 
respect to the mean index group, the 25 year old group. There 
is, therefore, a strong "life cycle" feature. 
The rise of per capita income for the last but one group, 
seems to reflect the leaving home of elder children which 
compensates for the absolute fall in disposable income by a 
more than proportional amount. However, the effect of the 
second son leaving is not noticed as much as the first if we 
observe per capita income profiles. 
As already mentioned, we cannot attempt an equivalent 
income comparison due to the absence of published data which 
takes into account the household's composition. Nevertheless, 
in the next Table,22 we do have the distribution of families 
for these categories. 
22. We do not have data for 1973 which thus prevents a 
temporal comparison. 
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TABLE 3.3 
COMPOSITION OF HOUSEHOLDS PER CENT 
Person 
alone 
< 65 
Person 
alone 
65 + 
Adults 
without 
children 
Adults 
and 1 
child 
Adults Adults Rest of 
and 1 and 3 house-
children children hold 
1981 3.24 4.86 37.04 17.16 19.94 10.18 6.74 
The Table seems to confirm the increase in, and important 
percentage of households without children (37.04%). 
There is no longer proper family allowance policy (that is 
likely to directly benefit families with children) in Spain 
(i.e. similar to the French). The existing policy only covers 
residual claims with many people claiming for their retirement. 
In any case, its effects on household income and their budgets 
are almost negligible (it is probably this reason that has been 
used in the arguments for the abandonment of this policy) . 
Also we can only expect it to have an offsetting effect for 
family size on the level and structure of incomes. 
On the other hand, family size is taken into account for 
many other social policies, like housing and transport 
policies, and then it will influence the fiscal revenue side in 
terms of allowances. 
3.2 The Labour Market, Education and Socio-Economie 
Categories 
The level of income from the labour market can be 
determined by a complex interaction of skills acquired, the 
educational system, the socio-economic categories and the 
availability of work. We shall look at each of these effects 
on income in turn. 
In 1981, on average, the difference for 1981 between a 
household in which the head was unemployed, and one in which 
the head works less than a third of the normal time (a sort of 
part-time work, but the meaning is not necessarily the same as 
is usually used in Europe), is only 16%, probably due to State 
support to both groups. But the most indicative difference 
occurs between families with the head unemployed and one in 
which the head is working full time, the difference in income 
is 60%. 
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The lowest incomes are those of pensioner households, 
these are, on average, 8% below those of the households with an 
unemployed head. 
On the other hand, the size of households with an 
unemployed head (4.3) is above the national average (3.7) and 
also higher than those with heads working more than a third of 
the normal time (full time) (4.1); thus in per capita terms 
the unemployed have the lowest incomes. 
The biggest disparities in income distribution are for the 
retired (44% in relation to the ones who work more than a third 
of the normal time. We will take this as the reference group 
(index = 100), with the unemployed lying close to this (a 4% 
additional difference if we do the analysis of the index by 
households) with a 28% disparity for the homes in which the 
head works full time. 
So the data seems to suggest that redistribution policies 
and public transfers have a strong impact. 
Looking at per capita income, the disparity is maintained 
for the unemployed, due to the "family effect", the part-time 
heads have an income which is 11% less than that of full time 
heads. 
There is no systematic relationship between the size of 
household and the labour market status of its members. If we 
take the unemployed as a base, incomes grow, up to a point, 
with the "quantity of work" done, but then decline. In other 
words, the typical text-book case of the backward bending 
labour supply curve is found in Spanish households. However, 
most importantly, it implies that the disparity profile changes 
if we look at per capita incomes. 
The distribution of households by labour market 
participation shows that this micro-economic data confirms the 
socio-demographic data discussed above. The percentage of 
unemployed heads seem to be low for those years (although 
probably this is the effect of the methodology employed when 
collecting the Survey) whereas we again appreciate the ageing 
of the population in the labour market "pyramid", with the 
retired being 24.78%. 
In Spain it is well known that there is no solid structure 
in the labour market which offers part-time work, a fact which 
is confirmed by this data, which shows the high percentage of 
heads working more than a third, and the low percentage working 
less than a third. 
It is also true that this data refers to a past period 
(1973-1981) as the economic crisis, and long-term socio-
economic and cultural tendencies occurring at this time later 
produced changes in the behaviour of Spanish households similar 
to that of other European countries (see for instance Ahijado-
Clapes 1987. 
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TABLE 3.4 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY TIME AT WORK 
AND LABOUR MARKET STATUS AND INCOME INDICES 
Work Work Unemployed Retired Rentier Others 
more than less than Pensioner Housewives 
Total one third one third Students 
3.7 4.1 
Average household's size 
3.3 4.3 2.6 2.1 2.8 
Distribution of households Percent 
100 66.08 1.9 4.41 24.78 0.005 2.32 
Per household 
100 
Per capita 
100 
Per earner 
100 
Index work more than one third = 100 
72.5 
89.6 
74.3 
60.87 
58.9 
58.70 
56.47 
89.80 
56.58 
82.13 
161.7 
102.06 
56.14 
84.5 
57.78 
The increase in the number of households with two earners 
is a direct consequence of the rise in the labour market 
participation of married women, and the tendency to stop 
working on marriage, as had previously been seen, over the 
period 1973-81. These effects are both a consequence of the 
crisis and the changes in socio-economic behaviour. The 
diminishing number of homes with three earners is also a 
consequence of changed socio-economic behaviour. During this 
period despite unemployment, the trend was towards sons with 
remunerative work becoming independent of parent's homes. 
It is quite common in countries with "low" incomes (which 
implies not only low monetary incomes, but also a low standard 
of living), like Spain, to observe the phenomenon of sending 
the first son, and possibly the second, into the labour market 
after compulsory education has been completed, but this may not 
happen to subsequent sons. This observation seems to be in 
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line with the above data.23 
If we take as average the one earner home, it can be seen 
that there is a 71% disparity between these and homes with no 
earners, and a 64% difference between the group of 3 or more 
earners and the average. Quite logically the size of 
households grows with the number of earners and vice versa. 
But the disparities are reduced as the number of earners 
increases as at first they increase and then decline, due 
probably to the socio-economic behaviour described earlier. 
The larger number of one earner homes (58.27%) hardly 
changed between 197 3 and 1981, (just a 1.91 percentage point 
change); this is followed by the two earners group with 29.91% 
and a percentage change of 7.47 points. The group of three or 
more earners also increased, but only covered 4% of households. 
All these figures do not differentiate between the sources 
of income that lie behind them, but we know (from previous 
sections) that the number of transfer-payments and mass 
unemployment increased, so all these features suggest strong 
positive action by the State, offsetting the market failures. 
Turning now to the effects of education, we see that the 
household size corresponding to the different educational 
groups is more or less stable at around the national average, 
although illiterates tend to have smaller households (3.2 
persons), which seems to be the expected result. 
Human capital theory invites us to expect increasing 
incomes with more education although, less (more) than 
proportionally if incomes are better (worse) distributed. 
The results obtained here will either confirm or modify 
those obtained for the socio-economic categories, and cross-
classification is used to see how income is distributed in 
practice. 
It is easy to appreciate that between 1973 and 1981 the 
number of illiterates decreased (by 13 percentage points) and 
the same can be said for the group of "primary studies". 
Curiously the number "without studies" increased quite strongly 
(by 32 percentage points). Maybe this is due to a rise in the 
share of households that have women heads if the number of 
women without educational attainment is higher than the number 
of men. 
By socio-economic class, the biggest increase corresponds 
to the skilled worker category (100 percentage points), and the 
23. Again a discrepancy arises between the two Surveys; 
the 1973 FES only includes: 1, 2 and 3 or more earners whereas 
the 1981 includes an additional category for 4 or more. 
Obviously this limits the comparisons that can be properly 
made. 
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TABLE 3.5 
EARNERS - DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS AND AVERAGE INCOMES 
Households 
without 
earners 
Households 
with 1 
earner 
Households 
with 2 
earners 
Households 
with 3 
earners 
Households 
4 or more 
earners 
1973 
1981 0.33 
59 
58 
41 
27 
27.76 
29.91 8.53 
[12.82] 
[11.46] 2.29 
Incomes 1981 
Households 
without 
earners 
Households 
with 1 
earner 
Households 
with 2 
earners 
Households 
with 3 or 
more earners 
Households 
with 4 or 
more earners 
Index - 1 earner 100 
100 
100 
100 
166.14 
83.07 
119.83 
230.59 
76.86 
143.80 
264.78 
52.14 
145.62 
category of low management also increases (59%), although in 
absolute terms it only represents a small part of the total. 
The largest absolute values correspond to the "without 
studies" group, as expected, and the "primary studies" group 
(25% and 47% respectively for 1981, with increases of 32 and 19 
percentage points respectively). 
If the average (index = 100) is taken to be the "primary 
studies" group the larger disparities in income occur between 
this and the group with university degrees. The disparity was 
2.6 and 2.2 times the average for 1973 and 1981 respectively. 
However, if this caused any increase in the inequality of 
income distribution it was only very slight. 
The difference between the first group (illiterates) and 
the last (superior) oscillates between 3.3 and 6 depending on the 
criteria used, i.e. looking at income data by households or per 
capita. The indices are basically stable over time in the per 
capita comparison and diverge and decrease, both by homes and by 
earner: 5 and 3.9 and 6 and 4.4 respectively for 1973 and 1981. 
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TABLE 3.6 
YEARLY AVERAGE INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD, PERSONS AND NUMBER 
OF EARNERS ACCORDING TO THE EDUCATION OF THE MAIN EARNER 
1. Illiterates. 
2. Without studies. 
3. Primary school. 
4. Secondary school - first level. 
5. Secondary school - second (high) level. 
6. Skilled workers. 
7. Lower management. 
8. University degrees. 
D i s t r i b u t i o n of h o u s e h o l d s 1973-1981 - % 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
7.97 19.09 59.15 4.80 3.55 0.62 2.25 2.57 
6.91 25.37 47.72 6.84 4.82 1.35 3.58 3.24 
Average size of household 1981 
3.2 3.7 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.8 
Incomes (Indices: average = 100) By household 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1973 52.52 75.73 96.73 136.07 166.56 137.15 181.57 262.01 
1981 56.62 73.15 96.19 120.12 160.98 127.96 172.04 221.90 
Per capita 
1973 64.36 77.15 94.58 132.80 162.74 128.39 183.57 245.23 
1981 66.36 72.79 94.51 122.46 164.38 122.55 167.65 220.38 
Per earner 
1973 52.93 72.20 95.28 149.80 195.53 160.33 205.19 318.39 
1981 55.17 69.35 97.07 130.81 166.28 141.52 177.50 244.32 
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Between the higher and lower groups the differences are 
stable for the different concepts and over time the higher is 1.3 
times the lower on the whole. 
Incomes for skilled workers are higher than ones for heads 
with High School (first grades) skills by 1.2 times and with 
respect to "O" levels, in a 1.2 ratio. This is fairly stable, 
regardless of the criteria it is based on. 
The earners of those with "A" level education shows the same 
relationship with those in the skilled workers category as this 
latter category has to those with "0" levels. 
These results coincide with those that correspond to the 
socio-economic categories (see key in Appendix C below). 
Here we again have Gini coefficients for 1973 and 1981. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
TABLE 3.7 
GINI COEFFICIENTS 
1973 
0.3981 
0.3668 
0.3007 
0.3070 
0.3766 
0.3445 
0.3299 
0.2982 
0.2542 
0.2775 
0.2945 
0.4357 
0.4820 
1981 
0.40785 
0.31329 
0.19921 
0.32305 
0.35125 
0.32639 
0.31616 
0.27438 
0.23265 
0.25567 
0.22492 
0.32840 
0.41037 
Obviously the figures indirectly confirm the relative 
stability observed above for all households. (It should be 
understood that the indices can be used: (a) to measure 
dispersion, between socio-economic categories or regions (see 
below) and, (b) dispersion for people living inside a socio-
economic category or region.) 
The ratio of the extreme deciles also confirms this 
stability. 
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DIO/DI 
1973 1981 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
4 . 
5 . 
6 . 
7 . 
8 . 
9 . 
I O . 
1 1 . 
1 2 . 
1 3 . 
9 . 2 9 
5 . 7 7 
6 . 4 0 
8 . 0 0 
8 . 0 8 
8 . 5 0 
5 . 3 0 
4 . 0 5 
4 . 7 5 
4 . 1 4 
6 . 7 2 
1 3 . 3 3 
1 8 . 2 3 
1 0 . 9 6 
4 . 0 1 
4 . 0 1 
7 . 2 8 
8 . 9 5 
7 . 7 5 
6 . 9 4 
5 . 1 3 
3 . 9 4 
4 . 8 5 
3 . 4 1 
1 2 . 8 2 
1 1 . 0 6 
The index decreased in 8 of 13 cases and increased in 5, 
but only slightly. 
It is easy to observe (Table 3.8) that only four groups 
the 7th, 8th, 9th and the 13th increased their percentage 
share. The last one, "non-employed" reflects the labour market 
circumstances in the period after the crisis of 1973-1979, and 
its growth is the largest, with the difference being the 
highest. Taking into account the other three increases 
(although these were very small gains) it may mean that the 
other groups (the 10th, 2nd, 3rd and 4th) were hit hard by the 
crisis; three of them are in the primary (agricultural) 
sector. 
The change in the structure of households reflects this, 
as does the migration process seen in the Spanish countryside 
since the mid-sixties, and which seemed to continue during the 
reference period. The shares of these groups fell by 18.35 
percentage points on average, and this represented the largest 
fall, apart from group 3, directors and managers, who lost 95%, 
although the numbers in this group are very low. 
It is quite interesting that the loss seen in group 10 
(blue collar workers) was 2.93 percentage points, reflecting a 
change in the socio-economic structure of the Spanish 
population. 
The biggest percentage increase was for the 13th group 
(non employed); this category acted as a buffer for the crisis 
as has been mentioned previously. 
Groups 12 and 13 could hide ambiguous results due to their 
excessive aggregation. 
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TABLE 3.8 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS AND AVERAGE INCOMES 
BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Distribution of Households % 
1973 
0.79 8.13 1.71 5.87 3.20 7.97 2.94 12.86 0.81 32.95 2.42 0.88 20 
1981 
0.47 6.40 0.08 4.31 2.92 7.27 3.09 13.71 1.26 30.02 1.27 0.40 27 
Yearly average income by household, persons and number of 
earners according to socio-economic category of the main earner. 
Indices: average = 100 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Per household 
1973 145 82 79 67 192 112 247 137 138 96 138 109 74 
1981 140 76 200 66 167 105 225 139 133 98 129 99 66 
Per capita 
1973 136 78 84 59 172 105 221 131 129 87 122 100 94 
1981 123 70 203 56 145 93 209 134 116 87 109 86 94 
Per earner 
1973 145 82 79 67 191 111 249 137 137 96 138 109 62 
1981 144 75 223 59 174 104 247 143 135 97 158 94 66 
The average household sizes are high, the average in 
agriculture being 4.5 and the largest non-agricultural sizes 
corresponding to the Armed Forces, and non-agricultural 
entrepreneurs with salaried workers, which is the expected 
result when the cultural and socio-economic characteristics of 
both groups are taken into account. 
The average income by household (and by earner), of a blue 
collar worker is close to the average and can be taken as a 
reference index for the disparities in income distribution. 
The largest positive (to the mean) disparities correspond 
to non-agrarian and agrarian directors and managers (the 
highest category of skills) with 125 and 100 per cent 
disparities respectively; non-agrarian entrepreneurs follow 
with 67% and 40% respectively. Then come intermediate 
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directors and foremen (39% and 33%) and finally there are the 
armed forces personnel (+29%). The non-agrarian entrepreneurs 
without salaried workers are close to the average (the blue 
collar workers). 
The largest negative disparities correspond to the rest of 
agrarian workers and to the non-employed (both with -34% 
disparity). This is a curious result: it suggests that it is 
the same, from the point of view of income, to be an agrarian 
worker as it is to be non-employed, and probably living on 
transfer payments. 
There are some with even lower incomes than the "agrarian 
entrepreneurs without salaried workers" who are in the lowest 
part of the distribution; quite probably this reflects the 
part of the Spanish agricultural structure of "minifundio" 
(i.e. very small holdings). 
Given the size of households for these categories the 
income profile is not altered, but the relative composition of 
incomes change if we take income per capita. Indeed the higher 
skilled maintain their ratio of twice the average but the non-
employed only have a 6% disparity in relation to the average. 
It seems to suggest the "cushioning" role of the family (i.e. 
to a great extent the family looks after their own unemployed). 
Taking account of all these facts the observed stability 
can be explained; apart from the role of the family itself as 
a shock absorber; by the effectiveness of the social security 
system (described above, Section 2) as a "short run" absorber 
during the crisis, reinforced by a long run trend derived from 
Education expenditure by the Government. Obviously both 
cushions came from the redistributional role of the State. 
The education policy, as a social policy, was very strong 
indeed during the period, with considerable rates of growth in 
expenditure, and it also took account of demographic and 
regional considerations. 
3.3 Geographical and Location Factors in household Income 
The geographical and location criteria are important in 
Spain due to the existence of some depressed and very depressed 
regions and other much richer ones, in a typical Mediterranean 
structure, a factor which has traditionally been suggested to 
explain inequalities in the distribution of income. 
Nevertheless, there are methodological problems for an 
operable classification of areas, in particular for the 
temporal comparisons, as the classifications in the FES changed 
over our reference period. As already noted, the Spanish State 
instituted a very large and fundamental political and 
administrative change in the creation of the "Autonomous 
States", which is reflected in the statistics afterwards. 
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We shall look first at the size of the municipalities. 
The Gini coefficients by size of municipalities, as an 
index of inequality or dispersion of income distribution, was 
surprisingly stable so we can conclude that income distribution 
by size of municipality has not changed, it is neither more nor 
less equal. 
TABLE 3.9 
GINI COEFFICIENTS 
1973 1981 
Up to 10,000 inhabitants 0.3804 0.38186 
From 10,000 to 50,000 0.3622 0.34075 
More than 50,000 0.6254 * 0.35369 
* This high figure probably hides some errors in 
the official statistics. 
And by regions.24 
TABLE 3.10 
GINI COEFFICIENTS 
1973 1981 
Andalucía 0.4337 0.37176 
Aragon 0.413 0.37694 
Canarias 0.3742 0.36469 
Estremadura 0.4269 0.37235 
Galicia 0.3894 0.36469 
Murcia 0.3958 0.34441 
Valencia 0.6433 * 0.35651 
* This high figure probably hides some errors 
in the official statistics. 
24. Taking the ratio of extreme deciles the inequality 
was reduced for municipalities where the index decreased for 
both cases. 
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We conclude that this disaggregate data confirms the 
aggregate trend commented on above; a general stability 
although possibly a slight increase in equality. 
By municipalities' size. 
D10/D1 
1973 
nts 10.25 
11.05 
TABLE 3.11 
1981 
8.66 
9.37 
Up to 50,000 inhabita
More than 50,000 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY DECILES 
ACCORDING TO SIZE OF CITY & 1981 
a) Up to 10,000 
b) 10,001 to 50,000 
c) 50,001 to 500,000 
d) More than 500,000 
10 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
15.4 
9.6 
6.4 
4.7 
13.2 
9.4 
8.0 
6.7 
13.3 
11.0 
8.3 
6.0 
10.6 
11.6 
9.1 
8.8 
9.2 
10.8 
10.0 
9.8 
8.7 
10.8 
10.8 
9.1 
7.8 
10.4 
10.8 
9.6 
7.1 
10.0 
11.7 
12.6 
6.4 
9.5 
11.9 
13.4 
7.8 
6.6 
11.4 
18.9 
During the reference period small cities suffered losses 
of more than 50,000 inhabitants who moved to larger cities. 
Without additional data it is not possible to know if the rate 
of migration (which started in the sixties) accelerated or not. 
In any case, we can say that the migration process occurred 
between 1973 and 1981. 
The average size of household was more or less constant 
for 1981, this was surprising as a large "average size" of 
household in small municipalities is normally expected as this 
is more characteristic of rural areas. 
Although it is very difficult to state anything 
conclusively without additional information on income 
distribution by household for each category, the analysis by 
deciles shows that the largest percentages in the household 
distribution by deciles are in the 500,000 or more category, 
and the smallest percentages in the bottom categories. 
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TABLE 3.12 
DECILES OF INCOME BY SIZE OF CITY 
a) Up to 10,000 
b) 10,001 to 50,000 
c) 50,001 to 500,000 
d) More than 500,000 
1 0 
a) 
b ) 
c) 
d ) 
2 . 6 1 
2 . 6 5 
2 . 6 8 
2 . 5 4 
4 . 1 1 
4 . 4 3 
4 . 5 5 
4 . 2 8 
5 . 2 2 
5 . 8 7 
5 . 9 3 
5 . 6 8 
6 . 4 2 
7 . 0 6 
7 . 1 4 
6 . 7 2 
7 . 6 4 
8 . 3 3 
8 . 2 8 
7 . 8 1 
8 . 9 8 
9 . 5 9 
9 . 4 3 
9 . 0 8 
1 0 . 6 3 
1 0 . 9 6 
1 0 . 7 1 
1 0 . 5 9 
1 2 . 5 6 
1 2 . 7 4 
1 2 . 4 2 
1 2 . 6 7 
1 5 . 4 3 2 3 . 3 6 
1 5 . 2 8 2 3 . 0 4 
1 5 . 1 1 2 3 . 7 0 
1 5 . 4 7 2 5 . 1 1 
It is easy to observe that for large cities the highest 
decile is around the average for all households, but for the 
other three groups of cities the percentage is less than the 
average. For the four types of cities the deciles 2, 3, 6, 7, 
8 and 9, have an average share of income and small cities are 
around the average. At the extremes, the medium sized cities 
have a larger than average percentage of households in these 
deciles. 
TABLE 3.13 
YEARLY AVERAGE INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD 
AND SIZE OF MUNICIPALITY 
average 100 
1. By household 1973 1981 
Up to 10,000 75.99 78.98 
10,001 to 50,000 non capitals 94.51 93.18 
More than 50,000 119.21 117.6 
average 100 
2. Per capita 1973 1981 
Up to 10,000 78.93 81.00 
10,001 to 50,000 non capitals 89.74 88.33 
More than 50,000 119.54 119.4 
average 100 
3. Per earner 1973 1981 
Up to 10,000 74.47 77.01 
10,001 to 50,000 non capitals 92.40 90.05 
More than 50,000 119.31 120.35 
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The stability of these indices is remarkable. The only 
people who have incomes above the average, (index 100), are 
those 50,000 plus who live in municipalities. These 
conclusions do not change if we refer to per capita or per 
earner income. Obviously, the incomes grew with the size of 
the municipality of residence, such that there is a difference 
of 1.5 times between the largest and the smallest, in terms of 
income. It appears that there is a strong correlation between 
income and size of the municipality the household is in. The 
differences favour the large municipalities where there are 
more opportunities to work in the industry and service sector. 
As already mentioned, the average size of household in 
each type of municipality is very similar, so we cannot 
attribute any of the observed differences in income to this 
variable. 
However, the level of prices is generally higher in the 
larger municipalities than in other areas (we have not 
published these indices for the cities); so, in terms of 
welfare, this fact can compensate somewhat for the lower 
incomes in smaller areas. But, on the other hand; (1) it is 
not easy to generalise in a country which has large disparities 
in the economic and social structure (i.e. consider the South-
east Mediterranean cities living from tourism) and other more 
"continental" cities: and (2) the supply of social services 
both in quantity and quality is superior in the big cities. 
Generally speaking, income is only one - even if a very 
important one - of the resources available to the family and 
its welfare depends on all resources, not only monetary ones. 
This is especially true for the countryside and rural cities 
where, for instance, consumption-in-kind, self-supplied goods 
can, in part, offset, the disparities in income. 
TABLE 3.14 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS BY THE SIZE 
OF THE MUNICIPALITY 
Till 10,000 10,000 50,001 more than 
to 50,000 to 500,000 500,000 
1973 32.52 22.04 [45.45] 
1981 28.37 18.19 41.22 [53.05] 11.8 
Average household size - 1981 
3.7 3.6 3.9 3.8 3.6 
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Within the different geographical locations market forces 
acted quite freely and there were no specific policies to 
correct disparities which arose due to the size of the cities. 
The market forces were considered correct in trying to arrive 
at an equilibrium in the labour forces of smaller cities, which 
are generally located in the agricultural sector, and of the 
larger cities, thus enabling Spain to catch up with the rest of 
Europe in the process of development and industrialisation. 
Now we turn to the regional considerations. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
1 
14.9 
9.8 
8.1 
8.1 
8.6 
5.1 
14.3 
18.6 
4.1 
8.2 
24.5 
11.1 
4.8 
11.5 
6.0 
4.1 
5.4 
8.3 
PERCENTAGE 
2 
13.3 
8.6 
10.7 
12.3 
12.1 
8.0 
11.1 
14.2 
5.7 
8.2 
21.0 
11.8 
6.8 
9.4 
5.9 
5.1 
9.7 
11.7 
3 
12.9 
7.6 
8.0 
11.0 
21.0 
8.9 
11.4 
15.3 
5.9 
11.5 
14.2 
12.0 
5.2 
15.8 
6.3 
4.9 
10.6 
11.3 
TABLE 3 , .15 
OF HOUSEHOLDS IN 
BY 
4 
11.1 
16.3 
9.2 
11.0 
9.5 
10.7 
10.0 
16.4 
6.9 
12.5 
11.0 
11.0 
7.8 
12.7 
4.6 
5.9 
9.7 
9.8 
REGION 
5 
9.3 
9.9 
7.8 
8.9 
10.6 
10.2 
9.2 
8.6 
10.0 
11.8 
7.6 
9.6 
10.3 
10.5 
9.5 
10.7 
11.9 
7.9 
1981 
6 
8.0 
8.3 
12.1 
9.3 
9.4 
11.0 
11.0 
7.1 
10.3 
9.8 
6.5 
10.4 
10.8 
11.1 
12.0 
11.6 
11.7 
8.7 
EACH DECILE 
7 
10.4 
8.1 
12.0 
9.7 
7.8 
11.2 
9.2 
6.7 
10.4 
10.4 
3.9 
7.9 
10.1 
9.0 
10.8 
14.9 
10.1 
9.4 
8 
8.8 
15.1 
11.6 
10.1 
7.7 
13.1 
8.4 
5.2 
11.6 
9.4 
4.1 
9.2 
11.6 
7.1 
15.5 
13.0 
13.7 
9.1 
9 
5.5 
8.6 
10.8 
9.6 
6.8 
9.6 
7.8 
4.5 
16.0 
9.3 
4.2 
8.9 
13.0 
6.7 
12.5 
13.4 
11.6 
10.5 
10 
5.2 
7.3 
9.2 
9.0 
6.1 
11.8 
7.1 
2.7 
18.5 
8.6 
2.4 
7.6 
19.0 
5.7 
16.6 
16.1 
5.0 
12.8 
Turning now to the geographical context, if we use average 
income as the barrier between poor and rich areas25 and if we 
consider location from the angles of average income, per capita 
income and income per earner, we find that from the 18 regions, 
7 (numbers 1, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12 and 14) (38% of households) are 
without any doubt in the "poverty" area (i.e. with all three 
indicators confirming this); in addition two more (numbers 10 
and 17) are on the "poverty line", with two of the three 
indicators showing this. Added together the percentage of 
households in poor regions rises to 50%. 
2 5. Generally it is accepted that the "poverty line" is 
situated around 30-40% below the average, but here we use the 
term in a more general sense. 
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TABLE 3.16 
PER CENT OF INCOME GOING TO EACH DECILE OF HOUSEHOLDS 
BY AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES; AND GINI COEFFICIENTS, 1981. 
Gini 
1 . 2 . 5 4 4 . 1 2 5 . 3 9 6 . 6 2 7 . 7 9 9 . 1 8 1 0 . 8 5 1 2 . 7 9 1 5 . 4 1 2 5 . 2 6 0 . 3 7 1 7 6 
2 . 2 . 3 5 3 . 8 9 5 . 3 6 6 . 8 3 7 . 9 5 9 . 2 6 1 0 . 7 2 1 2 . 4 9 1 5 . 4 5 2 5 . 6 5 0 . 3 3 8 3 8 
3 . 2 . 6 5 4 . 2 7 5 . 7 2 7 . 1 5 8 . 6 2 9 . 7 9 1 1 . 1 6 1 2 . 6 9 1 5 . 4 2 2 2 . 4 8 0 . 3 3 8 3 8 
4 . 2 . 8 8 4 . 3 3 5 . 4 4 6 . 5 6 7 . 7 5 9 . 3 2 1 0 . 6 9 1 2 . 5 9 1 5 . 6 2 2 4 . 7 7 0 . 3 6 1 8 8 
5 . 2 . 6 2 4 . 2 6 5 . 5 1 6 . 7 9 8 . 0 3 9 . 2 0 1 0 . 5 1 1 2 . 4 3 1 5 . 2 5 2 5 . 3 3 0 . 3 6 4 6 9 
6 . 2 . 8 9 4 . 5 9 5 . 8 9 6 . 9 7 8 . 0 7 9 . 2 0 1 0 . 4 5 1 1 . 9 7 1 4 . 7 3 2 5 . 1 9 0 . 3 4 8 4 9 
7 . 2 . 4 4 3 . 8 3 5 . 1 5 6 . 4 2 7 . 7 2 9 . 2 2 1 0 . 8 5 1 2 . 7 9 1 5 . 7 1 2 5 . 8 2 0 . 3 8 5 0 7 
8 . 2 . 6 2 4 . 2 7 5 . 2 4 6 . 5 6 7 . 8 5 9 . 0 8 1 0 . 5 7 1 2 . 6 5 1 5 . 5 2 2 5 . 5 9 0 . 3 7 2 9 7 
9 . 2 . 8 2 4 . 6 9 6 . 0 9 7 . 2 5 8 . 2 5 9 . 3 9 1 0 . 7 9 1 2 . 3 6 1 4 . 6 6 2 3 . 6 4 0 . 3 3 3 6 7 
1 0 . 2 . 7 0 4 . 5 5 5 . 8 6 6 . 8 9 7 . 8 7 9 . 0 0 1 0 . 4 8 1 2 . 2 2 1 5 . 1 4 2 5 . 2 5 0 . 3 5 6 5 1 
1 1 . 3 . 0 1 4 . 4 9 5 . 3 5 6 . 3 7 7 . 3 6 8 . 7 3 1 0 . 3 6 1 2 . 4 4 1 5 . 7 7 2 6 . 0 6 0 . 3 7 2 3 5 
1 2 . 2 . 6 1 4 . 2 2 5 . 4 3 6 . 6 5 7 . 8 5 9 . 3 6 1 0 . 7 6 1 2 . 8 6 1 5 . 7 1 2 4 . 4 9 0 . 3 6 4 6 9 
1 3 . 2 . 5 2 4 . 3 8 5 . 7 9 6 . 7 7 7 . 7 2 8 . 9 4 1 0 . 4 2 1 2 . 4 6 1 5 . 6 0 2 5 . 3 5 0 . 3 6 6 1 5 
1 4 . 2 . 6 6 4 . 5 9 6 . 0 1 6 . 9 5 7 . 9 9 9 . 3 8 1 0 . 8 4 1 2 . 5 2 1 5 . 3 1 2 3 . 7 0 0 . 3 4 4 4 1 
1 5 . 2 . 4 9 4 . 3 3 6 . 0 7 7 . 1 8 8 . 0 7 9 . 1 5 1 0 . 1 4 1 2 . 0 7 1 4 . 9 5 2 5 . 5 1 0 . 3 5 7 2 6 
1 6 . 2 . 8 5 5 . 1 6 6 . 4 8 7 . 4 9 8 . 3 5 9 . 2 6 1 0 . 4 7 1 2 . 1 7 1 5 . 2 4 2 2 . 4 7 0 . 3 1 7 1 5 
1 7 . 3 . 3 5 4 . 9 5 6 . 3 6 7 . 6 1 8 . 6 8 9 . 8 6 1 1 . 4 3 1 2 . 8 3 1 4 . 9 4 1 9 . 9 5 0 . 2 9 3 6 7 
1 8 . 2 . 4 2 4 . 0 3 5 . 1 7 6 . 4 0 7 . 5 9 9 . 2 1 1 0 . 7 6 1 2 . 8 4 1 6 . 1 6 2 5 . 5 5 0 . 3 8 6 5 2 
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Only four areas (numbers 9, 13, 15 and 16, with the 18th 
on the "poverty line" but near to the intermediate zone) , are 
in the higher income range, covering 22% of households. A 
further 2 2% of households are located in regions with 
intermediate incomes (the regions, 2, 36 and 28). 
Of regions with incomes below the average the overall 
disparity between these and the mean is 12.63% (the largest 
disparity is in Extremadura with income and per capita income 
being 36% below average, and income per earner being 31% below. 
The disparity for the regions with income above the average is 
16.5%, Madrid being the largest individually, with 26.24% and 
29%, according to the household, per capita and earner 
criteria. 
The difference between the highest and lowest region is 
62% when looking at income (for numbers 13 and 11, Madrid and 
Extremadura), and a 60% per capita and per earner. 
TABLE 3.17 
ANNUAL AVERAGE INCOMES BY REGIONS 
Index: average = 100 
Region By household Per capita Per recipient 
(earner) 
1 . 8 1 . 6 9 7 6 . 4 0 8 1 . 4 3 
2. 96.10 106.71 104.52 
3. 100.04 108.32 108.29 
4. 97.49 114.20 96.05 
5 . 9 0 . 5 9 7 9 . 6 3 9 3 . 3 3 
6. 109.37 109.95 103.86 
7 . 8 9 . 0 2 9 4 . 8 8 9 3 . 5 0 
8. 72.10 74.68 77.61 
9. 117.90 120.81 112.36 
10. 98.49 101.72 91.03 
11. 64.11 64.54 69.84 
12. 90.98 88.10 87.58 
13. 126.32 124.22 129.18 
14. 84.35 82.92 86.17 
15. 124.33 119.39 112.81 
16. 121.18 119.39 112.81 
17. 95.46 101.53 98.81 
18. 102.89 105.65 119.03 
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The explanation for the disparities comes from the 
industrial structure of the regions. It is not possible to 
identify a "North-South" structure, similar to, say, the 
Italian one, but it is quite easy to realise that there is a 
"Northwest-Southeast" divide where the largest incomes lie 
above the axis with the only exception being Madrid, which is 
considered an island in the very centre of the country (see 
Ahijado-Clapes 1987) . The differences in productivity and the 
rates of activity, employment and unemployment are partial 
explanations for the divide and these disparities. 
TABLE 3.18 
APPARENT PRODUCTIVITY BY EMPLOYMENT 
Regional index: National average = 100 
1979 1983 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Andalucía 
Aragon 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Castilla M 
Castilla L 
Cataluna 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
Pais Vasco 
La Rioja 
Valencia 
Ceuta-Melilla 
88.1 
100.6 
92.9 
109.3 
96.1 
89.1 
83.7 
86.4 
118.1 
73.0 
66.0 
131.8 
92.4 
100.7 
110.3 
98.1 
99.9 
— 
90.6 
103.4 
94.5 
107.3 
94.0 
95.6 
86.2 
90.0 
115.1 
69.1 
67.7 
121.7 
90.6 
107.5 
116.5 
106.5 
99.4 
■ " 
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TABLE 3.19 
RATES OF ACTIVITY, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT BY REGION 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Andalucía 
Aragon 
Asturias 
Baleares 
Canarias 
Cantabria 
Castilla M 
Castilla L 
Cataluna 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
Madrid 
Murcia 
Navarra 
Pais Vasco 
La Rioja 
Valencia 
Ceuta-Melilla 
1979 
30.70 
37.45 
38.60 
39.69 
33.80 
38.82 
33.63 
35.27 
39.02 
31.65 
42.85 
35.66 
33.96 
37.45 
37.94 
39.72 
37.81 
-
1983 
28.27 
34.52 
36.38 
38.69 
35.61 
34.43 
29.32 
31.54 
37.94 
28.40 
39.68 
34.73 
29.32 
33.57 
37.09 
33.41 
35.98 
1979 
26.23 
34.84 
35.53 
37.02 
29.74 
36.70 
30.78 
32.69 
35.56 
26.89 
/41.00 
31.69 
30.87 
34.01 
33.89 
38.08 
34.68 
1983 
21.63 
29.65 
31.46 
34.20 
28.23 
30.22 
24.80 
27.30 
30.62 
22.62 
36.11 
28.62 
25.07 
28.66 
29.68 
30.07 
29.86 
1979 
14.5 
7.0 
7.9 
6.7 
12.0 
5.5 
8.5 
7.3 
8.9 
15.0 
4.3 
11.1 
9.1 
9.2 
10.7 
4.1 
8.3 
1983 
23.5 
14.1 
13.5 
11.6 
20.7 
12.2 
15.4 
13.5 
19.3 
20.3 
9.0 
17.6 
14.5 
14.6 
20.0 
10.0 
17.0 
Spain 36.18 34.11 32.73 28.20 9.5 17.3 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Here we shall try to summarise the main results and look 
to see if any of the features studied accumulate in any way to 
create particular situations of disadvantage for certain 
categories of households. 
The most important feature is the stability and 
concentration of income distribution as measured by Gini 
coefficients, both in the aggregate and for several 
disaggregate categories. This has occurred despite changes in 
the sociological behaviour of the Spanish population during the 
period (in line with, and gravitating towards that of our 
European partners, i.e. ageing of the population, increase in 
dependency ratio etc.) and as a consequence of a more long-run 
trend and structural change, derived from the economic crisis 
and the large institutional change seen in Spain over the years 
studied. 
Some typical features remain (such as the number of 
illiterates, the small labour market for part-time jobs, and 
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the low level of unemployment benefits in relation to other 
European ones). Mass unemployment is another (the most 
important) structural problem and this is combined with the 
more traditional ones. 
Thus it seems that the State has had a significant role in 
offsetting some of the likely increases in inequality in the 
distribution of income which would have been caused by the 
economic crisis and the consequent market failures. It did 
this by improving the fiscal system and collection of revenue, 
which in itself has partially reduced some of the inequality, 
and by introducing a very important Welfare State policy 
(although this still lags behind the social security systems in 
use in other parts of Europe). 
The household data also seems to suggest that the family 
plays an important role as shock absorber in many of the 
instances studied. 
The Spanish data seems to fit in nicely with life cycle 
and "human capital" theories of individual income attainment 
but in the case of "human capital" this has been favoured by 
the State education policies. 
The structure of disparities has, on the whole, remained 
stable over the period whether looking at income per household, 
per capita or per earner. The size of family appears to be 
very important in Spain, partly because Spanish households are 
still, on average, larger than those in most other European 
countries, and this has been identified as a factor in causing 
deprivation. The size of the family appears to be more 
important in determining the position of the household in the 
income distribution than the number of earners in the 
household. However, some disparities have been reduced over 
the period. For example, the educational attainment of the 
head of household creates less disparity since more people are 
now receiving an education. 
The direct causes of poverty (especially where there are 
accumulative factors) are as expected: unemployment, the age 
of head (particularly when he/she reaches retirement), the 
location of the household in small towns and for the head not 
to have received any or much education. The advantage of this 
paper is that it has presented these often quoted ideas in a 
quantitative and systematic way. 
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APPENDIX 
A. Definitions and Methodology and comment on sources: 
the (FES) . 
House. By house is understood every room or set of rooms 
and the surroundings that is a building or structurally 
separate part of a building which, by its construction, is 
designed for the accommodation of a family. 
Household. A household is defined as the person or set 
of persons living together in a family house, or part of it, 
taking meals together or from the same budget. 
Head. It is understood by head the member of the family 
whose periodic contribution - non-occasional - to the common 
budget is the main basis of common spending. 
Income. The sum of all earnings, monetary or non-
monetary, net of taxes and other similar payments, received by 
each and every member of the household independently whether 
or not it is devoted entirely to the household common 
expenditure fund. 
The population investigated in the Survey (EPF) is the set 
of households covering the whole national territory, including 
Ceuta and Melilla (Spanish "provinces" in Africa). The FES 
excludes collective households (hotels, military premises, 
etc.) but it includes the private households located in 
collective households if they have autonomy of expenditure. 
The unit of sampling was family homes, according to the 
housing censuses (Censos de Viviendas, 1970). The FES takes as 
homes the room or set of rooms designated to be lived in by a 
family. At this point the Survey does not differentiate 
between a main home and a secondary one. The household is 
defined as the set of persons living and taking meals with a 
common budget. 
B. Size of samples 
The sample size in 1981 was 23,972 households. The 
corresponding one for 1973 was 24,251. 
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Key of socio-economic categories 
1, 
2, 
3, 
4, 
5, 
7, 
8 
9, 
10, 
11, 
12, 
13. 
Self-employed agriculture with employees. 
Self-employed agriculture without employees. 
High managers in agriculture exploitations. 
Rest (remainder) of agricultural workers. 
Self-employed non-agricultural with employees and 
professions. 
Non-agricultural entrepreneurs without employees and 
individual workers. 
High managers non-agricultural. 
Managers (medium level). 
Foremen (non agrarian). 
Non agrarian workers (blue collars). 
Army (military forces). 
Unclassified workers. 
Inactive. 
D. The classification of regions 
Regions included in the 1973 and 1981 FES 
1973 1981 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Andalucía 
Aragon 
Canarias 
Castilla la Nueva 
Castilla la Vieja 
Cataluna Baleares 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
Leon-Asturias 
Murcia 
Valencia 
Vascongadas Navarra 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
Andalucía 
Aragon 
Canarias 
Castilla Leon 
Castilla la Mancha 
Cataluna 
Baleares 
Extremadura 
Galicia 
Asturias 
Murcia 
C Valenciana 
Navarra 
Pais Vasco 
La Rioja 
Ceuta-Melilla 
Madrid 
Cantabria 
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE U.K. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with the changes in the 
distribution of household income that occurred between 1973, 
1979 and 1984. The aim is both to examine changes in the 
overall shape of the distribution of income and to identify 
those characteristics of households which are important in 
determining the position of the household within the overall 
distribution. Changes in the household income distribution may 
be due to socio-demographic changes on the one hand (age 
structure, size and composition of households, numbers of 
workers within the household), or to changes in the level and 
structure of income sources (including level and structure of 
employment by hours, industry, occupation and location, the 
structure and level of welfare payments) and indeed to changes 
in the opportunities for different types of household to gain 
access to income (including changes in employment opportunities 
for ethnic minorities, women 'and non-qualified workers or for 
households in specific regions, and changes in eligibility for 
welfare payments. Household income distribution thus varies 
with changes in patterns of internal household organisation, in 
population structure, in economic structure and in the 
organisation of the welfare state. These factors can be 
expected to interact to change the extent and nature of 
inequality in the system of distribution. Identification of 
these effects and their implications for income inequalities 
are essential for policy formulation in a national and EEC 
context. 
Recent work in the U.K. has focused on some of the aspects 
discussed above, but little has been done explicitly on the 
factors which predispose a household to lie in a certain part 
of the income distribution. O'Higgins (1985a, 1985b) and CS.O 
(1983) both look at the effectiveness of the tax-benefit system 
in reducing the inequalities observable in the distribution of 
market income against a background of increasing unemployment 
and reduced Government commitment to the Welfare State. 
However, they do not specifically look at the characteristics 
of a household that may cause it to lie in a certain part of 
the income distribution. Rubery et al (1983) examine in detail 
the effects of inflation and the changes in employment caused 
by the recent recession on the distribution of income. Of the 
studies that do look at the factors that determine the 
household distribution of income most concentrate on the 
characteristics of low income households. The extent and 
causes of poverty have been historically well documented in the 
U.K. (Rowntree, 1902; Townsend, 1979) and have also been 
looked at more recently (Mack & Lansley, 1985; Van Slooten & 
Coverdale, 1987) so a considerable amount is known about the 
factors which predispose a household to being in the lower 
parts of the income distribution. However, little has been 
done to specifically look at the combination of characteristics 
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that enable households to lie in other parts of the 
distribution. The intention here is to look at all the aspects 
of income distribution and so have an overall view of the 
factors that determine the level of income for the household, 
the way this gives rise to the aggregate distribution of income 
and how this can be affected by changes in the economy, the age 
structure of the population and government policies. Where 
appropriate the previous research already mentioned will be 
used to supplement the findings here. 
This study of the U.K. will also provide information for 
the cross-country comparison as here again the primary purpose 
is to compare the changes that are taking place in the 
distribution of income and identify whether these changes are 
associated with similar patterns of change in either the 
structure of households or in the structure of employment 
opportunities and welfare benefits. 
Cross-country comparisons must also, however, be concerned 
with long-term differences in the structure and shape of 
household income distribution. These differences will arise, 
for example, from specific systems of welfare provision, from 
differences in employment opportunities and earnings 
relativities, from differences in participation rates and 
household organisation and from different systems of labour 
market regulation. For example, in the U.K. there is a 
relatively high and rising participation rate for women but 
associated with part-time working. This pattern has arisen, on 
the one hand from lack of childcare facilities and, on the 
other, from the national insurance system which exempts 
employees and employers from payments on low weekly earnings. 
This level and form of participation will have a very different 
effect on the distribution of household income associated with 
life-cycle and demographic factors than a pattern of full-time 
working for married women as in France or a pattern of 
relatively low participation as in Italy. (Rubery, 1987.) 
The definition . and significance of employment categories 
also varies between countries. For example the U.K. workers 
laid-off or made redundant are not kept on employers' pay rolls 
as in Italy but are counted as unemployed. Self-employment is 
another factor whose importance is likely to differ between 
countries. In the U.K. a self-employed person pays tax and 
National Insurance contributions at roughly the same rates as 
they would as an employee. There is no additional payment to 
be made for being self-employed as there is in France, for 
instance. Thus there is likely to be a wider range of jobs in 
which people can be self-employed covering the whole earnings 
range. Being self-employed in the U.K. does not necessarily 
mean having earnings higher than the average as it would make 
it worthwhile if additional National Insurance payments had to 
be made. Thus attention must be paid to the role of these 
specific forms of labour organisation, welfare payments, 
household organisation and cultural, social and regional 
factors if the determination of the income distribution in 
different countries is to be understood. 
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1.1 The Data 
In this study the household is chosen as the income unit 
to be studied. This is chosen in preference to the individual 
or the tax unit as these both omit certain sectors of the 
population who are either no receivers of income or have income 
which is not subject to tax. Furthermore, the income of the 
household is a more appropriate way of looking at the standard 
of living enjoyed by the members of the household. Whilst it 
cannot be assumed that all members of a household have equal 
access to, or receive equal benefits from the income coming 
into the household, it is unlikely that there are many multi-
person households where the income earners are the sole 
beneficiaries of this income, so the total income of the 
household would, in general, be the most adequate proxy for 
looking at the standard of living enjoyed by· each of its 
members. Obviously when considering standards of living 
household size needs to be taken into account and this is done 
by looking at either per capita income or equivalent income; 
income weighted by the number and ages of people in the 
household, thus allowing for some economies of scale in shared 
households and differential needs; where appropriate. 
Having chosen the income unit to be looked at the income 
concept also has to be chosen. Income has been defined as "the 
value of rights which a person might exercise in consumption 
without altering the value of his assets."26 However, this is 
an ideal definition and most available statistics on income do 
not include capital gains or income in kind as part of the 
income available for consumption, therefore a narrower 
definition of income will have to be used. The time period 
over which income accrues also has to be considered. there is 
evidence to show that life-time inequality of income is not as 
great as the inequality of income across the population at a 
point in time.27 However, data on income over a life-time 
would only be available from tax returns and a considerable 
amount of extrapolation of future income trends for present 
generations would be necessary so this is not considered a 
suitable income concept. Therefore, the income concept it is 
intended to use here is that of income coming into the 
household from earnings, social security benefits, investments, 
annuities, pensions, subletting and imputed income from owner 
occupation,28 viewed at a point in time, in this case, in a 
normal week with income that accrues over a longer period being 
suitable adjusted. 
2 6. A. B. Atkinson 'Poverty and Inequality in Britain' in 
Wedderburn p.46. 
2 7. Ibid 
28. For definitions of what is included in each of these 
sources of income see Appendix 2. 
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The data source that has been chosen to look at income 
distribution is the Family Expenditure Survey (hereafter FES). 
This is chosen in preference to the Inland Revenue Survey, 
which forms the basis of the Survey of Personal Incomes, as the 
IR survey is based on the tax unit and therefore excludes 
incomes not assessable for tax, and those who fall below the 
tax level. It also gives very little other information on 
household characteristics and is difficult to compare over 
different years, as coverage alters with changes in tax laws 
and allowances. However, it does have the advantages that it 
uses a large sample and has a 100% response rate. the FES 
conversely covers all households and most types of income29 and 
also looks at various household characteristics in conjunction 
with income. However, it has a small sample of about 11,000 
households and a 70% response rate which is believed to involve 
biases of over-representation of families with children and 
under-representation of households with sick and old people and 
of the highest households.30 It is also prone to certain forms 
of understatement of income, in particular understatement of 
self-employment income and investment income,31 but it has been 
estimated that, on average, FES household income is about 12.5% 
higher than the income derived from looking at tax returns32 
and despite its problems Atkinson and Micklewright (1982) 
concluded from their study of the deficiencies of FES income 
data that "our findings lend considerable support to the view 
that the FES represents a valuable source of data on 
incomes".33 Therefore it has been decided to use the FES data 
for this study on income distribution. 
29. It does not include income in kind and capital gains. 
30. Family Expenditure Survey 1984. 
31. Atkinson and Micklewright (1982) compared the income 
declared in the FES with aggregate incomes given in the 
National Income Blue Books for the years 1970 to 1977. their 
main findings were that aggregate earnings were 5-10% below the 
Blue Book estimates, self-employment income as some 30% below 
the Blue Book estimates and income from investments fell 
considerably short of those in the Blue Books. Some of these 
short-falls are thought to be due to under reporting and under-
representation of the higher income receivers, the top 1% of 
which are thought to be under-represented by 30-50%. 
Occupational pensions and social security benefits are the same 
as the Blue Book estimates when adjusted for differences in 
definitions and the biased responses of families with children 
and the old and sick. 
32. Sandford (2977) p.132 
33. Atkinson and Micklewright (1982) p.41. 
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2. TEMPORAL COMPARISON OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: 
1973, 1979 AND 1984. 
2.1 Changes Affecting The Income Distribution 
The temporal comparison of the distribution of income is 
set against a background of significant changes in the economy, 
the age distribution of the population and changing government 
policies towards both wage and income increases and the role of 
the Welfare State. 
1973 was the peak of a period of continuous economic 
growth with low levels of unemployment and some implementation 
of wage controls due to worry about inflation. By 1979 there 
had been the oil crises which resulted in a period of rapid 
inflation, and had disrupted the steady economic growth seen 
previously, and unemployment had begun to rise. Attempts were 
made to curb inflation using wages and incomes policies and the 
Social Contract of the Labour Government of 1974 to 1979. This 
not only tried to control the rate of increase of wages and 
salaries but also had a redistributive effect built in. 
However, these wage increases restrictions all broke down 
resulting in further rises in wage inflation (Tarling and 
Wilkinson, 1977) . 
In 1979 the Thatcher Government was elected with its 
strong Monetarist policies. These managed to curb the 
increasing inflation of the 1970's but at the high cost of 
dramatically increased unemployment. This was set against a 
background of recession and a Government commitment to decrease 
taxation and public expenditure and to reduce the role of the 
Welfare State. At the same time, there has been an increase in 
the proportion of the population that are retired and a 
decrease in the proportion of children. All these factors can 
be expected to have significant effects on the distribution of 
income. Before looking at the distribution of income however, 
it is informative to look in more detail at the changes 
occurring during the period. 
2.1.1 Incomes Policies 
Attempts to control increases in income started in the 
I960's although these were largely through voluntary 
agreements. Under the Conservative Government of 1971 to 1974 
compulsory pay restrictions were brought in. These did little 
to stem the increase in wages in the long-term, as a sharp 
increase in wage inflation was seen in 1974 when the 
restriction was removed. 
The Social Contract, introduced by the Labour Government 
in 1975 and in operation until 1979, was a voluntary agreement 
with the unions and was seen to have inhibited wage increases 
till near the end of the period when dissatisfaction with the 
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wage bargaining mechanism and the gradual erosion of pay 
differentials caused the unions to concede to their members 
wishes and not adhere so strictly to the voluntary agreements, 
resulting in a period of increasing wage inflation. Under the 
Thatcher Government incomes policies have not been 
implemented.34 
A summary of the various incomes policies and their 
effects on wage rate and earnings increases is given in Table 
2.1. It can be seen that particularly those incomes policies 
that have the effect of narrowing differentials will affect the 
overall income distribution. 
2.1.2 Employment an Unemployment 
Throughout the period there have been changes in the 
numbers employed and unemployed and the percentages of males 
and females in employment. Some of these are the result of 
continuing trends, others the result of recession. Table 2.2 
shows that the working population has increased throughout the 
period although the size of the employed labour force has 
decreased due to the large rise in unemployment during the 
recent recession. 
The distribution of employees by sex reveals an increasing 
proportion of females as a percentage of all employees and a 
decreasing proportion of males. These tendencies are reflected 
in decreases and increases in the absolute numbers as well as 
the relative proportions and are the continuation of a long-
term trend. The lesser number of males is attributed to 
earlier retirement and a longer time spent in full time 
education. The increasing number of females is attributed to 
the increased availability of work and the growing trend in 
participation. This latter tendency is likely to have 
increased household income due to the addition of a second 
income earner. 
Even in the recent recession married women's participation 
has continued to increase although the general increase in 
unemployment has meant that this has not resulted in an 
increase in the numbers employed, instead the number of married 
women that are employed in 1984 is virtually the same as the 
number employed in 1979, which itself was a peak year for 
married women's employment. (Labour Force Sample Survey). The 
increase in unemployment observed over the period is likely to 
affect the distribution of income and increase inequality if 
the unemployed increase the numbers in the lower ranges of the 
income distribution. 
34. Although there have been cash limits on public sector 
employees pay increases resulting in lower increases in public 
sector wages. 
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TABLE 2.1 
PAY RESTRICTIONS 1973-1979 
Year 
Results: to Year 
Government Year 
Conserva-
tive 
Labour's 
Social 
Contract 
[1972-3 
[1973 
[1973-4 
[1974-5 
[1975-6 
[1976-7 
[ 
[1967-8 
[ 
[1978-9 
Pay 
Restrictions 
Freeze 
£1 + 4% 
7% or £2.25 + 
threshold payment 
Maintenance of 
real wage only 
£6 maximum 
5% - £2.50 min. 
£4 maximum. 
10% average 
earnings guideline 
5% average 
earnings guideline 
Implemen-
tation 
Compulsory 
Compulsory 
Compulsory 
Voluntary 
Voluntary 
Voluntary 
Voluntary 
Voluntary 
percentage 
Wage rates 
13.8 
13.7 
19.8 
29.5 
19.3 
6.6 
14.1 
15.0 
changes: 
Earnings 
12.9 
13.5 
17.8 
26.5 
15.5 
10.2 
14.5 
15.6 
Source: C. Pratten. Applied Macro-economics. P.241, 
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TABLE 2.2 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKING POPULATION AT JUNE IN EACH YEAR 
G.B. Thousands and Percent 
Employed Labour 
Force 
% of 
Working35 working Unemployed36 
Year Population Thousand pop. Thousand % 
1973 25547 
1979 26609 
1984 27006 
24972 97.7 
25375 95.4 
23976 88.8 
575 2.3 
1234 4.6 
3030 11.2 
Employees Employees 
by sex as by sex as 
% of all % of all 
employees working 
population 
Male Female Male Female 
60.8 39.2 53.9 34.8 
58.2 41.8 50.6 36.4 
56.0 44.0 43.8 34.5 
Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics. 
2.1.3 Age Structure of the Population 
Throughout the period the total population has grown 
slightly and increases in the numbers of retired have occurred. 
There has also been an increase in those of working age and a 
decrease in the number of children. The changing age structure 
of the population will affect the distribution of income if 
pensioners are to be found in particular deciles; specifically 
if pensioners tend to have low incomes an increase in the 
number of pensioners will increase the inequality of the income 
distribution. 
3 5. Working population is here defined as the sum of the employed 
and the registered unemployed. 
3 6. Unemployed are excluding school leavers. The figures in 1984 
are likely to be understated due to Government changes in definition, 
such as some men over 60 no longer having to sign on, and the number of 
women who don't register as they are ineligible for benefits. 
237 
TABLE 2.3 
Year 
1973 
1979 
1984 
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED POPULATION: U.K. 
At June 
Total 
Population 
56210 
56227 
56488 
: each year. Thousands and Percentages. 
Aged 0-14 Aged 15-64 Aged 65 and 
Thousands % Thousands % Thousands 
13434 23.9 
12089 21.5 
11015 19.5 
35187 62.6 
35873 63.8 
37113 65.7 
7645 
8265 
8360 
over 
% 
13.6 
14.7 
14.8 
Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics. 
The dependency ratios37 show that the dependant population has 
decreased in relation to the working population thus the 
numbers that are supportled both indirectly through the tax 
system and directly should have been reduced. However, this 
reduction is not necessarily due to a decrease in the numbers 
of the young and retired in relation to the numbers of those of 
working age, instead it could be due to the increase in married 
women's participation which has reduced the number of 
dependents and increased the size of the working population. 
These ratios show that between 1979 and 1984 the dependency 
ratio has increased so that an increased number of people are 
now dependant on each person in work. If these 'dependents' 
have lower incomes than those in work increased numbers of them 
may result in increased inequality in original and, possibly, 
gross income, although this will depend on the structure of the 
tax-benefit system. 
TABLE 2.4 
DEPENDENCY RATIOS 
Total population/ Total population/ 
Year Working population Working population 
1973 2.20 2.25 
1979 2.11 2.22 
1984 2.09 2.36 
Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics. 
3 7. Dependency ratio = total population/working 
population. 
S) 
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2.1.4 The Welfare State 
The distribution of gross income and disposable income 
will be affected by changes in government policies relating to 
transfer payments. Labour Governments traditionally try to 
reduce inequality in income through the tax-benefit system and 
Conservatives try to give a larger role to the market in 
determining income distribution. However, the extent to which 
a government can achieve these objectives is severely limited 
by other factors such as the number of pensioners, children and 
unemployed which determine the numbers of benefits to be paid 
out, although the total expenditure can be affected by the 
rates set by the government. 
In 1979 it was the final year in office of a Labour 
government committed to reducing inequality of income so it is 
likely that benefit payments would be relatively high. In 1984 
there had been five years of a Conservative government who were 
committed to reducing public expenditure, and although high 
unemployment and an increased number of pensioners increased 
the total amount paid out, policies to reduce the amount 
received by an individual were implemented. 
Such policies included the abolition of earnings related 
supplements for all short-term benefits from April 1981, the 
cutting of housing benefits, such as pensions, and earnings, so 
that these increase in line with inflation only, and the value 
of child benefit has not been maintained, this has been at its 
lowest level in real terms since the war. It has been 
estimated that these benefit cuts amount to some £1600 million 
throughout the Thatcher government's first term in office.38 
Table 2.5 shows the increasing number of households 
dependant on benefits. These cuts combined with the increasing 
number of households dependant on benefits in likely to 
increase the observed inequality of income between 1979 and 
1984. 
In summary, between 1973 and 1979 there were various 
changes which are likely to increase the inequality in the 
distribution of household income. These include the increasing 
number of pensioners and the slightly increased numbers of 
unemployed, which would swell the number of low income 
households, and the increased labour force participation by 
married women, which tends to raise the number of high income 
households. However, the increase in inequality of original 
income caused by these factors is likely to be partially offset 
by incomes policies which reduced differentials; the reduction 
particularly occurring between those with an those without 
educational qualifications.39 
3 8. Mack and Lansley (1985). 
39. Pratten (1985) p.242. 
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TABLE 2.5 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON TRANSFER PAYMENTS AND 
NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS OF CERTAIN BENEFITS. G.B. THOUSANDS 
Amount Transfer Persons in receipt of: 
spent on expend. Family Child40 
current as % Unemp- Retire- Unemp- Pension- Income benefit 
grants & total loyment ment loyment supp. supp. (children) 
subsidies expend benefit Pensions Supp. benefits (famil-
£000 1975 iture benefits ies) 
Year prices 
1973 11837 26.9 
1979 16568 32.1 
1984 19144 34.4 
247 7936 742 1732 101 11532 
432 8750 484 1846 76 13208 
974 8999 2289 1687 206 12593 
Source: Economic Trends and Monthly Digest of Statistics, 
Between 1979 and 1984 increased unemployment and numbers of 
pensioners is likely to have increased inequality in original 
incomes and the reduction in levels of many transfer payments, 
which more households are dependant on, is likely to have 
contributed to an increase in the inequality of gross income. 
2.2 The Distribution of Income 
The data from the FES on the distribution of income by 
decile41 is shown in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, diagrams 2.8 and 2.9, 
and the resulting Gini coefficients are shown in Table 2.10. 
It can immediately be seen that there was a slight increase in 
the inequality of original income42 between 1973 and 1979 
40. Child tax allowances and family allowances were replaced by 
child benefit between April 1977 and APril 1979. 
41. The deciles have been derived from published data 
given in terms of mean income and number of households within a 
range of gross weekly income by straightforward linear 
interpolation. Error seems to be small (around 1%) and whilst 
other methods of interpolation could be used this would not be 
suitable for other characteristics of households to be looked 
at in conjunction with income where the distribution within 
decile is not known. 
42. Original income is all income received from the 
market before National Insurance contributions and tax are 
deducted i.e.: gross income less social security benefits. 
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although gross income43 remained much the same. Between 1979 
and 1984 there was a large increase in the inequality of both 
original and gross income. 
Between 1973 and 1979 the increase in inequality in 
original income is reflected in the percentage of income going 
to the bottom deciles. Each of these deciles had a reduction 
in the percentage of original income they received whilst those 
in the upper half of the distribution gained. This is quite 
surprising in view of the incomes policies during the period. 
It would seem that the effects of these policies were 
outweighed by the increasing numbers of pensioners and 
unemployed who are likely to swell the numbers of those 
receiving low market incomes. Furthermore, the increased 
labour market participation of married women over the period 
may have added to this inequality as it will increase the 
number of households with higher incomes due to the presence of 
two earners. It is also likely to increase the differentials 
between households with two earners as women's contribution to 
household income increases as the husband's income goes up.44 
This then would tend to exacerbate the differences of incomes 
of households that may already be due to the differences in 
husband's earnings and socio-economic status. Inspection of 
the percentage of gross income going to each decile in 1973 and 
1979 shows that although there is very little change in overall 
inequality between the years, there does seem to have been some 
reduction in the percentage of income going to the top decile, 
and an increase in the percentage going to the bottom quintile, 
this then would tend to suggest that the benefit system had 
been quite effective in improving the lot of those at the lower 
end of the income range and particularly in negating the 
effects of the increased inequality in original income. 
Between 1979 and 1984 the story is rather different. The 
increased inequality in original income is seen to be a result 
of a fall in the percentage of income received by each of the 
bottom seven deciles and an increase in the percentage going to 
the top three. The bottom 50% of households only received 
15.3% of total original income in 1984. This reflects mainly 
the great increase in unemployment and, to a lesser extent, the 
increasing number of pensioners. 
The deciles of original income are categorised by gross normal 
weekly income of household, whilst this may not be completely 
accurate as some households may change decile if categorised by 
the income concept being studied, information to verify this is 
not available. 
4 3. Gross income is all income received by the household 
before the deduction of tax and NI contributions but including 
social security benefits. 
44 For further discussion of this see Section 3.3.2. 
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TABLE 2.6 
Year 
Gross 
Income 1973 
1979 
1984 
Original 
Income 1973 
1979 
1984 
Disposable 
Income 1979 
1984 
PERCENTAGE 
Decile 
1st 
2.19 
2.25 
1.67 
0.45 
0.43 
0.25 
2.38 
2.34 
PERCENTAGE OF 
Year 
1973 
1979 
1984 
2nd 
3.26 
3.28 
3.02 
1.35 
0.98 
0.91 
3.99 
3.65 
OF INCOME 
(arranged 
3rd 
5.09 
4.70 
4.23 
3.92 
2.94 
2.01 
5.41 
4.97' 
4th 
6.93 
6.58 
6.03 
6.82 
6.07 
4.82 
7.06 
6.63 
TABLE 
INCOME GOING TO 
Gross 
Income 
25. 
25. 
22. 
7 
1 
7 
GOING TO EACH DECILE 
by gross income) 
5th 
8.27 
8.29 
7.70 
8.48 
8.28 
7.26 
8.63 
8.06 
: 2.7 
6th 
9.96 
10.12 
9.66 
10.31 
10.62 
9.95 
9.64 
9.70 
THE BOTTOM 
Original 
Income 
21.0 
18.7 
15.3 
7th 
11.10 
11.54 
11.47 
11.69 
12.32 
12.14 
10.99 
11.34 
8 th 
12.90 
13.33 
13.85 
13.60 
14.38 
15.10 
13.40 
13.35 
9 th 
15.91 
16.71 
17.30 
17.03 
18.29 
19.20 
16.53 
16.42 
50% OF HOUSEHOLDS 
Disposable 
Income 
. 
27.5 
25.7 
10th 
24.41 
23.21 
25.OS 
26.36 
28.69 
28.35 
21.97 
23.53 
TABLE 2.10 
GINI COEFFICIENTS 
Gross Income: 
Original Income: 
Disposable Income: 
1973 
1979 
1984 
1973 
1979 
1984 
1973 
1984 
0 
0, 
0, 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0. 
.3416 
.3424 
.3769 
.4077 
.4268 
,4711 
,3168 
,3379 
242. 
Diagram 2.3 
Lorenz Curves of Original Income, 1973, 1979 and I9BU. 
Cumulative percentage 
frequency of income 
100 
Key: 
1973 
1979 
1984 
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Cumulative percentage 
frequency of households 
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Diagram 2.9 
Loren'. Curves of Cross Income, 1973, 1979 and 1984. 
Cumulative percentage 
frequency of income 
ICO 
Key: 
— 1973 
— 1979 
— 1984 
Cumulative percentage 
frequency of households 
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The changes in gross income between 1979 and 1984 reflect 
exactly the same patterns as the changes in original income, 
the bottom seven deciles have become worse off and the top 
three better off and the bottom half of the distribution have 
less than a quarter of total gross income. This shows how the 
cuts in benefits have aided the process of increasing 
inequality, as the benefits are no longer able to keep the 
income distribution at the same level of inequality as seen 
previously. Thus it would seem that those in work and at the 
higher end of the income distribution are becoming better off, 
whilst those at the lower end are likely to be retired or 
unemployed and they are becoming worse off. 
The changes in disposable income45 between 1979 and 1984 
also show an increase in inequality, thus the tax system is 
doing little to reduce the increased inequalities in original 
and gross income. However, the components of disposable income 
have changed between the two years so are not directly 
comparable.46 Even so, this period has been one in which the 
standard rate of tax has been reduced and the burden of tax on 
the highest paid has fallen whilst the effective levels of tax 
on the lower paid have increased. It has been estimated that 
the share of income of the top 1% of households has risen over 
this period and this is the first time their share has risen 
since 1949, also it is estimated that the higher income 
households have gained about £2600 million between 1979 and 
1984 from tax concessions.47 Therefore it is likely that there 
has been a considerable increase in the inequality of 
disposable income. 
In summary, there is considerable inequality in the 
distribution of household income in the U.K. and this 
inequality has been aided during the first term in office of 
the Thatcher government through increasing unemployment, 
reductions in benefits to the increasing number of households 
that are dependant on them, reductions in the tax rates on the 
better off and a greater tax burden on those at the bottom end 
of the income distribution. the changing age structure of the 
population has also added to these effects. 
4 5. Disposable income is gross income less tax and 
National Insurance contributions. Data on this is only 
available for 1979 and 1984. 
46. Disposable income fell for mortgage holders between 
1979 and 1984 due to the introduction of a mortgage interest 
relief at source system in 1983. For further details of the 
effect of this on disposable income see Appendix 3. 
4 7. Mack and Lansley (1985). 
245 
TABLE 2.11 
AVERAGE TAX RATES ON MARRIED MEN WITH TWO CHILDREN 
UNDER 11 AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF INCOME 
one and a 
half quarters half times twice 
average average average average average 
earnings earnings earnings earnings earnings 
1974/5 
1978/9 
1979/80 
1980/1 
1981/2 
1982/3 
1983/4 
1984/5 
Source: 
2.3 
7.4 
10.5 
12.4 
13.7 
16.1 
16.0 
15.4 
14.6 
Rubery 
Causes of 
of Income 
17.5 
18.8 
19.7 
20.7 
22.6 
22.8 
22.'3 
21.9 
et al ( 1986; 
the Changes 
22.6 
23.6 
23.5 
24.5 
26.2 
26.5 
26.1 
25.8 
> Table 
in the 
26.7 
28.3 
27.0 
27.9 
29.9 
29.4 
29.1 
28.2 
3 . 
Distribut 
28.3 
29.4 
27.7 
28.5 
30.1 
30.7 
30.4 
29.7 
ion 
Some of the factors that have been suggested may be 
instrumental in the greater inequality observed in the income 
distribution can be further investigated by looking at the 
changes in certain household characteristics by decile. 
2.3.1 The Increasing Number of Retired 
Households 
Table 2.12 shows that the percentage of households with 
retired heads increased between 1973 and 1984.48 This increase 
is obviously due, in part, to the increasing numbers of retired 
households, but the increase in the bottom quintile of 
households with no worker, accompanied by the decrease in the 
number of retired households in this quintile, would suggest 
that the unemployed and those dependant on State benefits are 
to be found at this lower end of the distribution. The 
percentage of households with unoccupied heads increased 
48. The percentage of households with retired heads in 
1979 has not been considered due to an anomaly in the published 
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dramatically overall and within each decile between 1973 and 
1984.49 
The vast majority of the unoccupied heads of household are 
to be found in the lower half of the income distribution and 
particularly in the bottom three deciles. The percentage of 
heads of households that are employees out of a job are given 
for comparison. However, these figures show very little and 
obscure the increase in unemployment in the economy due to a 
change in definition.50 
The definition in 1984 means that many of the unemployed 
are to be found in the unoccupied group, therefore this is the 
most representative category of the unemployed. Thus it seems 
that those to be found at the lower end of the income 
distribution are the unemployed and retired, the increases in 
both these between 1973 and 1984 will lead to greater 
inequality in the overall distribution of income as there will 
be a larger number of people on low incomes. 
2.3.3 The Increase in Labour Force 
Participation of Married Women 
It was suggested that the increased labour force 
participation of married women may affect the distribution of 
household income and make it more unequal if women were 
contributing more to household income in the higher deciles and 
less in the lower ones. This would help explain the increase 
in original income inequality found after a period of incomes 
policies designed to reduce this. 
Table 2.14 does not show the relative amounts contributed 
to household income by working married women in each decile but 
it does show a slight increase in participation between 1973 
and 1979 and the very high concentration of the households with 
married women working in the top half of the distribution. 
This concentration was higher in 1979 than in 1973 and 
therefore may well have affected the distribution of original 
income. 
49. The figures for 1979 have again been omitted due to 
some inconsistency in the numbers categorised as retired or 
unoccupied. 
50. In 1973 employees out of a job were considered as 
workers unless they had not worked for more than five years, in 
which case they were counted as unoccupied. For 1979 and 1984 
there is information on the percentage of employees that are 
employees out of a job, however, they were only counted as such 
if they had been out of work for less than five years in 1979 
and less than 1 year in 1984, otherwise they were considered 
unoccupied. Data for the two years, therefore, are not 
comparable. Furthermore, unemployed school leavers who had 
never worked were counted as unoccupied in 1984. 
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TABLE 2.14 
MARRIED WOMEN WORKING AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE HOUSEHOLDS 
WITH MARRIED WOMEN IN EACH DECILE 
Decile (arranged by gross income) 
Year 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th All 
1973 - - - - - - - - - - 5 3 . 6 
1979 8.2 8.1 17.1 37.3 46.2 59.3 67.7 74.9 77.2 74.1 56.3 
1984 18.5 9.4 13.8 28.7 39.0 52.5 60.6 64.2 76.1 74.5 51.7 
In 1984 the FES shows the effect of high unemployment, 
with the percentage of households with married women where the 
woman is working having fallen in most deciles, exceptions 
being the bottom quintile and top decile, the overall 
percentage having also fallen. However, this does not agree 
with information from other sources. For instance, the Labour 
Force Sample Survey, where the numbers of married women in 
employment remained fairly constant between 1979 and 1984. A 
possible reason for this discrepancy is the increasing ageing 
population as the number of married women in these older 
households will increase, but the likelihood of them working 
will be less. However, the findings of the FES with regard to 
the increasing numbers of working married women in the bottom 
quintile is still of interest as this reflects the changing age 
distribution of the income distribution; the unemployed that 
are moving into this quintile are younger than the retired 
households previously found here, so there are now more married 
women of working age in these deciles. 
2.4 The Source of Income 
Table 2.15 shows that the most important sources of income 
in all years are wages and salaries and social security 
benefits, for all households taken together. The decline in 
importance of wages and salaries and increase in importance of 
social security benefits between 1973 and 1984 can be partly 
attributed to the increases in unemployment and number of 
pensioners, as already discussed. The changes in self-
employment income correspond to the changes in numbers 
classified as self-employed in the survey.51 Investment income 
decreased in importance between 1973 and 1979, which may in 
part be due to the collapse in the Stock Market, and consequent 
large fall in the FT index in 1974. The importance of 
annuities and private pension plans has increased over the 
5 1. There will be an increase in this in 1984 due to the 
change in definition of self-employed, see Appendix 3. 
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period as increasing numbers of those entering retirement have 
invested in these. 
TABLE 2.15 
PERCENTAGE OF GROSS INCOME MADE UP BY INCOME 
FROM VARIOUS SOURCES 
All Households 
Source: 1973 1979 1984 
Wages and salaries 61.3 56.5 49.6 
Seif-employment 5.3 4.0 4.9 
Investments 3.1 2.8 3.4 
Annuities and pensions 3.4 3.6 4.9 
Social security benefits 21.3 26.4 30.6 
Sub-letting and imputed income 
from owner-occupation 4.3 5.1 5.4 
Other sources 1.4 1.5 1.2 
The largest changes within, and between deciles, between 
1973 and 1984 have occurred for wages and salaries and social 
security benefits (Table 2.16). From the 4th decile upwards 
wages and salaries constitute the source of the majority of 
household income. Between 1973 and 1979 the percentage of 
income from wages and salaries fell for all deciles except the 
10th. Between 1979 and 1984 they fell for every decile. This 
partly reflects the increasing importance of other sources of 
income and the increase in non-employed people. Social 
security benefits increased in importance for all deciles 
between 1973 and 1979, this may partly be a reflection of 
increased levels of benefits and of the switch from child tax 
allowances to child benefits as well as the changes already 
discussed. Between 1979 and 1984 the importance of benefits 
again increased for most deciles, the importance for the top 
decile fell, and the first three deciles became largely 
dependant on benefits. Again this reflects increased 
unemployment and numbers of pensioners. 
The distribution of other sources of income does not vary 
much between the years. The distribution in 1984 (Table 2.17) 
shows that self-employment income is most important in the 4th 
and 10th deciles, constituting a similar percentage in each of 
the intermediate deciles. This reflects the fact that self-
employment is not just a form of employment confined to the 
higher income earners as, in the U.K., unlike some other European 
countries, the self-employed person only has to pay his tax and 
"employees' National Insurance contribution, he does not have to 
pay the employer's part of National Insurance. This then means 
that there are no statutory additional costs for a person who is 
self-employed as opposed to employed, and so the self-employed 
range through small businessmen, professionals, craft workers 
(particularly in construction), to casual workers or homeworkers. 
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TABLE 2.16 
PERCENTAGE TO EACH DECILE FROM VARIOUS SOURCES OF INCOME 
Decile (arranged by gross income) 
Year 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
Wages and Salaries 
1973 
1979 
1984 
1973 
1979 
1984 
2.9 
2.2 
1.7 
82.5 
83.8 
89.1 
12.2 
6.4 
5.3 
64.2 
74.4 
74.5 
44.6 69.3 77.6 80.5 82.1 
28.0 58.5 69.7 76.1 79.9 
14.6 40.5 58.2 67.9 72.8 
Social Security Benefits 
30.7 10.7 6.7 5.9 4.1 
46.7 19.4 12.4 8.1 6.5 
59.6 31.8 18.8 11.2 8.7 
83.8 
81.1 
77.3 
4.0 
5.5 
6.0 
84.1 
83.2 
81.1 
2.7 
4.1 
4.2 
75.4 
80.4 
76.6 
1.8 
3.1 
2.6 
The percentage of investment income is fairly similar in 
all deciles, although the actual amount contributed from this 
source will rise with the decile. It constitutes the highest 
percentages in the 3rd and 10th deciles, possibly reflecting 
the numbers of retired households and the better off, 
respectively, who are more likely to have investments. 
Annuities and pensions are particularly important to the 3rd, 
4th and 5th deciles, again reflecting the concentration of 
pensioners with higher incomes in these deciles; there will be 
many in the lower deciles who only receive state pensions. 
Sub-letting and imputed income from owner-occupation reflects 
home ownership and this is important in all but the first 
decile. 
Overall, then it seems the most important sources of 
income in determining where a household will lie within the 
income distribution are the amounts received from earnings and 
the dependance on social security benefits. However, all 
deciles receive amounts of all sorts of income, although the 
importance of each source of income in making up total 
household income varies across deciles, therefore "knowing the 
form in which a pound is received does not unambiguously locate 
the recipient household in the distribution of income by 
size".52 
5 2. Borooah and Sharpe (1986) p.452 
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TABLE 2.17 
DISTRIBUTION OF OTHER SOURCES OF INCOME. 1984 
Decile (arranged by gross income) 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Source: 
Seif-employment 
Investments 
Annuities & pensions 
Sub-letting & imputed 
income 
Other sources 
1.2 
2.0 
2.6 
2.2 
1.2 
2.1 
3.4 
5.5 
7.5 
1.8 
3.1 
4.5 
9.1 
7.6 
1.6 
7.3 
4.1 
8.4 
6.3 
1.5 
5.4 
3.7 
6.7 
5.8 
1.4 
5.8 
3.6 
5.2 
5.3 
1.0 
6.4 
2.6 
3.2 
5.2 
1.2 
4.7 
2.8 
3.5 
5.1 
0.8 
4.2 
2.9 
2.2 
4.9 
0.6 
8.9 
4.5 
2.4 
4.5 
0.5 
2.5 Equivalent Household Income 
Equality in the household distribution of income would not 
imply equal income for each household, as then those households 
with least members would have higher standards of living. 
Instead, a concept of equivalent income has to be used. 
Equivalent income is the re-weighting of household income 
according to the number and status of members of the household, 
taking account of the 'economies of scale' to be gained from 
having a multi-person household and the lower cost of looking 
after a child compared to an additional adult.53 Per capita 
income weighted solely by the number of people in a household, 
does not take these factors into account. Equivalence scales 
are also important when discussing changes in the age structure 
of the population. Although an increase in the numbers of 
single pensioners on low incomes may have increased, thus 
causing greater inequality in the household distribution of 
gross income, this would not necessarily mean a greater 
inequality in the distribution of equivalent income, as these 
53. Weightings commonly used in the U.K. 
DHSS Economic Advisors Office. They are: 
are those of the 
married couple, wife not working 
single adult, householder 
2nd adult, non-householder 
3rd adult, non-householder 
child 
Rates 1971-2. 
aged 0 
2 
5 
8 
11 
13 
16 
Van Slooten 
1 
4 
7 
10 
12 
15 
18 
Coverdale. 
1, 
0, 
0, 
0, 
0. 
0. 
0. 
0, 
0, 
0. 
0. 
00 
61 
46 
42 
09 
18 
21 
23 
25 
27 
36 
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households may have the same equivalent income as households 
made up of adults and children who are likely to be found 
higher up the distribution of gross income. For these reasons 
then it is necessary to look at household size and equivalent 
incomes in conjunction with the temporal comparison of income 
distribution. 
TABLE 2.18 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ADULTS AND CHILDREN PER HOUSEHOLD 
Decile (arranged by gross income) 
Year 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th All 
1973 
1979 
1984 
1973 
1979 
1984 
1.15 
1.08 
1.06 
0.06 
0.06 
0.11 
1.51 
1.47 
1.43 
0.20 
0.21 
0.35 
1.75 
1.68 
1.69 
0.53 
0.41 
0.50 
1.86 
1.74 
1.78 
0.87 
0.77 
0.63 
Adults 
1.97 1.04 
1.91 2.00 
1L9O 1.99 
Children 
1.10 1.19 
0.95 1.12 
0.77 0.86 
2.12 
2.05 
2.10 
1.18 
1.14 
1.01 
2.23 
2.17 
2.17 
1.18 
1.07 
1.02 
2.38 
2.38 
2.39 
1.16 
1.03 
0.91 
2.63 
2.62 
2.58 
1.07 
1.10 
0.94 
1.96 
1.91 
1.91 
0.85 
0.79 
0.71 
The data on the average numbers of adults and children per 
household (Table 2.18) in each decile, shows an overall 
decrease in household size from 2.81 in 1973 to 2.62 in 1984. 
These overall figures reflect the slight decline in the numbers 
of adults per household in each decile over the years, and a 
decline in the number of children in each decile between 1973 
and 1979. However, between 1979 and 1984 the average numbers 
in the higher deciles decreased. This lends further support to 
the idea that the unemployed with families have moved into the 
bottom deciles. Across deciles the number of adults in each 
decile increases moving from the bottom to the top decile, the 
number of children increases from the 1st to the 8th decile and 
then falls slightly in the 9th and 10th deciles. 
The changes in the size of household suggest more older 
people who have smaller households, people deferring marriage 
and having single households for longer, people having fewer 
children and an increased number of single parent households. 
The distribution of household size shows more single, childless 
and old people at the lower end of the income range, households 
with children to be situated in the middle deciles and those 
with the most adults and fewer children to be in the top two 
deciles. 
The figures suggest an increase in household size as 
income increases which would mean that the distribution of 
equivalent household income is likely to be much more equal 
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than that of gross of disposable household income. However, it 
is not possible to calculate equivalent incomes from the FES 
published data54 and, even if it were calculated, it would need 
to be ranked by decile of equivalent income rather than the 
gross income deciles available in order to gain an impression 
of the income band a household lies within. It has been found, 
using FES data for 1982, that using equivalent income 
significantly alters the rank ordering of households so that 
less than half of all households remain in the same decile when 
the deciles are ranked by equivalent income compared to when 
they are ranked by unadjusted income.55 
However, other work can be drawn upon to show how using 
equivalence scales can significantly alter the observed income 
distribution. The equivalent income distribution has been 
found to be considerably more equal than the distribution of 
disposable household income.56 When looking at equivalent 
original income it has been found that households with working 
adults are to be found in the top half of the distribution, 
over half the long-term unemployed and nearly half of the 
retired households were to be found in the lowest quintile and 
households with children were particularly concentrated in the 
middle of the distribution. Thus using equivalent income does 
not greatly alter the conclusions reached from looking at gross 
income and household size by decile. The greatest impact of 
occupational pensions was found in the second quintile although 
all quintiles except the bottom benefitted from this source of 
income, so verifying the idea that those pensioners on State 
pensions were to be found in the lowest parts of the income 
distribution. Transfer payments were found to reduce some of 
the inequalities arising from the distribution of original 
income.57 
The temporal comparison of equivalent income showed that 
the recession in the U.K. has caused inequalities to grow so 
that households with more workers are found in the higher 
deciles and the previous position of the retired in the bottom 
deciles is being taken by those households with unemployed 
heads. O'Higgins concludes that "during the recession in the 
U.K., the role of the market has diminished, but its 
inequalities have grown."58 Although the inequality revealed 
5 4. There is a large amount of error involved in trying 
to calculate the equivalent income from the average incomes and 
numbers in a household given for a range of income as presented 
in the FES published data thus there is little to be gained 
from trying to do this. 
5 5. O'Higgins (1985a) 
56. Van Slooten & Coverdale (1977). 
5 7. O'Higgins (1985s) FES data for 1982. 
5 8. 0(Higgins (1985b) p.303 
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by these studies of equivalent income is less than those 
observed from the distribution of gross and original incomes, 
the conclusions as to the causes of the greater inequality, and 
those to be found in different parts of the income distribution 
remain much the same. 
2.6 Summary 
The temporal comparison of the distribution of income has 
revealed that original incomes have become more unequal in each 
year being studied, and whilst the inequality of gross income 
did not alter between 1973 and 1979, inequality increased 
between 1979 and 1984. The change in original income 
distribution between 1973 and 1979 has been attributed to 
increased labour force participation by married women and an 
increase in the percentage of the population that are retired 
or unemployed. However, the stable distribution of gross 
income between 197 3 and 1979 suggests that over this period the 
State benefit system did much to negate this increased 
inequality. Between 1979' and 1984 the increase in inequality 
in original income has largely been due to the increased 
unemployment and, to a much smaller extent, to the increase in 
the number of retired. However, the likely increase in 
inequality due to an increasing ageing population has been 
partially offset by the increase in the number of retired 
receiving pensions from private schemes which tends to reduce 
inequality between the retired and non-retired, although it may 
increase inequality within the retired group. 
The increase in inequality in gross incomes between 1979 
and 1984 reflects the inability and unwillingness of the 
Thatcher government to offset the increased inequality in 
original income. This has been amply demonstrated by the cuts 
made in transfer payments to individuals. The changing income 
distribution would, therefore, seem to be largely due to those 
in work becoming better off whilst those out of work are 
becoming worse off. 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS THAT HELP TO 
DETERMINE THE PART OF THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
A HOUSEHOLD WILL LIE IN 
This section proposes to look at what are the 
characteristics of a household that determine which part of the 
income distribution a household lies in? Various factors will 
be considered, such as the composition of the household, the 
age, employment status and socio-economic class of the head of 
household, the number of workers in the household and the 
geographical location of the household. In the main each of 
these factors will be discussed in relation to one year only, 
1984, but where there have been significant changes in a factor 
over time, this will also be considered. 
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3.1 Size and Composition of Household 
The size of household has changed quite considerably over 
the period being studied (Table 3.1). The average size of 
household has declined due to the decrease in percentages of 
households with five or more members and an increase in single 
person households, which is largely a result of the increasing 
older population. This is also shown by the data on the 
percentage of households of each composition (Table 3.2), where 
the percentage of households with two adults and three or more 
children has decreased, and the percentages of one adult and 
one adult and children households has increased. Therefore, 
the average size of household has fallen because of smaller 
family sizes, larger numbers of single adults and larger 
numbers of single parent families. 
1 person 
2 people 
3 people 
4 people 
5 people 
6 or more 
TABLE 3 
HOUSEHOLDS BY 
people 
Average size 
Source: Social Trends 
1971 
18 
32 
19 
17 
8 
6 
2.89 
: 1986 ( 
.1 
SIZE (%) 
1976 
21 
32 
17 
17 
8 
5 
2.76 
1971, 1981 
1981 
22 
32 
17 
18 
7 
4 
2.71 
. Popu] 
1984 
25 
32 
16 
18 
6 
3 
2.59 
.ation 
1976, 1986 General Household Survey). 
The indices of gross income and equivalent disposable 
income59 show similar trends across the different household 
compositions in all years (Table 3.2) therefore only 1984 will 
be considered in detail. 
Diagram 3.4 shows that the more adults in a household the 
higher is the gross income. However, for man and woman 
households gross income decreases with more than two children 
and for four adult households with one child it is lower than 
for the four adult household. This then suggests that even 
gross income is related to the composition of the household and 
disposable income (Diagram 3.3) composition appears to be much 
59. An equivalence scale is used to give equivalent 
disposable income to facilitate comparisons between households 
standards of living. The scale used is 1.0 for the first 
adult, 0.7 for each subsequent adult and 0.5 for each child. 
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more important than the size of the household; income 
increases slightly with the number of adults in the household, 
but decreases more markedly with the number of children, except 
for the single parent family. The number of adults in the 
household is likely to be a vague proxy for the number of 
workers, so it may be assumed that the standard of living of 
each member of the household increases as the number of workers 
in the household increases, but as the dependency ratio 
increases, that is the number of children or others who would 
not be working, the standard of living for each member 
decreases. 
TABLE 3.2 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION 
1 man mah man 2 2 4 
adult man woman woman woman adults adults adult All 
1 1/+ & & 1 & 2 & 3 4/+ 3 1/+ 4/+ 1/+ housi 
Adult child woman child child child child adult child adult child holt 
% households in groups 
1973 19.4 
1979 22.7 
1984 24.0 
2.6 
3.5 
3.7 
2.6 
28.9 
19.1 
29.7 
9.8 
9.2 
11.1 
14.2 
13.2 
12.5 
5.0 
4.5 
3.2 
2.0 
1.4 
6.9 
5.4 
6.3 
5.3 1.5 1.8 6941 
5.0 1.7 1.8 658: 
4.6 2.4 1.6 686! 
index of gross income 
1973 
1979 
1984 
42.8 
44.9 
45.2 
52.8 
63.8 
50.6 
9 5 . 0 1 1 2 . 1 1 1 4 . 2 1 2 1 . 4 1 1 6 . 6 1 4 2 . 9 1 5 7 . 5 1 9 9 . 6 1 9 6 . 9 4 9 . 
9 6 . 3 1 0 8 . 1 1 2 3 . 6 1 2 4 . 1 1 1 2 . 2 1 4 9 . 3 1 6 5 . 8 2 0 2 . 6 2 1 0 . 2 120 . 
9 8 . 5 1 1 8 . 2 1 2 8 . 1 1 2 0 . 6 1 0 5 . 5 1 4 6 . 9 1 6 1 . 9 2 0 6 . 5 1 8 9 . 5 197 . : 
index of equivalent income * 
1979 90.2 91.5 110.2 95.0 89.0 75.5 
1984 93.6 114.8 116.0 100.8 92.5 74.9 
60.1 117.0 110.8 121.4 112.2 
59.7 120.8 110.5 129.0 105.3 
51.! 
80.f 
Categories where there are '1 or more' etc. are assumed 
to have the minimum number of people for the purpose of 
weighting disposable income to get equivalent income. 
The two largest groups of households are the single adult 
and man and woman households making up over 53% of the total 
number of households in 1984. These groups are likely to 
consist of both retired adults and young people, and it is 
possible that these have very different gross incomes and 
standards of living, so they deserve more detailed examination. 
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Table 3.5 shows that there has been an increase in the 
1973 to 1984. Over half the one adult households, and about 
one third of the man and woman households, are made up of 
TABLE 3.5 
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH 
DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN 
1973 
% households in 
group 
Index of gross 
income 
1979 
% households in 
group 
Index of equivalent 
income 
Index of gross 
income 
% gross income made 
up bv: 
wages and salaries 
social security 
benefits 
Other 
1984 
% households in 
group 
Index of equivalent 
income 
Index of gross 
income 
% gross income made 
up by: 
wages and salaries 
social security 
benefits 
other 
under 
65 
42.1 
60.0 
42.1 
121.9 
65.0 
75.8 
8.1 
16.1 
43.3 
121.2 
63.2 
69.9 
9.9 
20.2 
1 ADULT OR MAN AND WOMAN. 
RETIRED AND NON-RETIRED 
1 adult 
over 65 
dependent 
on state 
I 
under < 
pension other 
57.9 
30.2 
33.9 
54.0 
23.0 
0.2 
93.7 
6.1 
30.5 
50.3 
20.4 
0.0 
. 92.9 
7.1 
65 1 
65.1 ■ 
115.1 · 
24.0 
85.9 
40.4 
0.0 
43.3 
56.7 
26.1 
98.3 
44.3 
0.0 
42.2 
57.8 
66.8 
130.6 
117.1 
81.0 
5.1 
13.9 
66.5 
133.7 
117.3 
73.3 
6.4 
22.5 
HOUSEHOLDS. 
man and woman 
over 65 
dependent 
an state 
Dension other 
— 
— 
-34.9 
-57.5 
14.1 19.1 
49.3 83.9 
35.8 68.2 
0.0 14.2 
89.3 39.9 
10.7 45.7 
12.6 20.9 
52.7 97.9 
36.4 76.0 
0.0 10.9 
89.2 39.0 
10.7 50.1 
Table 3.3 
Equivalent Disposable Household Income by Household Composition, 1904. 
Index of 
equivalent incomes 
Fercentage of households 
of each composition. 
&& 
m 
¿>0 
1 ^ 
¡31 EL 
.30 
■ 25 
­20 
15 
10 
1 adult 1 adult, man & 
1 child woman 
or more 
m A w, m & H, 
1 child 2 child 
m & w, ?. adults, 3 adults, 
3 child 4 or more 
children 
3 adults, 4 or more4 or more 
1 or more adults adults, 
children 1 or moie 
children 
to 
­J 
income 
house­
holds 
Diagram 3·^ 
Gross Household Income by Household Composition, 1984. 
Index of 
gross income 
220 
Percentage of households 
of each composition 
1 adult 1 adult, man & m & w, 
1 or more woman 1 child 
children 
m A w, 
2 child 
m Sc w, 
3 child 
2 adults, 3 adults 3 adults, 4 or more 4 or more 
4 or more 1 or more adults adults, 
children children 1 or more 
children 
to 
oo 
m 
income 
house -
ho lds 
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retired households. Of the non-retired households both the one 
percentage of one adult pensioner households over the period 
adult and two adult households have gross incomes that are 
considerably higher than those for the whole of the one adult 
and two adult groups, thus the averages for these groups are 
brought down by the retired households. The non-retired one 
adult gross income is higher than that for a single adult with 
children, but the non-retired two adult household has a gross 
income below that of the two adult household with one child. 
The same tendencies, as already observed for the equivalent 
income of one and two adult households, still apply for the 
non-retired one and two adult households, although their 
equivalent income is necessarily higher than for all one and 
two adult households. 
Of the retired households it can immediately be seen that 
there are large differences between the households that are 
largely dependant on State pensions, and those that have other 
pensions. Well over half of single pensioners and a third of 
two adult pensioner households are dependant on State pensions. 
These adults have the lowest gross incomes and equivalent 
disposable incomes of any group. Thus the old, largely 
dependant on State pensions are generally the poorest type of 
household when looked at by composition. The larger number of 
single adult households dependant on State pensions is likely 
to be due to the greater longevity of women of whom fewer have 
entitlement to other forms of pensions. The retired households 
dependant on other forms of pensions have gross incomes that 
are lower than the averages for the groups as a whole, but 
considerably higher than those dependant on state pensions, and 
their equivalent incomes are only slightly lower than the 
average for all households, therefore a reasonable standard of 
living is generally provided for by private pensions. Between 
1979 and 1984 there has been an increase in the number of 
pensioner households that have private pensions and, as already 
mentioned under the temporal comparison of the distribution of 
income, this should have helped reduce the overall inequality 
and may have accounted for some of the drift of pensioners away 
from the bottom deciles observed over the period. 
Increased membership of occupational pension schemes means 
that income is spread more evenly over a person's life-time so 
the distribution of income taken at a point in time should show 
a reduction in inequality as the incomes of those working is 
reduced and the incomes of pensioners increased. However, this 
does not necessarily mean there has been any reduction in life-
time inequality as a large number of pension schemes are 
calculated as a percentage of normal earnings, so pensions will 
reflect existing differentials between occupational groups.60 
Occupational pensions therefore reduce the inequalities amongst 
the retired with occupational pension schemes.61 Even more 
6 0. Wedderbury Se Craig in Wedderbury (Ed) (1974). 
61. O.'Higgins (1985b) 
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apparent is the inequality between those with occupational 
pensions and those dependant on State pensions. 
The membership of occupational pension schemes over time 
is shown in Table 3.6. As the increasing numbers of people in 
these schemes reach retirement the changes in inequality 
mentioned above will become more apparent. 
TABLE 3.6 
MEMBERSHIP OF PENSION SCHEMES 
By sector and Sex - U.K. (Thousands) 
1953 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 
Private sector: males 2500 6800 5500 4900 4600 4400 
females 600 1300 1300 1100 1500 1400 
Public sector: males 2400 3100 3200 3700 3700 3400 
females 700 1000 1100 1700 1800 1900 
% employees belonging to 
pension schemes 28 53 49 49 50 52 
Source: Social trends 1987 (Government Actuaries Dept.). 
Another type of household which is worthy of consideration 
here is the single parent family. If the one adult with 
children category is taken as representative of single parent 
families it can be seen that the percentage of this type of 
household has increased quite considerably over the period. 
This is also shown by Diagram 3.7 on divorcing couples by 
number of children. 
TABLE 3.8 
INCIDENCE OF SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES, 1984 
Decile (arranged by gross income) 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
% of 1 adult 
with children 
households in 
decile 5.6 10.3 7.5 5.2 2.1 2.2 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.3 
These households are largely to be found in the bottom 
three deciles (Table 3.8) and, as has already been shown, their 
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gross income is low62 with large numbers claiming benefits; 
nearly 40% of Family Income Supplement claimants were one 
parent families in 198463 and the number of one parent benefit 
claimants has risen from 370,000 in 1979/80 to 565,000 in 
1984/85.64 If the trend in increasing numbers of single 
parent families continues, this is likely to cause an increase 
in the numbers receiving low incomes and so lead to greater 
inequality in the distribution of income. It could also 
explain a small part of the greater inequality in income 
distribution seen in the temporal comparison. 
The data on the components of gross income by household 
characteristics for non-retired households (Table 3.9) show a 
decrease in the percentage contributed by wages as the number 
of children increases, this decrease is a result of the actual 
amount received from wages and salaries falling. One parent 
families have the highest level of social security benefits and 
the higher percentage of benefits for 3 and 4 adult households 
suggest the presence of retired or unemployed adult children in 
these households. ' 
To summarise this section it has been seen that household 
size does not seem to be a significant determinant of income in 
itself, although average household size increases with the 
decile. Instead income seems to be more related to household 
composition. Retired adults on state pensions have the lowest 
incomes and single parents are also likely to have low incomes. 
Gross income increases as the number of adults increases and is 
slightly reduced by the presence of children in households with 
three or more adults. Income of couples increases as they go 
from 0 to 2 children, but thereafter decreases. These results 
would tend to suggest that income is more related to the life-
cycle phase and the number of workers in the household than 
household size per se. These possibilities will be explored in 
the following sections. 
3.2 Age of Head of Household 
The age of the head of household is likely to have quite a 
strong bearing on the income of the household if income is 
distributed unevenly over the life-time. The data in Table 
3.10 and Diagram 3.11 suggest that this is the case. 
62. Equivalent income is higher but this is due to under 
estimation of the number of children as there was only assumed 
to be one in each household. Diagram 3.7 shows that over half 
the divorcing couples with children have more than one child. 
If the data is adjusted for this the equivalent income of a 
single parent family is less than that for the man and woman 
with a child. 
63. Monthly Digest of Statistics 
64. Government Expenditure plans CMND 9702. 
2 6 2 . 
DIAGRAM 3 . 7 
Divorcing Couples by Number of Chi ld ren . England & Wales. 
Key 1971 73 75 77 -79 8l S3 85 
LZL 3 or more c h i l d r e n under l 6 
2 or more c h i l d r e n under l 6 
1 ch i ld under l 6 
no c h i l d r e n under ΐ β Source : Soc i a l Trends I987 Table 2 .15 
TABLE 3 . 9 
COMPONENTS OF GROSS INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION, 1 9 8 4 . 
1 a d u l t ( n o n - r e t i r e d ) 
1 adult & children 
man & woman (non-retired) 
man, woman & 1 child 
man, woman & 2 children 
man, woman & 3 children 
2 adults, 4 or more children 
3 adults 
3 adults, 1 or more children 
4 or more adults 
4 or more adults &. children 
% gross income made up by: 
wages & social security 
salaries benefits Other 
6 9 . 9 
3 6 . 2 
7 3 . 3 
7 7 . 8 
7 7 . 8 
6 7 . 7 
5 9 . 3 
7 3 . 7 
7 6 . 5 
7 5 . 3 
7 5 . 4 
9 . 9 
3 7 . 1 
6 . 4 
7 . 4 
7 . 6 
1 2 . 8 
2 3 . 7 
9 . 9 
9 . 0 
7 . 3 
1 2 . 6 
2 0 . 2 
2 6 . 7 
2 2 . 5 
1 4 . 9 
1 4 . 7 
1 9 . 6 
1 7 . 0 
1 6 . 4 
1 4 . 4 
1 7 . 4 
1 2 . 0 
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TABLE 3.10 
INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS BY AGE OF HEAD, 1984. 
Head's age . 
less than 3 0 and 50 and over 
3 0 under 50 under 65 65 All 
% of households 
Index of gross income 
Index of equivalent 
income 
Average number of 
people 
Average number of 
adults 
Average number of 
workers 
Average number over 
Average age 
65 
12.6 
93.2 
95.1 
2.53 
1.77 
1.26 
0.01 
25 
36.6 
126.7 
100.7 
3.51 
2.05 
1.66 
* 0.02 
39 
26.0 
110.1 
113.0 
2.37 
2.14 
1.39 
0.22 
57 
24.9 
53.2 
83.0 
1.62 
1.59 
0.61 
1.33 
73 
7081 
£197.37 
£80.13 
2.62 
1.92 
1.18 
0.40 
51 
Gross income increases from the less than 3 0 age group to 
the 30-50 age group where it peaks and then declines until it 
reaches its lowest level at the over 65 age group. In terms of 
equivalent income, income increases until 65 years of age and 
then falls dramatically. The average number of people and 
average number of workers in each household is the highest in 
the 30-50 age group, which explains the highest gross incomes 
in this group. The 50-65 age group has a smaller household 
size, the highest number of adults but fewer workers than in 
the 30-50 age group. The smaller household size and fewer 
child dependents explains the higher equivalent income of this 
group. 
These figures suggest a definite life-cycle tendency for 
the household. When the head is less than 3 0 there are a 
mixture of single households, married households and married 
households with children. These households have a relatively 
low number of workers, and therefore have lower incomes. These 
lower incomes may also be due to people in career jobs, and 
involved in training in the younger part of this age range 
receiving less than their peak income. Between 3 0 and 50 
household size is largest with high numbers of children; 
however, there is a high average number of workers so household 
income is high. Between 50 and 60 there are less children and 
more adults, but as this group has a lower number of workers 
than the 30-50 age group, some of these households possibly 
include ageing relatives, or non-employed adult children and 
therefore have lower incomes. By the 65 and over age group 
households largely comprise adults only, few of which have 
workers. Therefore most of these households are dependant on 
pensions and thus have the lowest incomes. 
2 6 4 . 
DIAGRAM 3 . 1 1 
Equivalent Disposable Income and Average Size of 
Household by Ap;e of Head of Household, I Q & Î . 
Index of 
equ iva l en t 
income 
Percentage of household! 
in each age group 
Number of 
people 
3­5 120 ­
3.0 no 
2.5 100 · 
2.0 90 ■ 
1.5 80 □ 
income 
size 
percent 
less 
than 30 
30 and 
under 50 
50 and 
under 60 
Age of head of household 
These figures would tend to suggest that there is a life­
cycle tendency in household income, but that this is more 
dependant on the number of available workers, which is 
restricted by the number of old and young dependents to be 
cared for within the household, rather than the age of the head 
per se. It has been found that women in the U.K. are severely 
inhibited from working when their children are under five and, 
even when they are of school age mothers often only work part­
time in order to fit in with school hours. It is not until the 
children are considerably older that women are likely to resume 
full­time work. The main reason for this is attributed to the 
lack of suitable childcare facilities after school hours and 
during school holidays. Unlike some other European countries 
the State provides very little childcare and what is provided 
is often 'special needs' and does not cover normal working 
hours. therefore, the mother has to find someone to look after 
her children in order to be able to work. 
The numbers of dependant children of married couples at 
different stages in the life­cycle is shown in Table 3.12. 
these show that when the head is under 30 families are just 
being formed making it difficult for married women to work, as 
they have young children. In the 30­44 age group the higher 
percentage of larger sized families suggests that in many cases 
family formation has been completed and children are likely to 
be older than those in the under 30 age group. At this stage 
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women may find it easier to return to work, and if they do this 
is likely to then raise household incomes among this age group. 
The 45-64 age group shows reduced dependency and so it should 
be easier for women to work. However, the lower gross incomes 
of these households may reflect women not working due to the 
presence of ageing relatives and the fact that some of these 
heads and their wives will be retired at this stage. When the 
head reaches retirement age household incomes fall considerably 
and this definitely seems to be a life-cycle stage. 
TABLE 3.12 
MARRIED COUPLE FAMILIES BY AGE AND SIZE OF FAMILY 
Percentage with: 
3 or 
Head's age no dependents 1 child 2 children more children 
under 30 40 29 25 6 
30-44 18 24 39 19 
45-64 72 16 9 3 
65 and over 98 2 -
Source: Social Trends 1986 (from GHS 1982-84). 
The distribution of head's age by decile (Table 3.13) 
bears out the tendencies already found; under 30's are found 
in the highest percentages in the middle deciles, heads of 30 
to 50 years of age are found in the highest percentages in the 
top deciles, heads of 50 to 65 are found in all but the bottom 
three deciles in fairly similar numbers and heads over 65 are 
concentrated in the bottom three deciles. Although the age of 
the head of household may be taken as a reasonable guide to 
which part of the income distribution a household may be found 
in, there are reasonable numbers of all ages in all deciles , 
so there are other factors which affect the distribution of 
income and the age of head alone will not suffice to determine 
the decile a household lies in. 
TABLE 3.13 
AGE OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD BY DECILE, 1984. 
Decile (arranged by gross income) 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th All 
Average of head 62.4 59.9 58.6 51.9 48.6 46.5 44.2 44.3 45.4 46.8 50.9 
% heads under 30 9.9 12.3 9.5 14.4 17.1 16.1 16.5 13.3 10.1 6.7 12.6 
% heads 30 - 50 10.9 13.7 19.7 28.9 35.5 41.1 49.7 54.5 57.1 54.5 36.5 
% heads 50 - 65 20.8 19.1 21.4 28.5 27.2 30.2 24.9 25.7 27.5 34.5 26.0 
% heads over 65 58.5 55.0 49.4 28.2 20.2 12.6 9.0 6.5 5.3 4.3 24.9 
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3.3 Labour Market Relationships 
3.3.1 The Number of Workers per Household 
It has already been suggested that the number of workers 
per household will make a significant difference to the income 
of the household. The data in Table 3.14 and Diagram 3.15, 
relating to households with full-time employee heads support 
this. Gross income increases substantially with the number of 
workers in the household, although equivalent income is only a 
little higher for 3 or more worker households than for 2 worker 
households. This suggests that either the third worker does 
not bring in a very high income, which may be due to the third 
worker being an adult child bringing in a small income as 
he/she is in the process of training, or that the households 
with three workers have lower individual incomes than 
individuals in two worker or one worker households. The 
numbers of people, adults and children and the age of head 
relating to the number of workers in the household, tend to 
bear out the hypotheses put forward under the "age of head of 
household' about family structure and household life-cycle. 
TABLE 3.14 
NUMBER OF WORKERS IN HOUSEHOLDS WITH FULL-TIME 
EMPLOYEE HEADS, 1984. 
Number of workers 
% of households 
Index of gross income 
Index of equivalent income 
Average number of people 
Average number of adults 
Average number of children 
Average age of head 
1 
worker 
37.4 
78.1 
88.8 
2.68 
1.71 
0.97 
40 
2 
workers 
47.7 
104.8 
104.8 
3.09 
2.11 
1.46 
41 
3 6 5 
or more 
workers 
14.9 
139.6 
106.9 
4.07 
3.17 
0.90 
48 
All 
employee 
headed 
households 
3303 
£272.79 
£92.32 
3.08 
2.12 
1.19 
42 
The number of workers in the household by decile (Table 
3.16) shows the same trends. As the number of workers in the 
household increased, the likelihood of being in a higher decile 
increases: households with one worker are concentrated in the 
middle deciles, households with two workers in the top half of 
the income distribution and those with three or more workers in 
65 Only 2.6% of all households (5.6% of all employee 
headed households) had more than 3 workers in the 1984 sample. 
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the top two deciles. The average activity ratios102 increase 
with decile showing that an increase in income is directly 
related to the increase in the ratio of the number of workers 
to the number of people in the household. The number of 
workers in a household seems to be a good, although not 
infallible, indicator of the range of the income distribution a 
household is likely to find itself in. 
DIAGRAM 3.15 
Equivalent Disposable Income and Household Characteristics 
by Number of Workers in Households with Full-Time Employee Heads, ÎÇS^ 
Index of 
income 
No. of 
people 
Ape of 
head 
5 120 -
4 110 
3 IOC -
Percentage of 
households 
-100 
50 2 90 ·: 
40 1 80 
30 70 
1 worker 2 workers 3 or more 
workers 
All households 
with full-time 
employee heads 
% Index of equivalent disposable income 
^ Average number of people per household 
HI Average number of adults per household 
Average age of head of household 
II Percentage of households in each group 
1 0 2 Activity Ratio = 
average number of workers per household 
average number of people per household 
in each decile. 
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TABLE 3.16 
NUMBER OF WORKERS IN HOUSEHOLD BY DECILE, 1984 
Decile (arranged by gross income) 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th All 
% households in 
decile with: 
1 worker 8.8 15.4 26.6 50.4 54.9 45.1 35.2 30.6 16.9 15.0 29.3 
2 workers 0.7 2.5 5.5 14.9 24.5 39.6 52.3 52.4 53.6 46.3 29.3 
3 or more workers - - 0.1 0.6 1.8 4.3 5.8 12.7 26.6 36.2 8.8 
Activity ratio 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 
3.3.2 Married Women Working 
Having shown the importance of the number of workers in 
determining household income, married women working should be 
looked at in more detail, as this is the most obvious source of 
a second income earner within the household. As has already 
been seen, the percentage of households with married women 
working in 1984 rises from 1.1% in the first decile to 68.0% in 
the top decile. Overall 34% of households have married women 
working. Therefore, this source of income is very important in 
determining which decile a household will lie it. Table 3.17 
gives further evidence of this. 
TABLE 3.17 
INCOME CONTRIBUTED TO HOUSEHOLD BY MARRIED WOMEN, 1984 
Type of Household 
Ave. weekly % contributed by: 
Index of % of all gross 
income households income (£) Head Wife Others 
All households 100.0 100.0 197.37 71.4 16.7 11.9 
Non-retired households 
with: 
married women working: 
with dependant children 144.1 
without dep. children 151.8 
married women not 
working: 
with dependant children 106.5 
without dep. children 108.4 
16.6 
17.4 
18.0 
13.8 
284.35 
299.58 
210.26 
213.88 
68.8 
58.7 
85.8 
77.4 
24.3 
29.2 
8.0 
6.0 
7.0 
12.1 
6.2 
16.6 
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On average married women contribute less than 30% of 
household income where they are working. The percentage is 
less for married women with children, as they are less able to 
do full-time work due to family commitments. It is interesting 
that the husband contributes less, both proportionately and in 
absolute terms, in households without dependant children. This 
might suggest that couples have children when the husband's 
income is higher and is therefore presumably more able to 
support a family. This would then relate to the life-cycle 
distribution of income as discussed earlier. 
The earlier figures show how married women working helps 
position the household higher up the income distribution and 
Tables 3.18 and 3.19 show women with husband's in the non-
manual, particularly intermediate and junior non-manual, socio-
economic classes are more likely to be working and to be 
working full-time than wives of husbands in the manual socio-
economic groups. Furthermore, the earnings of others in the 
household, who are most likely to be married women, increases 
both absolutely and relatively as' the income of the main earner 
increases. This demonstrates how the inequality observed in 
original incomes is likely to increase with greater labour 
force participation of married women. 
TABLE 3.18 
ECONOMIC STATUS OF WIFE BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
GROUP OF HUSBAND. 1981-82. 
Economic Status of Wife (%) 
Working 
Socio-economic group 
of husband Full-time 
Part-
time Total 
Unem- In-
ployed active 
Professional, employers 
& managers 2 5 
Intermediate non-manual 31 
Junior non-manual 3 2 
Skilled manual & non-prof. 25 
Semi-skilled manual & 
personal services 24 
Unskilled manual 24 
34 
32 
31 
33 
32 
27 
59 
63 
64 
58 
56 
51 
3 
2 
3 
4 
5 
8 
38 
35 
33 
37 
38 
41 
Source: General Household Survey. 
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TABLE 3.19 
CONTRIBUTION OF OTHERS TO HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
BY QUINTILES OF ORIGINAL HOUSEHOLD INCOME, 1984. 
Quintile 
Averages per household Bottom Next Middle Next Top 
£ per annum 20% 20% 20% 20% 20' All 
Earnings: main earner 10 
Earnings: others 
Total original income 110 
Others earnings as % of 
main earner's earnings 0.0 
Others earnings as % of 
total original income 0.0 
1260 5600 
80 600 
2480 7130 
8350 12760 5580 
2140 5700 1700 
11200 19750 8130 
6.3 10.7 25.6 45.0 30.5 
3.2 8.4 19.1 28.9 20.9 
Source: Social Trends 1985 
3.3.3 Employment Status of Head of Household 
It has already been shown how employment and retirement 
affect the household in terms of the part of the income 
distribution it is likely to find itself in, and it is worth 
looking at these again in comparison with other groups. 
% households 
Index of gross 
income 
Average number 
people 
Average number 
adults 
Average number 
workers 
Average number 
over 65 
Average age 
Index of equiva 
income 
HOUSEHOLD 
of 
Of 
Of 
TABLE 3.2 0 
INCOME AND CHARACTERISTICS BY 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF HEAD, 1984. 
Employment 
All 
7266 
£196.09 
2.63 
1.92 
1.19 
0.39 
50 
Lient 
£79.60 
Em-
ployee 
52.6 
132.1 
3.01 
2.07 
1.78 
0.06 
42 
113.4 
Status -
Self-
Emploved 
7.1 
124.0 
3.23 
2.14 
1.84 
0.06 
43 
112.8 
of Head of Household 
Re- Unoccu-
tired 
24.6 
50.0 
1.57 
1.55 
0.14 
1.36 
73 
80.2 
pied 
13.0 
56.6 
2.71 
1.91 
0.35 
0.15 
47 
63.1 
Employi 
of 
Manual 
2.0 
62.8 
3.09 
1.96 
1.49 
0.06 
38 
63.8 
=e out 
i ob 
Non-
manual 
0.6 
111.6 
2.58 
2.04 
1.86 
0.02 
45 
122.1 
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It can immediately be seen from Table 3.20 that self-
employed and employee headed households have very similar 
income and characteristics. This is explained by the large 
number of occupations that are self-employed, and therefore 
cover a wide range of incomes. The importance of having a 
working head of household for both gross and equivalent income 
is clearly visible. The retired have the lowest gross incomes, 
although their equivalent incomes are higher than those of the 
unoccupied and manual employees out of a job. The unoccupied 
group largely consist of the long-term unemployed, as employees 
out of a job only covers those who have been unemployed for 
less than a year (hence the low number in this group) . The 
unoccupied have the lowest level of equivalent income, and 
gross income is only slightly above that of retired households. 
These long-term unemployed and other households in the 
unoccupied group will be largely dependant on supplementary 
benefits, and their extremely low incomes reflects the low 
levels of these benefits. Household size is slightly smaller 
than the size of employed households, average age of head is 
higher and the number not working over 65 in each household is 
higher. This would suggest that the unoccupied come from the 
higher age groups, and it is possible that older workers are 
either more prone to becoming unemployed or that they are more 
likely to suffer long-term unemployment. 
Of the employees out of a job manual workers seem to be 
more prone to short-term unemployment, they also have a larger 
household size and a younger average age than employee headed 
households. The non-manual unemployed have a smaller household 
size and older average age than employed heads. The manual 
unemployed have gross and equivalent incomes slightly above 
those of the unoccupied group. The non-manual unemployed 
appear to have very high gross and equivalent incomes which at 
first glance appears surprising. However, this can be 
accounted for by the fact that "all employees' incomes are 
biased downward because of the inclusion of both manual and 
non-manual workers; if both manual and non-manual employees 
out of a job are taken together the gross earnings index is 
73.3. This is higher than the index for the occupied because 
the unemployed will be getting unemployment benefit rather than 
supplementary benefit. However, the differential between 
manual and non-manual unemployed households incomes is still 
surprising as earnings-related unemployment benefit was 
abolished in 1982. The differential is partly due to 
definition where a 13 week rule is applied, such that a 
household member is considered to have his/her previous income 
from employment if he/she is sampled within 13 weeks of 
becoming unemployed, and possibly due to non-manual unemployed 
receiving more benefits to pay for higher fixed payments such 
as mortgage interest. 
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TABLE 3.21 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD, 1984. 
% households 
where head is: 
employee 
self-employed 
retired 
unoccupied 
Decile (arranged by gross income) 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th All 
6.8 11.3 21.0 43.0 59.6 40.0 76.6 82.9 85.8 83.7 54.1 
1.9 3.7 5.0 11.4 8.2 9.1 9.6 6.9 6.3 11.0 7.3 
66.1 56.3 49.2 27.3 19.3 12.7 8.3 6.4 4.5 2.8 25.3 
25.2 28.8 25.8 18.3 13.0 8.2 5.5 3.9 3.4 2.5 13.4 
% employees/emp-
loyee out of job 4.1 3.8 4.5 4.1 3.8 2.0 1.1 1.5 0.9 1.5 2.7 
Self-employed as 
% of all workers 
in decile 24.2 17.0 10.3 12.6 9.2 6.8 7.3 5.8 6.8 13.5 11.4 
The distribution of income by the employment status of the 
head of household (Table 3.21) shows that employees are 
concentrated in the top half of the distribution and the 
retired, unoccupied and unemployed are all concentrated in the 
bottom four deciles. The self-employed are present in 
reasonable numbers in all deciles except the bottom three, 
suggesting that seif-employment puts households into the same 
area of the income distribution as having an employed head. 
However, if the self-employed are looked at as a percentage of 
all workers in each decile, it can be seen that seif-employment 
is a major form of work in the bottom half of the distribution 
and the top decile. The apparent low pay of the self-employed 
is partly due to a change in definition,6^ which caused most 
people doing a small job on a part-time basis to be classified 
as self-employed, and may also be a reflection of some of the 
lower paid, less protected jobs being changed from employment 
to seif-employment during the recession to avoid overhead 
costs.68 
In summary, an employed head of household is the 
employment status most likely to put a household in the top 
half of the income distribution. However, over one third of 
the households in the bottom half have working heads. 
67 See Appendix 3 
6 8. It is also possible that this observation could be 
partly due to the non-response bias of high income earners and 
the self-employed and the understatement of seif-employment 
income, see Appendix 1 and Introduction. 
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Conversely, only 12% of the households in the top half of the 
distribution have retired or unoccupied heads. Therefore, 
having a retired or unoccupied head is more likely to place the 
household in the bottom half of the distribution than having a 
working head is to put it in the top half. 
3.3.4 Unemployment 
Some of the effects of unemployment have already been 
considered. However, due to its importance in the temporal 
comparisons of income and the tendency to situate the household 
at the bottom end of the distribution, some aspects of the 
nature and incidence of unemployment will be considered. 
TABLE 3.22 
ANALYSIS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BY DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT - G.B. 
(Males, Thousands) 
Percentage whose duration of 
unemployment has been 
Year 
1973 
1979 
1984 
Source: 
Total 
Unemployed 
499.4 
930.8 
2110.8 
: Monthly Dig 
less than 
2 weeks 2-8 wee 
13.5 19.7 
8.5 19.6 
5.6 11.5 
est of Statistics. 
ks 
more than 
8 weeks 
67.9 
71.9 
82.9 
Table 3.22 shows that the average duration of unemployment 
has increased quite considerably over the period so that there 
has not only been a tremendous increase in the number of 
unemployed but also in the number of long-term unemployed. 
This is further supported by the large numbers of unemployed 
claiming only supplementary benefit (Table 3.23). 
SOCIAL 
Percentage of 
unemployment 
benefit only 
1976 30.0 
1981 28.2 
1984 20.8 
Source: Soc 
TABLE 3.2 3 
SECURITY BENEFITS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED. 
1984, G.B. (MALES) 
unemployed receiving: 
unemployment & supplementary 
supplementary benefit only 
10.9 42.4 
11.4 46.0 
9.3 60.1 
ial Trends 1987. 
no 
benefit 
16.6 
14.4 
9.7 
total 
unemployed 
1076 
1944 
2117 
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Young and coloured males are most likely to experience 
some unemployment (Table 3.24). By socio-economic group manual 
workers are more likely to experience unemployment than non-
manual workers, and of the manual workers the semi-skilled and 
unskilled have the highest rates. Therefore, those with the 
higher paid more secure jobs are much less likely to experience 
unemployment, and the brunt of unemployment will fall on the 
lower paid workers, reducing their incomes further and so 
increasing the inequality of income distribution. 
TABLE 3.2 4 
MALE UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS 
BY AGE, COLOUR AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP, 1984, G.B. 
Percent with 
no spells of 1 spell of 2 or more spells sample 
unemployment unemployment of unemployment size 
Males aged: 
18 - 24 
25 - 39 
40 - 59 
60 - 64 
All males 
Colour: 
white 
coloured 
Socio-economic group: 
Professional/ 
employers/managers 
Intermediate/j unior 
non-manual 
All non-manual 
Skilled manual 
Semi-skilled/ 
unskilled manual 
All manual 
70 
84 
88 
91 
84 
84 
73 
94 
88 
92 
83 
71 
79 
25 
14 
11 
9 
14 
14 
25 
6 
11 
8 
15 
24 
18 
5 
2 
1 
-
2 
2 
1 
-
1 
1 
2 
4 
3 
1091 
2555 
2631 
654 
6931 
6316 
292 
1656 
1169 
2825 
2663 
1398 
4061 
Source: General Household Survey 1984 
3.4 Socio-economic Class of Head 
The importance of having an employed head of household in 
positioning the household in the income distribution has been 
seen, but this may be more closely classified by looking at the 
socio-economic class of the head, due to the existence of pay 
differentials between occupations. 
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In this section the importance of educational 
qualifications in determining the socio-economic class of 
males69 and their earnings will also be considered, as will 
the inter-generational transmission of socio-economic class and 
educational attainment between fathers and sons. If there is 
evidence of this inter-generational transmission any 
determination of the income distribution by socio-economic 
class is likely to remain stable over time, and different 
generations of the same family are likely to lie in the same 
part of the distribution. 
3.4.1 Socio-economic class of Head of 
Household 
The socio-economic class of head and its relationship to 
household income and household characteristics are shown in 
Table 3.25 and Diagram 3.26. There is a large variation in 
gross household income by socio-economic class of head with the 
gross income of the highest, group, administrative and 
managerial workers, being over twice that of the lowest, 
unskilled manual workers. The index of equivalent income shows 
exactly the same trends and ordering by socio-economic class as 
the gross income index, although the range is slightly 
narrower, the highest being just under two times the lowest. 
Therefore, it would seem that the tax system does little to 
reduce the differentials in gross income. This is particularly 
true in 1984 when the tax laws of the Thatcher government have 
benefitted the better off as, although the standard rate of tax 
has been reduced, the effective tax rate has risen, which has 
particularly affected the disposable income of low income 
families.70 A widening of the earnings distribution can be 
seen by comparing the indices of gross income and equivalent 
income for 1979 and 1984 (Table 3.27). This supports the view 
that the recession has lengthened the low income tail of the 
earnings distribution.71 The widening differentials between 
manual and non-manual workers is shown by the increase in the 
median male full-time workers income between 1981 and 1984; 
manual workers median income increased by 28.1% and non-manual 
workers income by 29.7%.72 
69. Males only are considered as it can be assumed that 
most heads are males, see Appendix 2. No information about the 
sex of head is available so the effect this might have on where 
the household finds itself in the income distribution is not 
discussed. 
70. Rubery, Tarling & Wilkinson (1983). 
71. Ibid. 
7 2. Social Trends 1986. The distribution also widened as 
the range between the highest and lowest decile as a percentage 
of the median between 1981 and 1986 increased from 85% to 88% 
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The average size of household is above average only in the 
administrative and managerial and skilled manual worker 
categories, caused by both higher numbers of children and 
adults. However, the range of household sizes is fairly small 
and the size of household seems to have little correlation with 
the socio-economic class of the head. The average number of 
workers per household will have an effect on gross income 
however. The administrative and managerial, skilled and semi-
skilled manual workers have higher numbers of workers per 
household. As these come from various parts of the earnings 
distribution there is no real evidence to suggest that there 
are more workers specifically in higher or lower classes, thus 
causing the differentials observed. These differentials do 
seem to be largely due to the pay differentials between the 
heads of households, although it must be borne in mind that 
wives are likely to contribute more, both absolutely and 
relatively, as husband's income increases, therefore widening 
these differentials. 
The average age of head differs slightly across the 
classes. These age differences may mean that the observed 
distribution of income between socio-economic classes may be 
slightly understated as different socio-economic groups have 
different earnings profiles. Male full-time manual worker's 
earnings peak between the age of 30 and 50 and decline slightly 
afterwards. Male non-manual earnings peak between 40 and 49 
and are only about three-quarters of this between the ages of 
25 and 29. 7-* From the age distribution of the categories it 
would seem that most of the manual workers have reached their 
peak earnings, whereas the non-manual categories have an 
average age which is only just reaching the peak of their 
earnings power. Therefore, the incomes here underestimate the 
differentials due to socio-economic category which would be 
observed if only workers on peak earnings were considered. The 
life-time incomes of the various groups are also likely to 
differ due to other factors, such as the chances of promotion 
and the ease of accumulation of assets.74 It has been found 
that few manual workers have the possibility of promotion to a 
non-manual occupation and there are limited opportunities for 
promotion for clerical workers, whereas increasingly 
opportunities for promotion are available for technically 
qualified men.7^ Thus the chances for increasing income are 
highest for the highly qualified non-manual workers and, 
therefore, taken over a life-time the differences in incomes of 
for manual and from 110% to 114% for male non-manual workers. 
7 3. Rubery, Tarling and Wilkinson (1983). 
7 4. Runciman in Wedderburn (1974) considers non-manual 
workers find it easier to accumulate assets and so increase 
income and wealth than manual workers. 
7 5. Wedderburn & Craig in Wedderburn (1974). 
Table 3.25 
Income ani Household Characte 
fv households 
Index of g r o s s income 
Index of e q u i v a l e n t income 
Arerag-ï number of people 
Aveiage number of a : lu l t s 
Average number of c h i l d r e n 
Average number of workers 
Average age of head 
All 
.Employées 
100.0 
inn. o 
100.0 
"3.01 
2.07 
0.94 
1.78 
4? 
P r o f e s s i o n a l 
Sc Technica l 
13 .9 
125.0 
121.5 
2.06 
2 .00 
0.06 
1.60 
41 
r i : s t i e s by Gocic 
Admin i s t r a t ive 
à Managerial 
14 .6 
133.9 
I3O.3 
3.17 
2 .15 
•1.02 
I . 8 7 
44 
»-Economic 
Teacher 
4 . 6 
120.9 
119.4 
2.82 
1.93 
O.89 
I . 6 7 
42 
C l a s s of 
C l e r i c a l 
9 .9 
87 .9 
80 .5 
2.4Q 
I .O3 
0 .66 
1.66 
41 
Head, 1904. 
Manual 
Sk i l l ed oemi-Ski l led 
34 .1 
91 .2 
92 .5 
3-27 
2 . I 6 
1.11 
1.84 
'H 
I 5 . 2 
79 .2 
81.6 
2 . 9 I 
2 .09 
O.82 
1.81 
'»5 
Unskil led 
5-2 
65 .9 
64 .9 
2 .75 
1.99 
O.76 
1.66 
48 
Table 3-27 Indices of Income, 1979 and 1984. 
Index of g r o s s income 
1979 
I9Q4 
Index of e q u i v a l e n t income 
1979 
I9O4 
P r o f e s s i 
Sc Tfichni 
119.7 
I25.O 
118.8 
I 2 I . 5 
onal 
c a l 
AH 
& 
I m i n i s t r a t i v e 
Managerial 
I 3 0 . 3 
133.9 
I29.O 
I3O.3 
Teacher 
I I 5 . 7 
I2O.9 
I I 5 . I 
I I 9 . 4 
C l é r i c a l 
87 .5 
87.9 
88 .5 
88 .5 
Manual 
Sk i l l ed 
06 .6 
91 ¡2 
96 .2 
92 . 5 
Se m i - s k i l l e d 
85 .4 
79 .2 
86 .2 
81 .6 
Unskil led 
73-5 
65 .9 
76 .3 
69.4 
Diagram 3.26 
Gross Income and Size of Household by Socio-economic Category of Head of Household, 1984. 
Index of 
income 
Number 
of 
people ^ 0 _ 
3-5 120 
3.0 110 
2.5 100 
2.0 90 
1.5 80 
1.0 70 
0.5 60 
Professional 
and technical 
Administrative 
and managerial 
Teacher 
Clerical 
Manual 
skilled 
Manual 
unskilled 
Manual 
semi-skilled 
All 
enployees 
Percentage of 
households with 
heads in each 
socio-economic 
category 
Π 
incoine 
size 
percent 
to 
00 
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manual and non-manual workers will be greater than those seen 
here. 
The age dispersion also suggests a tendency for the young 
in manual occupations to forego setting up home on their own 
till an older age than those in non-manual occupations. The 
higher number of adults and workers in certain groups may also 
be explained by these being the types of occupations where 
adult children are likely to live at home while training.76 
TABLE 3.28 
i 
Professional 
& Technical 
Administrative 
& Managerial 
Teacher 
Clerical 
Shop Assistant 
Manual: 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled 
Unskilled 
H.M. Forces 
30CI0-
1st 
3.6 
4.0 
2.0 
5.6 
-
42.9 
32.5 
7.5 
2.0 
ECONOMIC STATUS 
OF 
2nd 
6.0 
3.5 
-
10.4 
7.9 
21.8 
25.1 
25.3 
— 
EMPLOYEES 
OF HEAD AS A PERCENTAGE 
IN DECILE, 
Decile farrancf« 
3rd 
6.3 
4.8 
-
13.2 
7.1 
22.1 
28.3 
18.2 
— 
1 
4th 
6.2 
2.6 
1.7 
18.2 
2.5 
34.2 
23.7 
10.7 
0.3 
ι 
5th 
7.7 
6.4 
2.8 
10.8 
2.2 
40.8 
21.1 
7.5 
0.6 
=d bv 
6th 
10.3 
9.4 
2.9 
9.1 
0.8 
41.8 
19.2 
5.6 
1.1 
1984 
qross income) 
7th 
10.7 
11.8 
4.2 
10.3 
0.7 
41.0 
16.5 
3.8 
1.1 
8th 
15.2 
14.7 
5.3 
9.9 
1.0 
38.6 
12.0 
2.6 
0.9 
9th : 
17.4 
21.2 
7.0 
8.8 
. 0.6 
31.8 
8.9 
2.0 
2.3 
10th All 
27.0 
31.5 
7.8 
6.0 
0.6 
18.6 
5.9 
1.3 
1.3 
13 
14, 
4, 
9. 
1. 
34. 
15. 
5. 
1. 
.9 
.6 
.6 
.9 
.4 
, 1 
2 
2 
1 
The effect of the socio-economic class of the head in 
determining the position of the household in the income 
distribution is shown in Table 3.28. It can be seen that 
professional and technical and administrative and managerial 
workers are more likely to be in the top half of the 
distribution and they constitute nearly 60% of all employees in 
the top decile. Teachers are concentrated in the top four 
deciles and clerical workers are reasonably evenly spread 
through the middle eight deciles. Skilled manual workers are 
fairly evenly concentrated in all but the top decile, their 
presence in the lowest deciles is likely to be due to training 
and apprenticeships before workers have reached their peak 
wages. Semi-skilled manual workers are largely found in the 
bottom half of the distribution as are unskilled manual 
workers. 
76 On the assumption that male children often follow 
the same occupation as the father. 
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TABLE 3.29 
DISTRIBUTION BETWEEN MANUAL AND NON-MANUAL WORKERS. 1984. 
Decile (arranged by gross income) 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
Professional, techni-
cal, administrative, 
managerial & teachers 9.5 9.5 11.0 10.5 16.9 39.5 26.6 35.2 45.5 66.3 
All manual workers 82.9 72.2 68.6 68.6 69.4 66.5 62.4 53.1 42.7 25.8 
The distribution between manual and non-manual workers is 
more easily seen in Table 3.29. This shows that non-manual 
workers are more likely to be found in the top deciles and 
manual workers in the first seven deciles. However, manual 
workers form over half the workers in the 8th decile and over a 
quarter in the top decile. therefore, knowing that the head of 
household is a manual worker will not necessarily place the 
household in the middle and lower ranges of the income 
distribution. Even so, there does seem to be a fairly strong 
link between socio-economic status of head of household and the 
size of household income. 
3.4.2 Education and Socio-Economie Class77 
In the context of socio-economic class and household 
income it is also interesting to look at the effect of 
education on both class and income. Table 3.30 shows that the 
type of educational establishment last attended full-time has 
quite a significant bearing on social class of males. The 
manual and junior non-manual have very high percentages who 
have only been to school. However, the majority of employers 
and managers and intermediate non-manual also have over half 
whose last educational establishment attended was school. Only 
the professional class have over half who had any form of 
further education. However, it must be remembered that this is 
a sample of males of all age ranges and the educational 
qualifications required for many of the higher non-manual jobs 
have increased quite dramatically in recent years. There also 
seems to be quite a high correlation between highest 
qualification obtained and socio-economic class. 
77. The information for this comes from the General 
Household Survey. Data for this is only available for 1983. 
The sample covers economically active males aged 25-69 not in 
full-time education. 
Table 3-30 
Socio-Economie Group by Educational Establishment last attended full-time 
and by Highest Qualification Obtained. G.B. I983. Males. 
Educational establishment: 
School 
Polytechnic, college 
University 
Highest qualification: 
Degree 
Higher education (below degree) 
CCE 'A' level 
CCE ' 0 ' level & CSE Grade 1 
CSE other grades 
Foreign or other 
None 
Table 3-32 
Professi 
32 
30 
30 
68 
O 22 
4 
2 
0 
2 
1 
onal 
Employers 
Managers 
77 
15 
0 
13 
17 
11 
10 
9 
5 
26 
4 Intermediate 
Non-manual 
57 
29 
14 
26 
24 
12 
13 
5 
4 
16 
Junior 
Non-manual 
Oo 
16 
4 
4 
11 
13 
25 
10 
4 
33 
Manual 
Skilled 
93 
6 
1 
5 
7 
12 
20 
3 
- 33 
Semi-skilled 
94 
5· 
1 
2 
4 
7 
10 
4 
74 
Unskilled 
98 
2 
_ 
1 
5 
7 
2 
06 
All 
a? 
12 
6 
10 
10 
0 
1? 
13 
4 
44 
Source : General Household Survey, I983 
Educational Level of Son by Socioeconomic Group of Father, 1983. 
Highest Qualification 
obtained by son: 
Degree 
Higher education 
CCE *A' level 
CCE '0' level 
CSS 
Foreign or other 
None 
Professional 
42 
16 
14 
16 
2 
3 
6 
Employers 
Manager!?. 
22 
14 
12 
10 
7 
6 
22 
<t Intermediate 
Non-manual 
29 
37 
10 
10 
6 
4 
16 
Junior 
Non-manual 
17 
14 
14 
10 
0 
5 
25 
Manual 
Skilled 
6 
12 
9 
15 
12 
3 43 
Semi -skilled 
5 
9 
0 
11 
13 
2 
52 
Unskilled 
/l 
6 
7 
12 
13 2 
57 
Total 
11 
12 
10 
15 
11 
3 
39 
CO 
Source : General Household Survey, I983 
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TABLE 3.31 
HIGHEST QUALIFICATION LEVEL ATTAINED 
BY GROSS WEEKLY EARNINGS 1983. 
MALES. G.B.7^-
Qualification Level 
% with earnings of: 
Under 7 0.00 
70.01-80.00 
80.01-90.00 
90.01-100.00 
100.01-120.00 
120.01-140.00 
140.01-160.00 
160.01-180.00 
180.01-200.00 
100.01 and over 
Below GCE'A' GCE'01 
Degree Degree level level CSE None Total 
1 
1 
0 
2 
6 
5 
8 
8 
11 
Γ581 
2 
1 
1 
2 
8 
11 
14 
1122 
11 
37 
2 
3 
3 
7 
14 
16 
L15J 
12 
8 
20 
3 
3 
4 
6 
15 
18 
r is i 
10 
7 
18 
3 
4 
6 
9 
18 
r i s i 
16 
9 
6 
11 
7 
4 
6 
9 
18 
f191 15 
8 
5 
9 
4 
3 
4 
7 
15 
15 
Γ151 
10 
7 
20 
Source: General Household Survey, 1983. 
The highest qualification obtained also seems to have a 
significant effect on the range of the earnings distribution 
males find themselves in (Table 3.31). As can be seen, the 
median earnings (in boxes) increase as educational 
qualifications increase and the dispersion around the median is 
fairly narrow. The level of highest qualification appears to 
be a better indicator of the level of weekly earnings than of 
socio-economic class, although all three do seem to be related. 
3.4.3 Education Level by Socio-Economie 
Group of Father 
Given the importance of educational attainment in 
determining the level of earnings for an individual it is also 
interesting to see whether the educational attainment has any 
inter-generational influences within the family, that is, 
whether the educational attainments of the father will 
determine the male child's educational attainment and, 
therefore, his earnings level. If this is the case it is then 
difficult for a person born into a certain socio-economic class 
to rise into classes above, and also it predicts a certain 
stability in the income distribution over time, ceteris 
78 Covers males aged 20-69 in full time employment, 
Median groups in boxes, 
283 
paribus. Unfortunately data on educational attainments of 
fathers and sons is not available and the nearest available is 
educational attainment of son by socio-economic class of father 
(Table 3.32). This is an imperfect proxy but it may give some 
clues as to the inter-generational stability of the income 
distribution if it were to be determined solely by the 
differential incomes received due to educational attainment and 
socio-economic class and the possibility of inter-generational 
household mobility within the income distribution. 
Table 3.32 shows that 60% of the sons of professional 
fathers have higher education and between 3 0 and 47% of other 
sons with non-manual fathers have higher education or above. 
On the other hand, of those with manual fathers between 10 and 
18% have degrees or other qualifications from higher education. 
Conversely, around 50% of sons with manual fathers have no 
qualifications, compared to around 20% of sons with non-manual 
fathers. The numbers who finished education with GCE '0' or 
'A' levels are fairly similar for all socio-economic classes of 
father. As higher qualification levels on the whole lead to 
higher income, it does seem that to quite a large extent the 
socio-economic category of the father and his earnings level 
will have a considerable influence on the educational level of 
the son and his earnings level. However, these are not fool-
proof indicators and there is some evidence of inter-
generational changes in socio-economic status. But it seems 
there is likely to be considerable inter-generational 
inequality in the distribution of income transmitted through 
the educational system and related to the earnings 
differentials of men, and consequently to household income. 
3.5 Geographical Location of Household 
In some countries it was suggested that the location of 
the household may be an important factor in the household 
distribution of income. 
Diagram 3.33 and Table 3.34 show that there are some 
differences between areas, the main differences being in 
household gross income. The gross income in London is likely 
to be higher, due to London weightings given for living in 
London, and the likelihood that proportionally more people are 
involved in non-manual and professional jobs than in the rest 
of the country. The smaller size of household and fewer 
numbers of adults and workers suggests there are more single 
people, or people working in London when younger, and then 
moving further out as they get older and are thinking of 
starting families. The average head of head is slightly lower 
than for the whole country which supports this idea to some 
extent. 
The low income of Metropolitan and Clydeside areas may be 
explained by the greater unemployment in these areas, and a 
disproportional amount of manual workers. The lower average 
number of workers per household despite an average number of 
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people and adults per household suggests that unemployment is 
certainly a large factor in the explanation of lower gross 
income. High population density and low population density 
non-metropolitan areas have similar incomes and household 
characteristics, the only difference being the slightly higher 
numbers of retired in the low population density areas. 
Therefore it seems there are no major differences in 
household characteristics by location except for Greater London 
which has been discussed. The main regional difference is the 
size of income. This seems likely to be due to varying 
employment opportunities and the possible concentration of 
manual occupations in the Metropolitan areas and non-manual 
occupations in Greater London. Table 3.35 can be used to 
verify this. The classifications here are not exactly the same 
as those given before, but they are a fairly reasonable 
approximation. 
DIAGRAM 3.3 3 
Gross Income by Area, 198^. 
Index of 
gross income 
Percentage of 
households in 
each area 
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Greater 
London . 
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TABLE 3.34 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND CHARACTERISTICS BY AREA 1984 
Greater Metropolitan Non-metropolitan 
% Households in each area 
Index of gross income 
Average number of people 
Average number of adults 
Average number of workers 
Average number over 65 
(not working) 
Average age of head 
London 
10.4 
117.2 
2.39 
1.85 
1.17 
0.39 
50 
& Clvdeside 
23.4 
87.5 
2.60 
2.92 
1.07 
0.42 
51 
High pop. 
21.5 
103.2 
2.66 
1.92 
1.24 
0.37 
50 
Low pop. 
44.7 
101.0 
2.70 
1.94 
1.21 
0.41 
51 
All 
7126 
£197.3' 
2.6: 
1.9: 
1.11 
0.4( 
51 
TABLE 3.3 5 
LABOUR MARKET RELATIONSHIP OF HEAD BY REGION 1984. 
North Yorks, East & 
Greater Humberside, West All 
London North West Midlands U.K. 
employee heads who are: 
Professional, technical, 
admin. & managerial 
Non-manual 
Manual 
39 
59 
40, 
22 
35 
60, 
26.9 
38.3 
58.1 
29 
45, 
53. 
% unoccupied heads 11.0 
% heads who are employees 
out of a job 2.7 
15.8 
3.6 
12.8 
3.4 
12.9 
3.1 
Table 3.35 shows clearly that there are regional 
differences in the employment opportunities in different areas. 
The North and Midlands have higher than average numbers of 
unemployed and unoccupied and also a larger percentage of 
manual workers. Greater London has fewer unemployed than the 
national average, and a much higher concentration of non-manual 
jobs and large numbers of people employed in the higher non-
manual socio-economic categories. These factors would then 
seem to explain the regional differences in household income. 
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TABLE 3.3 6 
PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS IN DECILE IN AREA. 1984. 
Decile (arranged by gross income) 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th All 
Greater London 10.3 9.4 9.1 9.9 8.6 8.0 8.0 11.1 12.4 17.4 10.4 
Metropolitan & 
Clydeside 31.5 28.0 26.0 23.1 24.2 22.0 22.5 21.0 20.5 15.6 23.4 
Non-Metropolitan: 
high population 
density 22.2 22.1 18.8 20.9 20.1 22.5 19.0 22.7 21.5 24.7 21.5 
low population 
density 36.0 40.4 46.1 46.1 47.2 47.5 50.6 45.3 45.6 42.3 44.7 
The distribution of households in each area by decile 
shows no really dominant effects although, as expected, Greater 
London has a high percentage of people in the top deciles and 
Metropolitan districts have higher percentages in the bottom 
deciles. The distribution of non-Metropolitan households is 
fairly even across deciles. It would, therefore, seem that 
knowing in which area a household is located will do little to 
position it in the income distribution unless further 
characteristics of the household are known. 
3 . 6 Racial Factors 
It is possible that racial factors, that is ethnic origin, 
may have some bearing on the income level a household finds 
itself at. Whilst this may well be true, information on ethnic 
origin is not collected with the data on household income and 
characteristics. The information that is available is confused 
as some is classified by country of birth, which is not useful 
when looking at ethnic minorities as many were born in Britain. 
The information that is available classified by ethnic origin 
is the relative percentages that are economically active and 
unemployed. 
287 
TABLE 3.37 
ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE POPULATION OF WORKING AGE 
BY ETHNIC ORIGIN. 1984. G.B. MALES. 
Number Activity Unemployment 
Ethnic Origin (000"s) Rate (%) Rate (%) 
White 16281 88.2 9.8 
West Indian or Guyanese 178 84.7 24.2 
Indian/Pakistani/Bangladeshi 409 82.6 16.3 
Other79 212 69.2 12.1 
All 17327 87.7 10.1 
Source: Social Trends 1987. 
\ 
Table 3.37 shows that there are less economically active 
males amongst the ethnic minority groups, and among those 
economically active there are a higher percentage unemployed. 
As employment status relates strongly to income it would be 
expected that these ethnic minority groups would be 
disproportionately over-represented in the lower part of the 
income distribution. The largest group, Indian, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi males are likely to suffer the most unemployment 
and, therefore, be most highly represented amongst the lower 
income groups. However, this is all based on high unemployment 
and says nothing about the distribution under normal 
conditions, although other research suggests that coloured 
workers tend to have low paid and often unskilled jobs, 
therefore they would still be expected to be found in the lower 
parts of the income distribution. 
3.7 Summary 
Having examined various factors which may predispose 
households to be in a certain part of the income distribution, 
it appears there are a few which exert a definite influence. 
These are employment status of the head, the number of workers 
in the household and the life-cycle phase, which is connected 
to the first two. The head's socio-economic status and 
educational attainment appears to exert some influence too. 
If a family has a large number of employed adults in the 
higher socio-economic groups it is likely to be found in the 
top deciles. A high socio-economic status of the head of 
79. Includes African, Arab, Chinese, other stated and 
mixed. 
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household on its own has been seen not to guarantee this, and 
the number of workers in the household appears to be related to 
the life-cycle phase of the household, such that younger 
households have lower incomes and fewer workers which both 
increase with age to a peak around when the head is 50 years of 
age. Therefore, any household is likely to find itself in 
different parts of the income distribution throughout its life. 
This is particularly emphasised by the low incomes received by 
pensioners, although being in a higher socio-economic group 
during working years is likely to make the income received when 
retired higher than is the case for other socio-economic 
groups. The pensioners that have the lowest incomes are those 
mainly dependant on state benefits. 
If households at the same stage in the life-cycle, with 
the same household characteristics, i.e. numbers and ages of 
adults, children and workers, are considered, their income 
distribution will largely be determined by the socio-economic 
class of the head of household. If only employed households 
are considered it is likely that their position within the 
income distribution is determined by the number of workers, 
which is, in turn, related to the life-cycle phase, and, to 
some extent, by the socio-economic class of the head. 
For other households the lack of a working head tends to 
put the household lower down the income distribution with 
single parent families, the unoccupied, the unemployed and the 
retired mainly dependant on state pensions at the bottom. It 
is also likely that ethnic minorities will be 
disproportionately represented here due to their high rates of 
unemployment. 
The location of the household in the North or the South of 
the country does appear to have some influence on the position 
of the household in the income distribution. However, this is 
not due to different wages being paid for the same jobs or any 
differences in family characteristics, instead the differences 
would appear to be due to the availability and type of 
employment in the area, with the possibility of a high 
concentration of low paying industries in the North. 
Of those that are employed it would seem the position of 
the household in the income distribution is, to some extent, 
inter-generationally transferred, due to some correlation 
between father's and son's socio-economic status. This would 
be at its most apparent if peak incomes were compared, however, 
at a point in time, the effects of this may be mitigated by the 
life-cycle influences on the position of the household in the 
income distribution. However, the possibility of social status 
being an inter-generational phenomenon is widely accepted, and 
other research has concluded that "structures of inequality of 
both condition and opportunity .... are inherently resistant to 
change. The members of the higher strata have the motivation 
and, in general, the resources to hold onto their position and 
to transmit it to their children while the members of the lower 
strata are often caught up in vicious circles of 
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deprivation."8 ° 
Some of the factors that are likely to cause households to 
be in the bottom part of the income distribution have already 
been briefly mentioned. More information on this can be gained 
from looking at some of the recent studies on poverty. 
Van Slooten and Coverdale (1977) looked at low income 
households, defined as the lowest quintile of the distribution 
of equivalent normal disposable income, using 1975 FES data. 
All these households had equivalent incomes at or below the 
supplementary benefit level plus 20%. They found 55% of these 
households were pensioner households, and the second largest 
group were two parent families typically headed by a man in 
work. However, the prevalence of low income was highest for 
pensioner households, one parent families and the long-term 
unemployed, although these last two groups did not feature very 
highly in the sample in terms of numbers. Of those households 
with employed heads the prevalence of low income was highest 
for unskilled manual workers and lowest for households headed 
by professional and technical workers, and higher for those 
households with only one worker, in comparison to those with 
two or more workers. The prevalence of low income was also 
considerably higher in the North than in the South of the 
country. 
A more recent comparison of the lowest quintile of 
households by equivalent income for 1971 and 1984 (Social 
Trends 1987) shows that whereas in 1971 over half these 
households were pensioner households, in 1984 pensioner 
households made up only one quarter of the total. The number 
of single parent families increased slightly, and the 
percentage of working age couples with children and single 
people of working age increased dramatically. This shift in 
the composition of the lowest quintile reflects the increase in 
unemployment over the period. 
Table 3.38 shows the increase in numbers of low income 
families, where low income is defined as being on supplementary 
benefit or having income within 20% of the supplementary 
benefit level. Between 1979 and 1983 there have been dramatic 
increases in the numbers both on supplementary benefit and 
within 20% of this level. Most of this increase has been due 
to the increase in the numbers of long-term unemployed, 
although there are also more families with working heads who 
are below the supplementary benefit level. Pensioners have not 
fared so badly and the numbers on supplementary benefit have 
decreased slightly. 
80 Goldthorpe in Wedderburn (ed) (1974) p.218, 
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TABLE 3.3 8 
LOW INCOME FAMILIES G.B. 
(Thousands) 
Full-time other 
work or Unemployed under over 
self- more than pension pension 
Total employment 3 months age age 
1979 
On supplementary benefit 
Not on supplementary 
benefit with income: 
2590 380 360 1680 
Below SB level 
Above but within 20% 
of SB level 
1400 
1590 
180 
170 
100 
60 
220 
70 
850 
1230 
1983 
On supplementary benefit 
Not on supplementary 
benefit with income: 
3640 1290 580 1600 
Below SB level 1880 
Above but within 20% 
of SB level 2000 
290 
350 
370 
210 
300 
160 
870 
1220 
Source: Social Trends 1987 (DHSS) 
TABLE 3.39 
POVERTY AMONGST ADULTS BY AREA. 1983. 
London 
Rest of South 
Northern Conurbations 
Rest of North 
All 
Not in 
poverty 
14 
37 
31 
18 
100 
All in 
poverty 
13 
20 
40 
27 
100 
Sinking 
deeper 
11 
16 
45 
27 
100 
In intense 
poverty 
11 
10 
65 
14 
100 
Source: Mack and Lansley (1985) Table 6.8 
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A recent large study on relative poverty81 (Mack & 
Lansley, 1985) shows that there were 7.7 million people in 
Britain in 1983 who could not afford three or more necessities, 
i.e. were in poverty. By looking at the net equivalent income 
distribution they found the vulnerability to deprivation to 
extend through the bottom 30-40% of the distribution, and 
families with children were the worst off. Unemployment was 
found to be a very strong factor in causing poverty, two-thirds 
of the households that were found to be in intense poverty had 
unemployed heads. 
The significance of old age as a cause of poverty was 
found to have declined in the post-war years, while the 
recession and unemployment have caused other groups to 
constitute the majority of those found in poverty. Over two-
thirds of those in poverty were found to live in the North of 
the country, while under half of the comfortably off live in 
these areas, and the impact of the recession in Northern cities 
is shown by the high concentration of those in intense poverty 
(Table 3-39). * 
The results then back up the previous findings of causes 
of people being in the lower part of the income distribution. 
Long-term unemployment is one of the main causes of households 
being found in the lowest deciles and single parent families 
and unskilled manual workers also have large chances of being 
found in these deciles. Pensioners are less highly represented 
here than they have been previously, although those on state 
pensions have very low incomes. 
Overall then it seems that there are strong factors which 
predispose households to be in certain parts of the income 
distribution, and these are particularly evident when looking 
at the factors which predispose a household to be in the lowest 
parts; being retired on a state pension, long-term unemployed, 
or a single parent family are often sufficient to place the 
household in this part. However, for the other parts of the 
distribution, examination of various contributing factors by 
deciles reveals that knowledge of any one aspect of the 
household; size of household, age, employment status or socio-
economic class of the head; is not sufficient to locate a 
household within any particular decile or quintile. Instead it 
seems that various factors either combine or inhibit one 
another to determine where the household will lie, and it is 
only specific combinations of these factors that will result in 
households being located in a certain part of the income 
distribution 
81. A cross-section of the population was asked which of 
a list of items they considered necessities and a surprising 
amount of consensus was found. Households were then asked if 
they had, or could afford, the items defined as necessities, 
and if they lacked three or more of these they were defined as 
suffering from relative poverty. If they lacked six or more 
they were defined as being in intense poverty. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
In the introduction it was suggested that changes in 
demographic factors; such as the age distribution of the 
population or the size and composition of households; economic 
factors; such as changes in labour force participation and the 
availability of jobs; and changes in government commitment to 
the welfare state and associated benefits might each 
significantly affect the distribution of income. To the extent 
that any of these affects a particular household, they are 
likely to be instrumental in determining where the household 
lies within the distribution and, of course, when the 
individual households are aggregated, will determine the whole 
distribution. Examination of the changes in these factors in 
conjunction with changes in the composition and overall nature 
of the distribution has revealed the relative importance of 
each one. 
The increasing ageing population in the U.K. in the period 
covered, 1973 to 1984, has been shown to some extent to 
increase the inequality in the distribution as pensioner 
households are likely to have low incomes, so increasing the 
number of low income households. However, this tendency has 
been to some extent offset by the increase in the number of 
pensioner households with occupational pension which are 
considerably higher than those provided by the state. 
Furthermore, any increase in inequality due to the changing age 
structure of the population has been largely overshadowed by 
economic factors to which the increasing inequality in the 
distribution can be largely attributed in recent years. 
It would appear that the most important economic factor in 
the determination of the distribution is the availability of 
jobs. The increasing labour force participation of married 
women has been attributed largely to the increasing employment 
opportunities available to them. This increased participation 
has been shown to increase the inequality in the distribution 
in so far as households with two or more workers have a much 
higher probability of lying in the upper deciles, and as the 
number of these types of households increase, the average 
incomes of the upper deciles will become higher, whilst those 
at the bottom remain unchanged. Conversely, reduced 
availability of jobs, resulting in increasing unemployment in 
the economy will also lead to increased inequality in the 
distribution of income if unemployment benefits are low. This 
results in households suffering from unemployment to be likely 
to move down to the bottom deciles and thus swell the numbers 
on low incomes. 
In the second period studied, 1979 to 1984, it has been 
amply demonstrated that a large percentage of the low income 
households are households with an unemployed head, particularly 
one who is long-term unemployed, which results in unemployment 
benefit being stopped and the household having to survive on 
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supplementary benefit. These households now constitute some of 
the poorest in the U.K., often having incomes below those of 
pensioner households, and thus resulting in many of these 
pensioner households moving from the bottom quintile into the 
second quintile. The importance of job availability in 
determining the household income level and the overall 
distribution is most clearly demonstrated when looking at the 
North/South divide. In the North average household income 
levels are considerably lower, there are higher rates of 
unemployment and the probability of being in the lower deciles 
is much higher than for households in the South. However, 
whilst the regional levels of unemployment have a very strong 
bearing on this divide the importance of the availability of 
jobs, in terms of the types of employment available, and the 
extent to which there are employment opportunities for both men 
and women to work, also affect this regional divide. As has 
already been shown, there is a higher concentration of manual 
work in the North than in the South, and thus the regional 
averages of household income reflect both differential 
unemployment and levels of pay between manual and non-manual 
workers. 
The influence of both the above mentioned factors has, in 
part, been dependant on the levels of state benefits. Low 
levels of benefits and an increasing number of households 
dependant on them will alter the overall distribution of income 
if the incomes of those households not dependant on benefits 
remain unaffected. A government's commitment to maintain or 
reduce benefit levels will have a profound effect on the 
distribution of income in the face of changes in other factors. 
A commitment to maintain benefit levels can have the effect of 
creating stability in the distributions of gross and disposable 
incomes, even when economic and demographic conditions are 
operating to increase inequality, as shown under the Labour 
government of 1974 to 1979. However, reduction of benefit 
levels will allow these other influences to take their toll and 
increase the inequality, as has been seen under the Thatcher 
government, where benefit levels have been very low on average, 
not least because of the abolition of earnings related 
supplements for many short-term benefits. 
The position of the individual household in the 
distribution is also most reliably predicted from knowledge of 
the extent to which any of the above factors affect the 
particular household; if it is a pensioner household dependant 
on state benefits, or a household with an unemployed head, it 
is likely to be found at the lower end of the distribution, 
whereas if it is a household with two or more workers it has a 
high probability of being found at the upper end of the 
distribution. Other factors, such as the socio-economic class 
and life-cycle phase of the head, will also have some, but a 
much lesser, influence on the position of the household in the 
distribution. there is also some suggestion in the data looked 
at that inequality stems not only from the decrease in the 
number of jobs, but also from increasing restricted access to 
employment for particular types of households; for example, 
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those located in the North, those from the ethnic minority 
groups, those without a head with formal qualifications, and 
those headed by single parents. Systematic discrimination in 
access to income increases the importance of inequality in the 
income distribution as it is no longer due to either life-cycle 
factors or to chance economic factors; instead it becomes a 
more permanent and a less transitory condition. 
In conclusion, demographic changes, such as an 
increasingly ageing population, and economic changes, such as 
the increase in unemployment and the changing availability of 
jobs, have the potential to increase inequality in the 
distribution of income; although the effects of the ageing 
population have been far outweighed by the effects of 
increasing unemployment in the period being studied. The 
welfare state and levels of benefit payments can be used to 
offset or even negate this potential increase in inequality, or 
else they can be reduced to levels sufficient only for a 
minimum standard of living, and so let the economic factors be 
the dominant effects, and thus allow the possibility of 
increased inequality in the distribution of income. 
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APPENDIX 1 - THE F.E.S. SURVEY 
The Family Expenditure Survey is based on a representative 
sample of private households in the U.K. and has been in 
operation since 1957. The survey looks at household 
characteristics, income and expenditure at a national level and 
household characteristics, income and expenditure at a regional 
level. 
All types of private households in the U.K. are covered by 
the survey. In all years since 1967 a set sample of about 
11,000 addresses in the U.K. was selected. Of these about 
10,800 are in Great Britain and about 280 in Northern Ireland. 
Households at the selected addresses were visited in turn and 
asked to co-operate. Provided that all persons aged 16 and 
over in the household co-operated each was subsequently paid £5 
for the trouble involved in supplying the information. The 
sample is designed so that each household has an equal chance 
of selection, and also so that the interviews can be spread 
evenly over the year. The U.K. sample of 11,000 addresses 
contained some which were found to be those of hotels, boarding 
houses, institutions etc. (which were outside the scope of the 
survey) or which contained no households. On the other hand, 
some addresses contained more than one household. Allowing for 
such circumstances, an effective sample of households was 
obtained, equivalent to about 1 in 2000 of all households. In 
some of the households visited one or more members did not wish 
to participate in the survey or could not be contacted after 
repeated calls. The co-operating households represented 68% of 
the effective U.K. sample in 1984. 
Reliability 
Data produced from any sample survey as detailed and 
complex as the FES are inevitably subject to errors of various 
kinds. Very great care is taken in collecting information from 
households and comprehensive checks are applied during 
processing, so that errors in recording and processing are 
minimal. the main types of error that affect the reliability 
of the survey results are sampling errors, non-response bias 
and some mis-reporting of certain items of expenditure and 
income. In 1984 co-operation could not be obtained from some 
32% of the effective sample. Most of these were households 
that did not wish to take part; in only about 1.75% of the 
sample was the interviewer unable to contact anyone living at 
the selected address: the remaining 30% are refusals. 
There is evidence that the characteristics of these 
households differ from those who co-operate, and it is 
therefore possible that their patterns of expenditure and 
income also differ somewhat. Studies of the households 
responding in the 1971 and 1981 FES in relation to the figures 
from the census of population have found substantial response 
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variations. The 1981 comparison indicated that households 
without children, and those where the head was, or had been, 
self-employed produced lower response rates. Particularly 
marked was a fall in response with age, while response was 
lowest for multi-car households. Analyses made for the first 
time (in respect of 1981) showed that among male heads of 
households response rate rose directly with level of 
qualifications, but conversely declined in the case of female 
heads of households. There is some evidence from further study 
that response rates appear to be lower among households living 
in dwellings with higher rateable values; this is partly borne 
out by an analysis of tenure in both the 1971 and 1981 FES 
comparisons which indicate a lower response rate for the owner-
occupied. However, in general, comparisons of the results of 
surveys over successive years justifies confidence in their 
general reliability, and examination of the characteristics and 
expenditure and income patterns of various groups of households 
shows a high degree of internal consistency. 
It is thought that averages of household income recorded 
in the FES are on the low side, principally because certain 
forms of income, such as income from investment, occupational 
pensions, or self-employment may be under-estimated. 
Nevertheless, evidence for this is limited; for example, 
studies have shown that earnings data in the survey tend to be 
slightly deficient, though generally within a few percent of 
those indicated by other sources, such as the New Earnings 
Surveys, other earnings surveys by the Department and national 
income statistics. The main identified weaknesses in the 
survey were found to be an understatement of earnings by women 
in part-time employment, and an under-representation of the 
highest 1% of earners, which are relatively minor defects. 
The sample sizes for each year are: 
1973 7126 households 
1979 6777 households 
1984 7081 households 
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APPENDIX 2 - DEFINITIONS USED IN 1984. 
Household 
A household comprises one person living alone or a group 
of people living at the same address, having meals prepared 
together and with common housekeeping. Resident domestic 
servants are included. The members of a household are not 
necessarily related by blood or marriage. As the survey covers 
only private households people living in hostels, hotels, 
boarding houses or institutions are excluded. Households are 
not excluded if some, or all members are not British subjects, 
but no attempt is made to obtain records from households 
containing members of the diplomatic service of another 
country, or members of the United States armed forces. 
Head of Household 
The head of the household must be a member of the 
household. He/she is the person, or the husband of the person, 
who: 
a) owns the household accommodation, or 
b) is legally responsible for the rent of the 
accommodation, or 
c) has the household accommodation as an emolument or 
perquisite, or 
d) has the household accommodation by virtue of some 
relationship to the owner who is not a member of the 
household. 
When two members of different sex have equal claim, the 
male is taken as head of household. When two members of the 
same sex have equal claim, the elder is taken as head of 
household. In this analysis we do not know anything about the 
relative proportions of male and female heads when data is 
classified by ranges of gross weekly income. 
Members of Household 
In most cases the members of co-operating households are 
easily defined, in that they are the people who come under the 
definition of household who are present during the record 
keeping period. However, difficulties of definition arise 
where people are temporarily away from the household or else 
spend their time between two residences. The following rules 
apply in deciding whether or not such persons are members of 
the household: 
a) Married persons living and working away from home for any 
period are included as members, provided they consider the 
sampled address to be their main residence. 
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b) In general, other people (e.g. relatives, friends, 
boarders) who are either temporarily absent or who spend 
their time between the sampled address and another address 
are included as members if they consider the sampled 
address to be their main residence. 
c) However, there are exceptions which override the 
subjective main residence rule: 
(i) Children under 16 away at school are included as 
members. 
(ii) Older persons receiving education away from home, 
including children aged 16 and under 18, are excluded 
unless they are at home for all or most of the record 
keeping period. 
(iii) Visitors staying temporarily with the household and 
others who have been in the household for only a 
short time are treated as members, provided they will 
be staying with the household for at least one month 
from the start of record keeping. 
Adults 
Persons who have reached the age of 18 or who are married 
are classed as adults. 
Children 
Persons who are under 18 years of age and unmarried are 
classed as children. 
Persons working 
Persons working are persons aged 16 or more who fall 
within the following categories: 
(a) Employees at work: those who at the time of interview are 
gainfully employed full or part-time, and are attending 
work, or are absent on holiday only. Part-time work is 
defined as normally occupying 30 hours a week or less, 
including overtime regularly worked. 
(b) Employees temporarily away from work: those who at the 
time of interview had a job to go to but were absent from 
it for a reason other than holiday. 
(c) Employees not currently employed: those having no job at 
the time of interview, either through sickness, injury or 
other reason, but who have indicated that they intend to 
seek work or are seeking work. From 1982, persons are not 
included in this category if their last job was more than 
a year ago or if they have never worked. 
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(d) Self-employed: those who at interview stated that they 
were self-employed, including some persons who work 
minimal hours. However, from 1982 persons usually working 
3 0 hours per week and less and earning an average under a 
specified amount (£4.00 per week in 1984) are excluded. 
Persons not working 
(a) Retired: persons classed as retired are all those not 
working who have reached the age for receipt of national 
insurance retirement pension, i.e. 65 and over for men and 
60 and over for women, whether or not they previously 
worked for gain. 
(b) Unoccupied: persons, other than workers, who have not yet 
reached the age for receipt of national insurance 
retirement pensions are classified as unoccupied, whether 
or not they have worked for gain at any time e.g. 
housewives and people in full time education provided they 
are not working for financial remuneration. This category 
includes, from 1982, school leavers and other persons who 
have never worked, employees away from work (for whatever 
reason) for more than a year and certain self-employed 
persons such as mail order agents and babysitters not 
classified as workers. 
Occupation 
The occupational classification is based on, but not 
identical with, the Social Classes used in the Classification 
of Occupations, 1980 prepared by the Office of Population 
Censuses and Surveys. As far as possible occupation is 
classified according to an individual's current or most recent 
job; if he has more than one job the most remunerative one is 
regarded as the occupation by which he should be classified. 
Types of Administrative Area 
These are Greater London, Metropolitan Counties in England 
with the Central Clydeside Conurbation in Scotland, and non-
Metropolitan districts with high and low population densities, 
i.e. 3.2 persons or more, and less than 3.2 persons per acre 
respectively (7.9 persons per hectare). All Northern Ireland 
districts are treated as non-Metropolitan. 
Income 
The standard concept of income in the survey is, as far as 
possible, that of gross weekly cash income (but including 
imputed income from owner/rent-free occupancy) current at the 
time of interview, i.e. before the deduction of income tax 
actually paid, national insurance contributions and other 
deductions at source. However, for certain tables a concept of 
disposable income is used, defined as gross weekly cash (plus 
imputed) income less the statutory deductions of income tax 
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(taking refunds into account) and national insurance 
contributions. As a result of the introduction of Mortgage 
Interest at Source (MIRAS) in April 1983 for most owner 
occupiers still purchasing their homes, the amount of income 
tax recorded in the survey in 1984 will have been higher than 
under previous tax arrangements and recorded disposable income 
correspondingly lower: gross incomes were not affected by the 
change. The cash levels of certain items of income recorded in 
the survey by households receiving supplementary benefit will 
have been affected by the Housing Benefit scheme introduced in 
stages from November 1982. 
Although information about most types of income is 
obtained on a current basis some data, principally incomes from 
investment and seif-employment, are estimated over a twelve 
month period. The major exceptions to the general concept are 
the treatment of the earnings of employees during short periods 
of absence from work without pay; the inclusion of an amount 
to represent a notional addition to income for households which 
pay no rent; and the inclusion of imputed income from the 
owner-occupancy of housing. Each is described in greater 
detail in later paragraphs. 
The following are excluded from the assessment of income: 
(i) money received from one member of the household to 
another other than wages paid to resident domestic 
servants ; 
(ii) withdrawals of savings, receipts from maturing 
insurance policies, proceeds from sale of financial 
and other assets, winnings from betting, lump-sum 
gratuities and windfalls such as legacies; 
(iii) the value of educational grants and scholarships not 
paid in cash; 
(iv) the value of income in kind, including the value of 
goods received free and the abatement in cost of 
goods received at reduced prices, other than the 
imputed value of owner-occupied and of rent-free 
accommodation, of meal vouchers, and of bills paid by 
someone who is not a member of the household; 
(v) loans and money received in repayment of loans. 
Details are obtained of the income of each member of the 
household. The income of the household is taken to be the sum 
of the incomes of all its members. The information does not 
relate to a common or fixed time period. Items recorded for 
periods greater than a week are converted to a weekly value. 
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Particular points relating to some components of income 
are as follows: 
a) Wages and Salaries of Employees 
The gross normal wages or salaries of employees are taken 
to be their earnings. These are calculated by adding to normal 
'take-home' pay amounts deducted at source, such as income tax 
payments, national insurance contributions and other 
deductions, e.g. payments into firms social clubs, 
superannuation schemes, works' transport, benevolent funds, 
etc. Employees are asked to give the earnings actually 
received, including bonuses and commission, the last time 
payment was made and, if different, the amount usually 
received. It is the amount usually received that is regarded 
as the normal take-home pay. Additions are made so as to 
include in normal earnings the value of occasional payments, 
such as bonuses or commissions received quarterly or annually. 
If an employee has been away from work without pay for 13 weeks 
or less he is regarded as continuing to receive his normal 
earnings in preference to social security benefits such as 
unemployment or sickness benefit that he may be receiving. 
Otherwise, his normal earnings are disregarded and his current 
short-term social security benefits taken instead. Wages and 
salaries include any earnings from subsidiary employment as an 
employee. They also include earnings of H.M. Forces. 
b) Income from Sei f-Employment 
Income from seif-employment covers any person income from 
employment other than as an employee; for example as a sole 
trader, professional or other person working on his own account 
or in partnership, including subsidiary work on his own account 
by an employee. It is measured from estimates of income or 
trading profits, after deduction of business expenses but 
before deduction of tax, over the most recent twelve-month 
period for which figures can be given. Should a loss have been 
made no income would be recorded. The value of goods supplied 
from a household's own shop or farm is included in income by an 
allowance made by Inland revenue when the profits of the 
business are assessed for tax purposes. Persons earning only 
small amounts from occasional activities such as mail order 
agency, and with no other employment, have been classified as 
unoccupied rather than as self-employed and the earnings 
involved have been classified as earnings from 'other sources' 
rather than as self-employment incomes. 
c) Income from Investment 
Income from investments or from property, other than that 
in which the household is residing, is the amounts received 
during the twelve months immediately prior to the date of the 
initial interview. If income tax has been deducted at source 
the gross amount is estimated by applying a conversion factor 
during processing. 
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d) Social Security Benefits 
Income from social security benefits does not include the 
short-term payments such as unemployment or sickness benefit 
(including Statutory Sick Pay introduced in April 1983) 
received by an employee who has been away from work for 13 
weeks or less, and who is therefore regarded as continuing to 
receive his normal earnings. 
e) Income from Sub-letting Accommodation 
Since 1981 receipts from sub-letting part of the dwelling 
(net of the expenses of the sub-letting) have been counted as 
an addition to investment income. 
f) Imputed Income of Households which Pay No Rent 
For households living in rent free accommodation an 
imputed value is added to the income of the head of household 
to represent the gain through the absence of a charge for rent. 
As with owner-occupied housing the amount used is the weekly 
equivalent of the adjusted rateable value. 
g) Imputed Income from Owner-Occupancy 
An imputed value is added to the income of the head of the 
household living in an owner-occupied dwelling. Although no 
money passes between the owner and the occupier of a dwelling 
when they are the same person, the services of the dwelling do, 
nevertheless, have a value equivalent to the net income which 
could be obtained by letting the dwelling to a tenant. the 
amount used is the weekly equivalent of the adjusted rateable 
value. 
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HEADINGS USED FOR IDENTIFYING INCOME INFORMATION 
Source of Income 
l U U C K t t IN T A I I U 
Wajes jnJ salaries 
Self-em ploy m ent 
Investments 
C Investments (co-rwti/ed) 
Annuities and pensions, other than 
ioo.il security 
Social security benefits. 
Imputed income from owner/re«-free 
occupancy 
Other sources 
cat**o»*taTS$cr««.«rct.r inebri rtcn 
iNormal "lake-home" pay from main 
employment 
"Take-Home" pay from subsidiary 
employment 
Employees* income fas deduction 
Employees* Nattonal Insurance contri· 
button 
Su per annual ¡en contributions deducted 
from pay 
Other deductions 
Exrt_*-*rn*r i»nr*_s 
Income from business or profession, 
including subsidiary self-employment 
Interest on building society stura and 
deposits 
(merest on bank deposits and savings 
accounts including National Savings 
Bank 
Interest on British Savings Bonds 
Interest and dividends from stocks, shares, 
bonds, debentures and other securities 
Income frum trust or covenant 
Ren» or income from property, after deducing 
expenses allowed for income ta« (including 
rccapts from Idling or subletting pan 
of o-d residence (net of (he ei perues of 
[he Iettine, or ìub-letiing)). 
Other unearned income 
Annuities 
Pensions from central or local government 
services or from ihe armed Torces 
Other pensions 
Child benefit 
Family income supplement 
Unemployment benefit 
Sickness benefit 
Invalidity pension or allowance and 
ittendancc allowance 
Disablement or ***r disability pension or 
allo* ance 
Widow»" benefits 
Retirement or old age pension 
Suppfememary allowance or pension 
Any other benefit 
For o-ner-occupi cd and rent-free dwellings, 
the rateable value of the dwelling 
Married »oman's allowance from husband 
temporarily away from home 
Alimony or separation alio—anç«; allow-
ances for foster children. allowances from 
members of the armed forces or merchant 
navy, or any other money from friends or 
relatives, other than husbands outside the 
household 
Benefits from trade unions, friendly 
lodciies etc. other than pensions 
Value of meal vouchers 
Earnings from intermittent or casual work 
over t<*c!ve months.not included in a or b 
Money scholarships received by persons 
iged 16 and over 
Money Kholarshii** received by children 
under 16 
Other income of children under 16 
fi) In the calcularon of houtchoid income in 
this resort, where an employee has been 
awjy from work without ya^ for 13 » « » s 
or lesa his norm«! «age or salary has Sem 
used in estimating Nis tcnai income instead 
of social security benefits, such as 
unemployment or sickness benefit, lhat he 
may hav« received. Oiherw.ie such benefits 
are used in estimating loial income (see 
notes at reference r) 
Iii) Nor mal income from »»íes and salaries is 
estimated by adding to the normal "take-
home" pay deduciions matte at source last 
time paid, together with ihe »eekly value of 
occasional addi.'ions to «ages and salaries 
(seedefinition l!(a)) 
(¡ii) The components of wsges and saiarici for 
which figures are separately available 
amount in total in ihe normal earnings of 
employers, regardless of ihe operation of 
the U-week rulr in noie fi) abo*e. Thus the 
sum of the components listed here docs not 
in general equal the «ige* and salaries 
figure in tables ZI-Z3 and 31 of this tepori 
The earnings or profits of a trade or profes-
sion, after deduction of business eipensea 
but before deduciion of taa 
(i) The calculation of household income in 
this report takes account of the 13-»eek rule 
described at reference a. note (i) 
(it) The components of social security bene· 
Hts for which figures arc separately avail-
able amount in total to the benefits received 
in ihe week before interview. 
That Ls io say. they include amounts lhat «re 
discounted from ihe tola! by the operation 
of ihe 13-T-rk rule in note (i). Thus ine sum 
of the compon<ntt lilted here differs from 
the total of social security benefits used ia 
lhe income tables of this repon 
Rateable values are adjusted in proportion to 
increases since last valuation Ín an index of 
gross rents and housing subsidies (sec 
definitions 13(0 and (g)) 
eg from spare-lime jobs or income from trusts 
or investments 
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APPENDIX 3 
CHANGES IN DEFINITIONS USED 1973-1984 
Changes in Definitions used 1973-1979 
Following the reorganisation of local government types of 
administrative area were redefined. 
Adjustments to the rateable values used as the basis of 
imputed income of owner-occupiers and households living rent-
free were made in accordance with the movements of an index of 
gross rents and housing subsidies instead of changes in the 
rent component of the housing section of the General Index of 
Retail Prices. Also 1978 assessments of rateable values in 
Scotland were used in the calculation of imputed income and 
housing expenditure of owner-occupiers and those living rent-
free. 
Occupational categories changed between 1973 and 1979. 
The manual category of 1973 is broken down further in 1979 to 
give skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. This 
information is not available for 1973. 
Information on disposable income is only available for 
1979 and 1984 not 1973. 
In 1979 and 1984 a category "employee out of a job' was 
given as a subset of the employee category, this information is 
not available for 1973 and employees out of a job are counted 
as employees in this year. 
The categories of composition of household have been 
reduced considerably between 1973 and 1979. The options that 
are no longer available are: 2 adults with 4 children, 5 
children or 6 or more children - this is now given as 2 adults 
with 4 or more children, 3 adults with 2 children, 3 children, 
4 or more children - this is now given as 3 adults with 1 or 
more children, 4 adults with 0, 1 or 2 or more children, 5 
adults with 0 or 1 or more children - these are now given as 4 
or more adults or 4 or 5 adults with 1 or more children. The 
category others without children has been omitted completely. 
This is likely to lead to underestimation of the numbers of 
adults and children per household in 1979 and 1984 as these 
numbers were computed on the basis of each household having the 
minimum number allowed by the category in the absence of any 
more accurate information. 
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The 1979 and 1984 data can also be classified by chief 
economic supporter, rather than the head of the household. 
However, this option is not available for 1973 so head has been 
used throughout for comparability. 
The location categories in 1973 and 1979 and 1984 are as 
follows: 
1973 1979/1984 
Greater London Greater London 
Provincial Conurbations Metropolitan & Clydeside Conurbations 
Other Urban Non-Metropolitan: 
Rural High population density 
Low population density 
The 1973 Administrative areas use the definitions by the 
Registrars General for England and Wales, for Scotland and for 
Northern Ireland to classify local authority areas for the 
survey. 
In 1973 persons working are gainfully employed full-time 
or part-time as an employee or self-employed. If workers are 
unemployed or away from work because of sickness they continue 
to be categorised as workers provided the period away from work 
has not exceeded 5 years. The same applies in 1979 where 
"workers out of a job' were not included as workers if the last 
job was more than five years ago. In 1984 this definition was 
changed so that employees that had been away from work for over 
1 year were classified as unoccupied. 
Changes in definitions used 1979-1984 
There was a change in occupational coding of mail order 
agents from manual to clerical within the self-employed group. 
Receipts from letting or sub-letting were no longer 
deducted from housing costs and appeared (net of the expenses 
of the letting or sub-letting) as investment income. 
Persons working 
The following three groups of persons previously 
classified as workers are instead counted as unoccupied: 
a) those who have never worked e.g. school leavers 
without a job 
b) employees who have been away from work for over a 
year 
21) 
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c) persons such as mail order agents and baby sitters 
whose primary status is (part-time) self-employed but 
who earn on average less than a specified amount per 
week unless they usually work more than 30 hours per 
week. the earnings involved are classified as 
earnings from 'other sources' rather than as self-
employment income. 
Housing Benefit Scheme 
Under the Housing Benefit Scheme introduced in stages from 
November 1982, some cash transactions (related to housing, for 
example rent, rates and rebates) previously recorded in the 
survey by households receiving supplementary benefit were 
eliminated leading to identically reduced levels of both 
recorded income and expenditure. 
Mortgage Interest Relief at Source (MIRAS). 
The scheme for applying mortgage interest tax relief at 
source for many households purchasing their own homes was 
introduced in April 1983. Under the scheme, income tax 
payments reported in the FES by most households with mortgages 
under £30,000 no longer reflect their total tax liability 
because relief at the basic rate (30%) is deducted at source 
from their interest payment by their lending institution. 
Income tax payments are therefore higher, and disposable income 
correspondingly lower, than under previous arrangements; and 
the figures reported in the 1984 FES for mortgage payments, 
income tax and disposable income are not comparable with those 
in earlier surveys. It is estimated that 2343 households in 
the 1984 FES were affected by MIRAS, representing nearly 90% of 
owner-occupiers with a mortgage, or over 30% of all households. 
For households affected by MIRAS, in 1984 average reported 
income tax payments are estimated to be about £7 per week 
higher (and disposable income correspondingly lower) than under 
previous arrangements. For households with a mortgage, average 
reported income tax payments are estimated to be some £6 per 
week higher, while for all households the corresponding figure 
is around £2 per week, about 1.2% of reported average 
disposable income. 
The actual value of social security benefits for each 
income range is not given in 1984, instead the percentage that 
it makes up in gross income is given. Therefore, the 
calculation of 'gross income less social security benefits' is 
likely to be slightly less accurate in 1984 than in previous 
years. 
Averages of normal weekly disposable income classified by 
gross income range have been given in 1984. In 1979 the 
information was given in terms of ranges of weekly disposable 
income categorised by ranges of gross income, therefore, the 
midpoint of each range was assumed as the average. Thus the 
1984 data on disposable income by decile is likely to be 
slightly more accurate than that for 1979. 
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In 1979 the number of heads of households that are workers 
in the occupational classification was equivalent to the number 
of employees (including the employees out of a job) in the 
employment status classification. In 1984 this was no longer 
the case as the two numbers differed slightly for most income 
ranges. I assume this occurs because of the change in 
definition between the two years. However, it does not affect 
the results, as employment status is given as a percentage of 
all heads of household in the income range (therefore summing 
to 100) and occupational status is given as a percentage of all 
those classified as worker; employee (again summing to 100) as 
in the previous years. 
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APPENDIX 4 
AVERAGE INCOMES FOR VARIOUS TYPES OF HOUSEHOLD 
To facilitate comparisons between countries the average 
gross incomes for various types of household are given. These, 
in both current and real82 prices, are as follows: 
1973 1979 1984 
All households 
Employee headed 
Self-employed 
Socio-economic class of 
head: 
Professional & technical 
Administrative & 
managerial 
Teacher 
Clerical 
Manual: 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled 
Unskilled 
Pensioner households: 
Single person: 
all 
state pension 
other pension 
Two person: 
all 
state pension 
other pension 
Current Real m 
49.40 
58.25 
61.60 
72.78 
87.11 
71.40 
53.02 
51.70 
-
-
-
14.92 
-
-
28.41 
-
— 
m 
71.18 
83.92 
88.76 
104.87 
125.52 
102.88 
76.40 
74.50 
-
-
-
21.50 
-
-
40.94 
-
— 
Current Real Current m 
120.45 
149.96 
137.74 
177.05 
192.77 
171.26 
129.50 
142.96 
126.36 
108.69 
36.41 
27.70 
48.66 
65.57 
43.12 
82.16 
(£) 
72.65 
90.45 
83.08 
106.79 
116.27 
103.29 
78.11 
86.22 
76.21 
65.55 
21.96 
16.71 
29.35 
39.55 
26.01 
49.55 
(£) 
197.37 
259.03 
243.15 
323.88 
346.88 
313.27 
227.82 
236.41 
205.25 
170.79 
62.00 
40.26 
87.43 
120.62 
71.84 
150.00 
Real m 
75.62 
99.25 
93.16 
124.09 
132.90 
120.03 
87.29 
90.58 
78.64 
65.44 
23.75 
15.43 
33.50 
46.21 
27.52 
57.47 
8 2. Real prices are calculated by deflating by the 
General Index of Retail Prices given in Economic trends Annual 
Supplement 1985, for all items. The RPI has a base year of 
1975 and is:- 1973 
1975 
1979 
1984 
69. 
100. 
165. 
261. 
.4 
.0 
.8 
.0 
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